ESPIONAGE

Past, Present, Future?

Edited by
WESLEY K. WARK



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Espionage:
Past, Present, Future?

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Notes on Contributors

Christopher Andrew is Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at the University of Cambridge. His books include *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (1985), *Intelligence and International Relations, 1900–1945* (with Jeremy Noakes, 1987), and, with Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (1990), *Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985* (1991) and *More Instructions from the Centre* (1992).

Donald Avery is an Associate Professor of History at the University of Western Ontario. His work includes *'Dangerous Foreigners': European and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1900–32* (1979) and *The Science of War: Canadian Scientists and Military Technology during the Second World War* (forthcoming, 1994).

James Der Derian teaches in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He is the author of *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (1987) and *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War* (1992).

Michael G. Fry is Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California. His books include *Lloyd George and Foreign Policy, Volume One: The Education of a Statesman, 1890–1916* (1977), *History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians* (1991) and, as editor, *Power, Personalities and Policies: Essays in Honour of Donald Cameron Watt* (1992).

Oleg Gordievsky was employed by the KGB from 1962 to 1985, when he defected to the West, having been working for British Intelligence since 1974. He has since, with Christopher Andrew, produced three books on the KGB.

Larry Hannant teaches in the Department of History at the University of Victoria, British Columbia.

Miles Hochstein is a PhD candidate in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. His dissertation is on Genocide.

Gregory S. Kealey is University Research Professor at the Memorial University of Newfoundland. He is the author of *Toronto Workers Respond to Industrial Capitalism* (1980), *Dreaming of What Might Be: The Knights of Labor in Ontario* (1982) and the forthcoming collection of essays, *Workers and Canadian History*. With Reg Whitaker he co-edits *RCMP Security Bulletins*.

Timothy J. Naftali, who received his PhD from Harvard, is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Hawaii. His dissertation, a study of American counter-espionage in the Second World War, is due to be published in 1994.

Wesley K. Wark is Associate Professor of History at the University of Toronto and assistant editor of *Intelligence and National Security*. His publications include *The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939* (1985), *Spy Fiction, Spy Films and Real Intelligence* (editor, 1990) and *Security and Intelligence in a Changing World: New Perspectives for the 1990s* (co-editor, 1991).

Introduction: The Study of Espionage: Past, Present, Future?

WESLEY K. WARK

The essays collected together in this volume were, for the most part, first produced for a conference held at the University of Toronto in November 1991. This provenance has some unusual features. One was that the History Department of the University of Toronto was celebrating its centennial and had decided to sponsor, as one of its main anniversary events, a conference on the history of intelligence. One hundred years ago, intelligence was hardly a subject for polite discourse in the academy. Indeed modern intelligence services were just on the point of being born, as European and imperial tensions of the late nineteenth century and the fast pace of technological change, especially in the field of armaments, led to unprecedented attention being given, in peacetime, to the uses of systematic information-gathering by government departments.[1] These subversive pressures, in turn, ignited a spark of public fascination and fear about the clandestine world of espionage which would help generate pressure for measures of protection (counter-espionage) and offence (foreign espionage) and, not least, launch the genre of spy fiction on its glorious and lucrative popular culture career.[2] But it was to be many more years before the serious study of intelligence caught up with these developments in the conduct of international relations. Not until a fortuitous combination of events occurred in the mid-1970s was the academic study of intelligence truly born.

These events included, in Britain, the eventual leakage of the 'Ultra Secret', with its revelations about Allied codebreaking successes during the Second World War and, in the US, widespread fears about the exercise of secret power by the Central Intelligence Agency, stimulated by investigative journalism and Congressional inquiries, all brewed within the atmosphere of withdrawal from Vietnam and the Watergate presidential débâcle.[3] These events provided scholars in the Western world, at least, with hitherto absent incentives and reasons to study intelligence: access to archives and historical data previously shrouded in secrecy; intimations of the significance of the power and performance of intelligence services; the loosening of constraints inherited from the national security atmosphere of the earlier days of the Cold War; political agendas; contemporary relevance; and, not least, a market-place for their ideas. Professional associations devoted to the study of intelligence blossomed; scholarly journals appeared; essay collections began to disseminate research findings; monographs were published by University presses; courses began to be taught in a wide range of institutions in the Western world.[4] The intelligence revolution, which had been manifesting itself throughout the course of the twentieth century, finally found an echo in a scholarly revolution in the last quarter of the century. The energy and speed with which this revolution in the study of intelligence has proceeded has since been impressive, belying its slow start.

One way to measure both the nature of this revolution and to answer the question of how it all matters is to look at the varieties of the study of intelligence that have emerged. It is possible to identify a wide range of intelligence 'projects' that have come to the fore in the past 15 years, each with its community of scholars and with its own research agenda and focal issues. These projects are all loosely related, and frequently overlap. At least eight can be identified.

One I would call the 'research project'. Effort here is devoted to the unearthing, sometimes publishing, of the vital raw material for intelligence studies – primary source documentation.[5] Without such material, intelligence studies remain speculative, prone to conspiracy theories and trashy conjecture, and of uncertain significance. This project has been made possible in recent years by a combination of increased access to relevant archival collections, by more liberal legisation bearing on research in a variety of countries, by sheer investigative fervour, and by the new technologies of reproduction, which make the mass circulation of archival collections (albeit at a price) feasible. The proliferation of microfiche, microfilm, CD-ROM, and computer databases suggest that we are at the dawn of a new era of global access to research materials, including those related to the study of intelligence services. It is one of the many features of the 'research project' that a student at the University of Toronto can, for example, research what was once the most holy of holies, the 'Ultra Secret', by spooling one of 300-plus reels of microfilm onto a machine on the third floor of the Robarts Library. No security clearance is necessary, only a library card. The future, in the technological and archival dimensions, of the research project seems secure. In fact, the range of archival materials open to interested researchers is bound to increase exponentially with the end of the Cold War and the spread of archivally based research beyond the geographic confines of selected Western states. It may be some years before the Univerity of Toronto student can wind her/his reel of KGB documents onto a future version of a microfilm reader, but that time is sure to come.

This is not to say that future researchers will ever possess a complete archive of intelligence service data. There will always be major gaps in the documentation for the study of intelligence owing to accidental and deliberate destruction, continuing censorship, and the bureaucratic maze through which intelligence reports flow in government, which can make the intelligence paper trail exceedingly difficult to follow. Some societies will continue to be more secretive and protective than others. In any case, documentation, especially in the clandestine world of intelligence, will never tell the whole story.[6] But two positive things can be said. One is that, as Donald Cameron Watt has reminded us, historians of intelligence are relatively better off than many of their brethren studying such periods as classical and medieval history.[7] The other point worth making is that students of intelligence might be relatively blessed in their release from the conditions of massive archival overload that is a feature of research into other dimensions of the post-1945 international system.[8]

The second enterprise of note is the 'historical project'. This is linked intimately with the pattern of archival openings, and also with the issues that dominated at the outset of the scholarly revolution – notably revelations about intelligence during the Second World War and about the CIA. The historical project has produced a substantial body of work focused on the episodic treatment of intelligence in peace and war, with a chronological concentration on the period from the 1930s to the early Cold War, and a geographical focus on studies of the Western intelligence services, notably those of Britain, Canada and the United States. Such studies have not always fundamentally altered our understanding of the past, as was suggested they might in the first days of the recovery of the 'Ultra Secret', but their contribution has been notable all the same. The case-study approach, implicit in this project, underpins the provocative definition of intelligence as the 'missing dimension' of international relations, but also has an integrative function. As such case-studies proceed, and their revisionist potential is tested, they will help establish as a fundamental norm the need to consider the role of intelligence assessments in the conduct of external policy.

Several formulae have already emerged to guide these studies. One is that intelligence assessments, broadly conceived, provide a unique insight into both the prevailing spoken and unspoken assumptions of government agencies tasked with the making of foreign policy and military decisions.[9] A study of intelligence assessments, in other words, is a study of government (mis)perception and psychology as decision-makers seek to measure the power and intentions of the 'other', competitive entities in the international system. This formula bypasses one popular misconception about the role of intelligence studies: namely that it is always necessary to provide evidence of a direct link between intelligence and policy outcomes. Such direct links are sometimes difficult to pinpoint, without the risk of conceptual simplification. Instead, one can argue that a study of the intelligence process illuminates the atmosphere and mentalities surrounding decision-making, crucial elements about which other sorts of documents are often silent. A second formula has been advocated in convincing fashion by Michael Handel; this highlights the overt and hidden political pressures that shape intelligence assessments.[10] Ernest May has argued persuasively that government structures of decision-making, more than any other factor, decided the impact of intelligence assessement on the eve of the two world wars.[11] Christopher Andrew has led the way in establishing an outline of the long historical cycles that determined the growth of intelligence communities and defined their performance capabilities.[12]

The expansion of the historical project, with its focus on case studies, has also produced the foundation for some excellent general surveys of the history of intelligence, usually focused on individual national intelligence communities.[13] This activity will surely increase in future. What is immediately needed are more comparative case studies, and surveys that range more broadly beyond the confines of one, usually Western, nation state and indeed beyond the confines of the major powers.[14] The comparative context should reveal more about the degree of universality of the twentieth-century intelligence revolution. It should also highlight the ways in which different political and cultural systems have adapted intelligence services to their needs, and their relative success in doing so.[15] One intriguing clue to the significance of such an approach concerns the finding, not yet fully explored, that totalitarian states proved to be much less effective producers and consumers of intelligence than did their democratic counterparts during the Second World War.[16] Comparative studies might also elucidate for us the perennial dynamic which sees the mobilization of intelligence services in crises and their demobilization in times of perceived peace.

It is perhaps surprising that in the midst of the kind of activity devoted to research and case study writing, relatively little attention has been given to the parameters of the subject of intelligence itself. Yet the literature that is devoted to efforts to establish a definition of intelligence and to construct a paradigm for the intelligence process deserves notice as a separate 'project' among the rest. While definitions of intelligence have proved slippery, the question of a paradigm of intelligence as a process has proved more tractable. Early (pre-revolutionary) studies of intelligence, such as the pioneering book by Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, mapped out the intelligence function.[17] Building on this work, scholars of intelligence are now familiar with a three-part model, which identifies the key functions of intelligence as collection, assessment of information, and policy-input. Loosely connected to this model is a fourth, operational function of intelligence, incorporating such activies as propaganda, covert operations and paramilitary conflict.[18] No doubt this paradigm will continue to be debated and refined, as scholars seek the boundaries of the concept of 'intelligence' and attempt to reassess the range of intelligence functions. Indeed this debate may take off in new directions, if James Der Derian's arguments about the ways in which the intelligence function is bleeding into a cybernetic universe of simulation and simultaneity are heeded.[19]

Associated with the 'definitional' project, pursued with more vigour, but within decided limits, has been a methodological project designed to apply conceptual models to the study of intelligence and to use the conclusions of intelligence case-studies to test exisiting theoretical approaches in the broader domain of the social sciences. Michael Fry and Miles Hochstein contribute what is the first major assessment of progress in this project for our volume. Their findings are sobering, not least in terms of what they have to say about the ways in which intelligence studies have been left at the margins of the study of international relations undertaken by its dominant community of political scientists. One major bridge between the two solitudes described by Fry and Hochstein, has been provided by studies of intelligence failure. Here scholars are fortunate to be able to explore and build on the findings of authors such as Roberta Wohlstetter, Michael Handel and Richard Betts.[20] Indeed Richard Betts' article, 'Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable' has become an acknowledged classic, capable of spawning ongoing controversy by its effort to establish two provocative and worrying conclusions: that intelligence failures are unavoidable; and that intelligence failures occur and recur because the intelligence process mirrors the irrationality of policy decision-making, not least in the power of deeply rooted perceptions to shape images of foreign states.[21] Fry and Hochstein argue that there are many other potential bridges available that might lead to a closer integration of the historical and political science approaches to intelligence and the study of international relations. Interdisciplinary endeavour thus stands out as a neglected avenue in the past, and an important future direction for intelligence studies.

It was implicit in the origins of the contemporary study of intelligence that one of its projects would operate in the realm of public policy, especially within the United States. The circumstances of political debate surrounding the Central Intelligence Agency from the mid-1970s, and the decision, made possible by a relatively free legal environment, of former intelligence practitioners to engage in open argument over the past functions, present status and future role of US intelligence have profoundly affected the public policy dimensions of the study of intelligence.[22] Key debates have emerged around the issues of accountability, executive leadership, efficacy, and ethics, especially the ethics of covert operations. All of these debates are embryonic; all have significant futures, especially, I suspect, that concerning ethics. On these issues the scholarly community will find a popular audience with its own well-entrenched views. The future legitimization of national intelligence communities and of the scholars who study them will probably depend, in part, on the resolution of such debates.

Perhaps the most valuable outcome of an engagement by veterans of intelligence services in public discourse will be found in the stimulus it will provide for the writing of memoirs, even policy prescriptions dressed up as memoirs, as an outlet and significant source.[23] The freedom to contribute to a public debate inevitably helps loosen the shackles of clandestine thinking and the arrogance of special knowledge that are pitfalls for the community of 'insiders'. But the problems of academic co-opting are ever present in the search for intelligence nostrums and the argument for the value of experience is weighted heavily against the academic community.[24] The organizational skills and power of the ex-practitioners are manifest, and the spectre of a debate led and guided by former members of the intelligence community serves perhaps to undermine the credibility of the study to sceptical onlookers from within and without the academic community. Over time, a healthy exchange of views should be possible and the public policy project should benefit. Walter Laqueur's study, *A World of Secrets*, already suggests what might come from such an endeavour, not least with respect to an understanding of the dilemmas of intelligence reform and the intellectual skills required by intelligence communities for adequate performance of their tasks. But there remains, at present, a need to educate both the community of practitioners and the community of scholars into the strengths and weaknesses of what each has to offer. And in many countries outside the US, the relationship between these two communities is still minimal, fraught by traditional suspicions and protective screens. What can be said is that without some fruitful collaboration, the public policy project will never really succeed. This would be a pity, given the obvious need for intelligence services and governments constantly to adjust their intelligence structures to the continuing intelligence revolution and the broader changes in domestic and global politics nowadays occurring at great and accelerating speed.

So far, much of what has been said about research projects has concerned the study of intelligence services whose task it is to collect information on the outside world. The division of labour between those whose study foreign and domestic intelligence-gathering systems is real, if unfortunate, and is present in yet another research endeavour, which we might call the 'civil liberties project'. The focus of this research project is on the dangers of domestic intelligence-gathering in a democratic polity, and its findings are often strongly normative. The most extensive work has been done on such agencies as the FBI, though similar research has been undertaken on Canadian and British domestic security agencies.[25] The focus on abuses of the law in a domestic political system and on the protection of privacy make it difficult for findings from this project to be linked very concretely with the results of studies of external agencies, where legal norms, especially in an anarchic international system, are not the issue. Yet this difference obscures the many points of contact that might be developed between this and other research projects within intelligence studies. The questions of organizational politics and of perceptions are just two such points. The history of the national security state would certainly suggest that the boundaries between domestic and foreign intelligence-gathering services are permeable and that perceived threats generally owe their existence to a concatenation of externally and internally generated fears of unrest and subversion.[26] The division of labour between the study of domestic and foreign intelligence-gathering is surely artificial and destined to be broken down, with benefit to both endeavours.

Two final research projects remain to be identified. One is intensely visible; the other largely invisible. The visible partner is the 'investigative journalism' project; the invisible the 'popular culture' project. The fifth estate has been active in probing the nature of the intelligence revolution far longer than has the scholarly community. Its investigations reveal a sometimes sophisticated, sometimes crude, appetite for conspiracy theory. At the heart of its method are two potentially contradictory propositions: one is that the claims made for what intelligence services do are false and overblown; the other is the 'iceberg' theorem. In this view, intelligence services and their people show a visible surface which is but the tip of a larger political conspiracy of dangerous proportions. Investigative journalism functions in the force field between these two propositions – that intelligence services are ineffectual and that they are all-powerful.[27] Working this terrain can provide wonderful narrative colour and readability. Consider this quotation from Ron Rosenbaum's essay, 'The General and the Blond Ghost':

> A fascinating pair, [General Richard] Secord and [Ted] Shackley. Not, perhaps, the conspiratorial 'Secret Team' they have been described as by some, but an extraordinary couple of covert operators.

> Talking to them in succession, listening to their accounts of three decades of secret wars and clandestine missions, was like having a door open on a hidden chapter in contemporary history, an unexpected glimpse into the murky culture of clandestinity that grew out of the dark side of J.F.K.'s Camelot.[28]

Rhetorically, this passage hits all the right buttons, and is almost formulaic in its construction. Another dimension to the investigative journalism project comes with the cautionary reminder advanced by Christopher Hitchens, that some conspiracy theories actually prove to be accurate.[29]

The connection between the investigative journalism project and its more invisible 'popular culture' counterpart comes with the identification of human agency as the key to an understanding of events. The study of the popular culture of intelligence has scarcely begun, despite the longevity of some of its chief products, such as the spy novel and spy film. The question 'Why study Bond?' should be on the agenda, not least because of the fascinating relationship between the growth of intelligence communities, their legitimization and delegitimization, and the popular image of spying represented contemporaneously in fiction and film. Spy fiction as a genre has, despite its shifting formulas, always represented the individual agent as the actor in a high political drama.[30] The social standing of the spy, the ethics of spying, the organizational setting of spy work, even the gender of the agent have all changed, but the power of the individual to alter the course of history has remained a constant in the fictional world, even in the techno-thrillers of a Tom Clancy.[31] David Stafford recognizes that fictional spies serve as agents propping up imperial decline; Michael Denning argues that fictional spies are purveyors of popular consumerism.[32] With such agendas to represent, it seems certain that spy fiction will have a healthy future, whatever precise changes are forced on the political backgrounds to the plots. The popular culture project is destined, I think, to emerge from invisibility to become part of the puzzle, to help explain the persistence of a certain vision of historical agency, to help uncover our fascination with espionage itself, and to aid in identifying the popular projection of clandestinity.

It is in the nature of things that revolutions meet resistance; counter-revolutions emerge. In terms of the scholarly study of intelligence, counter-revolutions are measured in ink not blood, in alignments and counter-alignments and in the fraying of tempers among academics. Yet the question of reception is a significant one for the future of intelligence studies. Without a positive reception, the study of intelligence will, in the long run, die from lack of sustenance: it needs a steady influx of new authors, new research grants, new publications, new readers. Reception of intelligence studies, despite its achievements, has been mixed. Sceptics, both stubborn traditionalists and those more socratic, have been quick to affix the damaging label of 'trendy' to intelligence studies. Older attitudes die hard. The twin constraints of the McCarthy era and of the national security state, in which it was either distasteful or unpatriotic to engage in a study of intelligence, continue to exercise some generational hold. Scholars who have not paid much attention to the field are quick to reach for the iconography of popular culture in discussions of intelligence. The question 'Why study James Bond?' means, for them, nothing serious. Demands for proof of the significance of it all continue to be posted. Here, I would argue, the problem lies in part in the fact that the wrong kinds of smoking guns are demanded, even by such noted and well-disposed authorities as John Lewis Gaddis.[33] Evaluation of the significance of intelligence studies depends on the angle of approach and the kinds of questions being asked. Consider the case of a study of intelligence during the Munich crisis of 1938. One can easily imagine a fruitless argument between those who might say that British intelligence played a major role in shaping events and those who would deny that it had anything to do with the crisis, given the decisive power of the strategic environment and the pre-convictions of the British administration. The terms of reference of such a debate would need to be changed to make it useful. But there is a strong prima facie case that intelligence played a vital role in some crises – the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example – and that, overall, what is of interest is the function of intelligence services as shapers and reflectors of the official mind in Washington, London or wherever. To step back to the Munich crisis, two things emerge as significant in a study of intelligence at the time: the intelligence services 'worst-case' assessment of the shape of a possible Anglo-German war, very much shared by the Chamberlain government; and the ways in which fast-moving events caused the façade of this assessment to crack and reveal a host of competing visions, one of which, at least, provided brief support for a more forceful deterrent strategy at the apogee of the crisis. Intelligence assessments, buffeted by so much information flow and so many political pressures, are rarely static. They certainly were not during the Munich crisis, despite the conventional wisdom.[34] In a larger sense, some part of the revisionist potential of intelligence studies is to be found in the very volatility of intelligence assessments during major crises.

II

The essays contained in this volume represent some, but by no means all, of the kinds of research projects enumerated above. Their disparateness is a feature of the current state of research into intelligence, for which no apologies are necessary. They fall into three broad groups. The opening essays by Michael Fry and Miles Hochstein and by James Der Derian visit methodological and definitional questions about the nature of intelligence practice, intelligence theory and its relationship to the mainstream canons of inquiry in international relations. The middle essays by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky explore the recent history of Soviet intelligence, up to the demise of the KGB itself. The final group of papers emerge out of the documentary and historical research projects and focus on new findings concerning the history of Canadian security intelligence. Timothy Naftali's essay might be said to witness some overlap between the historical and popular culture projects, in so far as it explores the ways in which Sir William Stephenson used the genre of popular biography to atttempt to impose his own self-mythology on historical events.

One other feature of this volume illustrates the current state of intelligence studies. Planning for the conference papers was very much overtaken by events, in a way that heightened the drama of the conference proceedings themselves. The conference met in the immediate aftermath of the failed KGB-led coup against the Gorbachev reforms, and we were fortunate to have experts of the calibre of Oleg Gordievsky and Christopher Andrew to comment on these events. In the course of the conference it became clear that a new agenda for the historical study of Soviet intelligence was opening up: one that sought to reassess the efficiency and institutional mentality of a KGB that for long was vaunted for its ruthlessness and skill. Christopher Andrew's revisionist portrait of a bumbling, corrupt and paranoiac KGB did not meet universal agreement at the Toronto conference, and no doubt the investigation, thus stimulated, will proceed. But it may well prove that the post-1945 history of the KGB will affirm a lesson emerging from the study of the Second World War: that totalitarian intelligence services are disadvantaged in the crucial business of constructing accurate images of their identified enemies in the international system.

Viewing the broad spectrum of activity going on within the field of intelligence studies, it might be enough to say that the future holds more of the same. Sooner or later, however, a greater coalescing of the individual 'research projects' will have to occur, if the field is to prosper, face its critics, and give confident answers to the perennial and proper question, 'So what?' It is hoped that readers will find a rich variety of suggestive answers to that question in the essays that follow.

NOTES

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1. Christopher Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London, 1985), Ch. 1.
2. On these developments in Britain, see David French, 'Spy Fever in Britain 1900–1915', *Historical Journal*, Vol. XXI, No. 2 (1978), pp. 355–70.
3. 1974–75 can be considered a 'year of intelligence'. It witnessed the publication of Frederick Winterbotham's revelatory memoir, *The Ultra Secret*, in Britain (which followed on the heels of another major breach of wartime secrets, J. C. Masterman's *The Double Cross System*), while in the United States an extraordinary literature suddenly exploded on the scene which included Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks' *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York, 1974), Philip Agee's *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (Harmondsworth, 1975), the investigative reporting of Seymour Hersh in the *New York Times* on CIA activities within the United States and covert operations abroad, and eventually the televised Senate committee investigation chaired by Frank Church.
4. The main associations include the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies, the British Study Group on Intelligence, the Intelligence section of the International Studies Assocation in the United States, and a variety of professional organizations with membership consisting of retired personnel from the US intelligence community. The main scholarly journals are *Intelligence and National Security* and *The International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence*, both of which were launched in 1986. Two major essays collections appeared in 1984: Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds), *The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1984) and Ernest May (ed.), *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars* (Princeton, 1984). Edinburgh University Press now supports a series of books on 'Perspectives in Intelligence'. For details on university courses in the United States and Canada, see the valuable publication by the National Intelligence Study Center, *Teaching Intelligence in the Mid-1990s* (Washington, 1992).
5. The work of the National Security Archive in Washington, DC, in this domain deserves special mention.
6. On some strategies for research, see Wesley K. Wark, 'In Never-Never Land? The British Archives on Intelligence', *Historical Journal*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1992), pp. 195–203.
7. D. Cameron Watt, 'Intelligence and the Historian', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 199–204.
8. Ernest May, 'Writing Contemporary International History', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 8 (1984), pp. 103–13.
9. See, for example, Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976), and among British historians, the writing of Donald Cameron Watt in this field, surveyed in 'Beyond Intelligence: The Study of British Strategy and the Norway Campaign, 1940', in Michael G. Fry (ed.), *Power, Personalities and Policies: Essays in Honour of Donald Cameron Watt* (London, 1992), pp. 233–57.
10. Michael Handel, 'The Politics of Intelligence', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Oct. 1987), pp. 5–46.
11. May, *Knowing One's Enemies*, Ch. 1 and Conclusion.
12. See Andrew, *Secret Service*; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *Inside the KGB* (London, 1990).

13. Ibid., and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy* (New Haven, 1989).
14. The methodology suggested in Alexander George, 'Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focussed Comparison', in Paul Gordon Lauren, *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy* (New York, 1979), might be useful.
15. For a broad approach to this issue that discusses non-western societies, see Adda Bozeman, *Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft* (Riverside, NJ, 1992).
16. See the perceptive essays by Michael Geyer on German intelligence and by John Erickson on Soviet intelligence in May, *Knowing One's Enemies.*
17. Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton, NJ, 1949); see the reconsideration and updating of Kent's approach contained in Bruce D. Bercowitz and Allan E. Goodman, *Strategic Intelligence for American National Security* (Princeton, NJ, 1989).
18. Roy Godson, 'Intelligence: An American View', in K. G. Robertson (ed.), *British and American Approaches to Intelligence* (London, 1987), pp. 3–36.
19. 'Spy Versus Spy: The Intertextual Power of International Intrigue', in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations* (Lexington, MA., 1989), pp. 163–87.
20. Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, 1962); Michael Handel, *The Diplomacy of Surprise* (Cambridge, MA, 1980); Richard Betts, 'Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable', *World Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1978), pp. 961–88.
21. Ariel Levite, *Intelligence and Strategic Surprises* (New York, 1987), attempted, unsuccessfully in my view, to counter Betts' findings.
22. David Atlee Phillips' memoir, *The Night Watch* (New York, 1977), provides a revealing account of the origins of a public campaign to defend the reputation of the CIA.
23. See Wesley K. Wark, 'Struggle in the Spy House: Memoirs of US Intelligence', in George Egerton (ed.), *Political Memoir* (London, forthcoming).
24. The series of volumes edited by Roy Godson, *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s* (Lexington, MA, 1979–86), 7 vols., and *Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s* (Lexington, MA, 1989) are cautionary in this regard.
25. Notable works in the literature on US domestic intelligence include Frank Donner, *The Age of Surveillance* (New York, 1981); Richard Morgan, *Domestic Intelligence: Monitoring Dissent in America* (Austin, Texas, 1980); Richard Gid Powers, *The Life of J. Edgar Hoover: Secrecy and Power* (New York, 1989); and Athan Theoharis, *Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the Huston Plan* (Philadelphia, 1978).
26. The Canadian case seems interesting in this regard. See Reg Whitaker, 'The Origins of the Canadian Government's Internal Security System, 1945–1952', *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. LXV, No. 2 (1984); and Wesley K. Wark, 'Security Intelligence in Canada, 1864–1945: The History of a "National Insecurity State" ' in Keith Neilson and B. J. C. McKercher (eds), *Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History* (Westport, CT, 1992), pp. 153–78.
27. Examples of the journalistic argument for the historical ineffectuality, even nuisance value, of intelligence services are Phillip Knightley, *The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1986) and James Rusbridger, *The Intelligence Game: The Illusions and Delusions of International Espionage* (London, 1989).
28. Ron Rosenbaum, *Travels with Dr. Death* (New York, 1991), p. 93.
29. Christopher Hitchens reviews books on intelligence subjects for the *London Review of Books*. So do Paul Foot and R. W. Johnson. All three have a healthy respect for conspiracy theories. See also 'The Bond of Intelligence', a hard-eyed look at the Anglo-American special relationship in intelligence in Hitchens, *Blood, Class and Nostalgia* (London, 1990), pp. 319–39.
30. Wesley K. Wark, 'Introduction: Fictions of History', in Wark (ed.), *Spy Fiction, Spy Films and Real Intelligence* (London, 1991).

31. James Der Derian, 'The C.I.A., Hollywood and Sovereign Conspiracies', *Queen's Quarterly*, forthcoming.
32. David Stafford, *The Silent Game: The Real World of Imaginary Spies* (Toronto, 1988); Michael Denning, *Cover Stories: Narrative and Ideology in the British Spy Thriller* (London, 1987).
33. John Lewis Gaddis, 'Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 191–212.
34. An extended, comparative study of intelligence failure during the Munich crisis is neeeded.

Epistemic Communities: Intelligence Studies and International Relations

MICHAEL G. FRY and MILES HOCHSTEIN

John Gaddis, in an essay which Donald Watt found altogether too pessimistic, seemed encouraged at least by the progress made since the mid-1980s in intelligence studies and the proliferation of university courses and serious journals devoted to them.[1] Others, Stafford Thomas for example, have made similar claims.[2] Gaddis, in effect, identified an intellectual community, in the Kuhnian sense, being created, flourishing, and going about its business in a coherent, consensual way. That may be so, but what is more remarkable and regrettable is the failure to integrate intelligence studies, even in a primitive way, into the mainstreams of research in international relations. That is less so with respect to international history. If one sees international history, therefore, as a central part of the field of enquiry that is international relations (for it is a field of enquiry and not a discipline), the depiction is flawed. But if one subscribes to the more orthodox view, so prevalent in the United States, that international history is peripheral to the study of international relations, dominated as it is by political scientists of various stripes, the depiction is accurate. Indeed, it provides one of the clues as to why there exist not competitive solitudes exactly, but two almost distinct, discrete communities, devoted, respectively, to the study of intelligence and the study of international relations. Intelligence studies have been and remain a very modest part of the intellectual agenda of the international relations community, even though international politics and security affairs have long dominated that agenda.

INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

The intelligence studies community brings together four groups – historians, political scientists, practitioner-scholars, and journalists and freelance writers. In this community the historians are pre-eminent. They are principally from the English-speaking world. Indeed, Donald Watt has identified a 'British school',[3] to which can be added its Commonwealth affiliates and its American appendages. The senior partners in the firm are Christopher Andrew and Watt; Wesley Wark, a Canadian, is both prominent and accomplished; Gaddis, Ernest Mayand Robin Winks hold up the American end. Their most impressive work, collectively, is on the pre-1945 period, but the attraction of the Cold War, with all its pitfalls, is irresistible.[4] The historians, and therein lies their pre-eminence in the intelligence studies community, have provided content and cumulation by quarrying the archives and launching the empirical work on the pre-1945 period, developed intelligence studies conceptually and in terms of method, rules of evidence and typologies, fueled many of the significant debates while overcoming some of the psychological and ethical barriers to the study of intelligence and leaving the lurid, the sensational and the trivial behind them, and to others, offered more in effect than '... lightweight meals that sit so heavily on the stomach',[5] and set a context in social and political as well as international and military history for intelligence studies.

This is not to exaggerate their accomplishments. Problems of archival access and evidence remain, government paranoia being more in evidence in Britain than in the United States, placing a premium on inference. This remains true, arguments about information overload from the files of democratic governments not withstanding. And quality of data remains a problem. International and military history got a long way without them. Indeed, intelligence studies may be seen as a refinement of them and no more than that. And for all the historian's enterprise, Gaddis's 'so what' test has never been far below the surface of commentary, and with justification.

The political scientists in the intelligence studies community are principally American. The research of Richard Betts, Loch Johnson and Michael Handel is worth singling out, and, indeed, all three can claim a place in the international relations community. So perhaps can Roy Godson. Generally, however, the work of the political scientists, while theoretically informed, is also mainly empirical and analytical-descriptive. Indeed, they write a form of contemporary history. They deal almost exclusively with the period since 1945, with the United States side of the Cold War, with the CIA if not the NSA (and in some cases the OSS), and, in impressionistic fashion, with the KGB. Both the historians and the political scientists have an Israeli contingent of characteristic vigor, which extends the analytical agenda to the Middle East and provides one of the links to the practitioner-scholars. There is a distinction, of course, between the practitioner turned scholar and the scholar turned practitioner.[6] The practitioner-scholars are mainly American and British, former insiders now on the outside, well-informed, if narrowly, often perceptive and enjoying a quasi-monopoly of policy prescription. They write almost exclusively about the Cold War era. So do the journalists and freelance writers. They are also principally Anglo-American; some of their work, also empirical and analytical-descriptive, is impressive.

Political scientists rule at the core of the study of international relations. They are receptive to the work of other contributors to the field of enquiry – historians, economists, geographers, lawyers, sociologists and psychologists – without arriving at anything more than an unstable equilibrium with their work. Some eminent members of the international relations community, Raymond Garthoff, Alexander George and Robert Jervis for example, have made contributions, more indirect than direct, to intelligence studies, building bridges that complement those constructed by Betts, Johnson and Handel.[7] But, by any reasonable yardstick, the proposition that there exist two distinct communities is not dismissible. The international relations community in the United States publishes three distinguished journals – *International Organization* (devoted to international political economy), *World Politics* and *International Security*. It is not clear whether the problem lies on the supply or demand side, but since the early 1980s, when the intelligence studies community was forming, these three journals published a grand total of five articles on intelligence subjects[8] – two in *World Politics*, three in *International Security*, and none in *International Organization*. The flagship of the International Studies Association, *International Studies Quarterly*, riding somewhat lower in the water, published three articles.[9] It is worth noting, however, that books on intelligence subjects have not gone unnoticed in certain journals in this same period. While the British journal, *International Affairs*, published only one article on an intelligence subject, it published 22 book reviews; the *American Political Science Review*, while publishing no articles, published 18 reviews of books on intelligence subjects. International relations scholars, meanwhile, with the exception of Betts, Johnson and Handel, have made few appearances in the two significant journals of the intelligence studies community: *Intelligence and National Security*, and *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*.[10] Practitioner-scholars publish in these journals,[11] but without ever getting to the core of the intellectual action in international relations. If a reasonable additional test is the number of courses on intelligence taught at the graduate or undergraduate levels in Schools of International Relations in the United States, or the number of doctoral dissertations completed, activity is at a minimal level. And has anyone ever been appointed to a position identified with intelligence studies at a university in the United States?

Security studies are, in the United States, a sub-field of international relations. Since 1985, in a series of meetings, reports and articles, the history, current status and future of security studies has been under review.[12] The attempt to rethink security studies took on greater urgency with the events of the winter of 1989–90 and the subsequent drama in the Soviet Union. The Gulf War in 1990–91 brought its own complications.

The three days in Moscow that rattled the world in August 1991 ensured that the debate would continue, but it has not been particularly satisfactory. The very basic nature of the questions posed revealed an underlying lack of sense of direction, even of confidence, mixed with a form of bravado. The enquiry was essentially parochial, in two senses; it was narrowly 'American' and yet it left out significant constituencies from the United States. It came to rest in a state of almost unbridled optimism. The renaissance of security studies of the late 1970s and the 1980s, marked, it was argued, by a new burst of theoretical vigor, mounting empirical richness and impressive policy-relevant work, in a conducive political and financial climate, would continue to flourish. It was a case of on and on and up and up, mastering a rich, even overflowing, research agenda. But in all this intelligence studies, it would seem, has no role whatsoever. The future would be, in that sense, a replication of the past.

