Full text of the
speech made by Secretary Defence Mr. Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the inaugural
session of the Galle Dialogue Maritime Conference as follows.
`Your Excellencies, Heads of Missions based in Colombo
Secretary to the President
Secretaries to Other Ministries
Chief of Defence Staff
Service Commanders
Admiral Arun Prakash, former Chief of Staff, Indian
Navy
Prof. James Clad
Invited Speakers
Ladies and Gentlemen
I am glad to have this opportunity to address you at
the Inaugural Session of the Galle Dialogue Maritime Conference, which
is being organized by the Ministry of Defence of Sri Lanka. This
Conference takes place at an opportune time, one year after the defeat
of the LTTE, one of the world's worst terrorist groups, by the Sri Lanka
Defence Forces.
The importance of this achievement cannot be
overstated. It has not only created the space for an economic resurgence
within Sri Lanka, but has also strengthened security and stability in
the region as a whole. Furthermore, this military defeat of terrorism is
an unprecedented event. There are many lessons that other countries can
draw from the Sri Lankan experience. One of the reasons behind the
organizing of this Conference is to provide a forum for this exchange of
information to take place.
The LTTE, which caused enormous suffering in this
country for three decades, was no ordinary terrorist group. It had a
well-organized international network that provided both funding and
logistical support to its domestic outfit. It also had a network of
operatives within Sri Lanka that had infiltrated every part of the
country. It had a ruthless ground force, a fledgling air force, and a
sophisticated naval wing. At its height, the LTTE not only controlled a
large area of land but, crucially, up to two thirds of Sri Lanka's
coastline.
The LTTE's naval power and its control over so much of
the coastline was a grave threat to this country. Their ability to
attack our naval vessels, as well as attack targets on the mainland
using the sea, was a significant security challenge. The arms,
ammunition and equipment that it procured and smuggled in through
international waters posed an even greater problem. Over the years, as
depicted here,
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Artillery weapons: 152 mm |
Artillery weapons: 122 mm |
MBRL - 107mm |
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Mortars - 120mm and 140mm |
Anti tank weapons - SPG-9, ATGMs |
Shoulder fired
Anti Tank Weapons |
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Anti aircraft systems - 20mm, 23mm, 30mm, 37mm |
LTTE Aircraft - Type Zlin 143L |
Missiles - SA-7, SA-14 |
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LTTE Aircraft - Shot Down |
Torpedo |
Torpedo Launcher |
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Underwater Scooters
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Underwater Diving Gear - Re-Breather Kits |
Communication Equipment - Satellite
Communications System
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the LTTE managed to bring in thousands of items of
heavy weaponry, including heavy artillery, mortars, multi barrel rocket
launchers, and anti aircraft systems. They also managed to smuggle in
sophisticated equipment, including aircraft, communication systems,
missiles and torpedoes with which they greatly enhanced their offensive
capabilities.
The mechanism through which these items were brought
to Sri Lanka is worth elaborating. As mentioned earlier, the LTTE had a
large network of activists around the world that raised funds to support
their separatist ambitions. By engaging in various criminal activities,
including extortion, smuggling, and various kinds of fraud, as well as
by tapping sympathizers in the Diaspora, this network generated a
constant flow of funds. These funds were used to procure arms,
ammunition and equipment from various sources. These items were stored
at large warehouses in strategic locations abroad, and when needed were
transported to Sri Lanka through international waters.
The ships that the LTTE used were often purchased
under false pretences at international auctions. The ships travelled
under different guises, hoisting flags of various countries and changing
their names from port to port. Instead of travelling to Sri Lanka, where
detection could lead to an attack and the destruction of their cargo,
these ships became virtual floating warehouses that lay thousands of
miles away in international waters. Smaller vessels, such as trawlers,
were then used to transport the weaponry in batches to terrorist bases
on the coastline. Even during this phase of the operation, the boats
were usually disguised as fishing vessels, and the weaponry was hidden
within false hulls.
Through this financial and logistical chain, the LTTE
obtained various sophisticated equipment, all sorts of heavy weaponry
and enormous quantities of ammunition with which it engaged our Defence
Forces over the years. It is pertinent as well as disturbing to note
that much of this activity took place in a post 9-11 world, despite
increased global awareness and sensitivity about the dangers posed by
international terrorism. The LTTE's financial network operated with
varying levels of impunity in many countries. The weapons they procured
quite often came from unscrupulous sources within respectable nations.
Finally, their cargo ships travelled mostly unimpeded through
international waters.
Over the years, through the obtaining of intelligence
about these floating warehouses, the Sri Lanka Navy was able to engage
and destroy ten vessels, often by going over a thousand miles into the
deep sea. The destruction of these ships, as depicted here, was a
key factor in crippling the LTTE's ability to sustain itself.
