Winning Wars: political will is the key - Defence Secretary
(interview with Indian Defence Review)
 "President Mahinda Rajapaksa took several brave
decisions. In the final analysis, it was the cumulative effect of those
decisive, brave decisions that enabled Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) to
liquidate the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)"
- Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Defence Secretary, Sri Lanka -
Sri Lanka's Master Strategist, Gotabaya Rajapaksa,
reveals to the Indian Defence Review the key decisions of the Government
of Sri Lanka (GoSL) that led to the successful completion of SLAF's
combat operations against the LTTE.
The Intangibles
 Mr.Gotabaya
said: "Usually in a military operation the world outside the conflict
theatre, domestic and international, see only soldiers fighting. They
see tanks, guns, armoured vehicles, artillery weapons and men and women
in battle fatigues. What is not visible to the people, to the outside
world, is the strategy. What is also not visible immediately and also
not recalled at that moment in time is the history that led to the
current context of military operations. What was that context? Eight
previous governments led by four different Presidents had failed to end
the war. They had failed to rein in the LTTE. It is not as if those
eight governments and four Presidents did not have under their command
good military leaders and soldiers. In fact, when President Rajapaksa's
government assumed charge in 2005, around 26,000 SLAF soldiers had
already sacrificed their lives."
The Calculus of Political Will
Political will is the supreme commander. That is, in
effect, what Gotabaya emphasizes. In fact, he points to the successful
Operation Liberation or Vadamarachchi Operation from May to June 1987
and Operation Riviresa from October to December 1995 to suggest that
there was no deficiency in the SLAF. The Vadamarachchi Operation led to
the recapture the Vadamarachchi region in Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE
control. This was SLAF's first conventional combat engagement in Sri
Lankan soil after the British colonial rule. During Operation Riviresa
(Operation Sun Rays) the SLAF launched a successful assault to wrest
control of Jaffna and rest of the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE. Using
these past examples, Gotabaya, explains that if at all there was any
deficiency then it was on account of inadequate, lax and effete
political will.
Mr Gotabaya added: "When President Rajapaksa assumed
office in 2005 we studied all previous war operations: Eelam War I
(1976-1987); Vadamarachchi Operation; IPKF intervention; Eelam War II
(1990-1995); Operation Sea Breeze; Operation Thrividha Balaya; Operation
Balavegaya I, II; Eelam War III (1995-2002); Operation Riviresa;
Operation Jayasikurui; Operation Rivibala; Operation Ranagosa; Operation
Rivikirana; and Operation Kinihira I, II, III/IV, V/VI, VII, VIII, IX.
"The objective of our study was to arrive at
conclusive reasons for our previous failures to comprehensively finish
the war against the LTTE in the last 30 years. All four previous
Presidents had resorted to military means and yet had failed. So a
political decision was made by President Rajapaksa to comprehensively
study all previous war operations and arrive at a solution for every
factor of failure or inability to win to the war. For every factor we
found a solution," said Mr Gotabaya.
Numbers Make A Difference
"We found that there was really no 'failure factor'
attached to the military. In fact, we realized a simple fact in 2005,
that if we launched war operations against the LTTE then we would have
to fight with the same military that had fought the LTTE in the last 30
years. We were confident of winning with the same military and its
Special Forces and commandos. They were already there! Yet, what
explained the inability of the previous governments led by four
different Presidents to utilize the country's military strength
effectively? We came to the conclusion that the solution was to increase
the force strength. The key factor of SLAF's previous inability to
finish the war was inadequate numbers. We realized the expansion of
military would have a definitive impact on LTTE." Gotabaya revealed to
IDR that, therefore, the second decisive political decision was to
expand the SLAF.