WHAT DIVIDES THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM INTELLIGENCE STATUS?

Each of the intellectual communities, then, goes very much its own way. The links between them are tenuous at best, a regrettable state of affairs which requires explanation. First, the international relations community as defined here, has rediscovered history, as a laboratory, a source of cases, and as a basis for comparative reasoning. Its members bristle at the idea of international relations being merely current events or contemporary history. But their principal concern, empirically, is with the second half of the twentieth century. Intelligence studies, however, are more impressive when they deal with the pre-1945 period, especially to the extent that they are archivally based. Problems of evidence and perspective mount when they explore the nuclear age. So what is of most interest to international relations scholars is least accessible and lacks a certain credibility, the work on the CIA and the KGB notwithstanding. Second, to the extent that international relations is quintessentially an 'American' science, its practitioners are uninterested in the 'British' school, its partners and the issues in Anglo-European history before 1945 which they examine, even including the drama of Ultra. Again, only the USA–USSR relationship and, therefore, the CIA–KGB contest is of significant interest to them.

Third, the intelligence studies community, and certainly its historians, rest essentially in the realist paradigm. So do many, even most, international relations scholars in one way or another and with varying degrees of comfort, but they see intelligence studies largely as a refinement of diplomatic and military history, or a form of contemporary history, very much as 'more of the same'. For those international relations scholars who have left the realist paradigm so much of intelligence studies seems to be an enterprise of diminishing intellectual relevance. Intelligence studies would have to change their focus sharply to attract the attention of non-realists. Fourth, the international relations community has resisted, almost effortlessly it would seem, any temptation to inflate the significance of intelligence studies. In addition to seeing them as a refinement of diplomatic and military history, or as a form of contemporary history, scholars of international relations assume that what is interesting politically, what is anecdotally rich or even titillating, is not necessarily significant intellectually.

Finally, and at the core of the matter, the international relations community of social scientists is serious, and explicitly so, about theory, and about method. Its members have concluded, apparently, that while intelligence studies might illustrate and even help refine theory, there is nothing there that cannot be subsumed under existing theory. No new theory needs to be crafted to accommodate intelligence studies; no theoretical stretch is required. This is particularly the case with theories of rational choice, decision-making and what is called, in an expressive but inelegant phrase, 'information processing', by individuals and small groups. Intelligence is, in its essence, information gathered by covert, non-conventional means, and thus plays a role in policy formulation. A modest series of easily formulated questions on the type, nature and form of information, how information is acquired, selected, stored, retrieved and evaluated, what it is gathered on and how it influences problem definition and assessment of alternative courses of action, and its delivery into and reception in policy communities, illustrate the point. Or, in terms of relationships and interactions, one might ask what did a policy community know and how soon; what did adversarial policy communities know about each other; what did each know the other knew; and what intelligence had been planted and ingested? These questions can be asked when scholars examine both routine and crisis situations. It must be stated, however, that on the issue of policy implementation, an egregiously neglected subject by international relations scholars, intelligence studies may well be in the lead.

With policy formulation as the central concern, it is logical to turn to constraints on rational choice, to both motivational and cognitive psychology, to the significance of stress and bias (the latter from beliefs, images, attributions, schema and analogies) in decision-making. That set of questions has led to the examination of perceptions, judged sound or faulty with the benefit of distance and perspective, but being at the time simply perceptions. Decision-makers frame them about the intentions of adversaries and friends (involving motive, resolve, commitment, hostility, preferences, definitions of the present and judgments of the future), and about their capabilities. Intentions and capabilities are connected; assessing the former is usually more difficult than estimating the latter. The former may be misjudged just as the latter might be over- or under-estimated. Errors of perception may link military optimism to diplomatic pessimism, induce a commitment to an unsound course of action, and result in misjudging the consequences of various actions, the stuff of threat, provocation, pre-emptive behavior and aggression. It is a very short step from there to theories of risk, to the significance of whether policy communities are risk averse or acceptant, to the rationality of each posture in given circumstances, and to remembering that risk has two faces – of policy failure and political vulnerability. That last point demonstrates one of the many ways in which foreign policy and domestic politics unavoidably and routinely interact. The relevance of all this to the substantial literature on 'intelligence' failures and successes, and 'surprise', those central themes in intelligence studies, is obvious.

The international relations literature also moves easily from consideration of rational choice and constraints on it to the examination of organizational and bureaucratic behavior, and of cybernetic processes. What the CIA does (and the intelligence arms of the Departments of State and Defense) – collecting, organizing, assessing and presenting information, uniquely depicting 'other' (the adversary) to 'self' (the presidential policy community), providing a critical part of the institutional memory of 'other', and operating in a competitive, policy-formulating environment – fits almost effortlessly into theories of organizational and bureaucratic behavior and cybernetic process. This is particularly so when the CIA is seen as an apolitical actor in the policy process, as a caricature or even an idealization. Theories of leadership, the presidency and the President's role and behavior in the policy process, seen as open or closed and affected by presidential management style, requires little elaboration to accommodate the intelligence factor in policy formulation. Finally, theories of branch politics, addressing the relationships between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, and examining congressional monitoring and oversight (through, for example, the Senate Foreign Affairs, Armed Services and Intelligence committees), presidential prerogatives and advantage from a quasi-monopoly of intelligence, and policy legality, implementation, and *post mortem*, provide adequate theoretical perspectives. Where they do not, legal and constitutional theory and even philosophy, as Stafford Thomas, William Jackson and Glenn Hastedt have demonstrated, fill the void.[13]

PROPOSITIONS AND PROPOSALS

But these are not arguments for perpetuating the discreteness of the two communities. Indeed, the literature on intelligence studies contains puzzles and anomalies that should provoke a degree of collaboration. One should begin with the relationship between intelligence and the crafting of policy. It is, essentially, a relationship between two processes, one inductive, the other deductive. Intelligence gathering, ordering and presentation is an inductive process, synthesizing a myriad of facts to produce an image or theory of reality. Policy formulation is a deductive process whereby policy, guidelines for action, are meant to reflect first principles. The critical interaction occurs when policy communities receive and evaluate intelligence, and judge its value. When intelligence clashes with policy preference, intelligence loses; when information runs up against power, information is the casualty. Indeed, when information is countered by perception or, more accurately, conception, evidence is discounted. The policy community decides, claiming that its conclusions are supported by empirical reality and expecting its decisions to be implemented. That is why the CIA, for example, must be policy relevant, but not policy prescriptive, fulfilling the role of descriptor, but shunning the role of inscriptor. That is why critical, quintessential important, calculations about policy legitimation, about domestic support for policy, are made exclusively by the deductionists, by presidents looking inward into society and to political principle as much as outward into the international system, supposedly objectively known. As deviance is a particularly rich source of insight, exceptions to this polemical proposition are surely worth examination.

Attempts to measure how well one state 'knows' another may well begin with the inductive-deductive relationship. Marxist states, dominated by political principles concerning the nature of capitalist societies, may have lost analytical flexibility and perceptive ability. Israel's fixation on the prevailing 'concept' in 1973 similarly blocked appreciation of the significance of Arab preparations for war. The illusions of preconception and the hazards of deductive policy-driven 'intelligence' are well known. And, because the induction–deduction relationship remains an unresolved issue within the social sciences, it will no less affect the reasoning of academics as they attempt to generate theory about intelligence services.

The inductive–deductive relationship is also an excessively stark representation of reality. It portrays the CIA, for example, as apolitical, bereft of political consciousness, concerned with pure representations of reality, and keeping the world of fact and belief apart. It misrepresents the process whereby decision-makers routinely search for information, utilizing at will orthodox and unorthodox sources. The inductive–deductive relationship is also one of the principal sources of Western contempt for and ridicule of the KGB – a judgement now visibly gathering steam[14] – depicted as a sordid nemesis (now unmasked) floundering, despite its successes, in the moral squalor of Marxism in action, being part of the policy community while being the intelligence agency involved with the tracking of domestic as well as external enemies. There is a parallel here with so much of Western scholarship on Stalin – a supposed mediocre pathologue, yet holding power for almost 30 years, holding the union together, and extracting impressive victories from the Second World War. Indeed, the CIA–KGB or the Churchill–Stalin contrasts almost evoke portraits of 'Western rational man', able to keep the objective and the subjective separate, compared with 'Eastern man', confusing the two, and floundering because of the confusion. The contrasts are surely, in every case, substantially overdrawn.

Another approach to the integration of intelligence studies into international relations is through comparative reasoning.[15] If one rejects, as one should, that nuclear weapons can be, for analytical purposes, 'conventionalized', and examines the meaning of the nuclear revolution, the differences between the pre- and post-1945 worlds take on unusual features. It is as if, after the Second World War, the West absorbed Ernest May's 'lessons' taken from the pre-1939 period, and constructed an intelligence apparatus designed to correct the errors of the pre-nuclear era, and institutionalize objective, inductive assessment, free of damaging political preconceptions.[16] But that new empirically sensitive apparatus was, in fact, in one centrally important way, overtaken by the technology of the ballistic nuclear-armed missile. As the nuclear delivery potential of the adversary grew, it became necessary to increase the sensitivity of the intelligence effort, and move the American nuclear arsenal ever closer to a hair-trigger pre-emptive launch. The catastrophic possibility of false positive detections grew even larger. Finally, nuclear missile technology made the induction of a possible Soviet strike before it occurred into an epistemologically untenable activity. The nuclear system was perforce shifted to 'assured second strike capability'. Intelligence reverted from a process of radar and telemetry-based inductive assessment, moving up through a complex bureaucracy to produce a rapid synthesis of the certain meaning of all incoming information, back to the political level. There, the President, like a monarch of old, assesses the situation by observing the direct communications from the enemy, i.e., incoming missiles.

The avoidance of 'surprise', the dangers of intelligence failures and the value of prediction (predicting war before it occurs, pre-empting it, and securing strategic advantage from the prediction – all the lessons of the Second World War, in fact), lost much of their significance as the number, velocity and variety of nuclear threats increased. Timing ceased to be the issue; relative capabilities superseded it. A nuclear attack had to be assumed; so was the ability to respond. Policy-makers, therefore, needed not to avoid surprise but to cope with it, simply because it was unavoidable. It was no longer an issue of uncovering military preparations and mobilization steps to induce what the adversary intended. Mobilization and attack by the adversary was instantaneous and was indistinguishable from political intentions. A nuclear response would be equally instantaneous, but it would now *follow*, not precede, an attack. The leadership level now had a renewed, if perverse, direct access to the intentions of the adversary. The intercession of a bureaucratic process of inductive intelligence assessment between the President and international reality was reduced on the most vital of issues – total war.

It is just as important to look forward beyond the classical Cold War as to look back, to the intelligence apparatus that has to be and is being constructed. That may well mean replacing 'deep' intelligence (the CIA providing definitive assessments for the President and his policy community only) with 'broad' intelligence (its collection being dispersed, its assessment involving many parties, and it being made more widely available to multiple actors). Or 'broad' might be added to 'deep' intelligence. Either way, the consequences of such transformations will be significant. Intelligence may well then be less private, restricted and perfect, but it might also serve more relevant purposes, and spread into other issue areas (economic questions, environmental and ecological considerations, the functioning of regimes, narcotics traffic, broader social questions, and nuclear proliferation). Intelligence activities would involve formally a network of units where sovereignty is dispersed among non-governmental actors, international organizations and corporations, and pay due attention to the worm's eye view of the world, i.e., the view from the streets.

Intelligence systems in war and peace, where opaqueness and translucence have different values, and intelligence relationships with friends and adversaries, have always been compared to advantage. But adversaries may or may not be colleagues. When they are, when statesmen have direct access to the 'other', inductivism is both less necessary and less useful. Regimes of mentalities among leaders are created, and common ground is found and held. Nothing matches the 'recoil effect' in creating these regimes, as statesmen pull back from crises of eminent danger. Chess provides the analogy, where master participants share assumptions and information, profoundly understanding rules and conventions, and predict moves and behavior with a dazzling degree of certainty.[17] And yet, game by game, stalemate, victory and defeat occur, with both players returning to compete another day. And the chess analogy may well be one path to understanding the learning that occurs between states. Adversaries were colleagues in the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century and and even on into the early twentieth century, and again following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The Cold War, in one of itsessential features, ended in 1962. Adversaries, in contrast, were not colleagues in the 1930s and from 1945 to 1962. Such a comparison, crossing the boundaries between different political systems, different conditions of systemic polarity and the nuclear threshold, may be particularly instructive.[18]

Both the above considerations, of policy and comparison, evoke questions of methodology. The policy process, with judgment of and choice between alternative courses of action at its core, points to the relevance of proof by contradiction, of falsification, as Ben-Israel has recently done, and effectively so.[19] This is not a novel argument but one worth further examination. The technique of structured, controlled comparison[20] seems particularly applicable to developing systematic analysis of several critical policy questions – intelligence failures and successes, surprise and the wise or unwise acceptance or rejection of intelligence by policy-makers, intelligence in competition with analogical reasoning and intuitively-arrived-at preferences, and the role of those in the intelligence community who 'dare to be wrong', who risk dissent.

The enduring fascination with intelligence agencies, the CIA and the KGB particularly, has resulted in a substantial literature which, however, seems to lack an organizing principle. Perhaps it is time to examine them in terms of the relationship between structures and agents, where the former constrains the latter in significant ways. Martha Feldman's examination of the US Department of Energy and Paul Roberts's indictment of the US Treasury in the first Reagan term, politics aside, might serve as models.[21]

Taking a lead from the literature on civil–military relations points one toward the problem of the creation, evolvement and even dismemberment of intelligence services. New states create intelligence structures as a matter of routine. The Ukraine, for example, will be no exception. There may be more to that process than can be subsumed under the generalization that, for example, all East European intelligence services were modeled slavishly on the KGB during the Cold War, or that imperial legacies determined the path followed by newly independent states in the era of decolonization. Proto-intelligence agencies played a role, undoubtedly, in the securing of independence, in state formation, and that role would influence the shape of the fledgling intelligence service.

Intelligence may also be seen as knowledge, permitting the development of a theory of knowledge and power. One could start from the proposition, already well entrenched in the literature, that knowledge is a multiplier of power. One army can, for example, defend two fronts if it knows that only one front will be attacked. Negotiating and bargaining prospects can be improved considerably, as were Stalin's in the summer of 1939, in dealing with the British, with a series of intelligence coups. Effective intelligence can improve the efficiency of investments in national security, enabling assessments to be made of relative power balances, and, therefore, permitting reductions in the size of armed forces.

On the other hand, intelligence efforts may also increase the threat perceived by the target of those efforts. It is accepted that building extra weapons systems and building up force levels induces a countervailing response, but so might increased espionage efforts. The efficiency of 'intelligence' deployed as a 'power multiplier', therefore, must be carefully assessed relative to simply building weapons systems and increasing forces. Intelligence may prove more important in operational terms than additional increments of defense spending, yet because of the type of response it induces, that is, even greater rearmament by the adversary, be of no great advantage relative to normal defense spending. What is needed is a theory of precisely how and when intelligence might contribute to state power, and how that contribution is to be weighed relative to other power-orientated activities of the state, such as the construction of forces. Doron and Pedatzur have made a promising start on this issue with regard to Israel. Whether the US intelligence establishment, or any other intelligence establishment, is readily amenable to such analysis remains to be seen.[22]

One might think, moreover, of the intelligence game conducted in the context of various paradigms of international relations. In a situation of 'complex interdependence', economic and strategic, for example, what are the types of interactions which occur between the intelligence services of the interdependent states? Surely, the content and value of intelligence would be expected to reflect extant political relationships. Situations of dominance and 'hegemonic stability' might be expected to reflect other types of intelligence relationships, less equal perhaps. In a hegemonic economic and political relationship, one might expect the hegemon to be opaque to others, and the dominated states to be relatively translucent to the intelligence activities of the hegemon. How can one begin to access these questions empirically? If an international system is moving from a situation of 'hegemonic stability' to one of 'complex interdependence', is the passage reflected by dilatorily reluctant and conservative intelligence systems, or might intelligence co-operation be a leading and valid indicator of changing political relations? Intelligence services may, in other words, reflect more or less accurately, lag behind or even anticipate paradigmatic change in the international system. The CIA, in the abstract, could be the last bastion of 'realism' and security consciousness, or extraordinarily prescient, or hover somewhere between caution and imagination.

Finally, one may begin to imagine a re-evaluation of the study of international relations itself as a theory of knowledge, instead of a theory of power. International relations would be increasingly conceptualized as a perspective which sees intelligence not merely as the 'eye' which perceives the objective international reality of power politics and describes it, but as in fact one of the primary locations of international relations practice. After all, if intelligence is a perfect mirror of reality, it is of little theoretical significance, and one can write it out of the study of international politics. In those circumstances, like a clear pane of glass, its significance for vision is inconsequential. But if the intelligence process introduces predictable and inevitable 'distortions' of reality, then it becomes an object of theoretical importance, which participates in the creation and reproduction of international political reality. In this view, one would begin to consider the possibility that intelligence does not merely describe the world in which the state operates, but in fact actively 'creates' that world for each state. Indeed, this much has been theorized for individual bureaucracies, by Jurgen Habermas and Harold Wilensky for example, though in the intelligence literature it is primarily considered to be a regrettable,[23] if not pathological, function. A theory of intelligence would instead accept the active role of intelligence in creating international reality, that is acting as political subjectivity, and expand this perspective to address *interacting* political subjectivities. A theory of intelligence would address international relations between the different subjective awarenesses which the intelligence bureaucracies represent. The empirical difficulties are formidable, of course, but the theoretical potentialities of such an approach bear examination, and hold out the prospect of expanded theoretical sophistication for the intelligence studies field.

These suggestions, some modest, other more far-reaching, may do something to encourage the intelligence studies and the international relations communities to look more closely at their respective research agendas and how they approach them. That may result merely in the conclusion that the costs of integration outweigh the benefits, but it is always beneficial to discover, reasonable efficiently, that what looked like a high road is merely a cul-de-sac. However, to continue to theorize about intelligence as if it was not a communicative inter-state enterprise, deeply entwined not only in domestic bureaucracy but also in the practice of international politics, would be to do intelligence studies a disservice. The intelligence activities of peacetime, no less than those of wartime, are a vast bureaucratic and intellectual exercise in international epistemology.

The international relations and intelligence studies communities should search for common theoretical ground, for there may well yet be a great deal more to say on the subject.

NOTES

1. John Lewis Gaddis, 'Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 191–212; and D. Cameron Watt, 'Intelligence and the Historian', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 199–204.
2. Stafford T. Thomas, 'Assessing Current Intelligence Studies', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1988), pp. 217–44, citing M. Cline (ed.), *Teaching Intelligence in the Mid-1980s* (Washington, DC, 1985). See also Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn (eds), *Military Intelligence and the Universities: A Study of an Ambivalent Relationship* (Boulder, CO, 1984). Thomas sets out the research agenda of intelligence studies in terms of four familiar tasks – description, policy prescription, normative prescription and explanation – with the last of these tasks being the least developed. While seeing political scientists, not historians, as central to intelligence studies, he identifies four approaches – the historical/biographical, the functional, the structural and the political.
3. Donald Cameron Watt, 'Intelligence Studies: The Emergence of a British School', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (April 1988), pp. 338–41.
4. See, for example, Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (London and New York, 1990).
5. Nicholas Hiley, in his review of Bernard Potter's *Plots and Paranoia: a History of Political Espionage in Britain, 1790–1988, The Times Literary Supplement*, Dec. 1989, pp. 22–8.
6. See Robin W. Winks, *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War* (New York, 1987).
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Foreign Policy (three articles); *World Affairs* (one article); *Foreign Affairs* (four articles and one review); and *Orbis* (five articles and five reviews). Other journals publishing articles or reviews on intelligence subjects include *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of Business Ethics, Far Eastern Economic Review, Middle East Journal, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Middle East Studies, American Journal of Sociology, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Howard Journal of Law and Public Policy*, and *Legislative Studies Quarterly*.

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Anti-Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and Surveillance Practice

JAMES DER DERIAN

'Simply put, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world that surrounds us.'

Intelligence: The Acme of Skill (CIA booklet)

'Every day I attach less value to intelligence.'

Marcel Proust, *Contre Sainte-Beuve*

This essay is an attempt to assess the theoretical value of intelligence for international relations. It begins with the premise that the accelerated pace of historical change and technological innovation have generated new forms of estrangement that can no longer be fully understood or adequately mediated by traditional intellectual and diplomatic practices. A new *anti-diplomacy* has emerged, by which I mean a late modern mediation of international estrangement by new techniques of power. It is my belief that anti-diplomacy requires a new intellectual approach.[1] In this essay I use a post-structuralist approach to explore one technique in particular: the power of surveillance.

The power of surveillance is transparent and pervasive, more 'real' in time than space, and produced and sustained through the exchange of signs not goods, rendering its political effects resistant if not invisible to traditional and re-formed theories of international relations.[2] Hence, a post-structuralist approach is called for, to help us to understand the *discursive* power of new *chronopolitical* and *technostrategic* forces in intelligence that elevate chronology over geography in their political effects; that use and are used by technology for the prevention and preparation of war; that produce and are sustained by historically transient statements which mediate our relations with empirical events.[3]

The late modern condition to which I apply a post-structuralist approach is the end of the Cold War, or more precisely, the vision of this end that is currently contested in the debate over the future of intelligence. Reform in the Soviet Union, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Chernobyl, freedom and democracy movements in East and Central Europe, removal of intermediate nuclear forces from Europe, the reunification of Germany, the relative decline of the American economic hegemony – even the growing hole in the ozone layer – were just a few of the important transformative events of the late 1980s that challenged the Cold War norms and ideological practices of superpower intelligence.

Neither a descriptive historical nor a social scientific approach is up to the task of explaining the radical transformations of international relations. In the more elegant words of Nietzsche, 'Historical study is only fruitful for the future if it follows a powerful life-giving influence, for example, a new system of culture – only therefore, if it is guided and dominated by a higher force, and does not itself guide and dominate.'[4] Following this conviction, I offer a post-structuralist inquiry into the contemporary and future representation of intelligence as a contest of visions of the Cold War and its demise.

THE GAME OF NAMES

First, however, there is the matter of names: an inquiry into intelligence immediately confronts recalcitrant problems of a terminological and theoretical nature. Unqualified, 'intelligence' usually refers to the mental ability to acquire and retain knowledge. Historically, the association of the term with the collection of information necessary to the security of a state emerges in the diplomatic discourse of sixteenth-century France and England.[5] By the seventeenth century, spies are frequently referred to as 'intelligencers', as are some of the weeklies – forerunners to the mass-circulation newspaper – which published accounts of the English Civil War and news of the Thirty Years War.[6] In both the eighteenth-century French *Encyclopédie* and Samuel Johnson's *Dictionary of the English Language*, the pre-eminent meaning remains a form of discovered news or 'commerce of information' (Johnson). However, by the nineteenth century, common usage begins to shift back to the earlier, Latin (*intellectus*) connotation of an individual, mental understanding. And in our own century this usage of intelligence as a mental faculty takes a scientific turn: preceded by 'artificial', it becomes a model for all cognitive processes; followed by 'quotient', it is the standard to measure mental ability.

To add to the confusion, the contemporary 'community of intelligence' has seemingly deemed the essential qualifier *foreign* as unnecessary, for reasons that might be quaintly archaic or self-evidently scientific – or perhaps both. Moreover, concise definitions of intelligence are rarely offered – except for the odd one 'simply put'. Perhaps there are policy benefits to be gained by a fuzzy definition. In a recent article, the CIA's Coordinator for Academic Affairs, Dr Michael A. Turner, admits that 'There is a good deal of uncertainty about the definition of intelligence, contributing to controversy about what intelligence organizations should or should not be authorized to do.'[7] He goes on to quote the relevant passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (Section 102(d), 50 N.S.C. Section 430(d)(1982)) which 'defines intelligence in terms of what the CIA is empowered to do: advise the National Security Council; make recommendations to the NSA; correlate and evaluate intelligence; perform centralizing functions; and perform special activities'.[8] It is interesting to note that Turner's preferred definition echoes the neutral eighteenth-century meaning, sanitizing intelligence into 'information management: gathering raw information; analyzing it; and disseminating evaluated information to decisionmakers, some of whom have been elected to make national security decisions'.[9]

To compensate for the historical lacuna, the new academic field officers of intelligence have begun to offer their own definitions, which tend to be long(-winded) and composed in the language of social scientific rigor (*mortis*). For instance:

> Accordingly, intelligence may be defined as knowledge, organization, and activity that results in (1) the collection, analysis, production, dissemination and use of information which relates to any other government, political group, party, military force, movement or other association which is believed to relate to the group's or government's security; (2) countering similar activities by other groups, governments, or movements; and (3) activities undertaken to affect the composition and behavior of such groups or governments.[10]

Anticipating an intelligent readership – and in the belief that a definition should begin rather than pre-empt an argument – I will offer at the outset a definition that is openly hermeneutic rather than comprehensively hermetic: ***intelligence is the continuation of war by the clandestine interference of one power into the affairs of another power.*** To delineate the strategic and interventionist nature of intelligence, I have borrowed and blended definitions provided by the strategist Clausewitz of war (the continuation of political activity by an admixture of other means) and by the jurist Oppenheim of intervention (the dictatorial interference in other states).[11] Clausewitz's famous dictum has been purposely inverted to convey the presupposition that international politics is a continuation of conventional war by alternative means; and Oppenheim's 'dictatorial' has been expurgated to avoid a normative prejudgment of what constitutes legitimate interference.

To be sure, intelligence in operation ranges widely from forcible to non-forcible interventions; from purely analytical to violently 'wet' work; and from overtly persuasive to covertly manipulative forms of influence. And, indeed, as the view within the community holds, intelligence can –

by prediction, preparation, and, if necessary, pre-emption – serve to prevent full-scale wars. But I believe a broad definition that treats intelligence as a whole, rather than one that reduces it to its most innocuous form of analysis – or, conversely, its most violent form of secret warfare – will enhance the prospects for a judicious survey of a field full of judgmental if not ideological inclinations.

This essay, then, seeks to widen the narrow horizon of traditional inquiries with a counter-perspective, one that does not pre-view intelligence as either the guarantor of peace or the secret source of war, but as the displacement and continuation of international conflict by other, anti-diplomatic means. Or, 'simply put', intelligence is to make war without war – which, in the superpower stasis of a nuclear 'peace', has made it, for a very long time, the only 'real' game in town.[12] The focus of the next section is on one mode of intelligence in particular, which I believe has emerged as the most powerful response to the estrangement and accelerated pace of international relations: surveillance, as the preferred technostrategic force of normalization in world politics.

INTELLIGENCE THEORY

Such an inquiry requires a theory of intelligence, unless one holds that common sense is a sufficient intellectual tool. However, as the economist John Maynard Keynes aptly points out in the conclusion to his *General Theory*, the pragmatist is usually – as well as unknowingly – in the grip of defunct theory that has devolved into the folklore of common sense. A de-familiarizing theory can liberate the practitioner and thinker from the political stasis and intellectual staleness of a common sense that serves as the last defense against rapid historical change.

However, a theory of intelligence confronts even more intractable sources of resistance. If we take as a guide the CIA booklet, *The Acme of Skill* – cribbed from Sun Tzu's dictum, 'To find security without fighting is the acme of skill' – then a theoretical inquiry into intelligence requires nothing less than a study of the knowledge and foreknowledge of the world: an intimidating thought that helps to explain the subject's atheoretical tendencies.[13] A more practical reason that is often mooted for the paucity of theory in intelligence is the lack of a set of *objects* for theory, conventionally defined as research materials. Official and unofficial secrecy acts on top of 30-years' rules on access to archives *are* effective deterrents against scholarly investigations – and a sure guarantee that journalists, conspiracists, and propagandists will rush in where scholars fear to tread.

I found an unexpected confirmation of this view from an unlikely source, a Soviet academic studying the US intelligence community, Nikolai Yakovlev, who opens his book *CIA Target – The USSR* with a familiar complaint:

> Any analysis of Western secret services is bound to be difficult. It is like hewing one's way through a dark jungle of confusing, sometimes totally confounding, facts. The difficulty is both conceptual and functional, relating to search and selection of information. Though the subject is unquestionably autonomous, and at times, has its own motive forces, the work of secret services is ultimately no more than a continuation by other means of the policy of the governments concerned. In many cases, however, it is work that the governments will officially and vigorously disavow. That reason alone, to say nothing of the secrecy that shrouds the subject, makes the researcher literally gasp for air – for aren't facts the air the researcher breathes? What he often gets instead is poison vapour, because no other sphere of Western governmental activity resorts so freely to misinformation.[14]

Yakovlev's account of US intelligence, although informative about the particulars of some famous espionage cases, offers more of an infinite regression of mirror-opposites to American versions than any depth to the general theoretical questions of intelligence. This would include his tendentious claim that 'the most tangible of Admiral Turner's innovations were the cynical paeans to the alliance of scholars and spies serving the interests of monopoly capital'.[15]

Good reasons all, to explain the resistance of intelligence to theorization; reasons which have been, I should add, scanted by a fledgeling group of British and North American academics trying to open up the field to study.[16] But I believe there are deeper reasons to account for the lack of theory. First, there is the 'classical' lament about the nature of international theory in general which aptly applies to the case of intelligence. In a rightly famous passage, Martin Wight ascribes the theoretical paucity and moral poverty in international relations to the necessitous demands of an anarchical system. It bears repeating:

> What I have been trying to express is the sense of a kind of disharmony between international theory and diplomatic practice, a kind of recalcitrance of international politics to being theorized about. The reason is that the theorizing has to be done in the language of political theory and law. But this is the language appropriate to man's control of his social life. Political theory and law are maps of experience or systems of action within the realm of normal relationships and

> calculable results. They are the theory of survival. What for political theory is the extreme case (as revolution, or civil war) is for international theory the regular case.[17]

I have attempted to show elsewhere how Wight is rewriting Hobbes, to make the claim that a total theory requires a sovereign power that is notably absent in the international system.[18] However, this is not to identify both international relations and international theory merely as 'a war of all against all'. In the *Systems of States*, Wight goes into great historical detail to show how a cultural homogeneity, the mutual recognition of rights and obligations, and international institutions like the balance of power, diplomacy, and, indeed, even espionage have together yielded a modicum of order and intelligibility in international relations: in Hedley Bull's felicitous phrase, an anarchical society. Wight's view of espionage is made in his usual, emphatic manner:

> The *spy* deserves not to be forgotten. He is primarily a means of information, but sometimes of communication. In the modern West, the world of intelligence, counter-espionage and double agents provides a reverse image of the states-system: the dark underside of mutual interdependence.[19]

According to Wight, the error – and arrogance – of the moderns is to believe that the increase in transnational communication and the accumulation of knowledge will somehow transform international relations from a realm of repetition and recurrence into a working experiment for scientific progress.[20] In a sense, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull were 'pre-mature' critics of 'neorealism' in their attack on North American behavioralism's attempt to accomplish in theory what could not possibly be achieved in practice: 'man's control of his social life'. Indeed, Bull found many of the pseudo-scientific, structuralist tenets that would later be awkwardly subsumed under the rubric of 'neorealism' to be, in fact, a form of 'neoidealism'.[21]

THE INTELLIGENCE OF THEORY

The putative problem of intelligence's resistance to theory is, I would like to suggest, further compounded by theory's resistance to intelligence. A brief genealogy of the coeval emergence of theory and intelligence can, I believe, make a credible proposition out of what admittedly sounds like a solecism. Of course, both theory and intelligence can be shown to have multiple chronological and diverse geographical origins; and when one steps outside of the dominant eurocentric historiographies, it becomes evident that other states-systems had extensive networks of intelligence – as well as theoretical accounts of their function and purpose – that pre-dated the Western experience. Sun Tzu's *Art of War* might come to mind for some students of intelligence, as we have seen it has for the CIA. There is also the example of Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, in which the crucial role of intelligence for the Hindu state-system is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the duty of envoys earns a single chapter while the subject of spying extends over several. But lest the partiality of this inquiry be mistaken as yet another exercise in an unselfconscious Eurocentrism, it is necessary to reiterate that it is the Western technostrategic models of intelligence *and* theory that have become, for better or worse, the global form.

Who then, were these supposed *ur*-theorists and *ur*-intelligencers, the first agents, in other words, to form systems of knowledge in the service of state power? I believe that the etymological and historical evidence would point to the *theoros* and the *proxenos* of the Greek city-states. Coming from *thea*, meaning 'outward look', and *horao*, 'to look at something attentively', the *theoria* were individuals designated by Greek officials to witness and later verbally certify the happening of an event that was considered important for the polity.[22] Their standing, in both a social and spatial sense, gave them the special status of detached truth-tellers. A modern equivalent – at a much lower level of status – would be a witness to a marriage, or to an execution. But in ancient Greece, by position and perspective, the *theoria* were the institutional voice of the public discourse.

The *proxenos* – meaning at first 'one who stands before or protests', coming then to imply 'guest-friend' or 'foreigner' – were used throughout the Greek city-states as *ad hoc* envoys who none the less enjoyed various privileges and permanent residence in foreign city-states.[23] The word incorporates the notion that they 'stood in place' of their clients. In spite of – or more likely because of – their special 'guest-friendship' status, the *proxenia* quickly turned into the primary institution of intelligence. In his book *Espionage and Treason: A Study of the Proxenia in Political and Military Intelligence Gathering in Classical Greece*, Andre Gerolymatos documents nearly 50 cases in which the *proxenia* saved their adopted city-states from great harm, and inflicted some damage of their own.[24]

What, then, have the origins of theory and the forerunners of intelligence in common? Etymologically, both carry a sense of collecting information at a distance. Epistemologically, both imply a special power-knowledge derived from an authorized displacement. Crudely, both can be said to have their origins in a kind of state-sanctioned voyeurism. This is further born out by the etymology of intelligence itself, from *intelligere* (to see into, to perceive) and the early synonymy of 'intelligencer' and 'speculator'.[25]

The point? As an alienated, speculative, perceptual knowledge of knowledge, intelligence is theory and theory is intelligence. It is in their very resistance to pure *knowing* and their affinity for partial *seeing* that both activities find their legitimation and standing. Yet, this very familiarity of theory and intelligence has bred a modern, mutual contempt. This is the source of Proust's disdain for the natural scientific corruption of theory and intelligence into a kind of 'literary botany'.[26] The indeterminacies, subjectivity, and ambiguities of life – the stuff of intrigue and literature – are disciplined by labeling, classification, ordering. In the name of intelligence (that is, self-certain, objective knowledge), the critic becomes taxonomist. In our own field, this contempt has been papered over on one side by the 'pragmatic rationalists' who claim that 'common sense' is sufficient to understand intelligence; and on the other side it has been scaffolded by the 'hyper-rationalists' who try to 'discipline' and neutralize a growing global disorder with organization and game theory, simulations of international conflict and co-operation, or rational choice models: in other words, to find in universal thought what can no longer be found in global practices.