Destruction
of the LTTE's floating warehouses
In this context, alongside the crucial blows it dealt
to the LTTE's naval outfit-known as the Sea Tigers-the Sri Lanka Navy
was instrumental in reducing the efficiency of the LTTE's ground
operation. The contribution made to the defeat of the LTTE through this
dismantling of its armaments supply chain cannot be overstated. In
addition, through its destruction of the LTTE's naval capability, the
Sri Lanka Navy justly deserves commendation for clearing the Indian
Ocean of overt maritime terrorist activity.
At the same time, we must realize that although the
LTTE has been militarily defeated in Sri Lanka, its international
network remains largely intact. In May this year, a vessel named the MV
SUN SEA was reported to be off Thailand waters. The MV SUN SEA is a
general cargo ship believed to be carrying more than 200 immigrants
including a considerable number of LTTE cadres, and is heading towards
Canadian waters. This voyage is part of the LTTE activists human
smuggling operation that began after the military defeat of the LTTE in
Sri Lanka.
Charging anything between US$15,000 to US$40,000 per
immigrant, this human smuggling operation poses a significant threat,
because it allows trained terrorist cadres to enter other nations while
disguised as civilians or refugees. It should be noted that these
operations benefits from a lax legal framework that prevents the
detention of such vessels while in international waters.
It is vitally important that all maritime nations
realize the threats they face from the sea. Transnational crimes,
whether human smuggling, piracy, drug trafficking, terrorism or the
smuggling of supplies for terrorism, have space to take place because of
the lack of adequate domination of the sea. The increasing number of sea
going vessels and their growing diversity makes the identification of
potential threats very difficult. It still not that difficult for small
vessels to slip through coastal defences and even allow trained
terrorists, like the Mumbai bombers, to slip into countries and wreak
havoc. Threats also exist to Sea Lanes of Communications, such as those
that cross this region. Given the vast quantities of cargo that cross
these Sea Lanes on a daily basis, they are vital to international trade
and energy security. A threat to them is a threat to peace. Countries
must realize that with the increasing sophistication displayed by
non-state actors in this era, the first line of defence is shifting
beyond the shore.
In this regard, the message that I want to stress most
clearly at this forum is the urgent need for greater international
cooperation in terms of maritime security. As the Sri Lankan experience
demonstrates, a terrorist organization was able to procure and transport
sophisticated equipment, heavy weaponry, and vast quantities of
ammunition over international waters for many years without much
difficulty. Even to this day, the same network engages in the dangerous
game of human smuggling.
There are legal difficulties relating to the ability
of a country to intervene with regard to such threats in international
waters. It must be said that despite the existence of various treaties,
there was insufficient commitment at a multilateral and bilateral level
to combat the LTTE's transnational operations. It is this lack of
effective intervention arising from an outmoded legal framework and
inadequate multilateral commitment to combating transnational crimes
that needs to be addressed if we are to successfully face future
challenges to maritime security.
Robust ties need to be established between the
maritime powers in the region not just at the diplomatic level but even
more importantly at the operational level. Ineffective treaties
extolling cooperation and token joint naval exercises are no longer
enough. There has to be a deep-rooted commitment to cooperation amongst
these powers. Proper intelligence sharing and timely communication
between the Navies is essential. If a suspicious vessel is sighted, the
relevant authorities in other nations should be contacted to determine
its provenance. If, once challenged, the vessel cannot give a valid
answer as to its business, the relevant Navies should be alerted and
proper steps taken to ensure that any potential threats are nullified in
time.
This level of international cooperation will only be
achieved once we all realize that no matter how powerful we are
individually, so long as we act in isolation, we will be ineffective
against threats arising from the transnational operations of non-state
actors. While the further strengthening of diplomatic ties remains
essential in achieving this understanding, it is our sincere hope that
your Dialogue at Conferences such as this one will encourage further
cooperation at an operational level. If we act together to oppose the
shared threats we face, we will be able to stand firm and uphold our
security. If we do not cooperate with one another, and are forced to
continue to act in isolation, we will all be at risk.
In conclusion, I would like to wish all the delegates
present here an informative, productive and enjoyable few days in Sri
Lanka. I am sure that a lot of hard work has gone into the preparation
of Papers by our distinguished presenters, and I am aware that the
organizers have gone to great lengths to ensure that the Conference is a
success. Special mention should be made of the assistance provided by
the Near East South Asia (NESA) Centre of the United States, which
assisted in numerous ways. The Conference has been named the "Galle
Dialogue". It is my sincere hope that the dialogue it prompts both
formally and informally amongst the participants over these two days
will promote greater and more effective cooperation in the region as a
whole. |