Also Read The Subverted
Indo-Bangladesh Border
Holding the Ground is Critical to Military Success
 President
Rajapaksa and his advisors detailed and nuanced study of previous war
operations was marked by two defining characteristics. One was attention
to detail and the second was their ability to quickly arrive at a
clutter-free decision. The third important political decision was a
natural corollary of the imperative to expand the SLAF. "We realized
that all previous operations had failed to hold the ground in the
immediate aftermath of battlefield success. President Rajapaksa,
therefore, made a political commitment to ensure that his government
will find the resources to expand the SLAF to ensure that there were
enough armed forces personnel available to hold the ground."
Multiple Front Operations
Gotabaya says the decision to increase numbers
actually enabled the SLAF to address two previous 'failure factors'. The
first has already been discussed. The second was the previous inability
of the SLAF to conduct war operations on a broad front and operate
simultaneously across multiple frontlines. "When we cleared the Eastern
Province, the LTTE said they were not defeated and that its forces had
merely staged a tactical withdrawal. The LTTE was confident that the
SLAF will not have the troop strength to hold the ground in the Eastern
Province. Like all earlier occasions the LTTE believed that if it opened
sporadic operations along the Northern Frontlines then the SLAF will be
forced to redeploy enabling LTTE to regain ground in the East. Several
opposition party leaders, too, openly declared that the military
operations in the East will not be sustainable. We lulled everyone into
believing that the previous status quo will prevail - that the SLAF will
fight and win, then the LTTE will open a new front, and the SLAF will
redeploy and fail to hold ground and consolidate in the areas where they
had attained victory - this would enable LTTE to regain control over
lost areas. Little did the LTTE know that we had prepared a new war
doctrine! That we were indeed prepared to fight war on a broad front,
along multiple frontlines." The fourth political calculus of a military
victory was President Rajapaksa's decision to back the formulation of
the SLAF's new war doctrine.
Re-invent the Role of the Navy and the Air Force
Gotabaya says that smaller countries with smaller
armies must re-invent the role of the Navy and the Air Force. "We had
taken the decision to increase the numbers, but we knew it couldn't
happen overnight. So we decided to re-invent the role of the Navy and
the Air Force by taking them out of their classical roles and deploying
them in ground roles as well. We trained them for ground roles. So,
overnight our strength to hold the ground increased. We used the Special
Task Force for the same purpose. (The Special Task Force is the
Para-Military arm of the Sri Lanka Police, deployed essentially for
counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency operations within the country.
They are also deployed for close protection Units, providing security
for VIP's and key installations). We also used the Sri Lanka Police
Units to buffer the strength of our combined forces deployed to hold the
ground."
"We also raised a new 42,000 strong para-military
unit, the Civil Defence Force. We recruited able bodied men from
villages threatened by the LTTE, trained them, provided these recruits
with automatic weapons. Their task was to defend their villages from
LTTE counter-attacks. In fact, within two weeks in the last month of the
war (May 2009) in the summer of 2009 we inducted 5,000 Civil Defence
Force members into the Army."
This was the fifth critical political decision that
influenced the course of Eelam IV and put the SLAF on a clear trajectory
of military success. This decision enabled the SLAF to single-mindedly
focus on the war in the northern jungles against the LTTE. "We were able
to operate on a broad front. We had the tactical freedom and
maneuverability to surround the LTTE from multiple directions. The
re-invention of the roles of the Navy, Air Force and Police Units gave
us the breathing space to induct and train the new SLAF recruits. With
combined forces holding ground in the East and with the SLAF dedicating
itself to operations along multiple Northern Frontlines, we not only
mounted pressure on the LTTE, but also ensured that we could secure
time-bound expansion of the SLAF. We were forming new battalions, new
task forces by adding 5,000 troops every month. We tripled the strength
of the Army from 100,000 to 300,000 in three years. In fact, in the
1980s the strength of the military (Army, Navy and Air Force) was
30,000. In 2005 when President Rajapaksa assumed charge the strength was
125,000. Between 2005 and 2009 the figure swelled to 450,000 out of
which 300,000 is the strength of the Army. This increase in numbers
enabled us to quickly replace those injured in the battlefield. It
helped us to ensure adequate rest and rehabilitation for our troops. It
helped us to mount military pressure on the LTTE."