It is not, then, a paradox but only logical that at a time when many of the conventional verities of world politics have come under sustained assault, the tendency toward grand theories and global explanations in IR should be matched by a disciplinary resistance against any form of critical pluralism.[27] All the more reason I believe to use theory to overcome the resistance that is theory; not to 'master' resisting subjects – that is, international relations in general and intelligence in particular – but to liberate them from the inertia of academic practices through a self-conscious critique. This means that if one is to make sense of intelligence, a theory of theory as well as the intelligence of intelligence is needed. Or less simply put, a meta-theory to de-familiarize intelligence is called for.

What would such a meta-theory of intelligence look like? First, it must take into account, or more precisely, account for the fact that ambiguous discourse, not objective truth, is the fluctuating currency of intelligence: what was said or seen by whom when is the indeterminate exchange-value of the field. Further distanced from the 'original' missile/battle/embassy/speech-site by encoding and decoding, disinformation and deception, the discourse of intelligence is short on truths (unless we share the Nietzschean definition of truths as 'illusions whose illusionary nature has been forgotten'[28]) and long on what deconstructionists are wont to call free-floating signifiers. Second, a meta-theory must address – and attempt to redress – the current imbalance between reason and rhetoric in the study of intelligence. A rhetorical approach serves intelligence better because it assigns meaning to the capability of the reader, rather than the intentions of the author. It is attuned to this fundamental aspect of language: that often what is said is not what is meant, and what is meant is not what is said.[29] Hence, since intelligence is – probably more than any other practice of international relations – a rhetorically conveyed and textually constituted field, an *intertextual* approach is called for.

INTERTEXTUALISM AND INTERNATIONAL THEORY

An intertext, defined by the semiologist Roland Barthes as 'a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash',[30] aptly covers the field of intelligence, where there is no final arbiter of truth, meaning is derived from an interrelationship of texts, and power is implicated by the contingent nature and ambiguity of language and other signifying practices.

Anyone who doubts the intertexutal nature of intelligence should undertake a careful reading of the transcripts of the Senate Intelligence Committee hearings on the nomination of Robert Gates to be Director of the CIA. Consider just one incident, the textual appropriations, displacements, and strategies that surrounded the inquiry into the 1981 attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II.[31] Ten texts are involved. Text No. 1 is a speech given by Secretary of State Alexander Haig the day after President Reagan's inauguration, in which he links the Soviet Union to international terrorism. Text No. 2 is a National Intelligence Estimate, commissioned by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which fails to find evidence that conclusively backs up Haig's charge. Text No. 3 is journalist Claire Sterling's book, *The Terrorist Network*, which goes a step further and claims that the KGB is the mastermind behind practically every international terrorist act. Text No. 4 is the same text, aggressively waved in the face of authors of Text No. 2 by Director William Casey, who claims that he learned more from it than anything that the CIA analysts were providing. The analysts cite, to no avail, a very secret Text No. 5, a CIA disinformation campaign in Europe that was probably the hidden source of Text No. 3. In 1984 Text No. 6 appears, Sterling's *The Time of Assassins*, which argues that the KGB was indeed behind the papal plot, prompting Casey in 1985 to order Robert Gates to commission Text No. 7, tendentiously entitled 'Agca's Attempt to Kill the Pope: The Case for Soviet Involvement'. Text No. 7, said by Gates in a cover memorandum to be the 'CIA's first comprehensive examination of evidence of who was behind the attempted assassination of Pope Paul II', refutes the conclusions of Text No. 2, stating that 'The Soviets were reluctant to invade

Poland ... so they decided to demoralize [the Polish] opposition by killing the Polish Pope.[32] Text No. 8 emerges in July 1985, when three senior CIA analysts note a political bias to Text No. 7 but absolve Gates of tailoring the report to satisfy pre-ordained conclusions. Text No. 9 comes from former CIA analyst Melvin Goodman, who testifies before the Senate Committee hearings that Gates personally rewrote the Text No. 7 to confirm Sterling's Text No. 6, and excised a 'scope' note which stated no effort had been made to weigh arguments against Soviet involvement. Text No. 10 is Gates rebuttal of Goodman's charges before the Intelligence Committee: 'Based on the evidence, the allegations that I drove this paper to its conclusions and then knowingly misrepresented it to policy makers is false.'

What does the interplay of these intelligence texts tell us? First, that as surveillance intensifies, the truth becomes not clearer, but more ambiguous, attenuated, removed from any material referent. Second, intertextualism reveals a strategic sensitivity: theoretical investigations do not serve as sovereign methods to order and verify facts but as part of a subjective social process by which political identities and differences are constructed and promoted. Third, in a polyphonic, multicultural, multipolar, three-ring world, we can no longer rely on the word of one *theoros*, one *proxenos* to convey the truth. '*At a certain moment*, therefore, it is necessary,' says Barthes, 'to turn against Method, or at least to treat it without any founding privilege as one of the voices of plurality – as a *view*, a spectacle mounted in the text, the text which all in all is the only "true" result of any research.'[33] Intertextualism is itself an imperfect yet apt surveillance practice applied to the intelligence text.

Intertextual theorizing is clearly not a process of scientific verification: nor, however, should it be construed as intrinsically anti-scientific. Rather, it takes a self-conscious step away from the dominant formalistic and ahistorical trends in international theory which 'naturally select' hermetic, rational models over hermeneutic, philosophical investigations. Earlier criticisms of the theoretical closure apply here as well. Persistently, the various forms of the rationalist approach in international relations, from game theory to structural realism, have taken on the appearance of simulacra: appealing and persuasive in their modeled abstraction, but metaphysical and exclusionary in their hyper-real application. Even the most promising recent debate in international relations theory, between neo-realists and their critics, told us much more about the politics of the discipline than about world politics. The issue was not how we, as theorists, think about the world, or even how others have thought about it in the past, but how we think others *ought* to think about it. Perhaps this is symptomatic of a degradation of theory, the effect of domesticating theory into a play for graduate students' minds and learned journals' pages.

International theory continually confronts institutional pressures to conform, to reduce itself to the reigning dogma, to discipline insurgent antitheses. To keep intelligence theory from falling victim to similar perils, one must on occasion take on the role of *agent provocateur.*

Perhaps a dip into popular culture can help to clarify these issues. Take, for instance, the second-generation Miller Lite Beer advertisements in the United States. For over a decade this beer was sold by lining up two opposing sides of 'Lite All-Stars' (composed of has-been comedians and over-the-hill athletes) in various locales, and having them shout at each other with increasing volume 'Tastes great!' and 'Less filling!'. The linguist Saussure would recognize this as an identity structurally determined by binary opposites. There is no reference to external criteria, such as a comparison with regular beer, or an analysis of the organic material that went into the making of the beer. We might call this a modernist or structuralist form of intertextualism. Miller has now gone for a post-modernist intertextualism. The advertisements consist of slogans: 'Lite is what beer is today'; 'It's the beer that beer's become'; and simply, 'It's it'. The last slogan is visualized by the 'L' and the 'e' dropping off the 'Lite' sign on the side of a Miller delivery truck, parked in front of 'The Original Irish Tap Room'. The point? Identity becomes free-floating and self-referential as historical and material signifiers are radically expropriated or simply dropped.

But we are still left with the empirical question: where is the 'beer' of intelligence, that is, the intelligence text? Facing similar lacunae in international theory, Martin Wight turned to historical literature – the works of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Ranke, Wheeler-Bennett, Mattingly, and others – for it offers 'a coherent structure of hypotheses that will provide a common explanation of phenomena', which certainly is not incompatible with scientific analysis, but 'it does the job with more judiciousness and modesty, and with closer attention to the record of international experience.'[34] However, intelligence, for reasons previously given, is bereft of such a respectable, commonly accepted corpus of knowledge. Its mysteries and paradoxes are not so easily rendered into univocal theories of coherence. The next best thing in the age of New Ambiguity and New Historicism?[35] I believe it is to be found in what many would consider to be the source of last resort in intelligence: the literature of international intrigue, intertextually interpreted.[36] But that is another study.[37] What we need first is a clearer understanding of a new surveillance regime has been intertextually constituted.

SURVEILLANCE: FROM PANOPTICISM TO 'TECHINT'

'Satellite, oh satellite,
Who sits upon our skies.
How deep do you see when you spy into our lives ... ?'

Good Morning Beautiful, The The

Within the utopian dream of the Enlightenment for the expansion of the social contract into a universal eternal peace, there lies a darker shadow, one that the rationalists of IR rarely note in their exaltations of modernity's promise. It is the perpetual dream of power to have its way without the visible exercise of will that would produce resistance. Readers of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci have found evidence of a similar form of hegemonic power operating in international relations, but their focus has usually been limited to the state and class origins of this power.[38] To understand the technostrategic origins of the most pervasive power of intelligence in international relations, one must turn to the rupture point of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, as does Michel Foucault, who sees in it ample evidence that modern politics would progress as war by other means:

> Historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a perfect society to the philosophers and jurists of the eighteenth century: but there was also a military dream of society; its fundamental reference was not to the state of nature, but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine, not to the primal social contract, but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights, but to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to general will but to automatic docility.[39]

The French Revolution embodied both aspects of the Enlightenment: the high ideals of the Declaration of the Rights of Man coexisted with the power of terror, and both were promulgated by revolutionary wars that quickly took on imperial aims with the rise of Napoleon. These revolutionary tensions yielded changes over the battlefield, in the work-place, and in military institutions. In April 1794, for the first time, a company of *aerostiers* successfully used a balloon to observe the battle of Fleurus in Belgium; throughout the early 1790s 'manufactories' were built according to principles found in the *Encyclopédie*, which called for close observation rather than coercion of the work-force; and in military schools, barracks and hospitals a new architecture was developing, based on a monastic model of spatial distribution.[40] Looking first like a progressive, scientific reform, then playing a repressive, militarized role in the years of the *ancien régime*, and eventually flourishing in modern societies as a positive, benign form of social control and penal correction, a new power took hold which now pervades modernity – a disciplinary power based on surveillance.

The same Bentham who coined the name that graces the disciplinary field of IR provided a name and a blueprint for the architecture of the new disciplinary regime: the 'panopticon'. By now almost everyone in the social sciences is familiar with the concept of the panopticon, an annular structure with a tower in the center which contains – or might not contain – a guard to observe and through this observation indirectly, non-violently control the behavior of prisoners, schoolchildren, hospital patients, military trainees, whoever find themselves on the other side of the one-way gaze. In the final chapter of *Discipline and Punish*, after a detailed, critical historiography of the panopticon, Foucault elaborates a theory of '*panopticism*'. The prison is merely the extreme version, the most graphic model, the ultimate 'pen' of our disciplinary society which inscribes the difference between normal and abnormal behavior, the good citizen and the delinquent. It is the ultimate sign of modernity's twin powers of normalization and surveillance. Put bluntly by the literary critic Maurice Blanchot: 'If it weren't for prisons, we would know that we are all already in prison.'[41]

Foucault does not take his acute analysis of modernity much beyond the borders of the prison-state. But I would like to extend his ideas to international relations, to suggest that it now faces similar developments in the field of intelligence. Obviously, in an anarchical society there is no central watchtower to normalize relations, no panopticon to define and anticipate delinquency. Historically, the great powers have reached relatively high levels of normalization by forging concerts of power, reciprocal codes of conduct, a body of international law. But this tenuous identity as a society was dependent upon a common diplomatic culture, *as well as* a collective estrangement from the 'Anti-Christ Turk', the 'colonial native', the 'Soviet Threat', and the most recent pariah, the 'international terrorist'. In contemporary international relations the end of the Soviet threat and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact have removed critical points of collective alienation. Equally, the efferent forces of states seeking resources and security grow stronger as America's ability to assert a hegemonic position declines. What power (some might prefer 'regime' or 'institution') can maintain stability and re-normalize relations in this late modern state of affairs, with multiplying state and non-state actors contesting the sovereign powers and truths behind 'Western domination' (Hedley Bull's 'Third World Revolt'[42]), at the same time that the foundations of that domination are undergoing internal fragmentation and diversification?

That power is here and now, in the shadows and in the 'deep black'. It has no trouble seeing us, but we have had great difficulties seeing it. It is the normalizing, disciplinary, technostrategic power of surveillance. This modern panopticism takes many forms, but it is the communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), radar intelligence (RADINT), telemetry intelligence (TELINT), and photointelligence (PHOTOINT) – all operating under the 22,300 mile-high roof of technical intelligence (TECHINT)[43] – that constitute a new regime of power in international relations. Human intelligence (HUMINT) has played, and continues to play an important role in normalizing relations through vigilance, but it lacks the ubiquity, resolution, and pantoscopic power of the technical intelligence system, as well as its apparent capability to provide value-free detailed information about the object of surveillance: 'the picture does not lie'. Indeed, much of its power lies in this aura of representational truth that surrounds the image, in spite of the interpretational debates (from the alarmist interpretation of Soviet civil defense bunkers by the former head of Air Force Intelligence, Major General Keegan, in the early 1970s, to the supposed discovery of Soviet MIG airfields and 'Cuban' baseball fields in Nicaragua in the early 1980s) that have marked the history of photo-reconnaissance. Admiral Stansfield Turner, more than any other director of the Central Intelligence Agency, promoted this view of technical intelligence:

> What espionage people have not accepted is that human espionage has become a complement to technical systems. Espionage either reaches out into voids where technical systems cannot probe or double-checks the results of technical collection. In short, human intelligence today is employed to do what technical systems cannot do.[44]

My purpose is not to rant against the 'machine in the garden', as Leo Marx put it; but neither is it to offer a paean to our new techno-gods. It is rather to point out a neglected problem of the surveillance regime, and to consider *why* it has been neglected. There is the previously mentioned factor of secrecy and compartmentalized knowledge that surrounds the systems and the attendant issue of accountability that automatically politicizes any inquiry. Technical intelligence systems are considered so sensitive that a new security classification was devised: SCI, for Sensitive Compartmented Information.[45] Perhaps, then, one reason why the politics of surveillance has been understudied by the field of international relations is because there simply is no testable, scientific method to determine how it is controlled, used and budgeted. These remain matters for historical investigation, intertextual interpretation and open-ended speculation –

not the usual methods and concerns of neo-behavioralists or neo-realists, but prime material for a post-structuralist inquiry.

The central problem of the surveillance regime is that it normalizes relations by continuing *both* war and peace by other, technical means. The same satellite that monitors and helps us verify whether the Soviets are conforming to the INF treaty simultaneously maps the way for low-level, terrain-following cruise missiles. TENCAP (Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities), using the latest generation of Advanced KH-11 and Milstar satellites, was designed to provide field commanders with the real-time command, control, communications and intelligence (C^3I) necessary to fight the cyberwars of the future – and perhaps to deter it, as immediate, local, *conventional* deterrence becomes a high priority with the prospects of a nuclear-free Europe.[46]

Moreover, multiple perspectives and interpretations of international crises are on the horizon, as several nations take steps to develop their own spy satellite capability, including Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Israel, India, and South Africa.[47] To avoid 'political manipulation' by the superpowers, middle-level powers like Canada and Sweden as well as the Western European Union, the nine-nation security organization, have called for internationally controlled satellites that would verify arms control agreements and monitor troop movements.[48] More recently, independent and commercial satellite surveillance sources have emerged. The first was the Swedish Space Media Network, which gained global attention when it scooped the Chernoybl disaster in 1986. Using images bought from the French SPOT system, American Landsats, and various weather satellites, and then boosting the resolution with a computer enhancement system, they have managed to uncover among other things Soviet laser installations, sites for Chinese missiles in Saudi Arabia, and new cocaine fields in Latin America.[49] More startling was what they failed to discover during the first few weeks of the Persian Gulf War: the massing of Iraqi forces on the Saudi borders that was used by President Bush to justify the immediate deployment of US troops to the region.[50]

Indeed, something of a paradox seems to be at work: the greater the transparency and the faster the response time of the new satellites (like the Lacrosse radar-imaging and Magnum communications-monitoring capabilities) that help provide C^3I, the greater the opportunity for deterrence to 'work'. At least that would seem to be borne out by one case – if it is to be believed – that Carter canceled a highly secret plan to attack Iran with 5,000 assault troops the autumn after the failed hostage rescue, because US satellites detected large Soviet troop movements (22 full divisions) heading toward Iran, a move made possible by the fact that the Soviets had gained access to US satelliterelayed messages – because the traitor John Walker had sold them the encryption key.[51]

THE PARANOIA OF CYBERSPACE

One policy implication of the new surveillance regime is that the superpowers have created a cybernetic system that displays the classic symptoms of advanced paranoia: hyper-vigilance, intense distrust, rigid and judgemental thought-processes, and projection of one's own repressed beliefs and hostile impulses onto the other. The very nature of the surveillance/cybernetic system contributes to this condition: we see and hear the other, but imperfectly and partially, *below* our rising expectations. This can induce paranoid behavior, that is, reasoning correctly but from incorrect premises, as happened with the participants in the well-known laboratory experiment at Stanford who were unknowingly subjected (through hypnosis) to a partial hearing loss: when placed in social situations, they assumed that people were whispering about them and soon took on the symptoms of paranoia.[52]

The pathological formation of the national security state takes on the characteristic of a feedback loop, constituting the need and the justification of surveillance systems which reinforces paranoiac behavior. Some classic examples are the 'bomber gaps' and 'missile gaps' of the 1950s and 1960s, when Eisenhower and the CIA played superego to a warring military id that (ab)used the new U-2 photo-reconnaissance to find bombers and missiles in every barn and silo of the Soviet Union.[53] Second, overclassification and overcompartmentalization of information in the national security state can lead to a form of overdetermined decision-making with policy outcomes based on a surfeit of 'deep', discrete sources that resist corrective feedback. And third, the national security identity itself becomes constituted by the internalization of the fear of an external 'other'. Perhaps the best example of many that I have come across is a 1963 internal FBI memo, written the day after Martin Luther King delivered his 'I have a dream' speech by the head of the Domestic Intelligence Division of the FBI, William Sullivan:

> The Director [Hoover] is correct. We were completely wrong about believing the evidence was not sufficient to determine some years ago that Fidel Castro was not a communist or under communist influence. On investigating and writing about communism and the American Negro, we had better remember this and profit by the lesson it should teach us. ... Personally, I believe in the light of King's powerful demagogic speech yesterday he stands head and

> shoulders over all other Negro leaders put together when it comes to influencing great masses of Negroes. We must mark him now, if we have not done so before, as the most dangerous Negro of the future in this Nation from the standpoint of communism, the Negro and national security.[54]

But what kind of feedback can possibly 'cure' the modern cyber-paranoic? At the level of superpower politics, perhaps our best hope – and the best elevation – for understanding the other at the highest reaches remains the much-maligned 'summit'. To be sure, there are many historical examples and counter-examples – the exchange of threats by Kennedy and Khruschev in Vienna, followed a decade later by bear-hugs between Nixon and Brezhnev – but a more recent case sticks in my mind: President Reagan, who approached his first summit with his Soviet counterpart with visions of the 'Evil Empire', came down from his third one saying (in something like Russian): 'Trust, but verify.'

Of course, it is dangerous to extrapolate lessons of the laboratory to the practices of power politics (the fetishization of the prisoner's dilemma game in international relations theory is a case in point); but if medicine finds it necessary to have a branch dedicated to the signs of illness (symptomology, also known as semiology), why not too the lesser science of IR?[55]

THE FUTURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE INTERTEXT

What lies ahead for intelligence? In keeping with my attempt to apply *critical* intelligence to the topic, my conclusions can only be speculative and skeptical: a précis of the gravest dangers, not a list of policy suggestions, is the best I can offer, and the most that the evidence can support as history continues to accelerate.

With the Second Cold War now a backdrop for MTV (the falling Berlin Wall and toppling Lenins playing as loop videos), and a hot regional war in the Persian Gulf proving slow to cool, there is little doubt that US intelligence will begin to change its focus – and little hope that there will be a decline in its (roughly) $30 billion budget.[56] Resources will be reallocated, industrial espionage will heat up, satellite orbits will shift, and new regional, multiple intertexts of intrigue will emerge to replace global, bipolar ones. However, still smarting from the underestimation of social and economic problems in the Soviet Union and overestimation of the staying power of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the CIA is working hard to convert an intelligence failure into a bigger budget.[57] The two messages most often delivered by the Director of Central

Intelligence William Webster before he retired were that arms control agreements under negotiation will require 'staggering' amounts of surveillance (that is, money), and that more and better intelligence (that is, money) will be needed in a world that 'may be more dangerous because it has become less predictable.'[58] Senator Boren, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, also weighed in on the side of budgetary increases as the Cold War winds down, stating in one interview that 'It's an irony, but it's true: as Star Wars winds down, spy wars are escalating.'[59] During the Gates' hearings various new priorities for the CIA were mooted. Alongside the traditional roles of arms control verification and surveillance of nuclear weapons proliferation were placed new efforts to stem narcotics trade and terrorism, locate new energy sources, and improve economic analysis and monitor pollution and global warming (the CIA goes Green?). And, to judge from James Woolsey's quick, non-controversial confirmation as President Clinton's CIA Director, there seem to be no sign of executive or congressional moves to reform or radically trim the CIA. Indeed, Woolsey's hearing was long on metaphors and aphorisms about the dangers of a changed world – of a slain dragon giving birth to poisonous snakes, of the Balkan cancer metastasizing elsewhere, of what you don't know hurting you – and notably short on what changes in intelligence were necessary to meet these new dangers.[60]

Meanwhile in the once-East, many intelligence officers find themselves out of work and, worse, the butt of jokes. The one I heard most frequently during a 1990 tour of Central Europe was that only names need be given to taxi drivers, because the drivers were all former Stasi who already knew their passengers' addresses – and those of their friends as well. In the same region old intelligence archives are being excavated and appropriated for new political purposes. The 'true' confessions of former KGB officers compete for space in US supermarket tabloids, the new Bulgarian intelligence officers promise to share clues of the assassination attempt on the Pope with US intelligence, and McCarthyism makes an appearance in Prague when members of Parliament – including some like Jan Kavan with impeccable dissident credentials – face accusers waving papers from old intelligence files. And now former Soviet spies are discovering the merit and profit of intertextuality: two defectors, Stanislav Levchenko and Alexandra Costa have written their own spy novel for Random House. According to Ms Costa, a factual autobiography was eschewed because there are 'events that strain credibility ... it is much easier to write about them in a novelistic way'.[61] This is surely only the beginning: at the end of *the* history come a thousand, newly rewritten ones.[62]

To return to the claim of the introduction, the most promising way to assess the status and future of intelligence is to focus on its shift from an identity constituted by the Soviet Other to forms of estrangement more fragmented and less monolithic in nature. The origins of such a shift are impossible to identify, except by an historical sleight of hindsight. Reagan and Gorbachev exchanging toasts and jokes over dinner might well have been the first date of a post-Cold War relationship, but it will take a new joint surveillance regime to consummate it. Twenty-five years after Eisenhower proposed in Geneva an 'Open Skies' policy, the greatest hopes and greatest obstacles for a new intelligence identity remain in the promise of new verification and surveillance technologies and the threat that it would pose to traditional sovereign identities. We can note hopes raised by the experimental flight of a Canadian C-130 transport plane flying over Hungarian and Soviet military bases in February 1990, and he overcoming of disputes about missile factory inspections and the encryption of missile test flights that had stymied a Start agreement on limiting long-range nuclear weapons.

Should one promote, can one even imagine, a global surveillance system? The collateral damage to liberties of all kinds is obvious. Perhaps we need to be reminded of the absurdist drama of the new American chancery in Moscow. Designed to be a state-of-the-art embassy, and built at a cost of $23 million, the building turned out to be one huge listening device; the Soviet builders had managed to incorporate surveillance systems into the steel girders and concrete walls. The Soviets were stupid enough to think that the surveillance equipment would go undetected; the Americans arrogant enough to think that they could detect inferior Soviet technology at the outset. Both were wrong. After several expert studies, the State Department concluded 'that razing the building and constructing a new one in its place would cost less, be less physically dangerous, and take less time than neutralizing the listening systems in the uncompleted building'.[63] The best-case scenario is that the end of the Cold War will restore a level of diplomatic civility that might balance the desire for total transparency. However, given the value and quest for total information in late modernity, the citizen, like the diplomat, must maintain a level of counter-vigilance commensurate to the power of the cyber-paranoids and global voyeurs of the future.

NOTES

1. An earlier work of mine, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*, included a genealogy of the conflict between particularist states and universalist ideologies which gave rise to an earlier form of anti-diplomacy. With Hegel as guide, I attempted to show how a universal alienation, when mediated through particular interests, gives rise to new and often violently antithetical forms of estrangement and mediation. See J. Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 134–67; and *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Oxford, 1992).

2. See J. Der Derian, 'The (S)pace of International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly*, No. 34 (Summer 1990), p. 297.
3. Ibid.
4. F. Nietzsche, *The Use and Abuse of History* (New York, 1957), p. 12.
5. Margery Sabin, 'The Community of Intelligence and the Avant-Garde', *Raritan*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Winter 1985), p. 2.
6. Some examples would be the *Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer* (published by the Parliamentary side, and according to its masthead, 'Sent Abroad to prevent misinformation'), *The Publick Intelligencer*, and the European *Intelligenzblatt*. See Anthony Smith, *The Newspaper: An International History* (London, 1979), pp. 10–12.
7. Michael Turner, 'Understanding CIA's Role in Intelligence', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1991), p. 303.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 296.
10. Roy Godson and Richard Shultz, 'Foreign Intelligence: A Course Syllabus', *International Studies Notes of the International Studies Association*, Vol. 8, issues 3–4 (Fall–Winter 1981–82), p. 5. There was an exception to the rule that I came across in Michael McKinley's highly informative and provocative paper, 'The Alliance Intelligence Benefit and Australia: A Challenge to the Prevailing Orthodoxy' (paper presented at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association in Vancouver). He quotes R. H. Mathams' definition of 'strategic intelligence' as that 'kind of intelligence a State must possess regarding other States in order to assure itself that its cause will not suffer nor its undertakings fail because its statesmen and soldiers plan and act in ignorance'. See R.H. Mathams, 'The Intelligence Analyst's Notebook', Working Paper No. 151 (Canberra: Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, February 1988), p. 1.
11. See C. von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, 1976); and L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, Vol. I (London, 1905).
12. 'The art of deterrence, prohibiting political war, favors the upsurge, not of conflicts, but of *acts of war without war.*' See Paul Virilio, *Pure War* (New York, 1983), p. 27.
13. Acting as commentator on a version of this paper that was presented at the United States Institute of Peace, Paul Seabury informed me that the CIA got it wrong: it should be, 'To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.' He attributed the mistranslation to misplaced peaceniks – like former Director Admiral Stansfield Turner – in the Agency.
14. Nikolai Yakovlev, *CIA Target – The USSR* (Moscow, 1982), p. 5.
15. Ibid., p. 134.
16. Most of these scholars can be read in two relatively new journals of intelligence: the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* and *Intelligence and National Security*.
17. Martin Wight, 'Why is there no International Theory?', in H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds), *Diplomatic Investigations* (London, 1966), p. 33–4.
18. See J. Der Derian, 'The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations', in J. Der Derian and M. Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington, MA, 1989), pp. 3–10.
19. See Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester, 1977), p. 30.
20. A notable exception is Walter Laqueur, who offers a persuasive critique of efforts made by political scientists and other behavioralists to transform intelligence and its study into a scientific activity. See in particular 'Craft or Science?', *A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence* (New York, 1985), pp. 293–308.
21. Author's notes from Hedley Bull's Oxford University lecture on 'The Neoidealists'.
22. See *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*, pp. 11–12; Wlad Godzich, 'The Tiger on the Paper Mat', foreword to Paul de Man, *The Resistance to Theory* (Minneapolis, 1986), pp. xiv–xv; and the *Oxford English Dictionary*.

23. See Andre Gerolymatos, *Espionage and Treason: A Study of the Proxenia in Political and Military Intelligence Gathering in Classical Greece* (Amsterdam, 1986); and Wight, *Systems of States*, pp. 53–6.
24. For example, Alexandros of Macedonia, a *proxenos* of Athens, supplied the Athenians with the Persian battle plan at Plataiai in 479 BC; and in 427 BC the Corinthian *proxeni* in Corcyra arranged for the release of 250 Corcyrians imprisoned in Corinthos and then used them to subvert and overthrow the democratic government of Corcyra. See Gerolymatos, *Espionage and Treason*, pp. 110–15.
25. See Richard Wilmer Rowan, *Secret Service: Thirty-three Centuries of Espionage* (New York, 1937).
26. Sabin, p. 7.
27. See J. Der Derian, 'Introducing Philosophical Traditions in International Relations, *Millennium Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. xvii, No. 2 (Summer 1988), pp. 189–93.
28. de Man, *Resistance to Theory*, p. 67.
29. This borrows from one of the more recent – and certainly one of the richest – exchanges on the reason/rhetoric question between Jacques Derrida and John Searle on J. L. Austin's speech-act theory. See Searle, 'Reiterating the Differences, *Glyph*, Vol. I (1977), pp. 198–208; and Derrida's reply, 'Limited Inc abc', *Glyph*, Vol. II (1977), pp. 162–254.
30. 'The Death of the Author', in R. Barthes, *Image–Music–Text*, trans. S. Heath (New York, 1977), p. 146.
31. This account is drawn from videotapes of the hearings, and the edited transcripts of the hearings published by the *New York Times*, 2–5 Oct. 1991; David Johnston, 'Documents Show CIA Debate Over Whether Soviets Tried to Assassinate Pope,' *New York Times*, 2 Oct. 1991; Elaine Sciolino and David Johnston, 'In Rebuttal to Senate Committee, CIA Nominee is Truthful but Incomplete', *New York Times*, 13 Oct. 1991; and Anthony Lewis, 'Too Clever by Half', *New York Times*, 13 Oct. 1991.
32. Lewis, 'Too Clever by Half'.
33. 'Writers, Intellectuals, Teachers', in Barthes, *Image–Music–Text*, p. 201.
34. Wight, 'Why is there no International Theory?', p. 32.
35. By the 'New Ambiguity' I refer to an historical period of uncertainty and unpredictability (as often noted in speeches by President Bush); and by the 'New Historicism' to the historical approach influenced by literary theory, ably demonstrated by Stephen Greenblatt, Jonathan Arac, Jean Franco, Hayden White, among many others. By the use of these terms I seek as well to highlight the new discursive power emanating from the *circulation* and *interpenetration* of historical 'fact' and 'fiction', best instanced in politics by the presidency of President Reagan (who drew many of his facts from movies); in history by Simon Schama, e.g., *Dead Certainties (Unwarranted Speculations)* (New York,1991), and in fiction by Don Delilo, *Libra* (New York, 1989). See also H. Veeser (ed.), *The New Historicism* (New York, 1989).
36. I have focused primarily on the written text rather than visual texts, not because of some literary purity but simply because of archival limitations. Indeed, it could be argued that the cinematic and video intertext of espionage is now much more powerful. A case in point would be the short-lived television series 'Under Cover', about a husband and wife team in the CIA (thinly fictionalized as the 'National Intelligence Agency'). ABC decided not to broadcast one of the first episodes because it was deemed 'too' timely: it involved an attempt to thwart an invasion of Kuwait by Iraq which was to include the deployment of chemical weapons and missiles. It seemed that the CIA and other US intelligence organizations lagged behind the 'NIA's' assessment of the region by several months.
37. See J. Der Derian, 'Spy vs. Spy: The Intertextual Power of International Intrigue', in Der Derian and Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations*, pp. 163–88.
38. See Enrico Angelli and Craig Murphy, *America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis* (London, 1988).
39. M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1977), p. 169.

40. For three very different, very rich accounts of surveillance see Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, P. Virilio's *Guerre et Cinéma: Logistique de la Perception* (Paris, 1984), and W. Burrow's *Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security* (New York, 1986).
41. M. Blanchot, *The Writing of the Disaster*, trans. A. Smock (Lincoln and London, 1986), p. 66.
42. See H. Bull and A. Watson (eds), *The Expansion of the International Society* (Oxford, 1984).
43. That is, unless one goes beyond the favored geosynchronous parking spots to include the US Vela spacecraft which watches for the double flash of a thermonuclear explosion from 60,000 miles out. See Burrows, *Deep Black*, pp. 19–20.
44. Quoted in Burrows, *Deep Black*, p. v.
45. Not that it prevented Christopher Boyce, employed in TRW's satellite program, and William Kampiles, a CIA watch officer, from stealing and selling to the Soviets detailed, comprehensive information about the Rhyolite and KH-11 satellite systems.
46. This leaves unbegged the question of whether the Persian Gulf War was an intelligence or deterrence failure – or both.
47. On the likelihood of a post-Cold War proliferation of intelligence satellites, see Jeffrey Richelson, 'The Future of Space Reconnaissance', *Scientific American*, Vol. 264, No. 1 (Jan. 1991), pp. 38–44.
48. See William Broad, 'Non-Superpowers are Developing Their Own Spy Satellite Systems', *New York Times*, 3 Sept. 1989, p. 16.
49. Coming as a surprise to the Western intelligence agencies was the 1987 Soviet decision to enter the market of satellite photography, especially since it would appear that the photographs sold so far come from military satellites with a magnification power capable of discerning objects as small as five meters (the SPOT system resolves down to 10 meters, the Landsat 30 meters). It would seem that the exigencies of capitalism are greater than those of 'national security', since the US is now reconsidering its long-held policy of total secrecy for military reconnaissance photographs. See William Broad, 'Soviet Photos of U.S. Were for Spying', *New York Times*, 30 Jan. 1989.
50. This story was covered by the *St. Petersburg Times* (6 Jan. 1991), and reprinted in *In These Times* (27 Feb. 1991), but largely ignored by the wire services and the national media. Most newspapers at the time did mention that satellite images were used by Defense Secretary Cheney to convince King Fahd that a US troop deployment to the region was necessary.
51. See J. Barron, *Breaking the Ring* (Boston, 1987), pp. 24–5. There are certainly other crises in international affairs when a regime of independent satellite reconnaissance could have reduced tensions, such as the 1987 Operation Brass Tacks war exercise conducted by India that was almost mistaken by Pakistan as a real attack. See Richelson, 'Space Reconnaissance', p. 44.
52. See W. Herbert, 'Paranoia: Fearful Delusions', in *New York Times Magazine*, 19 Feb. 1989, pp. 62–3.
53. Burrows gives a good account of the inter-service rivalry and its effect on photo interpretation during this period. He quotes a former CIA officer who said that 'To the Air Force, every flyspeck on film was a missile.' See *Deep Black*, pp. 82–112.
54. Memorandum from William Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 30 Aug. 1963, 'Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans', Book III, *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities* (Washington, 1976), pp. 107–8.
55. But then IR might find it necessary to adopt the telling statement that I discovered in the fine print of a hospital release form: 'The patient recognizes that medicine is an imperfect art, not a science.'
56. Since the budget is secret, all such figures are very rough estimates. Contrary to the popular view, the CIA receives just over a tenth of the overall intelligence budget (in 1990, around \$3–\$3.5 billion) annually, while the technological ears and eyes of the community, the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office

receive the bulk of the amount (about $5 billion and $8 billion, respectively). See Michael Wines, 'Washington is Tiring of Supporting All Those Spies', *New York Times*, 4 Nov. 1990.

57. This is not an idle concern: after the failure of the intelligence agencies to predict the 1973 Yom Kippur war, the Deputy Secretary of Defense ordered budget cuts of 25 per cent. The CIA was spared, but not those agencies under Pentagon control, including the National Security Agency. See Stephen Engelberg, 'Pressure Grows for Cuts in Intelligence Spending', *New York Times*, 28 Nov. 1989.
58. See William J. Broad, 'US Adds Spy Satellites Despite Easing Tensions', *New York Times*, 3 Dec. 1989; and Michael Wines, 'It's Still Business as Usual for Spies, Even as the Eastern Bloc Rises Up', *New York Times*, 31 Dec. 1989, p. 15. During his tenure William Webster also used the theme of Soviet industrial espionage to justify the continuation of a high budget for US intelligence agencies. But with the common enemy gone, we should also expect more spying among friends, as was the recent case of French intelligence trying from 1987 to 1989 to recruit agents in IBM, Texas Instruments, and other computer companies. See Michael Wines, 'French Said to Spy on U.S. Computer Companies', *New York Times*, 18 Nov. 1990, p. 4.
59. See Stephen Engelberg, 'Senator Faults U.S. Effort to Deter Espionage', *New York Times*, 30 July 1989.
60. See Douglas Jehl, 'C.I.A. Nominee Wary of Budget Cuts', *New York Times*, 3 Feb. 1993.
61. See Barbara Gamarekian, 'Two Defectors from Soviet Marry and Turn to Writing about Spies', *New York Times*, 15 July 1988.
62. Some are better than others: see, for instance, Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (New York, 1990).
63. See Elaine Sciolino, 'The Bugged Embassy Case: What Went Wrong', *New York Times*, 15 Nov. 1989).

KGB Foreign Intelligence from Brezhnev to the Coup

CHRISTOPHER ANDREW

One of the main aims of the KGB was always to impress the Soviet leadership. Right up to the abortive coup of August 1991, it supplied regular reports designed to show its success in influencing the politicians and public opinion of the Third World. The format seems to have changed little from Brezhnev to Gorbachev. Among documents released from Communist Party Central Committee archives during the year after the coup was a 1969 report from the then KGB chairman, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, boasting of the KGB's ability to organize large protest demonstrations outside the US embassy in Delhi for $5,000 a time, and a letter to Gorbachev 20 years later by Andropov's successor, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov, reporting an increased number of agents in the Sri Lankan parliament and the 'sincere gratitude to Moscow' allegedly expressed by the leader of the Freedom Party for Soviet 'financial support'.[1] The KGB was also fond of boasting of its influence on a wide variety of international organisations, ranging from sections of the peace movement to the World Council of Churches (WCC). One recently declassified document of 1969 describes the work of five KGB agents on the WCC Central Committee and the appointment of another to a 'high WCC post'. A similar report of 1989 claims that, as the result of agent operations to implement 'a plan approved by the KGB leadership', 'the WCC Executive and Central Committee adopted public statements (eight) and messages (three) which corresponded to the political course of Socialist [Communist] countries'. While it would be naive to take such boasting entirely at its face value, there can be little doubt about the reality of Soviet penetration of the WCC.[2]

The KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate (FCD) was also able to claim numerous successes in plundering Western science and technology. Leonid Sergeevich Zaitsev, head of FCD scientific and technological intelligence (S&T), boasted in the early 1980s that value of the S&T obtained from the West more than covered the entire foreign operating costs of the KGB.[3] Kryuchkov, head of the FCD from 1974 to 1988, claimed in 1984 that the S&T obtained by the KGB had been 'used to real economic effect in our own industrial enterprises'.[4] The statistics are impressive. In 1980 the Military-Industrial Commission ordered 3,617 S&T 'acquisition tasks', of which 1,085 (over 60 per cent against US targets) were completed within the year by the KGB and other collection agencies, allegedly benefiting 3,396 Soviet research and development projects.[5]

The reality was less impressive. Despite their boasting to the Central Committee, both Zaitsev and Kryuchkov were well aware that S&T successes were failing to diminish the steadily growing gap between Soviet and Western technology, particularly outside the defence sphere. For all its success against soft targets, the FCD was dissatisfied with its own performance. High-grade political and military intelligence against the traditional 'main adversary', the United States, had become steadily more elusive since the early successes of the Cold War. In his biennial report on foreign operations in January 1984, Kryuchkov acknowledged that the KGB had 'not had great success in operating against the main adversary'. The main operational priority, he insisted, must remain, as it had done since the start of the Cold War, *'the recruitment of valuable agents from among foreign nationals first and foremost for working against the main adversary'*.[6]

The KGB's most successful American agents during the previous two decades were probably the Walker family spy-ring, whose operations from 1968 to 1985 enabled Soviet cryptanalysts to decrypt large quantities of US naval and other communications. But, in the eyes of the FCD, mercenary petty criminals like John Walker, however productive, were no substitute for the ideologically motivated high-flyers recruited on both sides of the Atlantic in the 1930s and 1940s. 'Valuable agents' seemed as elusive in Britain, the main ally of the United States, as in the 'main adversary' itself. Probably the most important British agent of the Brezhnev era, the sexual misfit and child-molester Geoffrey Prime, only served to underline the contrast with the earlier generation of Soviet spies led by the 'Magnificent Five' from Cambridge. When Michael Bettaney, a middle-ranking Oxford graduate in MI5, offered himself for recruitment in 1983, the KGB London resident, Arkadi Vasilyevich Guk, was so taken by surprise that he concluded, to his later chagrin, that Bettaney's approach must be an MI5 provocation.[7] The division of Germany made the Federal Republic an easier target for the KGB (and, still more, for the East German HVA) than either the United States or Britain. But China, the most important target after the 'main adversary' and its leading NATO allies, also suffered from what one FCD report termed 'lack of the essential agent apparatus'.[8]

In June 1984 Kryuchkov informed KGB residencies abroad that 'all the diverse intelligence assignments against the USA' could not be fulfilled unless there was a 'radical improvement' in agent recruitment.[9] On 21 February 1985 Kryuchkov addressed a special meeting of the FCD Communist Party called to discuss worldwide operations against the United States. 'Active intelligence work against the United States', he declared sententiously, 'is a matter of professional honour and an official and Party obligation for every member of the Service.' 'Recruitment work against the USA and NATO', he announced, would be the chief criterion by which the work of FCD officers abroad would be judged. Kryuchkov then denounced 'the low standard of this work' at present and 'the lack of appreciable results' by residencies around the world in recruiting Americans. There followed what the official record euphemistically termed 'a lively discussion' during which a number of residencies – among them Copenhagen, Canberra and Helsinki – were singled out for criticism.[10]

This discussion and others like it achieved little. The major obstacles to the recruitment of a new generation of high-flying ideological moles remained taboo. The most basic was the disintegration of the myth-image of the Soviet Union as the world's first worker-peasant state, the harbinger of a new classless society. The impression of an ageing Soviet bureaucracy vividly conveyed by Brezhnev and his two terminally ill successors had little appeal to most young Western radicals. Though no report by or to Kryuchkov could contemplate criticism of the Party leadership, there was some indirect acknowledgement of the Soviet Union's uninspiring international image in Kruychkov's call for more 'false flag' recruitment: the pretence to potential agents that they would be providing covert assistance not to the KGB but to some other cause more likely to inspire their loyalty, such as the peace movement.[11] Also taboo in discussions of the difficulties facing KGB foreign operations was the fact that Kryuchkov himself was part of the problem. Before entering the KGB in 1967, he had spent eight years working in the Central Committee's Department for Relations with Socialist Countries. Thereafter he was staunch in his defence of 'the Party apparatus' against what he termed 'modish' attacks by its critics.[12] Unlike many of his ablest officers, Kryuchkov had no experience of working at a KGB residency in a Western capital. His only foreign posting had been as a diplomat in Budapest during the mid-1950s: a period which included the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Rising. When Gordievsky first met Kryuchkov (then deputy head of the FCD) in 1972, shortly before he was posted to Copenhagen, he was struck by the naïveté and ideological dogmatism of Kryuchkov's instructions on how to recruit Western agents – a subject on which he possessed strong opinions but no practical experience.[13]

Kryuchkov also had exaggerated expectations about the ability of KGB 'active measures' campaigns to influence Western public opinion. In much of the Third World, KGB propaganda, covertly planted in the media, was able to tap a rich vein of anti-Americanism and a willingness to blame local problems on imperialist machinations. The story, spread by the KGB, that the Aids virus had been manufactured during a US biological warfare programme, though it had some resonance in the West, had far greater impact in the Third World. During the first six months of 1986 alone, it received major news coverage in over 40 Third World countries. Forged documents revealing non-existent American plots also seem to have made a significant impression on some Third World politicians.[14] Leonid Vladimirovich Shebarshin, who succeeded Kryuchkov as head of the FCD in January 1989, made his reputation as resident in India from 1975 to 1977 in part by the success of his 'active measures' operations. In a newspaper interview late in 1992, a year after his resignation from the KGB, Shebarshin spoke 'nostalgically about the old days, about disinformation – forging documents, creating sensations for the press'.[15]

The enormous effort devoted to 'active measures' campaigns in the West, however, yielded much slimmer results than in the Third World. Though residencies were quick to claim credit in the early 1980s for the growth of the Western peace movement and anti-Reagan articles in the press, there is no convincing evidence that they had more than a marginal influence on either.[16] Ingenious though some individual forgeries and disinformation campaigns were, the management of Service A reflected Kryuchkov's ponderous bureaucratic style – as witness, for example, the elaborate 'active measures' designed to sabotage the US bicentennial in 1976. Part of the campaign centred on a series of anti-American pamphlets purportedly produced by a (non-existent) European Bicentennial Committee based in Denmark, in reality fabricated by Service A in Moscow. Owing to delays and over-production of the pamphlets, they were still being posted by the Copenhagen residency to addresses in Western Europe and beyond at least five months after the bicentennial was over. Even in the spring of 1977, the Centre bureaucracy went on issuing detailed instructions on the precise method of posting its pamphlets. The experienced resident in Copenhagen, Mikhail Petrovich Lyubimov, was told to ensure that his officers were affixing sufficient stamps to the envelopes, not posting too many in the same letterbox, being 'meticulous when handling the envelopes', not leaving fingerprints on them, and sending some to Soviet Bloc embassies in order to check their safe passage through the post. Lyubimov was instructed to telegraph the date of despatch of the latest batch of pamphlets to the Centre. The FCD officer responsible for transmitting these officious lessons in elementary tradecraft was Viktor Fyodorovich Grushko, who later served under Kryuchkov as, successively, deputy-head of the FCD and deputy-chairman of the KGB.[17]

The cost-effectiveness of operations such as the anti-bicentennial pamphlets was rarely, if ever, challenged by the FCD leadership. Some of the first 'active measures' directed against Margaret Thatcher, after she became Prime Minister in 1979, were also in the form of pamphlets produced by Service A and distributed from Copenhagen under the name of a Danish journalist. Though they contained a number of embarrassing errors, such as the description of Grantham, Mrs Thatcher's birthplace, as 'in the suburbs of London', Service A was unaccountably proud of its production.[18] Any sober analysis of the effectiveness of the pamphlets would have concluded that they had negligible impact. When Gorbachev later ordered the scaling down of 'active measures' designed to discredit Mrs Thatcher, however, the FCD leadership was seriously put out. Shebarshin complained that Gorbachev 'would not countenance any serious plots against Mrs Thatcher, whom he saw as a friend'.[19]

The FCD suffered from no shortage of talent. It attracted some of the ablest and most adventurous young Soviet graduates. But their talents were constricted by the blinkered bureaucratic mindset of the Party apparat, exemplified by Kryuchkov. As the difficulties of recruiting high-grade Western agents increased, Kryuchkov responded by greater bureaucracy, demanding ever longer reports and more form-filling. A questionnaire distributed to residents in April 1985, which Kryuchkov intended to serve as the basis for reports on politicians and other 'prominent figures in the West' being considered as possible 'targets for cultivation', contained 56 questions, many of them complex and extensively subdivided.[20] The sheer scale, complexity and, in some respects, the pointlessness of the research required scarcely encouraged personal initiative. FCD officers were not, of course, alone in complaining that the volume of their paperwork hampered their intelligence operations. But pointless bureaucracy in the West, whether inside or outside the intelligence community, never rivalled the scale of that in the Soviet Union.

Even in the most successful periods of KGB foreign operations, the quality of its analysis did not equal that of its intelligence collection. Though the political slanting of intelligence reports was not, of course, unique to the KGB, it was always a more serious problem than in the main Western intelligence agencies. Authoritarian and one-party regimes are, by their nature, more intolerant of dissenting opinions than multi-party democracies. While the level of political correctness required in the Brezhnev era had clearly declined since the death of Stalin, it continued to corrupt the analytical process. During an interview in 1992, Shebarshin acknowledged that under both Brezhnev and Chernenko, the KGB 'had to present its reports in a falsely positive light'.[21] Loyalty to a former chairman of the KGB seems to have prevented Shebarshin also referring to Andropov's term as general secretary from 1982 to 1984. While Andropov may have been somewhat less blinkered than Brezhnev, however, the 'falsely positive' tone continued. Kryuchkov's discussion of 'international economic problems' in his biennial review of KGB foreign operations in January 1984 avoided all mention of the worsening crisis in the Soviet economy, save for a reference to 'the need to counteract the adversary's designs to undermine the economy of the countries of the socialist community by means of "economic warfare" '. He emphasized instead what he claimed was 'the deepening economic and social crisis in the capitalist world':

> The slowing down in the growth of industrial production, together with continuing technological progress, have led to permanent mass unemployment and to exacerbation of other social problems. The prospect of a worsening of these trends is frightening the imperialists. They are seeking an escape from the difficulties they have created in their own ways, including that of war.[22]

FCD reports suffered from a general tendency to tell the Party apparat what it wanted to hear. Residencies around the world were expected to provide prompt reports of favourable responses to every major speech and 'initiative' by the Soviet leadership. When no such responses occurred, they were commonly invented. On 25 March 1985, for example, the London residency received an urgent telegram asking for British reactions to Gorbachev's meeting with the executive committee of the Socialist International. Sooner than report that the event had failed to excite great interest in Britain, the residency simply concocted a favourable reply without contacting any of its limited range of sources.[23] According to Vyacheslav Ivanovich Gurgenev (alias Artyomov), deputy head of the FCD, interviewed a few weeks after the 1991 coup:

> Our service has had enough trouble in the past trying to collect responses to every 'brilliant' initiative by our leaders. This kind of work tended to corrupt people who started out with the illusion of doing something useful.

The FCD also sought to pander to the apparently insatiable appetite of the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee for personal details about the lives of foreign communist and left-wing leaders. Though many FCD officers were sceptical about the significance of much of this information, they refrained from saying so in their reports. According to Gurgenev:

> ... You know, this was simple and cynical. Our main client was the International Department of the Central Committee. And they'd be

> happy with any piece of gossip. Knowing what one group in South Yemen was saying about another was something they revelled in.[24]

The ID was also deeply interested in Western socialist and social-democratic parties, whose policies it hoped to influence. Its head, Boris Ponomarev, declared optimistically in 1976, 'Cooperation between Communists, Socialists and Social-Democrats could become one of the decisive factors for peace and social progress.' He greatly exaggerated the significance of the Socialist International, seeing it as a watered-down socialist version of the old Moscow Comintern. In reality, the International's London-based secretariat, a major target of the KGB, had a staff of only twelve and little ability to influence the policies of member parties. But the London residency forebore to challenge the ID's estimate of its importance.[25] The FCD also sought to impress its customers by giving an exaggerated impression of the extent of its secret sources in the West. According to Gurgenev, one of the FCD's favourite maxims, even at the beginning of the 1990s, was: 'If a Soviet secret agent has to choose between listening to a weather report at 5 p.m. or stealing it 4.45, he'd prefer to steal it.'[26]

One FCD political intelligence officer, interviewed a few weeks after the 1991 coup, told *Izvestia* that the attempt to 'serve mostly Party interests' had led to 'profanation of the essence of intelligence activities':

> ... In order to please our superiors, we sent in falsified and biased information, acting on the principle 'Blame everything on the Americans, and everything will be OK'. That's not intelligence, it's self-deception.[27]

The leading US expert in the FCD during the 1970s, Oleg Danilovich Kalugin (who, in 1974 at the age of 39, had become the FCD's youngest general after successes which included setting up the Walker family spy-ring), sometimes found it difficult to gain a hearing for reports which failed to 'blame everything on the Americans'. While head of the PR (political intelligence) line at the Washington residency in 1968, he forwarded to the Centre what he described as 'absolutely reliable documents' demonstrating that the Prague Spring had taken the CIA and the US administration by surprise. The FCD, however, claimed to detect a large American conspiracy behind the events in Czechoslovakia. When Kalugin returned to Moscow, he discovered that the Centre had ordered that 'my messages should be destroyed and not shown to anyone'.[28] The conflict between Kalugin's relatively pragmatic view of the West and Kryuchkov's hardline dogmatism led in 1980 to Kalugin's removal from the FCD. The main British expert in the Centre, Mikhail Petrovich Lyubimov, whose pragmatism was even less to Kryuchkov's taste, was expelled from the KGB in the same year.[29]

'Blaming the Americans' derived less from a conscious attempt to pander to the prejudices of the Party hierarchy, though there was an element of that, than from the FCD leadership's traditional predilection for conspiracy theory. Western intelligence officers during the Cold War sometimes showed a similar predilection, but grand conspiracy theory has much greater official appeal within one-party states than in plural-value systems. The last chairman of the KGB, Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin, appointed soon after the abortive 1991 coup, defined 'Chekism', the traditional mindset of the KGB, as the 'constant search for an enemy': 'At first this meant Counter-revolutionaries, then Trotskyists, then members of the Doctors' Plot, then U.S. imperialists, then dissidents and so it continued.'[30] Though Andropov and his successors as KGB chairman never fully returned to the paranoia of the Stalin era, they retained a tendency to see imaginary imperialist conspiracies behind Soviet setbacks both at home and abroad. In January 1977 Kryuchkov, as head of the FCD, forwarded to the Central Committee a report entitled 'On CIA Plans To Recruit Agents Among Soviet Citizens'. The report detailed a non-existent CIA masterplan to recruit large numbers of bright young Soviet graduates, train them in sabotage as well as espionage, 'and then advance them into administrative positions within Soviet politics, the economy and science'. The CIA would then order its agents to cause 'severe' political problems in the Soviet Union, 'sabotage the economy', and 'channel scientific research into dead-ends'. Kryuchkov considered this imaginary conspiracy so alarming that he sent his report to be signed by Andropov and circulated to the Politburo who, presumably, failed to grasp its absurdity.[31] FCD active measures helped to spread the image in some Western media of Andropov (whose protégé Kryuchkov was) as a closet liberal with a sneaking regard for dissident intellectuals. But though more sophisticated than most of his predecessors, Andropov never wavered in his belief that the West was engaged in a gigantic campaign of 'ideological subversion'. He celebrated the centenary in September 1977 of the birth of Feliks Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Cheka and patron saint of the KGB, with a speech denouncing all dissidents as part of an imperialist plot:

> The existence of the so-called 'dissidents' only became possible because the enemies of socialism set up the Western press, diplomatic, as well as intelligence and other special services to work on this business.[32]

At least until the mid-1980s the FCD also continued to draw up elaborate 'workplans' to counter vast and improbable schemes for Zionist 'ideological subversion' which it believed were being run by Zionism in collaboration with Western intelligence agencies.[33]

The most dangerous distortions in intelligence analysis generated by the KGB leadership's penchant for conspiracy theory occurred during the early years of the Reagan presidency. In May 1981 Andropov told a major KGB conference in Moscow that the new American administration was actively preparing for nuclear war. He then announced that, by decision of the Politburo, the KGB and GRU were for the first time to collaborate in a global intelligence operation, codenamed Ryan, designed to detect signs of American preparations for a nuclear first strike. Though the chief promoter of Ryan in the Politburo may have been Marshal Dmitri Fyodorovich Ustinov (later one of Andropov's key supporters in the struggle to succeed Brezhnev), the FCD had no doubt that Andropov's alarm was genuine. Most residencies in Western capitals were less alarmist than the KGB leadership. When Gordievsky joined the London residency in June 1982, he found all his colleagues in the PR line sceptical about Operation Ryan. None, however, was willing to risk his career by challenging the Centre's assessment. Ryan thus created a vicious circle of intelligence collection and assessment. Residencies were, in effect, ordered to search out alarming information. The Centre was duly alarmed and demanded more.[34] Andropov declared in December 1982: 'The war preparations of the United States and the NATO alliance it leads have grown to an all-time high, assuming a scope unprecedented in history.'[35] The Centre interpreted the announcement of the SDI ('Star Wars') programme in March 1983 as part of the psychological preparation of the American people for nuclear war. Marshal Ustinov and Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov, who had become KGB chairman in December 1982, jointly informed Andropov in a secret memorandum that the apparent straying off course of the South Korean airliner KAL 007, shot down over Soviet territory on 1 September 1983, was part of another American plot:

> ... We were dealing with a major, dual-purpose political provocation carefully organised by the U.S. special [intelligence] services. The first purpose was to use the incursion of the intruder aircraft into Soviet airspace to create a favourable situation for the gathering of defence data on our air defence system in the Far East, involving the most diverse systems including the Ferret reconnaissance satellite. Second, they envisaged, if this flight were terminated by us, using that fact to mount a global anti-Soviet campaign to discredit the Soviet Union.[36]

On 28 September the terminally ill Andropov issued from his sick-bed a denunciation of American policy couched in apocalyptic language unparalleled since the depths of the Cold War. 'Outrageous military psychosis' had taken over the United States. 'The Reagan administration, in its imperial ambitions, goes so far that one begins to doubt whether Washington has any brakes at all preventing it from crossing the point at which any sober-minded person must stop.' Alarm within the Centre reached a climax during the NATO exercise Able Archer 83, held in November 1983 to practise nuclear release procedures. For a time the KGB leadership was haunted by the fear that the exercise might be intended as cover for a nuclear first strike. London cannot have been the only residency in which some KGB officers were by now more concerned by the alarmism in the Centre than by the threat of a Western surprise attack.[37]

Operation Ryan wound down (though it did not end) during 1984, helped by the deaths of its two main promoters, Andropov and Ustinov, and by reassuring signals from London and Washington. Gorbachev became general secretary in March 1985 with the clear intention of promoting East-West détente. But, even at the dawn of the Gorbachev era, the FCD was still discovering imaginary American conspiracies. Grushko, deputy head of the FCD, circulated residencies with a warning that the CIA might be deliberately infecting grain imports to the Soviet Union.[38]Glasnost, however, had some impact on the KGB as well as on the media. According to Shebarshin, then deputy head of the FCD, 'the KGB no longer had to present its reports in a falsely positive light',[39] though many of its officers must surely have found it difficult to throw off the habits of a lifetime. Chebrikov, the chairman of the KGB, had supported Gorbachev's appointment as general secretary in the belief that he was the man most likely to provide the leadership necessary to end Soviet economic stagnation and establish a stable 'correlation of forces' with the West. But he became deeply frustrated by Gorbachev's inattentiveness to his conspiracy theories, and increasingly out of sympathy with the 'New Thinking' in Soviet foreign policy. He used the 110th anniversary of Dzerzhinsky's birth in 1987 to denounce a gigantic plot by Western intelligence agencies to spread ideological subversion (Trotskyism included!) throughout the Soviet Bloc:

> ... [Western] subversive centres spare no effort to carry out acts of ideological subversion, step up their attempts to discredit Marxist-Leninist theory and Communist Party policy, and seek in every way to discredit the Soviet state's historical path and the practice of socialist construction. To this end bourgeois ideologists are reworking their threadbare baggage, and they not infrequently draw arguments for their insinuations from the arsenal of Trotskyism and other opportunist currents.[40]

Chebrikov interpreted the growth of nationalist unrest within the Soviet Union as an integral part of the imperialist plot:

> It is no accident that the special services of imperialist states and foreign anti-Soviet centres align themselves with extremist actions intermingled with nationalism, and subsequently begin themselves to play the part of direct instigators of hostile acts aimed at kindling hostility and discord between nations. The danger of this method of subversive activity against our country must not be underestimated.[41]

Gorbachev was increasingly embarrassed by the publicly evident gap between Chebrikov's conspiracy theories and his own New Thinking. He was far closer to the more politically astute Kryuchkov, who increasingly saw an opportunity, by winning Gorbachev's confidence, to replace Chebrikov. In December 1987 Gorbachev took Kryuchkov with him on a visit to Washington to sign the first arms control treaty to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers – the first time that a head of the FCD had accompanied a Soviet leader on a visit to the West. In October 1988 Kruychkov achieved his ambition of becoming the first FCD head to become chairman of the KGB. His valedictory address on leaving the FCD was a remarkable mixture of the old and new thinking. 'Democratization and "glasnost" are the motive force of perestroika', he declared, 'and we shall not win through without them.' But, he added, 'order and discipline' were also necessary conditions for the success of perestroika. Kryuchkov paid a fulsome, even slightly obsequious, tribute to Eduard Shevardnadze's achievements in foreign policy and to the 'energy, initiative, purposefulness and consistency' his diplomats had displayed. 'Unless we have an objective view of the world, seeing it unadorned and free of clichés and stereotyped ideas, all claims about the effectiveness of our foreign policy operations will be nothing but empty words.'

A reading of Kryuchkov's address, however, makes clear that the old suspicions and conspiracy theories still lurked not far below the surface. Without mentioning Operation Ryan by name, he sought to justify the principles on which it was based: 'Many of [the FCD's] former responsibilities have not been removed from the agenda. The principal one of these is not to overlook the immediate danger of nuclear conflict being unleashed.' And he added a warning about the continuing brutality of 'provocation operations' by Western intelligence services; he claimed that there had been over 900 such operations during the first half of 1988 alone.[42]

In January 1989 Kryuchkov was succeeded as head of the FCD by the 53-year-old Shebarshin, the first man with experience of working in countries outside the Soviet Bloc to run foreign intelligence since the Second World War. One of his main jobs at the beginning of the Gorbachev era had been to prepare intelligence reports for the Party leadership. The fact that he leapfrogged several more senior candidates for his new post is a certain indication that his briefing had impressed Gorbachev.[43] A number of FCD officers interviewed by *Izvestia* after his resignation in September 1991 referred to Shebarshin as 'the first really competent head of the FCD in decades'.[44] According to Shebarshin, his main initial brief was 'to ensure the West did not cheat on arms control'.[45]

Kryuchkov began 1989 with a dramatic demonstration of the new climate of East–West relations, becoming the first chairman in KGB history to receive the United States ambassador in his office. Thereafter he embarked on an unprecedented public relations campaign designed to win over Western as well as Soviet opinion. 'The KGB', he declared, 'should have an image not only in our country but worldwide which is consistent with the noble goals I believe we are pursuing in our work.'[46] In the course of 1989, however, the crumbling of the Soviet Bloc drove a wedge between Gorbachev and the KGB leadership. While Gorbachev accepted the collapse as inevitable, the Centre did not. The FCD devised 'active measures' intended to stave off the downfall of the regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and elsewhere, but was refused permission to implement them. According to Shebarshin, the communist leaders of Eastern Europe were told to fend for themselves. 'But', he complains, 'they were educated only to be friends of the Soviet Union; they were never prepared to stand on their own feet. They were just thrown to the wolves.'[47]

As the Soviet Union's economic problems multiplied during 1990 and separatist movements strengthened, the Centre's traditional suspicions of the 'main adversary' and its allies revived. Unlike most of his predecessors, Kryuchkov did not place all the responsibility on the imperialists. 'The main sources of our trouble, in the KGB's view', he declared, 'are to be found inside the country.' But he also placed increasing blame on Western plots. According to Shebarshin, Gorbachev failed to heed the FCD's warnings. 'He and his friends lived in a world of self-delusion ... We were hitching our wagon to the Western train.'[48] With Gorbachev, in the Centre's view, unwilling to offend the Americans, Kryuchkov began to make public some of the KGB's neglected warnings. In December 1990, probably at about the time when he began to make secret preparations for the coup, Kryuchkov gave a speech warning of a Western plot, 'akin to economic sabotage', to 'deliver impure and sometimes infected grain, as well as products with an above-average level of radioactivity or containing harmful substances': much the same conspiracy theory set out by his deputy, Grushko, in a secret circular to residencies almost six years earlier. In February 1991, first Grushko and then the new Prime Minister, Valentin Pavlov, denounced an equally imaginary plot by Western banks to undermine the rouble. The fullest public version of the Centre's theory of a vast American-led conspiracy to subvert the Soviet Union was set out in a speech by the head of KGB assessments, Nikolai Sergeevich Leonov, formerly deputy head of the FCD, responsible for operations in North and South America, in April 1991. The goal of US policy, he declared, was 'to eliminate the Soviet Union as a united state'. Gorbachev, he implied, was refusing to listen:

> The KGB has been informing the leadership of the country about this in time and detail. We would not want a repetition of the tragic situation before the Great Patriotic War against Germany, when Soviet intelligence warned about the imminent attack of Nazi Germany but Stalin rejected this information as wrong and even provocative. You know what this mistake cost us.

Further dramatic evidence of the resurgence of the KGB leadership's traditional conspiracy theories about the West in the months before the coup came in a speech by Kryuchkov to a closed session of the Supreme Soviet on 17 June. Kryuchkov acknowledged that the main menace to the survival of the Soviet Union was internal, but he emphasized the simultaneous threat from 'certain external forces'. As evidence of the nature of this threat, he read out to the Supreme Soviet the hitherto top secret FCD report to the Politburo of January 1977 'On CIA Plans To Recruit Agents Among Soviet Citizens', which revealed an imaginary CIA masterplan to sabotage the Soviet administration, economy and scientific research. This plan, Kryuchkov claimed, remained in force and had already produced 'certain results'.[49] Gorbachev evidently did not take such nonsense seriously. (Nor, no doubt, did many FCD officers with the firsthand experience of the West which Kryuchkov lacked.) Kryuchkov believed that, having tamely accepted the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989, Gorbachev was now presiding over the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In August he became the chief organizer of the group which attempted to topple Gorbachev and preserve the Union. But Kryuchkov's conspiracy proved as ill-judged as his conspiracy theories. Instead of propping up the Soviet system, he merely hastened its collapse.

The FCD stayed mainly on the sidelines during the August coup. According to Gurgenev, its deputy-head, residencies were sent the text of resolutions issued by the Emergency Committee which briefly replaced Gorbachev, but were given 'no instructions whatsoever' to accompany them. Gurgenev claims that the residencies reported to Moscow that 'the actions of the Emergency Committee were being censured throughout the world'.[50] On the day following Gorbachev's return to Moscow, he summoned Shebarshin to see him. According to Shebarshin, as he recounted what Kryuchkov had told him, Gorbachev paced up and down, repeating 'The scoundrel! The bastard!' Gorbachev then appointed Shebarshin acting chairman of the KGB in place of Kryuchkov. Next day, Shebarshin was himself replaced as chairman by the would-be reformer, Vadim Bakatin. A few weeks later, Shebarshin resigned from the KGB. The FCD was separated from the KGB to form an independent Foreign Intelligence Service.

Shebarshin now publicly defends Kryuchkov's leading role in the coup as a patriotic attempt to preserve the Soviet Union. There are, however, three 'traitors' whom, he claims, he can never forgive: Gorbachev, because of his 'self-adoration and naivete'; Gordievsky, because of his work for British Intelligence (and for revealing the secret FCD files which have made this article possible); and Bakatin, for disclosing more KGB secrets (as well as, no doubt, for allowing the rest of the Gordievsky family to join Oleg in England). Shebarshin struck an English interviewer in 1992 as a man with perfect manners and sharp intellect who 'shows little sign of ageing – or softening'. He says openly that he hopes Gordievsky will be assassinated ('Technically, it's nothing very special'), and still rails against CIA anti-Russian plots, which he claims are once again on the increase: 'They are determined to see no resurrection of Russia as a great power ...' He concluded by telling his interviewer: 'You must observe I'm trying not to slip into paranoia.'[51] Paranoia, however, is one of the oldest KGB traditions.

NOTES

1. *Moscow News*, 1992, No. 25.
2. Documents cited in Joseph Harries, 'The Gospel according to Marx', *Reader's Digest*, Feb. 1993.
3. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev*, Sceptre edition (London, 1991), pp. 621–3.
4. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions from The Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985* (London, 1991), p. 9.
5. Philip Hanson, *Soviet Industrial Espionage: Some New Information* (London, 1987).
6. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions*, pp. 9–11.
7. Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, p. 599.
8. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions*, p. 204.
9. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *More Instructions from The Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Global Operations 1975–1985* (London, 1992), pp. 2–4.
10. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions*, pp. 115–17.