The Supreme Commander of the Military does not Wear Battle Fatigues,
He Displays Political Will
Finally, the battlefield commander fights to win the
battle. But it's the political will that determines success or failure
in war. If the battlefield commander is let down by lack of political
will or consensus, victory is impossible to achieve. "These decisions
were taken by the Supreme Commander, the President of Sri Lanka and not
by the Army Chief or Battlefield Commanders. It is the Head of State who
can decide the course and trajectory of war operations," says Gotabaya.
"All the four previous Presidents could not take bold decisions. They
were indecisive and were afraid that bold decisions might negatively
impact our small economy. They were afraid that our country's economy
could not sustain such a large expansion of the SLAF. In fact, the
previous Presidents and political leaders were genuinely apprehensive of
a rapid military expansion and its possible impact on the polity." "I
remember distinctly the Security Council meeting in Colombo in 2005. I
told the President that we must expand the Army by 50,000 as soon as
possible. This was mandatory to win the war. The President immediately
issued a directive that if that was required to finish the war for once
and all times to come we must make the necessary allocation right away.
It is this on the spot, tough decision-making that finally led us to
victory."
Gotabaya says that he along with SLAF top brass 'read'
and analysed the war operations every hour, every day. "I could
understand and gauge the need and requirements. Any military commander
will ask for everything, every possible weapon, every possible
inventory. My job was to understand the priorities, rationally organize
those priorities in terms of what was really required for victory and
flush out needs and requirements that had zero relevance to our
objectives. "When you go home, tell them of us that we gave our today,
for their tomorrow" is the political mantra that fires the military
imagination.
"President Rajapaksa was determined to single-handedly
absorb the pressure of deaths and causalities," says Gotabaya. This
seventh political decision made all difference for the SLAF. "In three
and half years nearly 6,000 soldiers were killed. You can imagine the
political pressure on the President when body-bags come home from the
battlefield. The President was determined to absorb the political
pressure generated by battlefield casualties. He committed his
Presidency and his government to achieving the objective of winning the
war. He demonstrated his courage to continue the war till the military
objectives were completely attained. This is what made him different
from all previous Presidents. After all, the President is responsible to
the people and the fact is that he needs the support of the people to be
elected back to power. He knew that he was risking his political career
because any other President in his place would have succumbed to the
enormous political pressure created by mounting casualties in war
operations."
Also Read Interview with
Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Defence Secretary, Sri Lanka
"The Muhamalai debacle of April 23, 2008 in which 120
soldiers were killed by the LTTE in just one day could have shaken up
any other President. In fact, in this case the LTTE took away the dead
bodies of the soldiers. Any other President would have doubted. But
President Rajapaksa did not waver from the objective his government had
set at the very outset. The war must be won. Not for a single moment in
the three and half years of the war did he unplug himself from taking
stock of the war operations. Every Wednesday he attended Security
Council meetings from morning till evening. He followed every
operational development closely. He was, therefore, able to take correct
and timely decisions. He knew we were on the correct track."
The India Factor
"President Rajapaksa clearly outlined the India Factor
at the very outset as a key strategic factor that could either influence
victory or bring defeat," says Gotabaya. "The President realized that
keeping India aligned with us was important. Our study of previous war
operations led us to examine in detail the reasons why we could not
sustain the successful Vadamarachchi Operations of 1987." Brigadier
Denzil Kobbekaduwa and Colonel Vijaya Wimalaratne, two SLAF war heroes
in the annals of Sri Lanka's military history had assured the then
President, Junius Richard Jayewardene and the then minister of National
Security Lalith Athulathmudali that the LTTE will be militarily
defeated. But the Government of India intervened through Operation
Poomalia, which involved the Indian Air Force air dropping food packets
over Jaffna on June 4, 1987. Jayawardene buckled under Indian pressure
which led to the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Accord and the entry of
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the island nation.