11. Ibid., pp. 11–12.
12. *New Times*, 1989, No. 32.
13. Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, pp. 537–8.
14. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions*, p. 97; Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, pp. 629–31.
15. Interview with Shebarshin, *Daily Telegraph*, 1 Dec. 1992.
16. See, e.g., Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, p. 586.
17. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions*, pp. 91–7.
18. Ibid., pp. 131–7.
19. Interview with Shebarshin, *Daily Telegraph*, 1 Dec. 1992.
20. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions*, pp. 29–40.
21. Interview with Shebarshin, *Daily Telegraph*, 1 Dec. 1992.
22. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions*, pp. 6–8.
23. Recollection of Oleg Gordievsky, then resident-designate.
24. Interview with Gurgenev (identified only by his first name and patronymic), *Izvestia*, 24 Sept. 1991.
25. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions*, Ch. 8.
26. Interview with Gurgenev, *Izvestia*, 24 Sept. 1991.
27. *Izvestia*, 24 Sept. 1991.
28. Interviews with Kalugin in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 20 June 1990, and *Moscow News*, 1990, No. 25.
29. Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, p. 545.
30. Interview with Bakatin, *Izvestia*, 2 Jan. 1992.
31. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions*, pp. 221–2.
32. Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, pp. 487–8. Richard Popplewell, 'Themes in the Rhetoric of KGB Chairmen from Andropov to Kryuchkov', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 6 No. 3 (1991), pp. 514–19.
33. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *More Instructions*, pp. 89–98.
34. Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, pp. 582–603. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions*, Ch. 4.
35. Popplewell, 'Rhetoric of KGB Chairmen', p. 517.
36. Ustinov and Chebrikov, 'To Comrade Yu. V. Andropov', Dec. 1983, *Izvestia*, 16 Oct. 1992.
37. Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, pp. 591–605.
38. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions*, pp. 102–6.
39. Interview with Shebarshin, *Daily Telegraph*, 1 Dec. 1992.
40. *Pravda*, 11 Sept. 1987.
41. Popplewell, 'Rhetoric of KGB Chairmen', p. 520.
42. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions*, pp. 212–17.
43. Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, pp. 620–1.
44. 'Intelligence Service Divorces From The KGB', *Izvestia*, 24 Sept. 1991.
45. Interview with Shebarshin, *Daily Telegraph*, 1 Dec. 1992.
46. Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, pp. 627–8. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions*, pp. 217–18.
47. Interview with Shebarshin, *Daily Telegraph*, 1 Dec. 1992.
48. Ibid.
49. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), *Instructions*, pp. 218–22; *More Instructions*, pp. 125–8. Remarkable though Kryuchkov's and Grushko's conspiracy theories were, they were less extraordinary than some which circulated within the Centre. The senior FCD analyst, Lolly P. Zamoysky, had been obsessed for many years by his belief in a global Masonic–Zionist plot, which he elaborated to residency staff during his briefing trips from the FCD. (Gordievsky heard him deliver a lecture on the subject during his visit to the London residency in January 1985; Zamoysky was then deputy-head of the FCD Directorate of Intelligence Information.) In 1989 he published in several languages the Masonic part of his global conspiracy theory in a book grandly entitled *Behind The Facade Of The*

Masonic Temple. 'Freemasons', he claimed, 'have always controlled the upper echelons of government in Western countries ... Masonry in fact runs, "remotely controls" bourgeois society ... The true centre of the world Masonic movement is to be found in the most "Masonic" country of all, the United States ... Ronald Reagan has been characterised as an "outstanding" Mason.' Zamoysky's explanation of the Cold War was startling in its simplicity:

> The first ever atomic attack on people, the use of atomic weapons for blackmail and the escalation of the arms race were sanctioned by the 33-degree Mason Harry Truman.
>
> The first ever call for the Cold War was sounded by Mason Winston Churchill (with Truman's blessing).
>
> The onslaught on the economic independence of Western Europe (disguised as the Marshall Plan) was directed by the 33-degree Mason George Marshall.
>
> Truman and West European Freemasons orchestrated the formation of NATO.
>
> Don't we 'owe' to that cohort the instigation of hostility between the West and the Soviet Union ...?

(Lolly Zamoysky, *Behind The Facade Of The Masonic Temple* [Moscow, 1989], pp. 6–7, 141.) Shebarshin, the head of the FCD, can scarcely have believed most of this rubbish but he must presumably have authorized its publication by one of his senior officers unless the decision had already been approved by Kryuchkov before his departure from the FCD. In common with other FCD authors, Zamoysky was not identified in his book as a KGB officer.

50. Interview with Gurgenev, *Izvestia*, 24 Sept. 1991. It is difficult to believe that the residency response was quite so unanimous as Gurgenev suggests.
51. Interview with Shebarshin, *Daily Telegraph*, 1 Dec. 1992.

The KGB after The Coup

OLEG GORDIEVSKY

The failure of the coup in August 1991, or rather the defeat of the putschists and the victory of Boris Yeltsin and other Russian democrats, provides my starting-point. These events brought to an end an enormous expansion of the KGB, the secret political police of the Soviet Union, which on the eve of the coup had under its command some 700,000 people in the Soviet Union including 12,000 intelligence officers. Something like between 1,500–2,000 of these officers were stationed abroad. At least 250 KGB officers were at work in Canada and the USA. This figure does not include the assets: the secret informers and KGB contacts in North America. To illustrate KGB deployments further: at least 700 KGB officers were posted in Germany, 100 in France, 100 in Italy and 150 in Austria; about 100 were stationed in India, 75 in Japan and so on. To this tally must be added the intelligence presence of the Soviet military, the GRU. Such was the scale of the Soviet espionage attack on the rest of the world.

Now it is likely that the democratic revolution in Russia will change that pattern of aggressive espionage, but not immediately and not entirely. What happened after the events in August? Part of the explanation rests in the personal relations between the then head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, and Mikhail Gorbachev. Mr Kryuchkov owed his position perhaps to the fact that he supported Gorbachev so consistently in 1984–85 on his way to power. Gorbachev was really attached to Kryuchkov and trusted him entirely. The KGB was always significant for Gorbachev; in fact the KGB was his darling. The coup revealed that Gorbachev's best friend was a traitor. When the coup was defeated Gorbachev's fascination with the KGB was finished, and he realized that the organization was a direct threat to his position of power. So it was not only Yeltsin and the democrats that were concerned about the KGB. Gorbachev himself realized that the time had come to do something about it.

Gorbachev was determined to make the KGB harmless as a potential instrument for another coup. So he agreed immediately to a series of radical measures. First, the KGB was stripped of control of the government communication troops and communication services. They were reconstituted as an independent committee for government communications, under the direct command of Gorbachev. Secondly, Gorbachev arranged for all KGB troops to be removed from the KGB and placed under the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry, of course, welcomed the addition. Another important measure concerned the disposition of the force once known as Stalin's bodyguards. After Stalin's death, it was called Directorate Number Nine. Moscovites knew very well about the 'Number Nine people'. They played an important part in the August coup as traitors, isolating Gorbachev in his dacha in the Crimea, helping the communications officers to cut all his contacts with the outside world. And it was they who removed Gorbachev from the 'button', which was supposed to give the President control of the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union. We still don't know who was in control of those weapons during the three days of the putsch. The post-coup clean-up saw the Bodyguards Service of the KGB made into an independent department.

Yeltsin and the democrats also wanted to do something about the KGB, but they were not united. There was one school of thought which supported the 'Czechoslovakian' way of dealing with the former secret service. Their preference was to abolish the 700,000 strong KGB *completely*. But there were also some people who thought the KGB could be reduced, reformed, re-structured and democratized. And there were some people of the old school who actually thought, like Gorbachev and his people, that the KGB was not so bad after all, if given proper leadership. With the right people at the top, the KGB could be useful.

In order to satisfy Yeltsin and the hard core of democrats around him, more decisions concerning the KGB were taken. One example involved the fate of the former Directorate Number Five, later known as Directorate Z, the ideological heart of the KGB. In the past, it had been responsible for watching political dissidents; in more recent times it watched all political opponents and enemies of the Communist Party, including Boris Yeltsin himself. Yeltsin, in the last two or three years, was under total surveillance. His apartment was bugged and all his communications were intercepted. Yeltsin knew very well what was going on. That is why the Fifth Directorate was entirely abolished. Now the KGB (renamed the 'Ministry of Security') claims that it is not involved in any politically motivated investigations.

Yeltsin also insisted on reducing the size and the functions of KGB Department Number 12. It had a sinister reputation. It employed linguists, women mostly, who listened to the telephones and monitored the bugs installed in the apartments, the homes of foreign diplomats, the embassies, hotel rooms, all the places where the foreign targets of the KGB live. Practically all embassies and living dwellings of all foreign diplomats were monitored by the KGB. But the largest part of the department consisted of Russian transcribers only, and they were listening to an unknown number of Russian targets, who sometimes included very important political figures. Until the coup, Yeltsin was target Number One. He knew this very well and did not forget it.

Gorbachev, in his book, writes about his own experience. Immediately after the beginning of the coup, he and his wife and his daughter and son-in-law immediately started to speak in a special way like the rest of the Soviet population speak at home. He was sure that Department Number 12 was active against him. In the aftermath of the coup, only the 'Russian' part of the organization was curtailed.

Inevitably, the question of changes to the leadership of the KGB was prominent after August 1991. The old leaders, Vladimir Kryuchkov, Viktor Grushko, Geni Ageyev and many others, had been heavily involved in the aborted coup. Since Yeltsin secured the privilege to suggest his own candidates to head the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, Gorbachev was allowed to appoint his man as head of the KGB. Therefore Vadim Bakatin was appointed. He had a reputation of being a liberal person, as liberal as a member of the old communist establishment can be. His task was to democratize the KGB to some extent, but also to protect it against criticism and attempts to dismantle it entirely. Despite his lack of popularity with the staff of the KGB, he accomplished his task of protecting it from radical changes very well.

The KGB that emerged from these changes was still huge and very important. It continued to run the massive army of internal secret informers in the population, several hundred thousands of them. The secret informers were the main weapon and the main source of information of the KGB. They were left intact and were still run by the rump of the KGB in the aftermath of the coup. Nevertheless, the might and influence of the Russian KGB is undermined. The reformed KGB is, in theory, more manageable. Its future place in the society and modus operandi will depend on the wisdom and administrative skills of Boris Yeltsin and his government. With the break-up of the federal structure and the process of devolution, the parts of the KGB which belonged to the former Soviet republics are becoming more and more independent of Moscow. In the future they will be genuinely national security and intelligence organizations, but for a long time ahead they will bear the stamp of the KGB's traditions, philosophy and tradecraft.

Perhaps the most important structural change in the KGB, at least from the point of view of foreign governments and their intelligence services, concerned the fate of the First Chief Directorate, the external intelligence service of the KGB. What happened here? Like some other parts of the KGB its First Chief Directorate was separated from the rest of the organization. (In 1992 it was renamed 'Russia's Foreign Intelligence

Service'.) Members of this body never liked to be identified as KGB officers. Now they can claim that they are like the American CIA, a civilian, independent foreign intelligence service (though apparently the system of military ranks remains). The appointment of Yevgeni Primakov as head of the new agency was a result of a compromise between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. The massive criticism of the KGB following the coup d'état for the first time ever reached its foreign intelligence branch. Primakov, an academic with an international reputation, turned out to be a useful screen for the intelligence service. Some elements of the media and democratic forces started to speak openly about depriving the KGB operating abroad of its traditional diplomatic and journalistic cover. Even the newly appointed Foreign Minister, Boris Pankin (subsequently dismissed in November 1991), added his voice to these demands. Primakov, supported by Vadim Bakatin, dampened the criticism and the threats to expel the KGB from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from the media, which would have been a severe blow to the ability of the KGB to conduct its foreign operations.

The question of covers aside, for the first time ever, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service is facing a budget crisis. Change, in this instance, is being driven not by public criticism nor by alterations in the nature of Russian foreign policy, but simply by shortages of foreign currency. The Russian intelligence presence abroad is being reduced under fiscal pressure. The residencies in some African, Latin American countries, or for example in New Zealand, may be given up. But the size of the KGB in North America and Western Europe is not likely to shrink significantly.

What kind of espionage activity is likely to emerge in the future from the territory of the former Soviet Union? Each republic is busily organizing its own intelligence service. In the past each republican KGB used to have a 'Department Number One', which was an embryo of the larger intelligence organization. They are now all upgraded and will undoubtedly start operating against each other and against the traditional targets of the old KGB – particularly against North America, Europe, China and some countries of the Middle East. Paradoxically, in the not very distant future, we may see more espionage from the East, than occurred in the past. Yet whatever the level of activity, it will not pose the same threat, because Russia and the other former Soviet republics don't possess the ideological and political mission held by the old communist superpower.

Note: This essay is based on a lecture given in Toronto in December 1991. It has not been updated.

Intrepid's Last Deception: Documenting the Career of Sir William Stephenson

TIMOTHY J. NAFTALI

On 17 September 1989 under the headline 'Britain's War in America', *The Washington Post* reported its discovery of a top secret British document that revealed Sir William Stephenson's alleged manipulation of the US media during the Second World War. The story seemed to confirm a claim made in the best-selling *A Man Called Intrepid* that there existed a major private archive of materials detailing British intelligence activities in America in the 1940s. The document in question was described as the official history of Stephenson's wartime organization, British Security Co-ordination (BSC), which operated from New York as the directorate of all forms of British clandestine activities in the Western Hemisphere – covert operations, counterespionage and intelligence collection – between 1940 and 1946. The *Post* quoted a British intelligence expert, who asserted that this 423-page report was 'one of the most astounding documents in history'.[1]

Ironically, it turns out that the *Post* was itself a deceived party in a much larger story of media manipulation. The alleged exclusive was some 30 years old. Almost every detail of clandestine British support for American interventionists described by the *Post* could be found in a biography of Stephenson by H. Montgomery Hyde published in England in 1962 as *The Quiet Canadian* and in the United States a year later as *Room 3603*.[2] Moreover, several of the passages quoted directly by the *Post* from the 'top secret' document appeared verbatim in Hyde's work three decades ago.

The specific cause of *The Washington Post*'s mistake was the belief that Sir William had left a trove of highly secret documents that provided the basis for the most sensational of his biographies, the book *A Man Called Intrepid*, which in paperback is in its 25th printing with over two million copies sold.[3] Sir William Stephenson and his wartime deputy C.H. 'Dick' Ellis had founded their endorsements of the book *A Man Called Intrepid* on the assertion that the BSC history contained much that H. Montgomery Hyde had been enjoined from recounting in 1962 because of the strictures of state secrecy.[4] Yet when this BSC history – or the 'BSC Papers' as they had called this source – came to light it proved quite the opposite. The publication of *The Quiet Canadian* had in fact left few secrets about Stephenson. This made inescapable the conclusion that the 1976 book, *A Man Called Intrepid*, may have been unnecessary, even harmful to an historical interpretation of Sir William Stephenson.

The allegation that there existed an archive of 'BSC Papers' has long complicated any assessment of the version of Stephenson's life found in *A Man Called Intrepid*. From the moment it appeared in 1976, the book drew heated criticism. While most American reviewers embraced the book, revealing a general tendency to believe most legends about British intelligence, the book's publication induced strong rebuttals from the other side of the Atlantic.[5] Two veterans of British Intelligence, Lord Dacre (Hugh Trevor-Roper) and Sir David Hunt, sounded an alarm as to the accuracy of the book's essential claims. For the outside observer it was difficult to know whom to believe. With the bulk of Allied intelligence records still classified in the 1970s, the only people claiming to have documents were supporters of Sir William Stephenson. A decade later the first documented study of a BSC operation, David Stafford's *Camp X*, admirably began the march away from mythology.[6] Unfortunately, though a strong presentation of the existing evidence, Stafford's work was equally vulnerable to criticism that he had not seen the vaunted 'BSC Papers'.

Despite many years of controversy, the life of Sir William Stephenson thus remains a thicket of claims and counterclaims. Was he Winston Churchill's personal representative in the Americas, or not? Did he materially contribute to the success of the assault on German enciphered signals, or not? What role, if any, did he play in the assassination of Heinrich Himmler's righthand man, Reinhard Heydrich?[7]

The controversy over the legendary versus authentic dimensions of Sir William Stephenson's life is of essential importance for the history of wartime intelligence, but is also played out on the canvas of Canadian history. Canada has few heroes to compete with Sir William, recipient of the US Medal for Merit, the French Croix de Guerre with Palm and the Order of Canada.[8] Defendants of Stephenson are quick to decry any assault on his stature as a disguised attack on a Canadian 'great man'. While some of the points of dispute may appear picayune, because Sir William publicly identified himself with the most grandiose of the claims about his career, confirmation or refutation of them has the potential of supporting or discrediting much of what was written about the man in the last 20 years.

Although some of the mysteries surrounding this figure remain, many of the puzzles dissolve when the various iterations of the Stephenson biography and the forces that brought them about are examined. Instead of a mess of contradictions they present a more or less linear progression from histories based on documents and recent memory to apotheosis. David Stafford made the first important contribution to reconstructing Stephenson's relationship to his biographers.[9] With the BSC history as a guide, more can now be confidently said about the extent of the mythology that grew up around Stephenson, both created by him and in his name. In an effort to explode those myths, this article will relate the entire biographical process from the earliest wartime histories, commissioned in 1942–43, to *The Washington Post*'s discovery in 1989 of the so-called 'BSC Papers', which symbolized how far the public conception of Intrepid had diverged from anything that could be termed a reliable biography of Sir William Stephenson.

The first encounter between William Stephenson and Biography came after Pearl Harbor. The Japanese attack was a dual-edged sword for Britain's chief intelligence officer in the United States. It brought America's entry into the Second World War, the event for which Stephenson had worked since his arrival in April 1940; but it had its costs. The US declaration of war led to a multiplication of contacts between the US and British governments, thus reducing the comparative advantage of Stephenson's special channel through New York. At the same time all of the neutrality legislation that had hampered American intelligence officials was swept away with the result that British help was no longer required to intercept letters or survey the activities of merchant ships. Similarly, though the American agencies had turned a blind eye to British secret activities in the United States and Latin America in 1940–41, with the start of the Pacific War, they successfully put pressure on Stephenson to stop his independent operations.[10]

As the post of Director of British Security Co-ordination increasingly involved liaison responsibilities and with the focus of Anglo-American relations shifting away from New York, Stephenson became concerned that London might dismantle his organization.[11] Twice within a year, Stephenson ordered that a survey of his activities be written to demonstrate the value of centralizing all forms of secret activity under one command. The first document was completed in June 1942, the second in March 1943.[12] The timing of each report seems to have coincided with a moment of bureaucratic danger for the BSC.[13] The first appeared as the organization was adjusting to its transition away from independent operations in the United States.[14] The second came when it appeared likely that London would seize the opportunity presented by the waning of the German threat in Latin America to strip Stephenson of his responsibilities for co-ordinating the main elements of British intelligence in the Western Hemisphere.[15]

Stephenson relied on the head of his counter-espionage section, H. Montgomery Hyde, to write the second survey, which was longer and more detailed than the first. Hyde, who may have also written the first survey, though this cannot be determined, produced the most complete wartime study of the BSC.[16] Although short on operational details, the 200-page 'Report on British Security Co-Ordination in the United States of America' described at length the extent of Stephenson's activities and the institutional context within which they occurred. The Hyde document laid the foundations for evaluating the role of Stephenson himself. Explicitly or implicitly, it would be the reference point for all future studies of the man, including the document revisited by *The Washington Post* in 1989.

The Hyde report argued the following about Stephenson: the 44-year-old Canadian businessman had been picked for his American mission by the head of the British foreign intelligence service, MI6, Sir Stewart Menzies.[17] Although his initial assignment was as head of MI6 in the United States, over the course of three years Stephenson became the representative of all British secret agencies in the Western Hemisphere. In the year before Pearl Harbor, Stephenson had interpreted as one of his responsibilities the use of American contacts to further the British war effort. Using in particular Colonel William Donovan, the future head of the Office of Strategic Services, Stephenson added his voice to those emanating from other sections of the British government in favor of a deal for 50 overage destroyers. In the last year of peace for the United States, Stephenson used British resources to encourage US interventionist opinion and to nurse along Washington's first efforts at foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence. Finally, once his mission became primarily liaison, Stephenson left a legacy in the high degree of co-ordination that existed among the American, British and Canadian secret services concerned with Axis subversion and espionage in the Americas.[18]

When the war ended, Stephenson, who had remained at his post, ordered an updating of the Hyde report. The Second World War had seen the coming of age of the intelligence bureaucracy, and like all of the major intelligence chiefs of the war, Stephenson wanted a full account of the innovations brought about by his organization. He asked BSC officers Gilbert Highet, Roald Dahl and Tom Hill to stay on at Camp X, the BSC training installation, to write this document. Two of these men were to enjoy post-war fame in the world of letters; but it was the third man, Hill, who did most of the work on the first draft of the BSC history.[19]

A fourth hand shaped the history before it left Camp X. In what would become a recurrent theme in the Stephenson historiography, the Hill draft was rejected because William Stephenson considered it too dry. Stephenson asked Giles Playfair, a former radio broadcaster who had been a BSC counter-espionage officer in New York, to revise the entire manuscript.[20] It was this report, as revised by Giles Playfair, that *The Washington Post* quoted in 1989, and is known as the 'BSC History'.[21]

Playfair and the Camp X team produced an unusual report. A hybrid of a spy thriller and an administrative history, the document was remarkably eloquent and strikingly dramatic for an official publication. Very few real agents are fully identified in the text, though one of them, 'Cynthia', now known to have been Betty Pack, had everything else about her revealed:

> There was certainly nothing about her which suggested that her virtue was easy, (i)t may be that her appeal to her victims was in the first place intellectual, and that the discovery of her bodily charms came later as an intoxicating realization.[22]

In addition to its entertainment value, the Playfair document had a public relations purpose within the small community permitted to read it. It placed Stephenson at the center of the most efficient binational intelligence system ever constructed. Although it is doubtful that Stephenson initially expected this 'top secret' history to be declassified in his lifetime, the text was cleverly written in order to sell the BSC organization as a model of its kind, which would be useful in a world dominated by the threat of atomic holocaust.[23]

Despite its cheerleading tone, the report described William Stephenson's achievements as a function of his responsibilities as representative of the British secret services in the Western Hemisphere. There was no mention of any significant diplomatic role as advisor to Churchill. In the eyes of the authors, Stephenson deserved praise because of his particular genius for inspiring bureaucratic change. First, he had rationalized the flow of information from collectors to those who could use it. Second, he had set a powerful example that had been followed by William Donovan in creating the Office of Strategic Services and J. Edgar Hoover in expanding FBI operations to Latin America. Finally, Stephenson had succeeded in establishing a harmony of interests among the various British intelligence services operating in the Americas, squelching their habit of destructive competition.

Half a century later, the accuracy of the two administrative histories, Hyde's 1943 report and the Playfair BSC history is difficult to judge. Hyde brought some documents home with him at the end of the war. These confirmed the broad outlines of Stephenson's responsibilities, but only in a few cases substantiated specific details.[24] The documents used for the BSC history were actually destroyed at Stephenson's direction at the end of the war.[25] Nevertheless, in the context of the evolution of the

Stephenson story these administrative histories represented a high-water mark, for at least they had been based on documents and relatively recent recollection.[26]

What these reports did not reveal was that Stephenson held a different view of his own contribution to the war. Or, at least by the early 1950s, he had come to view himself as a top-level player in Anglo-American relations during the war; instead of the significant, though second-tier, figure that he had been. In 1952, he collaborated with journalist McKenzie Porter on a long, sensational article about himself for *Maclean's Magazine* that brimmed with revelations of hitherto secret operations.[27] Entitled 'The Biggest Private Eye of All', the piece not only focused attention upon Stephenson's secret life but recast some of the basic facts to give the entire BSC operation the allure of major historical importance.[28]

Stephenson's change of heart in his treatment of wartime secrets had come abruptly.* Robert Sherwood, Franklin Roosevelt's speechwriter, had called him 'a quiet Canadian' because of his characteristic discretion.[29] As late as 1949, when *Time* magazine interviewed him for a story about the cement industry in Jamaica, Stephenson had pointedly refused to discuss his wartime intelligence activities.[30] An explanation for his decision to break his silence may lie in the serious stroke that he suffered in 1950. Three decades later Stephenson stressed the power of this attack and ascribed it to the strains of his wartime responsibility.[31] It was the first of two strokes that were to hit him.[32]

Regardless of the cause, there was some outstanding bluster in the article that probably boosted Stephenson's ego. The *Maclean's* article asserted that this 'mysterious millionaire from Winnipeg' was at the center of the 'most secret of all cloak-and-dagger operations of the Second World War'.[33] It praised Stephenson in grandiose terms. He was a man of enormous energy, who never seemed to sleep. He was a speed reader whose sensory perception was so acute that he could spot a tiny plaster on a secretary's finger while he still had his eyes on his desk. The article continued:

*The North American public first learned of Sir William in 1946, the year after he was knighted. Stephenson made his first appearance in *Who's Who* and in December of 1946 was featured in a *New York Times* article when he became the first non-American to receive the US Medal for Merit. (*New York Times*, 1 December 1946). True to his reputation for discretion, Stephenson was not interviewed about the exploits that had earned him the highest honor the United States confers upon a civilian. *The New York Times* article merely reprinted as explanation the citation from President Harry Truman. Stephenson's *Who's Who* entry showed the same care. It stated his present employment as Director of British Security Co-ordination, a matter of public record, and listed his telegraphic addresses, 'Intrepid' in Jamaica and New York and 'Stevefarus' in London. There was nothing classified about any of that information.

> His New York headquarters staff of more than a thousand hand-picked Canadian men and women spoke of his doorkeeper as 'Peter,' of his secretary as 'Gabriel' and of him as 'God.' Only a handful of them knew him by sight.[34]

The tone of the article could be dismissed as a product of the time and of the magazine where it appeared. *Maclean's* was then in the habit of using breathless titles and included fiction alongside its general articles, inviting readers to move from fact to fiction and in the process blurring the line between the two.[35] But the article stands out in the canon of Sir William Stephenson because it introduced two assertions which, though never articulated in the secret histories, were to become part of the lore of the man. First, Sir William or one of those close to him told *Maclean's* that it was Winston Churchill who had sent the Manitoba native to New York 'to command all his government's secret-service operations in the western hemisphere'.[36] The second assertion was that Sir William had played a significant part in deciphering German messages. To understand the importance of this indiscretion it must be recalled that the Ultra operation was not revealed publicly until 20 years later, in 1974, with the publication of Frederick W. Winterbotham's *The Ultra Secret*.[37] Yet the 1952 *Maclean's* article said that the BSC had contributed to the sinking of 'many enemy submarines by decoding their radio signals and pinpointing their position at sea' and then gave a specific example that a careful reader could interpret as proof that the British had broken German operational ciphers.[38]

For all its bluster and its incautious reference to Ultra, the *Maclean's* piece excited little interest.[39] Having broken his silence, Sir William may well have experienced some disappointment that no journalists or historians sought to pick up the end of the thread that he had begun to unravel. Perhaps some envy of the public position of his colleague and friend William Donovan may have influenced his next move.[40] Stephenson knew that Whitney Shepardson, the wartime chief of the Secret Intelligence branch of the OSS, was working on a biography of Donovan.[41] None of this can be known at present. But what is clear is that by the end of the 1950s, Stephenson was determined to reap some reward for his secret work and set in motion a plan aimed at widespread public recognition. He commissioned his former deputy at the BSC, C. H. Ellis, to write his biography, telling the latter that he wished to be portrayed as 'a man of initiative, an innovator, who in spite of official obtuseness and sometimes obstruction, created something out of nothing'.[42] For Stephenson, there was more to this project than simple self-aggrandizement. He saw it also as an excellent business opportunity. Apparently Henry Luce of Time Inc. had promised Stephenson $100,000 for the biography.[43]

Stephenson's biographer, Ellis, misunderstood what was expected of him. Ellis seemed to have all the prerequisites for an excellent history of Stephenson and the BSC. At his disposal were not only the Hyde and Playfair documents, but his own wartime reports, which because of a continuing intelligence responsibility, he was able to consult in MI6's archive in London.[44] But Stephenson was not going to pay for a faithful bureaucratic history. Ellis refused, for example, to accept his former boss's claim that he had initiated the intelligence liaison between Washington and London, a link which Ellis, a career British intelligence officer, knew to have predated Stephenson's arrival in New York in 1940.[45] Stephenson had no patience with this quibbling. He wanted a best-selling biography of himself. When he read Ellis's first draft, Stephenson stopped the project, telling Ellis that he had 'pulled (his) punches too much', his style was 'too dry', and that the story was not sufficiently brought to life 'to make a saleable book'.[46]

Stephenson next turned to his first chronicler, H. Montgomery Hyde, to realize his dream of a big biography.[47] As Hyde was most reluctant to leave a professorship in Pakistan, Stephenson offered to pay his living expenses. For his part, Hyde was determined to spend as little time on this project as possible.[48] After only six months of writing, he presented a manuscript to the publishers in June 1962.[49] Massive borrowing from the Playfair history made this feat possible. No doubt feeling that he was merely taking from a document that was effectively just an expanded version of his 1943 report, Hyde copied whole passages from the 1945 history. In fact, of the approximately 240 pages in *The Quiet Canadian*, about 200, or 85 per cent, are either direct reproductions or faithful executive summaries of the principal sections dealing with intelligence, special operations and counter-espionage in the Playfair document. Similarly, Hyde did not interview Stephenson for the book. Instead he imported paragraphs from the BSC history, dressed them in quotation marks and ascribed them to Sir William Stephenson.[50]

Unlike Ellis, Hyde handled the assignment professionally. To meet Stephenson's requirement of a bestseller, Hyde added anecdotal color, changed all the references to 'BSC' in the official history to 'Stephenson', and dropped the turgid sections of the Playfair document dealing with communications intelligence and security. Conscious that his most important audience would be in the United States, Hyde diplomatically excised some, though not all, of the more condescending descriptions of the US political system.

Curiously, in making decisions about what to publish, Montgomery Hyde showed little concern for the probable official British reaction. He was well aware of the potential penalties for lifting complete descriptions of secret operations from the 'top secret' BSC history. As a leak of what intelligence historians describe as 'sources and methods', *The Quiet Canadian* could hardly have been more ambitious. Even the most casual reader could pick up the essential elements of running double agents and a careful one might catch even a suggestive reference to the reading of German signals traffic, though there was nothing so blatant as what had appeared in *Maclean's*.[51] Hyde retained the most important details of the BSC's principal espionage operations – the double agents Tricycle (whom he called 'Bicycle'), Springbok and Pat J and the penetration agent Cynthia – and the covert action against the US isolationist movement, while leaving out only a few direct references to individuals.[52]

Given the nature of its revelations, Hyde's book could well have been the *Spycatcher* of its day; but the British government expressly decided to let this violation of the Official Secrets Act go unpunished. Years later Hyde was to credit the fact that he had never made reference to any MI5 or MI6 documents in his text.[53] Dick Ellis, who was also liable because of his role in the affair, had assumed there would not be any prosecution because MI6 had actually foregone its opportunity to screen the book and legal action would have meant admitting its mistake. Apparently an MI6 officer had approved Ellis's first draft of the biography but did not show any interest in Hyde's more revelatory reworking of the material, despite the fact that Ellis had told him about it.[54] A more persuasive explanation than that offered by Hyde or Ellis goes beyond a technicality or MI6's *amour propre*. The swell of press interest in the fall of 1962 about a Soviet penetration agent in the British Admiralty, John Vassal, probably left the Conservative government of Harold Macmillan unwilling to embark on another time-consuming and embarrassing legal battle.[55] The potential for scandal in this case was especially great because in addition to being a former member of MI6, Hyde had sat in Parliament for nearly a decade as the Ulster Unionist member for North Belfast and in the mid-1950s had represented the United Kingdom at the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly in Strasbourg.[56] Most suggestive of this interpretation is Prime Minister Macmillan's public handling of the book affair. Three days after confiding to his diary that '[t]he Vassall case is getting more embarrassing,' Macmillan effectively protected Hyde by finessing a direct question in the House of Commons on the applicability of the Official Secrets Act to *The Quiet Canadian*.[57]

The British decision to leave well enough alone paid off. Though a critical and respectable commercial success, the book was soon forgotten in Britain. And while prominently and favorably reviewed in the United States – it was compared in the *New York Times* to D.H. Lawrence's *Lady*

Chatterley's Lover in its ability to shock – the American edition, entitled *Room 3603*, also failed to achieve any lasting fame.[58]

At the tail-end of the *Quiet Canadian* project, Stephenson's physical condition intruded again into the writing of his biography. Although the date remains uncertain, it appears that in 1963 he suffered a second major stroke. His health had been declining for some time; but the attack appears to have come in the summer. Apparently it left him in a coma. His friend Ernest Cuneo, an old colleague from the BSC period who was J. Edgar Hoover's lawyer, visited Stephenson in the hospital after he came out of the coma. Cuneo was dismayed by what he saw. Although Sir William was clearly on the mend, the stroke seemed to have erased his memory.[59]

Although there is some controversy surrounding the effect of the two strokes on Stephenson's mind, Stephenson's ill health in 1963 undeniably complicated the publication of *Room 3603*, the American edition of *The Quiet Canadian*.[60] Stephenson began to exhibit a querulousness in early 1963. He started disagreeing with Hyde over how much to reveal about covert operations in the United States, especially those involving the American journalists Drew Pearson and Walter Winchell. Hyde wanted as much controversy as possible to sell more books. 'So far as I am concerned the more public interest which its appearance in your country can create the better,' he explained to his New York publishers Farrar, Straus and Cudahy.[61] Stephenson also wanted a bestseller; but not at the cost of alienating his American friends. When David Ogilvy, the doyen of American advertising and a former BSC intelligence asset in George Gallup's polling organization, suggested that the more condescending paragraphs regarding Americans in *The Quiet Canadian* be toned down in the US edition, Stephenson agreed and asked Hyde to delete 20 pages from the manuscript.[62] Hyde refused.[63] Instead, to calm his publishers, who had been receiving insistent messages from David Ogilvy and Stephenson, Hyde wrote:

> As you know, Sir William Stephenson has been and is in very poor health, also like other great characters, contemporary and historical such for instance as Mr. Nehru, he is inclined to listen to the last person who talks to him, as he cuts himself off almost completely from his old circle of friends.[64]

Hyde's insubordination, coupled with perhaps the lingering effects of his bout of sickness, soured Stephenson on *The Quiet Canadian* and *Room 3603*. By the late 1960s he had resumed his search for a satisfactory biography. Stephenson became involved with two new projects, whose contours revealed a pathetic shift in the old man's interpretation of the past.[65] Sir William began to embrace a much broader view of his role in the Second World War. He enhanced his previous claim to have been selected by Winston Churchill for his job in Washington with the assertion that he had been the secret linchpin between the US and British governments during the Second World War. The *Maclean's* boast had had few historical implications, but this new version implied a role of such significance for Stephenson that were he accurately recalling the past, international histories of 1940–41 would have to be revised. To reflect this new recollection, Stephenson changed his 30-year-old *Who's Who* entry to read that not only had he been Director of the BSC but Winston Churchill's personal representative in the Western Hemisphere.[66] By the 1970s, Stephenson had the unshakable conviction that he had played a decisive role in the establishment of American support for beleaguered Britain in the period when it was going it alone. And that by extension, his intelligence work had been secondary to his primary responsibility as Churchill's man.[67]

The first biographer to retell the old BSC story with this new twist was Dick Ellis, who revised his previously rejected manuscript to reflect Stephenson's reinterpretation.[68] In the unpublished 'The Two Bills: Mission Accomplished', Ellis asserted that Sir William had been Churchill's personal envoy, a claim he had not made a decade before. Also added were the claims that Stephenson and the Prime Minister had been 'close friends' and that Churchill had viewed sending Stephenson to New York as the first step in improving Anglo-American relations in the spring of 1940.[69]

The change that most set the tone for the next biography, *A Man Called Intrepid*, was Ellis' acceptance of the contention that Stephenson had played a decisive role in covert diplomacy before Pearl Harbor. Whereas Ellis had written in 1963 that Stephenson had had only an indirect influence on the process that resulted in the exchange of British bases for American destroyers; in 1972, Ellis asserted that Stephenson had represented Churchill in secret discussions of the 'Destroyers for Bases' deal at US Secretary of State Cordell Hull's home.[70] In the intervening decade, however, no new evidence had appeared to support a revision of Ellis' first version.[71]

Ultra was one subject that Ellis did not touch. His book was written in 1972, two years before the Ultra secret was revealed by Winterbotham. The honor of linking Stephenson with Ultra fell to the second biographer, a Canadian journalist named William Stevenson.