"President Rajapaksa decided that he would consciously
go out of his way to keep New Delhi aligned to Colombo's military
objectives in its battle with the LTTE. He did not want a repeat of
Operation Vadamarachchi. During the course of the three and half years
of war between 2005 and 2009, there were several instances where India
could have forced us to stop the operations. We did not allow such a
situation to arise because we kept New Delhi briefed properly. We
realized that the UPA government headed by Dr Manmohan Singh was a
coalition government and so the Congress Party was sensitive to the
concerns of its coalition partner, primarily the DMK. We realized the
sensitivity of the issue with regard to civilian causalities in Tamil
Nadu. So President Rajapaksa ensured that he briefed the Indian
leadership. We also ensured that our line communications were open at
all times. From our side Basil Rajapaksa (Senior Advisor to the
President and Member of Parliament), Lalith Weeratunga (Permanent
Secretary to the President) and myself interacted extensively with MK
Narayanan (former National Security Advisor, India and now Governor of
West Bengal), Shiv Shankar Menon (former Foreign Secretary, India and
now National Security Advisor) and Vijay Singh (former Defence Secretary
and now Member, Union Public Service Commission). Between the six of us
we had continuous dialogues. Whenever there was a sensitive issue, we
met and discussed and resolved it. This helped the SLAF to continue its
military operations absolutely unhindered."
"A day before the Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam (DMK)
supremo and Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi went on a fast on
April 27, 2009 at the Anna Memorial in Chennai protesting against the
SLAF offensive against the LTTE, Menon called me on my cell phone at
4.30 pm. The Indian team wanted to visit Colombo for urgent talks. I
went straight to the President's office and got his sanction and called
Menon back within five minutes. Within six hours of Karunanidhi going on
fast we could defuse the crisis in Tamil Nadu by issuing a statement
announcing the end of combat operations and shelling inside the 'No Fire
Zone', which led to the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister ending his fast. This
was a classic example of quiet, corrective diplomacy between two
officially designated government teams."
"The manner in which President Rajapaksa tackled India
was a key factor of our military success. We knew that only India
influences us militarily. India is a huge power in our neighbourhood and
our proximity to Tamil Nadu with 60 million Tamils sensitive to what's
going on in Sri Lanka made the situation extremely complex for us. We
knew that while other countries could or would resort to economic
sanctions, only India had the power to militarily influence the course
of our war operations. So it is to the credit of President Rajapaksa
that he was successful in keeping New Delhi aligned with Colombo's
military objectives."
Military Victory is Dependent on Public Goodwill
Gotabaya says the ninth decisive political decision
was to ensure sustenance of the war operations tempo by forging public
goodwill. "The President repeatedly emphasized in almost all national
security council meetings that sustaining a war campaign over a long
period of time will require public support. He directed his government
officers and ministers to ensure public support for the war campaign.
Public support was also critical to ensuring that we succeeded in
getting new recruits for the SLAF. 'Let's not use war as an excuse for
failing to provide good governance and undertaking development
activities'. That was his clear one line directive. Therefore, even as
the war campaign continued in the North, the government embarked on mega
development projects in other parts of the country. The government also
became one of the biggest employers in the country by recruiting for
various public sector enterprises. In the course of the three and half
years of the war, the President also effected a pay hike for public
sector and government employees. He managed the economy in such a manner
that he did not allow the public support for the war campaign to
diminish."
Political Stability is Vital for Military Focus
The final political decision was an internal political
choice that President Rajapaksa made. In 2005 when he took over as
President he was entrusted with the responsibility of stitching together
a coalition alliance to ensure political stability. This factor led to
his decision to create a jumbo cabinet. He increased the cabinet, the
biggest in Sri Lanka's history, by providing positions to leaders from
all political parties in the coalition alliance. "His only condition was
that he wanted a stable government till the end of the war," says
Gotabaya.
Courtesy : Indian Defence Review
| 