Though the two men were not related, Sir William and the younger Canadian shared a love of adventure. The author Stevenson had been a British naval pilot during the Second World War. After a brief stint at Oxford, he tried his hand at journalism. For the next 30 years he worked as a foreign correspondent for a few Canadian newspapers. In addition, he produced a series of books about various political hot-spots. In 1958 he wrote about his stay in China, in 1967 he wrote about what he had found among the anti-Sukarno underground in Indonesia, and in 1971 he described life for air force pilots during Israel's 'War of Attrition'.[72] In each case, he produced reportage.[73] All of the books have the feel of a one-sided television documentary: rarely a secondary reference and many quotations uncritically presented and linked into one narrative by Stevenson's descriptions of his own activities. In eschewing an Olympian perspective, Stevenson expected a high degree of trust from the reader.[74] The result was a gaggle of fast-paced, melodramatic books with little analysis.

In Stevenson, Sir William had found his Pindar. The journalist produced the biography in the style of his many previous books. The reader was introduced to a colorful world that revolved around the central character. As for that pivot, the younger Stevenson had created Intrepid, the personal emissary of Winston Churchill, and a significant participant in work against the German ciphers. Of course this flew in the face of the Hyde wartime report and the Playfair document, neither of which mention the codename 'Intrepid', a meaningful role in cryptanalysis or any special personal or professional link between Stephenson and the wartime Prime Minister. But Stephenson at last had his bestseller.

A Man Called Intrepid garnered generally positive reviews and appeared on bestseller lists across North America.[75] The success of the book was partly a function of timing, as well as of the slick writing of the author Stevenson. The book's appearance coincided with the explosion of interest in the United States about intelligence matters, owing to the Church Committee hearings on the CIA and the FBI and the twin disclosures from the Second World War of the Ultra success and of the masterful Allied deception program involving British double agents.

The author William Stevenson mined the Playfair manuscript for whatever Hyde had found too sensitive or too insignicant to include. There was little of the former, and quite a bit of the latter. Hyde had concealed the names of several suspects, informants, and agents: for example, Torkild Rieber the pro-German president of Texaco, and the Comte de la Grandville and Captain Charles Brousse, diplomats in the Vichy French Embassy in Washington. Stevenson used them.[76] Hyde had also deleted information about the co-ordination of intercepted radio signals effected by BSC with the assistance of the Canadians and Americans. It is in *A Man Called Intrepid*.[77] But the most astounding difference between the first and second tellings of the Stephenson story in book form was that in the course of the retelling the gifted British intelligence officer of *The Quiet Canadian* was transformed into the secret channel between President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with a hand in every single intelligence achievement of the war. Sir William's view of his own past had won out.

Two examples suffice as evidence of the nature of the transformation of the Stephenson story wrought by *A Man Called Intrepid*. Hyde had remained true to the details contained in the wartime intelligence histories of the BSC. References in his book to Stephenson's supposed role in the High Politics of Anglo-American relations are anecdotal and quite peripheral. In *A Man Called Intrepid*, however, the anecdotal takes center stage and any uncomfortable facts in the official histories just disappear. Thus hagiography became myth. The Playfair document of 1945, for instance, makes clear that Stephenson did not meet Franklin Roosevelt on his first trip to the United States in 1940. His sole contact to the White House was through an intermediary, J. Edgar Hoover's lawyer, Ernest Cuneo.[78] According to the BSC historians, it was Cuneo who related to Stephenson, who was then a special envoy of MI6, the President's wish that there be 'the closest possible marriage between the FBI and you'. In *A Man Called Intrepid*, however, there is a summit between the President of the United States and the neophyte British intelligence officer at which Roosevelt turns to Stephenson, speaks of matrimony, and initiates the intelligence liaison between J. Edgar Hoover and Sir Stewart Menzies, the chief of MI6.[79]

A second example involves the invention of a personal connection between William Stephenson and King George VI in *A Man Called Intrepid*. In describing William Donovan, Playfair wrote in 1945, 'Donovan, by his very independence of thought and action, inevitably has his critics, but there are few among them who would deny the credit due to him for having reached a correct appraisal of the international situation in the summer of 1940.' In *A Man Called Intrepid* the same paragraph reappears in capital letters and in a somewhat abbreviated form as a putative cable from Stephenson to the King of England, sent before Donovan's trip to England in the summer of 1940.[80] Needless to say, the Playfair report never mentions His Majesty at all, let alone as Stephenson's penpal.

In its discussion of Ultra, *A Man Called Intrepid* indeed seemed to represent a contribution to Hyde's portrait. Hyde had been unwilling to discuss the decryption of German messages in 1962. However, it was not a great omission in the context of Stephenson's career both because he had been a consumer more than a producer and because high-level operational Ultra had not affected the progress of his most important work in the United

States, which had taken place before 1942.* Nevertheless, a case could have been made to study Stephenson's use of Ultra in promoting hemispheric security, as well as his role in discussions over how much of these most secret sources to share with Americans. But this was not the angle that the author Stevenson emphasized in his book. The Intrepid myth included the claim that Sir William had contributed to the actual process of decryption by providing British codebreakers with a copy of the German Enigma machine and by encouraging them to use computers to 'unbutton' German signals.[81]

Sadly, Sir William staked his reputation on the distorted image of his career created by this book. In twin forewords, he and his failed biographer, Ellis, set a more sensational tone for the story of the BSC than it had ever had before.[82] Stephenson introduced the notion of the 'BSC papers', a hitherto untapped archive, that allowed a fuller treatment of the wartime work of British intelligence; while Ellis, who obviously knew better, promised a great read as only a partial leak of these secrets had been possible in 1962.[83]

Sadder still was the fact that it was only with the publication of this exaggerated account of Sir William's career that he was accorded the recognition that his war records had long merited in Canada. In the 1980s Sir William received awards ranging from the sublime to the ridiculous. In 1980, Governor General Edward Schreyer travelled to Bermuda to pin on Stephenson the Order of Canada. In subsequent years, Stephenson was awarded four honorary degrees from Canadian universities.[84] His hometown of Winnipeg bestowed honorary citizenship on him. And Manitoba incongruously named him Chief Hunter, Order of the Buffalo Hunt, when he was 89.[85]

Although Sir William publicly held to the Intrepid story until the end of his life, in private he began to rue his participation in the *A Man Called Intrepid* affair, admitting in a 1984 interview that Churchill had not given him a codename during the war.[86] 'Intrepid' had not even been his nickname in wartime intelligence, which was instead 'Little Bill' (Donovan

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* According to the Playfair history, the BSC's principal contribution to the Ultra campaign was in intercepting some raw – undeciphered – messages for delivery to the codebreakers of the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park. In 1942 the BSC opened listening posts to capture local transmissions from agent radios in Latin America. By October 1942 there were six new installations in South America and three in Central America. Before this program began, MI6 had had only one Latin American intercept station, in Rio de Janeiro. The BSC official history claims that these stations were 'most profitable auxiliaries' to the existing listening services of the United States, Canada and the rest of British intelligence. Because the BSC's stations were sometimes able to intercept intra-European traffic, they occasionally filled a gap in London's coverage of the most important German communications. ('BSC History', p. 396).

was the other Bill).* More significantly from the point of view of his biographies, Sir William also admitted that the 'BSC Papers' did not constitute an archive.[87] He blamed the author Stevenson for all of these embellishments.[88] On more than one occasion, Sir William complained that none of the published biographies was very good, dismissing *The Quiet Canadian* and *A Man Called Intrepid* as too journalistic.[89] Despite all of these private misgivings, however, Sir William remained convinced that he had been Churchill's special representative, though in later years he allowed that he had never served as a secret channel between the Prime Minister and Franklin Roosevelt.[90]

Stephenson's first biographer, Hyde, also denounced *A Man Called Intrepid* in private. He charged the younger Stevenson with having 'put words and ideas' into the elder Stephenson's mind.[91] He thought the claim that Stephenson had had anything to do with the Ultra success preposterous.[92] He also denied any credit for the BSC in the assassination of SS intelligence chief, Reinhard Heydrich.[93] But he too was unwilling to make the case publicly. Instead, he invited Sir William to pen a foreword as 'Intrepid' for his own memoirs and when *The Times* of London asked him to write Sir William's obituary, he repeated part of the canard about Stephenson's role in discovering the use of the Enigma decryption machine, something that he did not believe.[94]

The reluctance of Sir William Stephenson and H. Montgomery Hyde (Dick Ellis died in 1975) to admit that the Stephenson story had gone out of control created a confusion among the general public and historians interested in intelligence matters as to what Sir William had actually done before and during the Second World War. It was into this muddle that *The Washington Post*'s David Ignatius fell when he announced his discovery in 1989. Ignatius later explained that he had used *A Man Called Intrepid* as his guide and when he found that the BSC history differed from it, he assumed he had made an important find.[95]

The story of Sir William and his biographers should be a cautionary tale for intelligence historians and the reading public.[96] In the absence of documents, the most romantic version of intelligence history is irresistible. This is especially true with biography. By imputing more intelligence successes to Sir William than had been the case, the author of *A Man Called Intrepid* gave in to the temptation to pin all on one man. At times

* Stephenson had three official codenames. In correspondence with MI6, he was referred to as 48000. (The country designator for the United States was 48 because of the number of states then in the Union.) The London headquarters of the Special Operations Executive knew him as G. Finally, within the BSC, he was the Director of Security Co-ordination (DSC). These titles come from Hyde, 'Report on British Security Co-ordination in The United States of America', Hyde/Churchill.

this approach to biography has a felicitous effect on a man's reputation. Sometimes, the effect is a prosecutorial brief that is used to discredit the subject.[97] In all cases, such histories distort the relationships among men and the role of chance, bureaucracy and hierarchy in the production of historical events.

There can be no doubt that Sir William Stephenson's exploits were great during the Second World War. He was among a handful of Allied officials who shaped the most integrated, and most successful multinational intelligence community in history.[98] As the principal representative of British intelligence in the United States, Stephenson played a significant role in London's campaign to use all available means to press Britain's case in its moment of greatest danger. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, he deserves the lion's share of credit for inspiring the establishment of an American intelligence community and for building up William Donovan as a credible player in Washington.[99]

But Sir William Stephenson's restless attitude toward his place in history tainted that legacy, despite the fact that his indulgent biographers bear some of the responsibility for the myths. From now on all historians, however sympathetic to Sir William's wartime role, will have to begin their studies in the negative. Stephenson was neither Intrepid, nor Churchill's personal envoy. He did not contribute in any meaningful way to the Ultra achievement, nor did his beloved BSC execute Himmler's right-hand man. Thus, despite all the recognition he enjoyed in the last years of his life, Sir William Stephenson was himself the greatest victim of the Intrepid deception.

NOTES

This essay is dedicated to the memory of Andrew A. Naftali (1904–92), grandfather, patient reader and friend.

1. *The Washington Post*, 17 Sept. 1989.
2. H. Montgomery Hyde, *The Quiet Canadian: The Secret Service Story of Sir William Stephenson* (London,3rd ed., 1962); H. Montgomery Hyde, *Room 3603: The Story of the British Intelligence Center in New York during World War II* (New York, 2nd ed., 1963). This conclusion is based on comparison of the above with the 'BSC history', the document entitled 'British Security Coordination (BSC): An Account of Secret Activities in the Western Hemisphere, 1940–45', 31 Dec. 1945. [Unfortunately, as of mid-1993, this document is not yet publicly available. The author, who gained access to it through a channel that prefers to remain anonymous, hopes that the revelation of the similarities between the 'BSC history' and *The Quiet Canadian* will bring its official release.]
3. *The Washington Post* was not alone in believing that the 'BSC Papers' might hold important new revelations. See 'U.S. publisher has 'Intrepid' secret papers', *The Independent*, 27 March 1989. For information regarding the number of copies of *A Man Called Intrepid* in print, see the Ballantine Books edition (New York, 1990).
4. Sir William Stephenson, Foreword to *A Man Called Intrepid* by William Stevenson (New York, 1976), pp. xiii–xx; C. H. 'Dick' Ellis, 'A Historical Note', in *A Man Called Intrepid*, pp. xxi–xxiv.

5. In the mid-1970s there were few scholars or publicists familiar enough with intelligence history, especially in America, to spot the telltale flaws in the book. Ironically, John Le Carré's review in the *New York Times Book Review*, 29 Feb. 1976 (pp. 1–2), set the tone for most of the American reviews. While critical of the book's style he recommended it as an interesting and important history of wartime intelligence: '... my advice is to persevere. It's worth it.' He added: 'It may be quite some while before we get that disinterested history which the man and the subject undoubtedly merit.' *Newsweek*'s Walter Clemons said pretty much the same thing (*Newsweek*, 22 March 1976, pp. 79–80). Naomi Bliven in *The New Yorker* even praised the book's style: 'clear, lively, absorbing', she wrote (*The New Yorker*, 5 April 1976, p. 135). Finally, *National Review* indulged in its own exaggeration: 'it may well be the most fascinating non-fiction book of 1976' (Steve Ownbey, *National Review*, 3 Sept. 1976, p. 964). The journalist and military scholar, Hanson W. Baldwin, distinguished himself from most of the American reviewers in pointing out that the book's flaws undermined its overall trustworthiness. While not dismissing the book out of hand, he noted its evident distortion of Stephenson's relationship to the Roosevelt White House. Until he called the FDR Library with a query for this review, Baldwin wrote, the librarian had never heard of Stephenson or 'Intrepid' (H.W. Baldwin, *Saturday Review*, 6 March 1976, p. 26). The response of British experts was far less temperate. Hugh Trevor-Roper (Lord Dacre) called the book 'utterly worthless'. A veteran of high-level wartime intelligence himself, he knew *The Quiet Canadian* to have been a reasonable account and recognized the wild swing taken by Stephenson's newest biographer. (Hugh Trevor-Roper, *New York Review of Books*, 13 May 1976, pp. 3–4). Sir David Hunt seconded Trevor-Roper's assessment in the *Times Literary Supplement*, 28 May 1976, p. 643.
6. David Stafford, *Camp X* (Toronto, 1986).
7. The debate attained its most recent form in 1989 after Sir William's death at the age of 93 produced a stream of obituaries representing various degrees of acceptance of the claims made by and about him. For a description of this debate, see *The Times*, 18 February 1989. Two examples of the most laudatory comments come from the *Sunday Times* of London and *Maclean's Magazine*. In January 1989 he was hailed in the *Sunday Times* as an architect of the special relationship with the United States, who was second only to Winston Churchill in responsibility for Britain's success in the Second World War. Simon Jenkins, 'We shall not see their like again ...' (*Sunday Times*, 5 Feb. 1989). *Maclean's Magazine* described him as having been Winston Churchill's 'key confidant in North America', who had been entrusted with 'the largest espionage operation in history.' Anne Steacy, 'Shrouds of Secrecy', *Maclean's Magazine*, 13 Feb. 1989. Implied in these tributes was the belief that Stephenson had manifestly contributed to the greatest intelligence achievement of the Second World War, the decryption of high-level German messages that produced what is now referred to as Ultra. Two excellent general discussions of problems in the historiography of Sir William's career are in Nigel West, *A Thread of Deceit: Espionage Myths of World War II* (New York, 1985), pp. 127–38; and David Stafford, 'A Myth Called Intrepid', *Saturday Night Magazine*, October 1989.
8. Entry for Sir William S. Stephenson, *Who's Who*, 1989.
9. David Stafford, '"Intrepid": Myth and Reality', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 22 (1987), pp. 303–17; 'A Myth Called Intrepid', *Saturday Night Magazine*, Oct. 1989; 'The Man Who Never Was', in J.L. Granatstein and Stafford's *Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnost* (Toronto, 1990); and see Stafford's review of a paperback reissue of Hyde's *The Quiet Canadian*, in *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (July 1990). In these publications Stafford effectively weakened the case for the Intrepid legend by revealing the collusion between Stephenson, Ellis and Hyde in 1960–62. He drew much of the strength of his arguments from documents in the H. Montgomery Hyde Collection at Churchill College, Cambridge (hereafter, Hyde/Churchill). In addition to several other important papers generated by the BSC and Stephenson, Hyde left his copy of the 1943 history and a thick file of correspondence regarding *The Quiet Canadian* project. Dr. Stafford and I were among a handful of scholars permitted to view this collection by Montgomery Hyde before it was

screened by the British government. The British government withdrew many of the BSC documents and noted that they would be closed until 2041, the centenary of Pearl Harbor. For the current status of the collection see Mary S. Lovell, *Cast No Shadow: The Life of the American Spy Who Changed the Course of World War II* (New York, 1992), pp. 345–8.

10. H. Montgomery Hyde, 'Report on British Security Co-ordination in The United States of America', Part I: Intelligence (SIS), 17 March 1943, pp. 10–13; 22–6, Hyde/Churchill. Regarding changes in the BSC's responsibilities see speech by Col. C. H. Ellis, 'British Security Coordination', 16 Aug. 1943, Hyde/Churchill.
11. Hyde later recalled several occasions after Pearl Harbor when Stephenson was despondent because of the restrictions placed on his organization. Stephenson did not want his organization destroyed. Hyde described him as a 'dollar-a-year man' who had invested more than just pride into the BSC. Hyde claimed that Stephenson had contributed some of his personal fortune to build up the organization. Telephone conversation, 21 May 1984.
12. The June 1942 document cannot be found. It is referred to in the foreword of H. Montgomery Hyde's 'Report on British Security Co-Ordination in the United States of America', 17 March 1943. Hyde/Churchill. Hyde writes: 'This survey of the origins, development and current activities of the Directorate of British Security Co-ordination in the United States brings up-to-date an initial work which was prepared in June, 1942. The process has involved a number of important additions as well as the re-writing of considerable portions of the original work. However the primary purpose remains the same. It is to place on record the achievements of an organization which has grown up in a comparatively short period and which has during that time embodied within its framework the functions of Secret Intelligence, Security and 'Special Operations' as well as the normal Foreign Office functions of Passport Control.'
13. Ibid. Sensitive to the nature of the attacks on Stephenson, both reports justified his creation of the BSC in terms of the circumstances that he had found in New York in 1940–41: 'It was inevitable that the peculiar conditions prevailing in the United States during the eighteen months which preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour should require that the head of British S.I.S. [MI6] in that country should undertake operations and extend his interest outside the scope of what in normal times would be considered legitimate S.I.S. functions. It was inevitable too that in their joint interests these activities as they developed should be coordinated under the direction of a single individual'. In the foreword to the second survey, Hyde argues that his work took this argument from its predecessor.
14. For a description of the BSC's difficulties with the U.S. State Department in the first half of 1942, see Hyde, 'Report on British Security Co-ordination', Part I: Intelligence (S.I.S.), pp. 22–6, Hyde/Churchill. Hyde went into more detail about the challenge from the State Department in his own memoirs, *Secret Intelligence Agent: British Espionage in America and the Creation of the OSS* (New York, 1982), pp. 174–88. Although the first half of 1942 saw an increase in Stephenson's authority among British intelligence chiefs – in April 1942 the Security Executive (The highest committee on British Domestic Security) began a direct correspondence with Stephenson – he may well have believed that with the working environment becoming more hostile in the United States, he had to prove the BSC's intrinsic value to be confident that London's support would continue.
15. In February 1943, C. H. Ellis (48905), visited MI6 headquarters in order to clarify the BSC's status. For some months, London had been cabling Stephenson to curtail most of his activities. The push was on for operational intelligence to assist the liberation of the continent. As the BSC was poorly positioned to provide this kind of information, London sought to shift resources elsewhere. H. Montgomery Hyde, 'Report on British Security Co-Ordination in The United States of America', I, p. 80, Hyde/Churchill. The 'BSC history' provides further evidence that Stephenson had lost most of his operational responsibilities by mid-1943. Stephenson relinquished whatever control he had over all MI6 stations in Latin America in March 1943 (pp. 142–3). Meanwhile, because the

threat of a Nazi invasion of Latin America had passed with the Allied recovery of North Africa, London began to close all of the Special Operations Executive stations in South and Central America. By May 1943, Stephenson had lost the remaining SOE stations in Latin America, which had formerly reported to him (pp. 222–3). Stephenson's fear that this retrenchment would go even further was well founded. In the Hyde papers there is a reference to a meeting of Duff Cooper (Head of the Security Executive), Lord Selborne (Minister of Economic Warfare), Sir Charles Hambro (Head of SOE), Sir David Petrie (Head of MI5), Sir Stewart Menzies (Head of MI6), 'Loxley' (Foreign Office representative) and Desmond Morton on 9 April 1943, to discuss the future of the BSC. It is possible that Hyde's report featured in their discussion. The group agreed 'to make no change'. Handwritten note, Section 1/1, Hyde/Churchill.

16. The Hyde report is composed of four parts: one each on intelligence (SIS), security, special operations (SOE) and passport control (PCO).
17. Members of MI6 referred to their organization as SIS, the Secret Intelligence Service. Hyde, 'Report on British Security Co-ordination in The United States of America', Part I: Intelligence (S.I.S.), Hyde/Churchill.
18. Ibid. It appears likely that the Hyde report was written for British eyes only. In addition to admitting that the BSC worked around the State Department (pp. 22–6), the report contains some snide remarks about J. Edgar Hoover, who is described as having 'a touch of the prima donna in his temperament' and 'not unmindful of the benefits and joys of publicity for himself and his organization'(pp. 12–13). It also gives Stephenson too much credit for making an intelligence chief out of William Donovan: 'Donovan's natural predilection was towards the active sphere of military operatins [*sic*]. Fortunately, his constant association with 48000 [Stephenson] served to stimulate his interest in intelligence at a critical time in this country's history' (p. 16).
19. David Stafford, *Camp X* (Toronto, 1986), pp. 250–7. Stafford's account is based on correspondence with Tom Hill and interviews with Roald Dahl and Giles Playfair. I am grateful to David Stafford for sharing his work on the origins of the BSC history with me.
20. Ibid.
21. In an interview on 21 May 1984, H. Montgomery Hyde claimed that only Giles Playfair and Herbert Sichel wrote the BSC history. There is reason to doubt Hyde's account. He left the BSC in 1944 and played no part in the revision of his 1943 report. Moreover, none of the four contributors to the history interviewed by Stafford, including Playfair, mentioned Herbert Sichel.
22. 'History of the BSC', p. 153. The official BSC version of the Cynthia case is reproduced practically word for word in *The Quiet Canadian*, pp. 105–10. The quotation cited here can be found in its emended form on page 105. 'Cynthia' was a woman of many names. Born Amy Elizabeth Thorpe, she was Betty Pack during the war and died Elizabeth Brousse. See Lovell, *Cast No Shadow*, pp. 1–3.
23. David Stafford has discovered that Stephenson was angling for the job of chief of Canadian Intelligence at the time that the foreword to the history was written. In January 1946, Sir William requested the assistance of a Canadian BSC officer, Charles Vining, in putting the case for a Canadian intelligence service to federal bureaucrats in Ottawa. Ultimately, Vining wrote a new foreword for the history that stressed the value of a BSC-like organization in a bipolar world. Stafford, *Camp X*, p. 252.
24. One example of a confirmatory document is a letter from Duff Cooper to Stephenson, in which Cooper explains Stephenson's responsibilities as representative of MI5 in the Western Hemisphere. At the time, Cooper was the chief of Security Executive, the nucleus of the British imperial security system. Letter, Duff Cooper to Stephenson, 12 Oct. 1942, Hyde/Churchill.
25. Hyde recounted that Stephenson had ordered the destruction of the BSC papers after Playfair and Sichel completed their report. 'There are no BSC Archives', he said. Interview with H. Montgomery Hyde, 17 April 1984. Sir William Stephenson confirmed that there were no BSC archives later that year. Interview with Sir William Stephenson,

11 Oct. 1984. This was also confirmed by Tom Hill in a 1985 interview with David Stafford. See *Camp X*, pp. 256–7.

26. The case of the 'Nazi Map' is one illustration of the historical challenge posed by the Playfair BSC report. At the Navy Day dinner in October 1941, Roosevelt announced that he had proof, in the form of a map, of Hitler's designs on South America. The Playfair history and *The Quiet Canadian* both assert that the BSC provided this map to the President through William Donovan. These texts also present an identical explanation of its origins. The map was purloined from a courier of the German Embassy in Rio. (*The Quiet Canadian*, pp. 148–50; 'BSC History', pp. 216–17). A more detailed version of the same story appears in *A Man Called Intrepid*. Stevenson names the courier Gottfried Sandstede, a former attaché in the embassy in Argentina, who had copied this map from the ambassador's personal files. According to Stevenson this man paid dearly for his mistake. (Stevenson, *A Man*, p. 327). The *Intrepid* version had one great weakness: Sandstede was never punished by the Nazis. Finding this error in the course of researching Nazi activities in Latin America, John F. Bratzel and Leslie Rout, Jr., undertook a review of the standard version of the map story. From H. Montgomery Hyde, they then heard that some trickery had been involved. The 'Nazi map' was based upon an actual document; but the forgery department (Station M) of the BSC had made extensive changes to it to enhance its propaganda value. (Bratzel and Rout, 'FDR and the "Secret Map",' *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (January 1985), pp. 167–73 – credit to Dr. Fran McDonnell for finding this reference). Unfortunately, the historians' case that the map had been tampered with rested solely upon Hyde's testimony. Further, their work on Sandstede did not invalidate the courier from Rio thesis. In fact, instead of completely undermining the case for Sandstede being the ill-fated courier, they provided additional evidence that he had left South America for Germany in September 1941, exactly the time when the courier would have been intercepted if the Rio story is to be believed. They also demonstrated, through reference to a report from the US military attaché in Argentina in 1941, that Sandstede had had a map of the new boundaries of South America hanging in his office, which showed the territorial gains that Germany's friends such as Argentina could expect. Meanwhile, a more telling assault on the official version came from another former BSC officer, who claimed that not only had the technicians of Station M touched up the map, they had created it out of whole cloth. In 1975 Ivar Bryce wrote a short memoir, *You Only Live Once: Memories of Ian Fleming* (London, 1975; Frederick, MD, 1984), in which he took credit for having forged this map. Bryce related that after doodling a map of a Nazified South America he proposed a plan to Stephenson: 'Were a genuine German map of this kind to be discovered or captured from enemy hands and publicized among the good neighbours themselves, and above all among the "America firsters" with their belief that America could get along with Hitler, what a commotion would be caused.' According to Bryce, Stephenson jumped at the idea and came up with a plan that had nothing to do with Rio. He arranged for the FBI to 'find' the map by planting it at a location in Cuba that he knew to be a German radio post. After telling the FBI about the radio center, he sat back and let the FBI make its important discovery. Because both rest on a single, uncorroborated source, the Bratzel/Rout and Bryce challenges to the map story leave the truth a distant prospect. What happened? Is Bryce to be believed in that the President's map was a pure invention? Or was it based upon an actual map taken from Sandstede and then improved for maximum effect? What is one to make of the official BSC version, which discusses the theft but not any enhancement of the map? Elsewhere in the official history, Playfair and his colleagues spared no ink in describing how clever the BSC was at tricking Americans; why would they have neglected this supreme achievement? If, indeed, a decision was made in 1945 not to present in the BSC history any instances of deception against the US government then a great deal more than originally thought was lost in the bonfire of the BSC archive. A second example of this kind of censorship may well involve the Belmonte letter. The BSC history and *The Quiet Canadian* (pp. 262–6; 139–44, respectively) espouse the same account in which the letter – proof of planning for a

Nazi coup in Bolivia – was found on a German courier. However, Hyde in his later book, *Secret Intelligence Agent: British Espionage in America and the Creation of the OSS* (New York, 1982), pp. 153–5, argues that the letter was another BSC forgery that went to the US government. In the light of the discrepancies in the Nazi Map and Belmonte accounts, the Playfair BSC history begs caution and the extent of Stephenson's political action remains a puzzle.

27. McKenzie Porter, 'The Biggest Private Eye of All', *Maclean's Magazine*, 1 Dec. 1952. Porter also received help from some of Stephenson's colleagues, including Ernest Cuneo, formerly J. Edgar Hoover's lawyer and liaison officer to the BSC, and Sir William Wiseman who had performed a role somewhat similar to Stephenson's during the First World War.
28. The article claims that Stephenson had forced Hitler to delay his attack on Yugoslavia for six weeks by leaking certain information. Hyde wrote in 1962 that it was William Donovan who achieved this. See Hyde, *The Quiet Canadian*, p. 46.
29. Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, 1948), p. 270. Sherwood wrote: 'There was, by Roosevelt's order and despite State Department qualms, effectively close co-operation between J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI and British Security Services under the direction of a quiet Canadian, William Stephenson. The purpose of this co-operation was the detection and frustration of espionage and sabotage activities in the Western Hemisphere by agents of Germany, Italy and Japan, and also of Vichy France, Franco's Spain and, before Hitler turned eastward, the Soviet Union. It produced some remarkable results which were incalculably valuable, including the thwarting of attempted Nazi Putsche in Bolivia, in the heart of South America, and in Panama. Hoover was later decorated by the British and Stephenson by the US government for exploits which could hardly be advertised at the time.' Stephenson did help Sherwood. In his preface, Sherwood lists Stephenson as one of those whom he, or his assistant Sidney Hyman, interviewed for the book. Curiously, in the Sherwood papers at Harvard there is no record of any interview with Stephenson. See documents entitled 'Interviews and Correspondence for Hopkins Book', Robert E. Sherwood Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. There are two letters, however, from Stephenson to Sherwood. The first is largely a discussion of Sherwood's passage to Great Britain in 1948. Yet there is a tantalizing reference in this letter that implies Stephenson was prepared to discuss his secret work in some depth. 'I am making enquiries about the map and will try to obtain a copy for you. This might take some time' (Letter, William Stephenson to Robert Sherwood, 9 June 1948, Sherwood papers, Harvard). It is reasonable to believe that Stephenson was here making a reference to the so-called Nazi map of South America that FDR worked into his Navy Day address of 27 Oct. 1941. On the controversy surrounding this map see note 26.
30. *Time*, 6 June 1949, pp. 88, 90. The magazine reported: 'Sir William's World War II work was so secret that he will still not discuss it. ...'
31. Sir William Stephenson, interview, 11 Oct. 1984, Bermuda. Stephenson's daughter Elizabeth confirmed that he had his first stroke in the early 1950s. Letter, Elizabeth Stephenson to the author, 30 Oct. 1991.
32. Interview with H. Montgomery Hyde, 17 April 1984. Hyde said that Sir William had suffered two strokes (as indeed had Hyde).
33. Porter, *Maclean's*, 1 Dec. 1952.
34. Ibid.
35. An article in the same vein was 'How We Tricked the Nazi Spies', by Col. W. W. Murray, the former commander of the Canadian Intelligence Corps. *Maclean's Magazine*, 15 Sept. 1949.
36. Porter, *Maclean's*, 1 Dec. 1952.
37. Frederick W. Winterbotham, *The Ultra Secret* (New York, 1974); *The New York Times* first mentioned British decryption of German wartime messages in November 1974. See the *Times*, 10 Nov. 1974.
38. Porter, *Maclean's*, 1 Dec. 1952. The article gave one example of BSC decryption: 'In

1943 a German submarine surfaced off the coast of Uruguay. It broke radio silence for a few seconds to report its position in code. The message was picked up by a BSC radio monitor on the coast. It was transmitted to New York. It went through the decoding machine and was passed on to the Admiralty.'

39. One sign of this was that *Maclean's* did not publish any letters to the editor on this piece, whereas on average for every long article there were at least one or two. Furthermore, the article did not elicit any American response. Neither *The New York Times* nor any popular US journals followed up on the *Maclean's* article.
40. The 1950s brought the publication of remarkably frank, if overdrawn, intelligence memoirs by former members of William J. Donovan's Office of Strategic Services, the American analogue to Stephenson's BSC. Examples include Donald Downes' *The Scarlet Thread: Adventures in Wartime Espionage* (New York, 1953); Aldo Icardi, *American Master Spy* (New York, 1956); William J. Morgan, *The OSS and I* (New York, 1957). The urge to tell of their unusual experiences proved overpowering for quite a few OSS officers. Memoirs of the OSS period appeared just as soon as the Second World War ended. George C. Constantinides has compiled a useful list of OSS titles in an appendix to his article, 'The OSS: A Brief Review of Literature', in George C. Chalou (ed.), *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II* (Washington, 1992), pp. 115–17. Professor Christopher Andrew has suggested that Stephenson may have also aspired to a place in history similar to that of his predecessor in the First World War, Sir William Wiseman. Wiseman, chief of British intelligence in New York, acted as a special channel between his government and the Wilson administration in 1917–18. Christopher Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London, 1985), pp. 208-9; 214. August Heckscher, *Woodrow Wilson* (New York, 1991), pp. 460–61; 474–5. It is interesting in this regard that Wiseman was interviewed for the 1952 *Maclean's* article on the other Sir William.
41. Dick Ellis told Hyde that Stephenson envisioned *The Quiet Canadian* as a companion volume to Shepardson's work on Donovan. Section 1/11, Hyde/Churchill. Shepardson's project was never realized.
42. Letter, C. H. Ellis to Hyde, 10 Dec. 1960. Through a mutual BSC colleague, John Pepper, Stephenson was able to explain to Ellis what he wanted in this book. Hyde/Churchill. Ellis gave August 1959 as the date of the commission. Section 1/11, Hyde/Churchill.
43. Ibid. Ellis wrote: '[i]n his original letter to me suggesting that I do the work, Bill said that Luce had offered $100,000 for the book, Makenzie (Toronto) [*sic?*] offered him $30,000 of the first royalties. He thinks he can get various people to boost sales here and in the US and Canada.'
44. Ibid. When he passed on the project to Hyde, Ellis revealed that he had taken some reports home with him: 'I don't feel like sending the original material (the copies of official reports &c.) by post. In the first place I shouldn't have them, and secondly they are close to the bone and contain much that is not publishable.' Evidence that Ellis had access to the MI6 archives can be found in a letter of June 1963. In the wake of Kim Philby's defection in January 1963, MI6 had tightened security at headquarters, and Ellis could no longer consult documents as easily as he had in the past. 'Nominally', he wrote to Hyde, 'I am not entitled to see pp. later than '47, & now the particular type of record you are interested in is being moved to another building so that no one *without good reason* can call for papers. This, of course, is a sound move, but it makes it almost impossible for anyone without *"the right to know"* to look up facts.' Letter, C.E. to Harford, 18 (or 10) June 1963, Hyde/Churchill.
45. Letter, C. H. Ellis to H. Montgomery Hyde, 17 Aug. (1961?). Ellis wrote: 'Bill seems to think everything started with him. It didn't really. The link existed but owing to US Neutrality Act it was "working to rule" only in 1939 & early '40.'
46. Letter, C. H. Ellis to H. Montgomery Hyde, 10 Dec. 1960; Ellis' manuscript, *Anglo-American Collaboration in Intelligence and Security: Notes for Documentation, c. 1963*, is not in the Hyde collection; however, it bears all the hallmarks of being his attempt at the BSC history. Stephenson shares the spotlight in this work with William Donovan:

'The circumstances in which this development [i.e. the formation of Anglo-American collaboration in intelligence and security matters] took place have as yet found only brief reference in post-war memoirs or in the more or less sensational war stories that have appeared in recent years. The account given in the following pages of cooperation for the common effort of the Canadian, William S. Stephenson and the American, William J. Donovan – the "Two Bills", as they were known at the time – should go some distance to fill this gap in the record and place on record, and in its proper perspective, an achievement that contributed in great measure to the winning of the war.' Ellis, *Anglo-American Collaboration*, p.7. Despite this focus on William Stephenson, there is strong internal evidence that this manuscript was written before *The Quiet Canadian*. Hyde's book is not mentioned, and the only secondary sources cited in the text are those listed by Ellis in his letter of 10 Dec. 1960 to Hyde, when he turned the project over to him. The only known copy of the Ellis manuscript belongs to Thomas Troy, who kindly shared it with the author.

47. Interview with H. Montgomery Hyde, 17 April 1984. On 10 December 1960, Dick Ellis wrote to Hyde suggesting that he take over the project because Sir William had just rejected his manuscript. In 1966, Hyde wrote to Stephenson's secretary, Miss A.M. Green: 'I need not remind you that the idea of the book, which has caused me such a costly expenditure of time, energy, anxiety and money over the past three years since this wretched action began, did not originate with me and that I was invited by Sir William to write it.' Letter, H. Montgomery Hyde to Miss A.M. Green, 22 March 1966, Hyde/Churchill. By 'this wretched action', Hyde meant a costly libel case involving former Vichy French diplomat Gaston Henry-Haye that he had lost. In the book – p.95 – Hyde had asserted that Henry-Haye organized "a kind of Gestapo" in the Washington embassy. Hyde's assertions about the character of the former Vichy ambassador to the US did not hold up in court. For information about the libel case see Hugh Trevor-Roper's review of *A Man Called Intrepid*, in *New York Review of Books*, 13 May 1976.
48. Letter, H. Montgomery Hyde to Miss A.M. Green, 28 Jan. 1962, Hyde/Churchill. Hyde writes that he began the project in December 1961 and expected to take three or four months to write the book. In the spring of 1966, Miss Green wrote on behalf of Sir William to request that Hyde repay his 'outstanding debt'. Apparently Sir William was reneging on his original offer to pay Hyde's expenses for the period when he was writing the book. This incensed Hyde. 'In view of everything that has happened I should be extremely astonished if Sir William sees fit to press for its repayment now.' Letter, H. Montgomery Hyde to Miss Green, 22 March 1966, Hyde/Churchill.
49. The book went to the printer on 6 June 1962, according to Hyde's records.
50. Two examples: compare Hyde, *The Quiet Canadian*, p.35 with pp.9–10 in the 'BSC history'; and compare pp.21–4 of the 'BSC history' with pp.152–6 of *The Quiet Canadian*.
51. Hyde, The *Quiet Canadian*, p.179. Hyde wrote: 'In this connection Stephenson made available to Donovan the deciphered wireless communications between Germany and the various secret wireless stations in South America concerning the activities of Nazi agents.' This was not as harmful a revelation as the *Maclean's* reference to the submariners' messages because the *Abwehr* agents in Latin America generally encrypted their messages by hand. These transposition ciphers were not very challenging to professional codebreakers. In fact, they were often broken by amateur code and cipher enthusiasts. U-boats, however, employed Enigma machines to hide their messages. It was the success of the British against those vastly more complicated cryptological systems that constituted the Ultra secret. Regarding the ciphers used by *Abwehr* agents in Latin America, see John F. Bratzel and Leslie B. Rout, Jr., 'Abwehr Ciphers in Latin America', *Cryptologia*, Vol.7, No.2 (April 1983), pp.132–44. In 1984, Hyde argued that Stephenson had wanted to reveal the Ultra secret in his biography. Hyde refused because unlike Sir William, he planned to live in Britain and would therefore be subject to the Official Secrets Act. Interview, Hyde, 17 April 1984.

52. On the double agents, see The *Quiet Canadian*, pp. 217–20. The 'Cynthia' case is described in pp. 105–10, whereas a description of the BSC propaganda campaign involving the US media can be found on pp. 199–210. In the 'BSC history', pp. 303–10 describe 'Bicycle', 'Springbok', and 'Pat J'. 'Cynthia' is described on pp. 152–4 and 166–7. The interventionist propaganda campaign is covered on pp. 91–9 in the 'BSC history'.
54. Interview, Hyde, 17 April 1984.
55. Mary Lovell quotes a letter of 5 Nov. 1962 written by Ellis to Hyde: 'It is not strictly accurate to say that the proofs were submitted to MI6 and returned with few corrections. MI6's SO saw the first draft (mine) and passed it, and when I offered the final version, he said he did not want to see it but trusted me to scrutinize it for possible security lapses. I gather "C" is being harassed but I think it extremely doubtful that the DPP take action as the book was offered for clearance.' Lovell, *Cast No Shadow*, pp. 345–6. Ellis was reprimanded, however, by MI6. He lost his position with the Intelligence Research Board, a division of MI6. In the fall of 1963 he wrote Stephenson requesting monetary compensation for losing this job. He said it carried a salary of £1,000 a year. Ellis to Hyde, 3 Nov. 1963, Hyde/Churchill.
55. The timing and extent of press interest can be gauged by looking at the US Army's file on John Vassall. See 'Vassall, John', AA855209, Record Group 319, National Archives, Washington, DC. The press feasted on revelations about Vassall, who was homosexual and had carried on a friendly correspondence with the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, Thomas Galbraith. Macmillan had been unhappy with the press's conduct in 1961 when a different Soviet naval intelligence ring and George Blake were uncovered. When he learned of Vassall's treachery in September 1962, he predicted: 'There will be another big row.' Vassall was sentenced to 18 years in prison on 22 Oct. 1962; but strong press interest continued because of the implication of Galbraith. See Alistair Horne, *Macmillan, 1957–1986: Volume II of the Official Biography* (London, 1989), pp. 456–67. The quotation, which Horne found in Macmillan's diary, appears on p. 460.
56. From 1950 to 1959 Hyde was the Ulster Unionist MP for North Belfast. For three years during his parliamentary career, Hyde represented the United Kingdom at the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly in Strasbourg. This comes from Hyde's curriculum vitae, dated 1984, deposited at Churchill College, Cambridge.
57. Macmillan's official biographer, Alistair Horne, found this particular reference to Vassall in Macmillan's diary entry for 5 Nov. 1962. *Macmillan*, II, p. 461. On 8 November Macmillan rose to address the Hyde matter in the House of Commons. In an exchange with Prime Minister Macmillan, Dame Irene Ward asked: 'Will he explain how it is that Mr Montgomery Hyde has an access to papers – presumably Foreign Office papers – how it is that Sir William Stephenson has been able to give all his experiences, and how Mr Sefton Delmer has been able to write a book giving all sorts of experiences of his, while other people have their books refused?' Macmillan responded: 'My honourable friend's question was cast in general terms, and I therefore replied in general terms. If she will give me particular instances I will certainly look at them.' The general response to which the British Prime Minister was referring was his earlier statement that all those who had signed the Act knew their responsibilities and he did not think 'that any special steps [were] required to ensure uniformity of treatment between individuals ...' *Hansard*, House of Commons, UK, 8 Nov. 1962, cols. 1153–54. The legality of *The Quiet Canadian* was never raised again in the House of Commons.
58. Ladislas Farago, *New York Times Book Review*, 30 June 1963, p. 7.
59. Interviews with Ernest Cuneo, 27 Jan. 1984; 19 Oct. 1984. In the second interview, Cuneo recounted the story of the hospital visit. He said that there had been some fear that Stephenson would never emerge from the coma. Apparently he had a brain lesion. Cuneo placed this meeting at the time of President Eisenhower's trip to the Far East. According to Stephen Ambrose, the presidential trip to the Far East took place in June 1960. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, II: *The President* (New York, 1984), pp. 581–2.

However, there is reason to doubt the date given by Cuneo. There is no mention of the illness in Ellis' letter of 10 Dec. 1960, which describes the collapse of the first *Quiet Canadian* project; whereas there is ample evidence in Hyde's correpondence from 1963 that Stephenson was seriously ill. It appears that the worst period was that summer. By 1964, Stephenson was described as an invalid. See Sections 1/5 – 1/11, Hyde/Churchill.

60. David Stafford, 'A Myth Called Intrepid,' *Saturday Night Magazine*, October 1989; David Stafford argues that *A Man Called Intrepid* was based on the delusions that Stephenson suffered after a stroke in the 1960s. See 'Letters to the Editor', *Saturday Night Magazine*, for rebuttals.
61. Letter, H. Montgomery Hyde to Roger W. Straus, Jr., 22 Feb. 1963. Hyde/Churchill.
62. Two cables, Intrepid (Stephenson's cable address) to H. Montgomery Hyde, 15 and 16 Feb. 1962. Hyde/Cambridge. Regarding David Ogilvy's career, see Hyde, *The Quiet Canadian*, pp. 194–5.
63. Letter, Roger W. Straus, Jr., to David Ogilvy, 1 Feb. 1963. Hyde/Churchill. Straus wrote that Hyde had made 'several' of Ogilvy's suggested changes but any further changes were out of the question as the book had already gone to press.
64. Letter, H. Montgomery Hyde to Roger W. Straus, Jr., 22 Feb. 1963. Hyde/Churchill. Later in this letter, Hyde was even more condescending: 'I have always liked the little man [Stephenson] and have been on fairly friendly terms with him for the past twenty-three years.' However inexcusable Hyde's treatment of his former mentor, there was increasing evidence that the 67-year-old Stephenson had impaired judgement. He began to fantasize about a Communist conspiracy against him. In March 1963 he furiously cabled Hyde hoping to stop the sale of rights to an Icelandic publisher. 'Hyde, ... there is a Comie [*sic*] plot to handle publication and use that hotbed Reykjavik as base to discredit us and create unfriendly relations Sweden and whole of Scandinavia. ...' Cable, Intrepid to H. Montgomery Hyde, 15 March 1963. Hyde/Churchill.
65. Telephone conversation, Stephenson, 12 Sept. 1984; interview, Stephenson, 11 Oct. 1984. On the telephone, Stephenson showed little enthusiasm for *The Quiet Canadian* and complained that there was nothing very good in print about him.
66. *Who's Who*, 1974. This entry also lists 'The Two Bills', and *A Man called Intrepid* as published books (in 1972 and 1973, respectively). Ellis' manuscript was never published and *A Man Called Intrepid* was published only in 1976.
67. When asked what he considered his greatest contribution, Stephenson said in 1984 that it was 'getting supplies when Britain was practically sinking'. Interview, 11 Oct. 1984.
68. Although it is not certain that Ellis's 'Anglo-American Collaboration in Intelligence and Security: Notes for Documentation, c. 1963' is identical with his first draft of *The Quiet Canadian*, given that 'Anglo-American Collaboration' does attempt to describe Stephenson's pre-war role, it is useful as evidence of the broad change in Ellis' views of Sir William's career.
69. Ellis, 'The Two Bills: Mission Accomplished', 1972, p. 8. [The author is grateful to Thomas Troy for sharing this document with him.] The manuscript's preface was written by Major-General Colin Gubbins, the wartime head of the Special Operations Executive in London. Gubbins argues that *The Quiet Canadian* left out the story of Stephenson's work as a channel between Churchill and Roosevelt. Gubbins gives the 'Destroyers for Bases' deal as the best example of Stephenson's diplomatic work.
70. 'Anglo-American Collaboration in Intelligence and Security: Notes for Documentation, c. 1963', p. 33; 'The Two Bills: Mission Accomplished', Sept. 1972, p. 29. Cordell Hull does not mention this meeting in his memoirs, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 2 volumes (New York, 1948). There are no references at all to Stephenson in these volumes.
71. In his authoritative reconstruction of the negotiations over the destroyers, David Reynolds leaves out Stephenson. Citing Hyde, Reynolds does mention Stephenson in the text but argues that his own archival research did not turn up any further substantiation of Stephenson's role in diplomacy. See David Reynolds, *The Creation of the*

Anglo-American Alliance, 1937–1941: A Study in Competitive Co-operation, (London, 1981), p. 331.

72. See William Stevenson's entries in *Who's Who* (London, 1977, 1978); See also 'A man who could well be called intrepid', *Maclean's Magazine*, 3 Nov. 1980, pp. 10–13.
73. William Stevenson, *The Yellow Wind* (Boston, 1959); idem., *Birds' Nests in Their Beards* (Boston, 1964); idem., *Zanek! A Chronicle of the Israeli Air Force* (New York, 1971).
74. In *Zanek!*, supposedly a non-fiction account of the Israeli Air Force, Stevenson warns the reader that he has invented 'S', a narrator who acts suspiciously like Stevenson. 'Being unable to inject myself into a chronicle about those who daily face dangers far greater than any I have known, I have had to create the stranger S. He could be in several places at once, watching and listening. He could bring together a number of separate incidents and make them happen on the same day. When necessary, S could create one character out of several men whose identities had to be protected for the security reasons indicated above.' But then he asks himself who that 'S' was. 'I'm not sure who the stranger S really is. Myself, perhaps, and the ghosts of the dead already.' Ibid., p. vi.
75. See note 5.
76. Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid.* On Rieber, see p. 115; On Cynthia and the Vichy officers, see pp. 337–76.
77. Ibid., pp. 194–6.
78. In another twist to this story, Cuneo maintained to his death that he had had no role in bringing Roosevelt and Stephenson together. He specifically denied carrying the 'marriage' proposal. Cuneo thought that Vincent Astor, who was in charge of US intelligence co-ordination in New York City, might have been the intermediary. Cuneo said that he did not meet Stephenson until 1942. Interview with Ernest Cuneo, 12 Dec. 1984.
79. See 'British Security Coordination (BSC): An Account of Secret Activities in the Western Hemisphere', pp. xi–xii; Hyde, *The Quiet Canadian*, p. 26 and Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid*, pp. 83–4.
80. 'British Security Coordination (BSC): An Account of Secret Activities in the Western Hemisphere, 1940–45', p. 9; Stevenson, *Intrepid*, p. 121
81. Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid.* Stevenson discusses Stephenson's role in acquiring a mockup of the Enigma machine on p. 45. Stephenson's suggestion that computers be employed to crack German ciphers is on p. 105. On p. 57, Stevenson writes that so far as Sir William was concerned solving the Enigma puzzle was the most important operational responsibility he had in 1940. There is no evidence of any of this in the Playfair BSC history, which does describe most secret sources in other respects.
82. There is reason to doubt that Ellis wrote the foreword attributed to him. Hyde believed that Ellis had not been in any shape to write it. Interview, 14 March 1984.
83. Sir William Stephenson, Foreword to *A Man Called Intrepid* by William Stevenson (New York, 1976), pp. xiii–xx; C. H. 'Dick' Ellis, 'A Historical Note', in *A Man Called Intrepid*, pp. xxi–xxiv.
84. These were an honorary LLD from the University of Winnipeg and an honorary DSc from the University of Manitoba in 1979, an honorary DSc from the University of Winnipeg in 1980, and an honorary DSc from the University of Windsor (Ontario) in 1985. See Sir William Stephenson's entry in *Who's Who*, 1989.
85. *Who's Who*, 1989.
86. Interview, Stephenson, 11 Oct. 1984. When asked the genesis of the codename Intrepid, Sir William averred: 'Out of the imagination of the writer William Stevenson.'
87. Ibid.
88. Despite his disappointment over the book *A Man Called Intrepid*, Sir William did authorize a second Intrepid book in 1983. He later said that he had done so reluctantly because he thought the book *Intrepid's Last Case*, which was about his role in the Igor Gouzenko affair, would 'smoke out all of the Reds' in Western governments. He had

also hoped that it might serve to defend his late colleague Dick Ellis, who had died in 1975 with accusations of treachery hanging over his head. Interview, 11 Oct. 1984.

89. Telephone interviews, Sir William Stephenson, 12 Sept. 1984 and 26 May 1985.
90. Interview, Stephenson, 11 Oct. 1984. Stephenson repeated the assertion that he had been Churchill's representative in the Western Hemisphere in a telephone discussion of 26 May 1985. For evidence of his shift away from the view that he had acted as the secret channel between FDR and Churchill, see what he wrote, or had published under his name, in 1982. After John Colville, formerly Winston Churchill's Private Secretary, attacked the description of the Stephenson/Churchill relationship in *A Man Called Intrepid*, Stephenson defended himself in two forewords the following year. See John Colville, *Winston Churchill and His Inner Circle* (New York, 1981), pp. 83–4. In his foreword to Hyde's *Secret Intelligence Agent: British Espionage in America and the Creation of the OSS* (New York, 1982), pp. xiii–xviii, Stephenson repeated the claim that Churchill had named him as special representative at a meeting on 10 May. Colville, who had worked with Churchill before and during the Second World War, disputed Stephenson's account, saying that he had never heard Churchill speak of Sir William Stephenson, nor did he know of any proof of the meeting on 10 May. Stephenson countered: 'My calls at No 10 [Downing Street] were invariably late at night when Colville had probably gone to bed, or else was away serving with the RAF which he did between October 1941 and the end of 1943.' Incidentally, in this foreword, Stephenson disputed the allegation that he had commissioned Hyde's biography. 'It was a purely spontaneous effort on the part of the author, but he did it with my approval and he had access to BSC records.' Nevertheless, this foreword did evince some stepping back from the spirit of the *Intrepid* account. In response to Colville, Sir William wrote: 'Whatever may have been written or said about me by others, I can state categorically that I never at any time claimed to provide a secret liaison between the British Prime Minister and the American President.' In the second foreword, which he wrote for a biography of William Donovan, Stephenson repeated the story of the visit with Churchill on 10 May. Significantly, Sir William ascribed to himself only a secondary influence on the 'Destroyers-for-Bases Deal'. Sir William Stephenson, Foreword to *Donovan: America's Master Spy* (New York, 1982), pp. vii–x.
91. Interview, H. Montgomery Hyde, 17 April 1984.
92. Ibid. Hyde said that Stephenson had purchased an Enigma machine in 1934, but he had had no idea that it would be used by the Nazis. He was not one of those responsible for solving the puzzle posed by the Nazi ciphers.
93. Ibid. Hyde did allege that one of the five assassins had had some training at Camp X, though not in connection with an attempt on Heydrich. Stafford's account of the training school, however, shows that even this limited connection with the assassination could not be true. Camp X only opened in December 1941, months after the members of the Czech team had begun their training in England and only three weeks before they parachuted into occupied Europe. See *Camp X*, pp. 273–5.
94. Sir William Stephenson, Foreword to *Secret Intelligence Agent: British Espionage in America and the Creation of the OSS* by H. Montgomery Hyde (New York, 1982); Sir William Stephenson, Obituary, *The Times*, 3 Feb. 1989. Hyde described 'Intrepid' as Stephenson's 'nickname' during the war. About Stephenson's role in the Ultra story, Hyde wrote: 'In 1937, through his contacts in the German communications industry, Stephenson discovered that a revised and portable version of Enigma was being used by the Nazis. ...' Hyde did not allege that Stephenson orchestrated the capture of an Enigma prototype; For a first draft of this obituary see Hyde, *Secret Intelligence Agent*, pp. 78–81.
95. Interview with David Ignatius, Oct. 1990.
96. In his article on this case, David Stafford also described the Intrepid affair as a cautionary tale for those interested in intelligence history. 'A Myth Called Intrepid', *Saturday Night Magazine*, Oct. 1989.

97. A fresh example is Tom Mangold's study of James J. Angleton's career, *Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton, the CIA's Master Spy Hunter* (New York, 1991).
98. F. H. Hinsley and C. A. G. Simkins, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, Vol. 4: *Security and Counter-Intelligence* (London, 1990), pp. 142–8. Ironically, though supplemented by some documents, the official British description of the BSC's responsibilities is based on Hyde's *Quiet Canadian*. See footnotes, p. 156.
99. See Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, MD, 1981).

Allied Scientific Co-operation and Soviet Espionage in Canada, 1941–45

DONALD AVERY

On 14 June 1946 Canadian military intelligence received a frantic request from Colonel R.E.S. Williamson, the American military attaché in Ottawa. What top-secret military information had Soviet agents in Canada turned over to the USSR? Not surprisingly, the Americans were most concerned about atomic energy matters. Specifically, they wanted to know whether the Soviet Union had been able to obtain information about the Manhattan Project,' any samples of uranium 235 or plutonium .... (or) any plans or drawings showing bomb construction...?'* By the same token the Americans had searching questions about a number of other advanced weapon systems.These were categorized by Williamson as follows:

(a) Explosives: 'What did the U.S.S.R learn of methods of manufacture of explosives such as RDX?'
(b) Guided Missiles: 'What information did U.S.S.R. obtain on U.S. or British developments in the field of guided missiles?'
(c) Electronics and Proximity Fuses: 'What data was obtained from the Canadians on "the U.S. Navy electronic shell", i.e. proximity fuse?'
(d) Chemical Warfare: 'What information did the U.S.S.R. obtain on the German nerve gases?'[1]

Nor were the Americans alone in feeling that their national security had been compromised by Soviet espionage. Throughout May and June 1946 urgent messages were sent from the British War Office and from British intelligence agencies asking about 'any British military material or documents that may have been compromised to Russia'.[3]

While this crisis in Canada's military and intelligence liaison with the United States and Great Britain had many immediate and long term ramifications, my particular concern here is with a number of important questions concerning Canada's involvement with alliance military

*For a number of reasons I have chosen not to discuss here Canada's involvement in atomic research. The main reason is that the development of the atomic bomb did not directly involve either Canadian scientists or the Canadian military. It was essentially an American weapon, which was not used in the war against Nazi Germany. In addition, neither the United States nor Britain officially informed the USSR about the development of the atomic bomb until the Potsdam Conference in July 1945.[2]

technology during the Second World War.[4] Why did Canada have access to so much top secret information in the first place? To what extent had Canadian scientists become involved with the awesome weapon systems which had emerged at the end of war? Another set of questions relates to the counterpoint of Soviet espionage and Canadian, American and British security systems. Why did Soviet intelligence target Canadian defence and scientific institutions? Which defence science secrets were not available either through the Anglo-Soviet Technical Accord, or other bilateral arrangements with the Western Allies ? How did Soviet intelligence persuade some Canadians, including seven Canadian scientists, to pursue top secret scientific information? These and other questions will be addressed in what follows.

I

That science could be mobilized in the service of war was made plain to Canadian scientists during the Second World War. At the universities, at the National Research Council(NRC), and at the various laboratories of the Armed Services, scientists pushed forward the development of weapons for Canada and its allies. Chemists worked on new forms of explosives such as RDX and DINA, incendiary bombs and flamethrowers, as well as the offensive and defensive aspects of chemical warfare. In the rapidly expanding field of physics, the Canadian wartime scientific agenda included radar, sonar/asdic, missiles, the proximity fuse, and above all, atomic weapons. All this work was carried out through a complex scientific and military network which linked Canada with Great Britain and the United States.[5] Inevitably, alliance scientific warfare built upon established relationships between elite scientists and government officials. Before the war Henry Tizard and F.A. Lindemann (Lord Cherwell) had already established themselves as indispensable intermediaries between their fellow British scientists and Whitehall. In the United States Vannevar Bush, President of the Carnegie Institute, and James Conant, President of Harvard, likewise were well placed. The pre-war Canadian scientific community did not have equivalent figures, but under the pressure of wartime events scientific leaders emerged. Chief among them was C. J. Mackenzie, President of the National Research Council of Canada, and his scientific 'troubleshooter' Dr Otto Maass of McGill University.[6]

The most important catalyst in the emergence of scientific military co-operation between Canada, Britain and the United States was the Tizard Mission of 1940. This mission was forced on the British by the desperate circumstances of the war at the time, and reversed the earlier feeling in London that joint scientific projects with the Americans and the Canadians were unnecessary and dangerous to national security. With the country preparing for a German invasion, this attitude could not be sustained. Accordingly, the leading members of the country's scientific elite and military establishment were able to convince Prime Minister Churchill that it was in Britain's national interest to share the country's most important secrets with the Americans. This would give the United Kingdom access to desperately needed technology, while assisting 'the armed forces of the U.S.A. to reach the highest level of technical efficiency'.[7]

Although most of the emphasis was placed on co-operation with the Americans, there was also growing interest in Canada's scientific and military potential. In June 1940 Dr A. V. Hill, one of Britain's most eminent scientists, met NRC officials while serving as North American scientific liaison officer for the British Air Ministry. His subsequent report of 18 June 1940 pointed out that while defence research in Canada was still underdeveloped, assistance in the form of a British Scientific and Technical Mission would greatly improve this situation.[8]

Between August and December 1940 the Tizard Mission captured the attention of scientists and military officials in Canada and the United States. In deference to the Commonwealth connection, Sir Henry Tizard made Canada his first stop. Upon arrival in Ottawa on 16 August, he met C. J. Mackenzie and various NRC and military officials so as to explain the goals of his mission. According to Mackenzie his meeting with Tizard went very well; they 'seemed to talk the same language and reacted to most situations alike'. Mackenzie was particularly impressed with Tizard's ability to communicate with many different groups – 'senior political figures, senior military staffs, university people and scientists .... He understood the practical problems of the Services and industry, and respected their outlook, but he also had a feeling for the young research worker filled with enthusiasm and bright ideas but with very little practical background.' Tizard made more yards in Ottawa when he invited Mackenzie, General Kenneth Stuart and Air Vice-Marshal E. W. Stedman to join the British and American delegations in Washington after the first round of talks.[9]

The Washington meetings were a resounding success. British and American scientists and military officials had extensive discussions about the possibilities of joint research on radar, the proximity fuse, RDX explosives, ASDIC, and jet engines, and in many instances the basis for close wartime scientific co-operation was established.[10] The subsequent American scientific mission of March 1941, headed by Dr James Conant, President of Harvard and Bush's 'right hand man' at the National Defence Research Council (NDRC), provided a second important catalyst for a comprehensive Anglo-American exchange system.[11] With goodwill on both sides the mission turned out a great success.[12] The British now agreed that a NDRC Liaison Office should be established in their country, and that all of the American specialists committees should immediately be granted access to top-secret information. In addition, a system for the rapid exchange of scientific information was devised. Under this arrangement copies of American reports moved through the NDRC Liaison office in London, or through the Central British Research Office (later the British Commonwealth Research Office) in Washington, while information from Britain to the United States moved through a variety of other channels.[13]

II

The ramifications of the Tizard and Conant Missions for Canadian defence science were manifold. During the first year of the war, Canadian scientists were granted only very limited access to top-secret information about British weapons. At the same time they were denied almost all access to American military secrets, and neither the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940 nor the Hyde Park Agreement of 1941 dealt with this aspect of North American defence.[14] In the spring of 1941, however, all this changed. Now the British connection made it possible for Canadian scientists to become involved in the most sophisticated of American military projects. The fact that the United States was a non-belligerent until December 1941, also worked to their advantage since information about various British and American weapons was often channelled through Canadian agencies.[15]

On the other hand, being cast in the role of scientific linchpin between these two powerful nations had its disadvantages. Canada's sudden promotion to the first team, it was understood in Ottawa, had occurred only because the British and Americans believed that this facilitated *their* research co-operation. This meant that Canada's role might not be permanent, a perception borne out in part, at least, by subsequent events. After 1943 Canada's liaison role became much less important as the British and Americans opted increasingly in favour of more direct connections.[16]

For C. J. Mackenzie the problems of being a 'poor cousin' was a problem to be overcome through personal charm and quiet diplomacy when dealing with British and American scientific administrators.[17] Not surprisingly, given the fact that Canada was Britain's major wartime ally until December 1941, most of Mackenzie's responsibilities related to British defence priorities.[18] At the same time, however, through his liaison work with the NDRC and its 1942 successor the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), Mackenzie had many opportunities to become familiar with Bush, Conant and the other leading American scientific mandarins.[19]

As the war progressed, Canadian and American scientists became involved in a wide range of important collaborative projects, all of which necessitated close connections between the university, military and industrial laboratories of the two countries.[20] Inevitably, because American resources were so much greater, most of the movement of personnel that occurred involved Canadian scientists heading southward. One of the most popular destinations was the 'Rad Lab' at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, with its vast and highly advanced radar research facilities. This was particularly important for those Canadian scientists who were working on anti-submarine devices; they were also drawn to the sophisticated experiments being conducted at the Woods Hole Oceanography Institute and the New London naval testing laboratory.[21]

The OSRD was also prepared to recognize the specific talents of Canadian scientists and, where possible, use them in their extensive operations. In June 1941, Mackenzie was able to persuade Bush that Dr Joseph Wilson Greig, a Canadian scientist working in the US, should be brought into the highly sensitive OSRD proximity fuse project:[22]

> I understand ... that Dr. Tuve (of Johns Hopkins) would like to use Dr. Joseph Wilson Greig as a Liaison Officer between his group and Dr. Pitt's group at the University of Toronto so that the work on their special problem will be carried on with the most complete collaboration. I also understand that because of Dr. Greig's Canadian nationality it is impossible for him to be in the ordinary way a member of Dr. Tuve's group .... We have asked the R.C.M.P here to make inquiries into Dr. Greig's record, but we have no doubt that he will prove a suitable person for this secret work.[23]

Although Canadian scientists made many important contributions in the fields of radar, anti-submarine devices, and the proximity fuse, their overall impact on the development of these weapons was still rather small, particularly in the latter stages of the war when the United States had the scientific and industrial resources to proceed either on its own or with British assistance. In the area of explosives and chemical warfare, however, Canada's scientific role remained very important.[24]

Between 1940 and 1945 a large number of Canadian scientists at the NRC, at the universities and at various military and industrial installations worked on top secret chemical projects in close collaboration with their American and British counterparts. Most of this work was co-ordinated by the NRC, by the chemical warfare branch of the Canadian Army, and by the Explosives and Chemical Branch of the Department of Munitions and Supply. At the beginning of the war, liaison with the Americans was arranged primarily through the NRC-OSRD connection, or through the

Joint War Production Committee of Canada and the United States, and its more specialized Technical Subcommittee on Chemicals and Explosives.[25] According to J.R. Donald, the Canadian representative on the Technical Sub-Committee, the system was a great success, largely because of the mutual trust and respect that characterized the interaction between the two groups.[26]

The joint development of the explosive RDX exemplified this spirit of co-operation. Although it had been originally discovered during the First World War, the large scale military use of this powerful explosive had been hampered by its unstable qualities.[27] But this did not deter Otto Maass. In June 1940 he attempted to convince officials of the British Explosives Research laboratories in Woolwich that Canadian scientists should be given the opportunity to develop new forms of RDX. Maass, however, 'received very little encouragement and was told that this project... might well be discontinued'. Undeterred, he called upon his colleagues at McGill, Dr James Ross and Dr Raymond Boyer, as well as Dr George Wright of the University of Toronto to carry on further RDX experiments. By 1941 they had developed a stabilizing process (the Ross process) which promised to revolutionize RDX production.[28] The only problem was that RDX research teams at the University of Michigan, Cornell University and the University of Pennsylvania had, in the meantime, discovered a similar process (the Bachmann process). A successful partnership was soon forged.[29] In October 1941, with Bush and Mackenzie to the fore, a joint RDX Committee was formed consisting of Drs Wright, Ross, and Boyer from Canada, and Drs W.E. Bachmann, R.C. Elderfield, Ralph Connor, R.P. Linstead, Roger Adams, and F.C. Whitemore from the United States.[30] There was also extensive consultation with British authorities, and with representatives of the American military.[31] By the middle of 1942 a suitable RDX formula had been devised, the British and American military had endorsed the large-scale use of RDX, and production plants were operating in both Canada and the United States.[32]

Scientists of both countries were pleased not only with the results of their experiments, but also with the system of collaborative research. This sense of scientific 'boosterism'was certainly evident in the summary report submitted by the chairman of the American RDX committee in April 1942: 'the process now presented to the Army is one of which .... the Office of Scientific Research and Development can well be proud, both because it is ... a vitally important strategic material and because it is the result of a nearly perfect functioning of the principles on which the ... Committee was established, namely that decentralized research among scientific men can achieve important practical results in a minimum of time.' Canada's RDX scientists concurred.[33]

III

The involvement of Canadian scientists with the research, development and production of major weapon systems also meant that they were subject to the rules and procedures of the slowly evolving Canadian national security state.[34] But to what extent were Canadian scientists aware of the full implications of the Official Secrets Act?[35] How many would have shared the astonishment and horror which atomic scientist Norman Veall suddenly experienced when this potentially draconian measure was aimed in his direction:[36]

> This is the first time I have seen the Canadian Act, and I must confess I am very shocked in that a person can be tried and convicted on the flimsiest of circumstantial evidence. In fact I could go even further and state that I know dozens of perfectly innocent people, including myself, who would be liable for conviction under this Act. In short, no scientists engaged in secret work is safe from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment.[37]

All defence scientists would, however, have been aware of the classification system which the Canadian Armed Forces had adopted to differentiate among top secret, secret, confidential and open documents. On the other hand, many scientists had a tendency to view these procedures as arbitrary and bureaucratic with little relation to the scientific or military value of the information.[38] Problems of maintaining a consistent security system was further complicated by alliance warfare, a situation which was aptly described by the head of the NRC radar division: 'The security and classification of (secret) information is a complex and interlocking problem requiring simultaneous action by the appropriate bodies in U.K., U.S.A. and Canada. The picture is very cloudy due to disagreements, slow action and enforced alterations in status caused by the seemingly endless leakages.'[39]

Any attempt to assess the effectiveness of Canada's Armed Forces and the NRC to protect their scientific secrets is difficult. Most studies of this subject have relied on the documents and testimony of the Soviet defector Igor Gouzenko, which concentrated on developments during the last three months of the war.[40] Another problem is that most of the relevant Canadian and British security records remain closed.[41] Still, the fragmentary evidence does suggest certain patterns. One of these was the absence of systematic office, laboratory and factory security procedures which would have made the extraction and copying of top secret documents a more formidable undertaking.[42] This problem not only concerned C.J. Mackenzie and Commissioner Wood of the Royal Canadian Mounted

Police (RCMP), it also alarmed representatives of the British Supply Council who in September 1941 expressed concern that Canadian security measures were not adequate 'to prevent ... any discoveries made by men working with the N.R.C. being used against us'.[43] Nor was the situation appreciably better at research centres. In October 1944, for example, after a fire drill at the Army Ordnance facilities in Ottawa it was reported that 'classified papers and files were left exposed, the doors of offices were left open and even hot plates were left on'.[44]

Another difficulty was the limited size and capability of the RCMP, particularly during the early stages of the war.[45] With its resources already stretched to the limit guarding military installations,[46] and rounding up Nazi and Communist subversives, the RCMP simply did not have the manpower to conduct a comprehensive or effective screening of the thousands of new civil servants.[47] There was an even greater likelihood that scientific personnel, particularly physicists and chemists, would receive only a perfunctory security check since their services were immediately required by the NRC and the Armed Forces.[48] Many of these men were subsequently granted access to top-secret British and American documents, and allowed to visit key Allied defence laboratories.[49]

Throughout the years 1941–45 Canadian scientific and military administrators also encountered many difficulties in co-ordinating the safe exchange of Allied war material and documents. This was particularly the case in the fields of radar and chemical warfare research (CW), where co-operation with American scientific and production facilities became so extensive.[50] Although there were a number of radar 'leaks', some of the most controversial and potentially dangerous blunders involved CW exchanges.[51] In September 1942, for example, 570 tons of toxic mustard gas, sent by train from Huntsville, Alabama and destined for Suffield, Alberta, were left, virtually un-attended at the border crossing at Portal, North Dakota for almost 24 hours because American authorities had not informed the appropriate Canadian authorities of the train's departure.[52] But on the whole, Canadians were more often guilty of security indiscretions than their American CW counterparts. In February 1944, for example, a Suffield scientist lost a case full of top-secret documents in the crowded Chicago Union railway station while en route to attend a joint US–Canada CW committee meeting.[53]

IV

The alliance warfare relationship which proved most difficult to control was Canada's involvement with the Soviet Union. In part, this was because Canada was by default drawn into bilateral arrangements such as the

Anglo-Soviet Technical Accord of September 1942. Under this agreement, Britain and the USSR agreed to share information on all 'weapons, devices, or processes which ... are ... or in future may be deployed ... for the prosecution of the war against the common enemy'. A rider clause made it possible for either country to withhold specific requested material, but it had to justify this decision.[54] Until the autumn of 1944 the British government felt obliged to fill most Soviet requests for military technology, although few within the War Cabinet or Chiefs of Staff seemed to have shared Lord Beaverbrook's plea of October 1941 that 'there was to-day only one military problem – how to help Russia'.[55] Yet, even Beaverbrook's most vigorous critics could not deny the advantages of giving the Red Army sufficient weapons ' to kill Germans', and most of the discussion during these years was how to make the Accord more effective.

This was exemplified by the War Cabinet's decision in February 1943 to send a scientific mission under Sir Henry Tizard to Moscow. But Tizard drove a hard bargain. He would lead the mission only if he had permission 'to discuss anything which ... would be useful to the Russian (war effort) and to the general development and liaison of confidence between the two Governments'.[56] In particular, Tizard and his two key advisers, Drs John Cockcroft and P. M. S. Blackett, felt that it was essential that the Russian Armed Forces immediately receive advanced forms of British radar (both ground and airborne), as well as effective fire control and communications systems in order to gain the upper hand on the eastern front. They also suggested that the Kremlin might then be willing to provide information about Soviet incendiary bombs, rockets and chemical weapons.[57] Although Tizard's proposal encountered fierce opposition from the three Services, and from his *bête noire* Lord Cherwell, his arguments for a Soviet mission, not unlike his famous 1940 trip to the United States, seemed to carry the day.[58] In the spring of 1943 Tizard was given a long list of Russian military devices and techniques which the War Office, Air Ministry and Admiralty hoped to receive.[59]

None of this would materialize. By the summer of 1943 Tizard's Moscow mission had been scuttled, not so much by its British critics, but because of fierce opposition from the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).[60] Indeed, as early as February, 1943 the JCS had bitterly complained that they had not been properly consulted about the Tizard mission, in particular, and the Anglo-Soviet Accord in general. As a result, they took the hard line 'that the Russians should not get any information on equipment they did not already possess'.[61] Eventually the British were forced to give way, although they did attempt during the next 13 months to convince American authorities of the military advantages of either a separate US–Soviet Accord, or of a new British–US–USSR tripartite agreement. But it was not until after the second Quebec Conference of August 1944 'that the Western Allies adopted a common policy and began regular disclosures to the Russians'.[62]

Ironically, by this stage in the war, with Germany's defeat imminent, the British government now tended to view the Accord as more of a liability than an asset.[63] Although political considerations militated against outright cancellation, a variety of administrative changes were implemented which sought to reduce the number of official Soviet requests for top-secret weapons.[64] In November 1943 the War Cabinet also created a special supervisory committee of the Allied Supplies Executive, composed of representatives of the ministries of Supply and Aircraft production and MI5, with a mandate 'to work out detailed proposals for preventing the unauthorized acquisition of secret information by Soviet personnel in the United Kingdom'.[65] In its first report, the committee warned that the Anglo-Soviet Accord provided many opportunities for espionage since Soviet engineers, scientists, trade delegations and embassy personnel were allowed to visit advanced radar, aircraft, sonar and explosive research and production centres:

> During these visits information may be unwittingly divulged by seeing secret equipment in the factory during the tour of inspection; by indiscreet talk by employees who are often enthusiastic for the Russian cause, and in some cases for Communism; or by Managements who wish to impress their visitors and are therefore inclined to shew and discuss important work going on in their factory. It must be remembered that there exists a common impression that the Russians, as our most powerful and successful Allie [*sic*], are in an exceptional position and can be shewn anything.[66]

In order to reduce these opportunities for 'open' Soviet espionage, the Committee recommended that all USSR personnel be required to obtain a special permit from the Ministry of Supply , a procedure which, it was argued, would substantially reduce the number of visits and drastically limit 'any secret equipment which can be shewn'.[67]

By May 1945 the Anglo-Soviet Accord had run its course, and the flow of British information to Moscow stopped. In the United States, however, quite a different strategy was adopted, largely because President Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that Soviet military assistance against Japan could save thousands of American lives. As a result, a relatively generous policy of defence science exchange remained in place until October 1945.[68]

V

Canada was directly affected by the complex wartime negotiations between Great Britain and the USSR. These included Churchill's promise in July 1941 of military assistance, and the Anglo-Soviet Technology Accord of September 1942. Although British policy-makers generally regarded Canada as the most assertive of the Dominions, they still assumed that the King government would endorse major strategic initiatives such as the Accord. Nor did British authorities seem unduly concerned that anti-communist sentiments within the country, most notably in Quebec, would complicate the situation.[69]

This confidence is perhaps not surprising given the fact that by 1943 there were a variety of bilateral arrangements between Canada and the USSR. The most important of these was the extensive material support which was provided through the Canadian Mutual Aid Act of May 1943 which provided for the delivery of 'planes, tanks, wheat, bacon and lumber to all the Allies'. Unlike previous arrangements it also included the USSR. By the end of the war Canada had supplied the Soviet Union with approximately $167.3 million worth of food, medical supplies and war material.[70] Another major initiative was the agreement of February 1942 to have ministerial diplomatic exchanges between the two countries.[71] By October 1942 the Soviet mission headed by Ambassador Fedor Gusev had arrived in Ottawa, and others were on their way.[72] Early in 1943 Colonel Nikolai Zabotin of the Red Army assumed his duties as military attaché, a job which included streamlining the delivery of appropriate military technology to the USSR.[73] The ground rules for this exchange were determined by the Canadian War Cabinet and by the liaison division of the Department of National Defence. They were as follows:

> It is pointed out that Military Attaches have accredited status and that apart from routine duties their recognized function is to obtain military information by all proper means and to such extent as information may be volunteered them or granted them upon request.... While the exchange of information, particularly with Allied countries, is on a wide scale nevertheless it should be borne in mind that much of Canada's military development is closely linked with other British sources and it is incumbent to exercise responsibility in ensuring that the security of such information is properly recognized.[74]

The director of military operations and planning, Colonel John Jenkins, had the primary responsibility of dealing with Soviet requests for military and scientific information. It was not an arduous task. Colonel Jenkins was later to inform the Royal Commission on Espionage that so 'reasonable were ... Zabotin's ... official requests' that they 'had all been quickly approved'.[75]

But of course what really concerned Zabotin and his GRU superiors was how best to obtain top-secret allied information through their Canadian-based espionage operation. In terms of recruitment they had good reason to feel confident.[76] Between February 1943 and September 1945 Colonel Zabotin's organization secured the services of at least 17 agents – many of whom were well-placed civil servants and scientists. According to the Royal Commission on Espionage the following scientists assisted the GRU:

Raymond Boyer: Chemist, McGill University; RDX Project

Frank Chubb: Technician, Montreal Atomic Laboratory

Israel Halperin: Mathematician, Canadian Armament Research and Development Establishment (CARDE)

Edward Mazerall: Electrical Engineer; NRC Radar Branch

Alan Nunn May: Nuclear Physicist; Montreal Atomic Lab.

Matt Nightingale: Engineer; RCAF Navigational Research

Philip Durnford Smith: Physicist; NRC Radar Branch

David Shugar: Physicist; Canadian Navy; ASDIC Research

Norman Veall: Technician; Montreal Atomic Laboratory.[77]

From a Soviet intelligence perspective there were obvious incentives to operate in Canada during the war years.Because of its significant involvement with major Anglo-American weapon systems, Canada had important military secrets. Yet in contrast with its more powerful Western allies, Canada did not have the same capacity for mounting an effective counter-intelligence operation.[78] Moreover, extensive collaboration through the Mutual Aid programme gave Soviet officials such as Colonel Zabotin and Trade Commissioner Ivan Krotov access to high-ranking Canadian civil servants, military officials and scientists.[79] It also gave them licence to demand additional military technology and supplies by taking advantage of their knowledge that Canada was being pressed by British and American officials 'to make sure Russian requests were met'. And when all else failed, Zabotin could argue that Canadian officials must respect both the spirit and the terms of the Anglo-Soviet Technical Agreement.[80]

Since so much of Canada's wartime research and development priorities, as well as exchange guidelines, were determined by the British, it is not surprising that Canadian security officials and defence scientists often found themselves confused and frustrated. The wartime controversy over

RDX secrets illustrates many of these problems. In February 1943 the British government received a request from Soviet authorities demanding information about the production methods and technical characteristics of the explosive RDX. While British service and civilian authorities assumed that the British RDX process fell under the Accord, to be safe they decided to consult Washington. To their surprise the response was negative: no RDX secrets could be released without JCS approval on the grounds that it was a joint research and development project.[81] Although British and Canadian officials politely accepted this veto, they were annoyed by the hard-line JCS position, and by the fact that they now had to mollify both the Soviet government and pro-Russian groups at home. In Canada organizations such as the National Council for Canadian-Soviet Friendship viewed any attempt to keep advanced weapons from the Red Army as counter-productive. One of its members, scientist Raymond Boyer, felt particularly aggrieved over this decision to hoard RDX information, as he later explained to the Royal Commission on Espionage: 'Mr Howe was willing to give it [RDX] to the Russians and was not allowed to do so by the Americans.' Convinced that he was doing the right thing, Boyer agreed to convey RDX data to the USSR through the medium of Fred Rose, Communist member of Parliament:

> He [Rose] telephoned me and asked me to go to his apartment, and asked me to reveal to him what we were doing in RDX. I told him we had worked out a new process; what materials went into that reaction ... I told him all the ways in which RDX were used.[82]

Although the Soviets now had laboratory data about RDX, they still required information about the actual production process. In August 1944, USSR officials approached the Canadian Mutual Aid Board for this information; they, in turn consulted with the British and the Americans. This time there was no US opposition. Permission was quickly granted for a Soviet engineering delegation to tour the Shawinigan Chemical Plant in September 1944. Incredibly, neither the Mutual Aid Board nor the Department of Defence established any guidelines of what aspects of the RDX process the Soviets could or could not see. Instead, they left the matter 'entirely ... for Shawinigan Chemicals to decide as to how far they should go in allowing foreign visitors through their plant'.[83] The following account provided by a Canadian chemist, who worked in the plant at the time, indicates the extent to which the Soviet scientists found their tour instructive:

> They [Russian scientists B. Fomin and P. Solodov] had been told the names of the ingredients, the proportions of ingredients and rates

> of addition to the reaction vessels .... The Russians had been taking notes all the time and all their questions about the manufacture of RDX had been answered by officials at the plant ... the Russians saw everything .... They also spoke to the plant employees ... there had been no question of withholding any information from them. The process was discussed without reservation.[84]

The RDX saga also demonstrates that some Canadians were prepared, on occasion, to argue that there were 'higher loyalties' than the Official Secrets Act, especially when it meant helping Canada's gallant wartime ally.[85] Organized support for the Russian people and the Red Army assumed many forms in Canada after June 1941, but the most active and prestigious organization was the National Council for Canadian Soviet Friendship (NCCSF). Founded in June 1943 with its official patron Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King in attendance, the NCCSF soon had a broad membership with branches located in 18 centres across the country.[86] According to its president, the influential financier Sir Ellsworth Flavelle, one of the major goals of the organization was to disseminate in Canada 'authentic information ... about Russia' and to create specialized committees which would establish 'working relationships with similar groups in Russia'. Initial results were encouraging. For example, at a NCCSF meeting on 6 December 1943 committees representing Science, Medicine, Agricultural, Education, Trade, Labour and Arts committees all reported considerable progress in developing links with their Soviet counterparts.[87] But it was the work of the Science Committee which received special praise from the NCCSF executive because of their efforts 'to apply information discovered by Russian scientists to Canadian problems', and it was encouraged to persevere in attempts 'to secure the free exchange of scientific data between Canada and the USSR'.[88]

By the autumn of 1944 there was another Canadian organization was also calling for closer scientific ties with the Soviet Union – the Canadian Association of Scientific Workers (CAScW). In part the CAScW was an extension of the goals and aspirations of the parent British organization which had long campaigned for the creation of collective bargaining rights for British scientists, additional government support for scientific research and more emphasis on the creative role which scientists could perform in transforming society.[89] While the CAScW shared many of these goals, it was also the product ofwartime Canadian scientific activism with many of its members involved with major weapon systems, most notably atomic research at the Anglo-Canadian Montreal Laboratory.[90] By the spring of 1945 the CAScW had active branches in Montreal, Ottawa and Toronto, a national executive which included prominent scientists such as Dr Raymond

Boyer, Dr David Shugar and Dr Alan Nunn May, and its own journal *The Canadian Scientist*.[91] While the CAScW was concerned about the post-war status of Canadian scientists, they were equally committed to the ideals of scientific internationalism. Or more specifically, 'to maintain and extend the international character of Science by fostering the interchange of scientific workers and information between scientific institutions throughout the world'.[92] An important part of its internationalist mandate was a commitment to reduce suspicion and hostility towards the USSR. As a result, the CAScW strongly endorsed the Soviet-sponsored World Federation of Scientific Workers, and sought to educate its members about the achievements of Soviet Science by circulating scientific papers, books and films provided by the USSR embassy.[93]

In recruiting Canadian scientists who might be favourably disposed towards the USSR, Colonel Zabotin had another great asset – the assistance of two leading members of the Canadian Communist Party: Sam Carr, its national secretary, and Fred Rose, Labour Progressive MP for Montreal Cartier. Both men had achieved national status as champions of the radical left during the 1930s; each was adept in cultivating possible recruits from various Marxist study groups in Montreal, Toronto and Ottawa.[94] These included a number of civil servants and scientists. Among the Ottawa recruits was Eric Adams of the Research Division of the Bank of Canada, whom C. J. Mackenzie once described as one of the most able economic advisers in Ottawa.[95] Another was Gordon Lunan, editor of the defence department's publication *Military Affairs*, who had a wide range of military and scientific contacts. Because of their official positions, both Adams and Lunan were made cell 'captains'. In the spring of 1945 Lunan (or Back, as he was known to the GRU) was given the challenging task of first recruiting and then co-ordinating the espionage activities of physicists Ned Mazerall and Durnford Smith of the NRC's Radio Branch.[96] Among the other scientists who attracted GRU attention, Israel Halperin (ballistics), David Shugar (sonar), and Matt Nightingale (Loran navigation systems) were deemed the most valuable sources of information by Colonel Zabotin, not only because of what they could obtain in Canada, but also because they had access to top secret laboratories in Britain and the United States.[97]

Operationally, the GRU system was the responsibility of Colonel Zabotin who received regular instructions from the GRU director in Moscow. The actual task of managing the agents was the responsibility of his subordinates – Colonels Rogov, Motinov and Sokolov, and Lieutenant Angelov.[98] While each had demanding assignments, Rogov had the heaviest work-load since he orchestrated the Rose/ Lunan cell, whose portfolio included Mazerall, Smith, Halperin, and, for a time, Shugar.

Rogov's rather heavy-handed approach and insistence on following standard Soviet intelligence procedures did not always win him friends among the Canadians. According to Gordon Lunan, the Soviet Colonel acted 'like a goon', and he was quite offended when Rogov 'offered us money'.[99] Durnford Smith seems to have had a different reaction and Rogov reported that when offered $100, 'he [Smith] took the money readily'.[100]

With the defection in September 1945 of Soviet cipher clerk Igor Gouzenko and investigation by the royal commission, most of those involved with the GRU espionage system were apprehended.[101] For the accused, there were several forms of defence. Some, like Raymond Boyer, Gordon Lunan and Durnford Smith acknowledged a 'technical' violation of the Official Secrets Act.[102] They were quick to point out, however, that their actions were consistent with Canada's wartime commitments since the data they provided was essentially information which could have been officially transmitted through either the Anglo-Soviet Accord, or the Mutual Aid Act.[103] Several of the other scientists were more defiant when they appeared before Commissioners Kellock and Taschereau.[104] In their testimony, David Shugar and Israel Halperin angrily denied any involvement with Soviet intelligence, and charged that their detention was both unjust and brutal. Halperin went one step further when he accused the Commission of adopting unreal standards in their interpretation of what constituted illegal disclosure: 'My own principal (Wallace, Queen's University) had lunch with me once and asked me what I was doing. He did not ask for secret information, and I did not understand the question that way. I told him I was helping to organize an army research and development establishment which I told him would play an important role.' Although Halperin's retort did not impress the Commissioners, he was more fortunate in the court of law. He was acquitted. Boyer, Mazerall, Smith and Lunan were not so lucky; they were all found guilty of violating the Official Secrets Act, and sent to jail.[105]

CONCLUSION

Did the 'secrets' which the GRU and the NKVD obtained through their respective espionage operations enhance post-war Soviet military capabilities? This remains a difficult question to answer, in part because of the conflicting assessments provided by Soviet and Canadian authorities. On 20 February 1946 the government of the USSR issued a communiqué acknowledging Colonel Zabotin's indiscretion, while at the same time minimizing the military value of any Canadian research which Zabotin's operation might have secured given the 'more advanced technical attainment in the USSR'. In terms of British and American radar and atomic secrets, the communiqué claimed that 'the information in question could be found in published works on radio location, etc., and also in the well-known brochure of the American, J.D. Smyth, *Atomic Energy*'.[106] The Royal Commission on Espionage came to quite a different conclusion. At the very minimum, the secrets the Soviets had acquired in Canada complemented the 'body of data' which they had already obtained 'in England and ... in the United States'.[107] Moreover, the extensive activities of the GRU in itself confirmed that 'the information sought was considered of the greatest importance by the Russian espionage leaders, and that alone might be a fair test of the question of value'. And most important of all was the fact 'that the bulk of the technical information sought by the espionage leaders related to research developments, which would play an important part in post-war defenses of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States'.[108]

More useful critiques were forthcoming from Canadian scientists and military officials. One of the most comprehensive of these came from C. J. Mackenzie in a letter dated 19 September 1946 to Dr O.M. Solandt, director general of defence research (Army). What makes Mackenzie's response so useful is that it responded point by point to the letter of 14 June from the American military attaché cited on page 100. On the 'compromise' of atomic secrets Mackenzie was reassuring: Alan Nunn May could only have transmitted 'general information about the construction of the small pile at Chalk River but nothing of the operation of ... any full scale piles – in fact little more than was published in the Smyth report'. With reference to the methods of separating uranium 235 from uranium 238 Mackenzie asserted that May could not disclose any useful information 'since Canada did not work on this project'. Nor would he have been able to disclose anything about the 'construction, method of assembly, and operating features of an atomic bomb'. Mackenzie did, however, admit that it was 'possible' that May had given the GRU 'a minute quantity of plutonium'.[109]

Although atomic espionage most concerned the Americans and British, they were also anxious to learn about other weapon systems which might have been compromised. Once again Mackenzie was reassuring:

> Explosives: We have no further knowledge than that disclosed in the Commission report.
> Guided Missiles: As far as we know, nothing.
> Electronics and Proximity Fuses: As far as we know, nothing.
> Chemical Warfare: Nothing as far as we know.

Mackenzie did, however, acknowledge that there was a divergence of opinion among the various technical experts about the level of damage which the GRU espionage ring had caused.[110] The most ominous report came from Lieutenant Colonel Robert N. Battles of the Royal Canadian Navy Directorate of Electrical Engineering which contained a litany of Allied secrets which could have been jeopardized. Most of these were associated with sophisticated anti-submarine detection systems.[111] The other major appraisal was prepared by Dr D. W. R. McKinley of the NRC Radio Branch. His message was mixed. On the one hand, McKinley conceded that Mazerall and Smith had access to top-secret radar information which included 'some details essential to the production of successful and practical (microwave) radar equipment for military purposes'. At the same time, he admitted that the general research techniques deployed were 'non-secret and well established' and that they remained secret only because the Canadian Armed Forces had adopted a procedure whereby 'details of these techniques on wave-lengths shorter than 3 centimeters be kept secret'. On balance he minimized the damage: these NRC radar secrets could only be considered vital 'in case of war or in anticipation of war'.[112]

But by the spring of 1946, when the Royal Commission finished its work, the possibility of war with the USSR did not seem so remote. Not surprisingly, its *Report* was, therefore, more of a Cold War document than a comprehensive analysis of Canada's wartime relationship with the Soviet Union. There was, for instance, virtually no mention of either the Anglo-Soviet Technical Accord, or the Canadian Mutual Aid Board, or of the fact that Soviet diplomats, trade officials, and military advisers spent a great deal of their time co-ordinating the legitimate movement of radar sets, explosives, airplanes and other weapons to the USSR. Instead, the Commission could only see conspiracy: Allied defence science secrets had been obtained by GRU spies, and by Soviet agents 'working along the same lines in the United Kingdom, the United States and elsewhere'.[113]

Another example of the Commission's tunnel vision was its negative assessment of organizations such as the National Council of Canadian–Soviet Friendship, and the Canadian Association of Scientific Workers. The CAScW received special censure: 'Control by the Communist Party over a broad organization such as the Canadian Association of Scientific Workers could be used in a variety of ways not only for propaganda purposes, but eventually as base for recruiting adherents to that Party from among scientists, and in due course no doubt for recruiting additional espionage agents in key positions in the national life.'[114] This profile was, however, more of a legal indictment based on negative RCMP reports than an accurate assessment of the membership, goals and activities of the CAScW either in June 1946, or earlier.[115]

Nor did commissioners Kellock and Taschereau seem to appreciate the desperate wartime search for talented scientists; instead they seemed to have believed that left-wing scientists, if their identity had been known, would have been disqualified from important wartime service. In this assumption they were quite wrong. Raymond Boyer, for example, had well-known pro-Communist views and affiliations, yet neither C.J. Mackenzie nor C.D. Howe tried to exclude him from the RDX research project.[116] In Britain, Professor J.D. Bernal, one of that country's most outspoken Marxist scientists, became first a principal scientific consultant for the Minister of Home Security and then later personal scientific adviser to Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations. When Sir John Anderson, the Lord Privy Seal, was warned in 1940 that Bernal was a security risk, 'Sir John commented, "even if he is as red as the flames of hell", he wanted him as an additional adviser on civil defence.'[117] Along the same lines was General Leslie Grove's decision to appoint the 'progressive' physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer as director of the Los Alamos atomic weapons laboratory in 1942:

> After consideration of the availability and caliber of suitable scientists, I decided that it would be in the best interests of the United States to use Dr. Oppenheimer's services. Prior to this, I reviewed Dr. Oppenheimer's complete record personally. It was apparent to me that he would not be cleared by any agency whose sole responsibility was military security. Nevertheless, my careful study made me feel that, in spite of the record, he was fundamentally a loyal American citizen and that, in view of his potential overall value to the project, he should be employed.[118]

Scientific utility, not ideological correctness, was the dominant principle guiding military research in the United States, Great Britain and Canada during the Second World War. By 1944 all three countries also adopted an equally pragmatic approach towards the secrets exchange system with the USSR. If a new weapon would help the Red Army kill more Germans, then serious consideration was given for its release. Nor did sporadic evidence of Soviet espionage unduly concern the Roosevelt, Churchill, or King administrations.[119] What mattered most was a speedy end to the war, and retaining Soviet friendship. It is in this climate of opinion that the willingness of some Canadian scientists, 'persons of marked ability and intelligence', to supply Colonel Zabotin with certain 'secrets' must be considered.[120]

NOTES

1. National Archives of Canada (NAC), Department of National Defence Records (DND), file TS 711-270-16-1, Colonel R.E.S. Williamson to Colonel W.A.B. Anderson, director of intelligence, Canadian Army, 14 June 1946.
2. Robert Bothwell, *Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited* (Toronto, 1988), pp. 4–147; Martin Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance* (New York, 1977).
3. On 4 July 1946 Douglas Abbott, Minister of Defence, sent a strongly worded letter to Louis St. Laurent, Minister of Justice indicating that Canada's future military relationship with both the British and Americans was being undermined by the delay in meeting the 'most urgent and specific enquiries from the War Office, U.K. and the War Depart., U.S.A ....' NAC, DND, TS 711-270-16-1, Ibid., Abbott to St. Laurent, 4 July 1946.
4. The full account of the government's case against the USSR and its agents is found in the three separate reports which were prepared by the Royal Commission on Espionage, headed by Justices R.L. Kellock and Robert Taschereau of the Supreme Court of Canada: 2 March, 16 March, and 27 June 1946. The final report was released to the public on 15 July. Canada, *Royal Commission to Investigate the Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust, of Secret and Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power* (Ottawa, 1946). (Hereafter RC, Espionage, *Report*). For an edited version of the full transcript of the proceedings of the royal commission see Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, *The Gouzenko Transcripts: The Evidence Presented to the Kellock-Taschereau Royal Commission of 1946* (Ottawa, n.d.).
5. Wilfrid Eggleston, *National Research in Canada: The NRC, 1916–1966* (Toronto, 1978), pp. 116–296; W.E. Knowles Middleton, *Radar Development in Canada: The Radio Branch of the National Research Council, 1938–1946* (Waterloo, Ontario, 1981), pp. 20–86; Daniel Kevles, *The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America* (New York, 1979), pp. 91–139; Irwin Stewart, *Organizing Scientific Research for War: The Administrative History of the Office of Scientific Research and Development* (New York, 1948); James Baxter, *Scientists Against Time* (Boston, 1946).
6. In his student days Chalmers Jack Mackenzie had studied civil engineering at Dalhousie and Harvard. During the Great War had served in the Canadian Army; between 1921 and 1939 he was the Dean of Engineering at the University of Saskatchewan, where he gained a reputation as an efficient administrator. After 1935 Mackenzie became closely associated with the NRC, and its President General A. G. L. McNaughton. In September 1939 when McNaughton took command of the First Canadian Division, he recommended that Mackenzie be appointed Acting NRC President; Prime Minister Mackenzie King acted on this recommendation. In selecting his management team, Mackenzie almost immediately selected Otto Maass to co-ordinate NRC liaison with the universities, as well as directing RDX and Chemical Warfare projects. Eggleston, *National Research Council*, pp. 116–200. NAC, Diary of C. J. Mackenzie, 15 Jan. 1943.
7. Ronald Clark, *Tizard* (London, 1965), pp. 258–75; Guy Hartcup, *The Challenge of War: Britain's Scientific and Engineering Contributions to World War Two* (New York, 1970), pp. 17–85; R.V. Jones, *Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence, 1939–1945* (London, 1978), pp. 1–107.
8. Memorandum Dr A.V. Hill, 18 June 1940, cited in Middleton, *Radar Development*, pp. 20–1. In 1940 Hill was a Nobel laureate, Secretary of the prestigious Royal Society and a former member of the influential Air Defence Research Committee. Neil Cameron, 'The Politics of British Science in the Munich Era', in William Shea (ed.), *Otto Hahn and the Rise of Nuclear Physics* (Boston, 1983), pp. 191–2.
9. NAC, Mackenzie Diary, 2 Aug. 1940. In addition to Tizard, the other members of the Mission were Professor John Cockcroft and Dr E.G. Bowen, both experts in radar; Captain H. W. Faulkner from the Admiralty; Captain J. L. Pearce from the R.A.F.; and Colonel F.C. Wallace from the British Army. Clark, *Tizard*, pp. 240–70.

10. Before his return to England in December 1940, Cockcroft recommended that a British Commonwealth Scientific Office be established in Washington; this was eventually done in the summer of 1941. G. Hartcup and T.W. Allibone, *Cockcroft and the Atom* (Bristol, 1984), pp. 75–147.
11. National Archives, Washington (NAW), papers of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), Box 131, Conant Mission, Conant to Sidgwick, 2 March 1941. Clark, *Tizard*, pp. 210–30; Richard Rhodes, *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* (New York, 1986), pp. 357–61; James Conant, *My Several Lives* (New York, 1970).
12. Tizard's arguments that the advantages of co-operation with the USA far eclipsed any security concerns was clearly set forth in a letter of 2 April 1941 to Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Aircraft Production: 'The difficulties in my view are two-fold (a) If we have the American staff in our Experimental Establishments they would have normal access to most if not all of our secret developments (b) patent difficulties may arise .... Nevertheless, I strongly urge that the offer should be welcomed in principle. Risks cannot be avoided in war, and I feel that the advantage we should gain by having our staff strengthened by first-class young scientists and engineers from the United States would far more than outweigh the risks of premature disclosure.' Clark, *Tizard*, p. 283.
13. NAW, OSRD, Box 131, Conant Mission, Anglo-American Scientific Co-Operation on Defence Matters, Notes of Meeting held on 6 March 1941. During the next four years the London NDRC/OSRD office handled more than 1,400 visits, and a total of 59,135 separate reports, letters and samples from British and Canadian research agencies. In this same period the OSRD Washington offices forwarded to London some 82,153 documents. OSRD, Box 129, Summary of report on OSRD activities in the European theatre during the period March 1941–July 1945, submitted by Bennett Archambault, July 1945. Stewart, *Organizing for War*, p. 172. For the American and British military, the essential agency was the Combined Chiefs of Staff, established in January 1942; Colonel Stanley Dziuban, *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada* (Washington, 1959), pp. 15–65.
14. Dziuban, *Military Relations*, pp. 18–47; R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, *Ties That Bind: Canadian-American Relations in Wartime From the Great War to the Cold War* (Toronto, 1977), pp. 69–112.
15. In 1941 Mackenzie sent Dr Leslie Howlett of the NRC to London as the chief scientific liaison officer between the Canadian and British governments. Eggleston, *National Research*, pp. 160–3.
16. OSRD, 32. NRC, Webster to Caryl Haskins, OSRD, 13 Feb. 1943. C.J. Mackenzie was certainly impressed by the fact 'if America had declared war in September, 1939, instead of twenty eight months later ... [our] status would have quite different ....' Mel Thistle (ed.), *The Mackenzie-McNaughton Wartime Letters* (Toronto, 1969), p. 151.
17. Mackenzie Diary, 23 April 1942; Middleton, *Radar Branch*, pp. 32–3.
18. Generally speaking, Mackenzie was able to work quite well with British scientific administrators, particularly the three outstanding physicists – Dr R.F. Fowler, Sir Lawrence Bragg and Dr George Thompson – sent to co-ordinate Canadian defence science research and development in general, and radar research in particular. He did, however, feel that even these gifted scientists had a tendency to over-emphasize the importance of the British contribution to the war effort compared with that of the United States. Mackenzie Diary, 7 Jan. 1943; ibid., 15 Jan. 1943; Eggleston, *National Research*, pp. 172–5, 193, 211.
19. In his dealings with Washington, Mackenzie was assisted by Maass, Fowler, and Dr Alan G. Shenstone, a Canadian-born physicist who had studied at the Cavendish laboratory and who was well known in the United States. All agreed that direct bilateral negotiations with American scientific and military agencies was necessary if Canada was to be a full and active partner in war research, and not merely a British satellite. The creation of the OSRD in June 1942, under Vannevar Bush's direction, was well received by Canadian scientists since it promised much easier access to American defence science laboratories. OSRD, 32, liaison NRC, Fowler to Bush, 31 July 1941; Eggleston, *National Research*, p. 176.

20. Bush and his NDRC/OSRD colleagues liked Canada and his associates liked Canada and Canadians. They were aware, moreover, that they could use their Canadian contacts to obtain additional British top-secret information. OSRD, Box 32, NRC file, Manson to Louise Paddock, Administrative Aide, OSRD, 23 Nov. 1943.
21. For example, in November, 1942, a request was made by W. L. Webster, Secretary of the NRC Associate Committee on Explosives, for permission to visit these installations, and for any information, 'in the form of secret reports', about new kinds of depth-charges His appeal was favourably received as the Americans recognized Canadian operational expertise in anti-submarine warfare. Ibid., NRC file, Webster to Caryl Haskins, 14 Nov. 1942.
22. In April,1943,Mackenzie had the occasion to visit Tuve's top secret research station at Silver Spring, Maryland where he was informed 'that the proximity fuse was in production on a sizeable scale'. Mackenzie Diary, 24 April 1943; OSRD, 32, NRC, Mackenzie to Bush, 11 June 1941.
23. Vannevar Bush was most receptive to the idea, and he assured Mackenzie that since Greig was 'unusually well qualified for such a post ... we shall welcome his collaboration in this extremely important work'. Vannevar Bush provides some interesting comments on the development of the proximity fuse in his autobiography *Pieces of the Action* (New York, 1970), pp. 55–6, 106–14. More general accounts appear in Baxter, *Scientists Against Time*, pp. 91–250, and Ralph Baldwin, *The Deadly Fuze: The Secret Weapon of World War II* (San Rafael, 1980).
24. Canadian researchers in the field of aviation medicine were highly regarded by OSRD officials, and there was a high degree of co-operation between the two groups. Michael Bliss, *Banting: A Biography* (Toronto, 1985), pp. 270–80. In the fields of chemical and biological warfare, Canada also assumed an important role. John Bryden, *Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War, 1937–1947* (Toronto, 1989).
25. McGill Archives, J. R. Donald Papers, 'Report of the Technical Sub-Committee on Chemicals & Explosives (Canadian Section), Sept. 1945.
26. Ibid. The five American members of the Sub-Committee represented the Army, Navy, the Chemical Warfare Services and the Bureau of the War Production Board. The Canadian members were drawn from the Army, the Allied War Supplies Corporation, the Official of the Chemical Control, Department of Munitions and Supply and J. R. Donald, who was Chairman of the Canadian section of the Technical Sub-Committee. In 1942 Donald and the American chairman travelled to Britain together in order 'to further integrate the war programmes'.
27. RDX was actually an abbreviation for Research Development Explosive which British researchers had assigned to the explosive during the First World War. The chemical name was cyclonite. By 1941 there were three methods of desensitization which would make RDX usable for military purposes: an equal mixture of cyclonite and TNT; 91 per cent RDX and 9 per cent Beeswax; and 88 per cent RDX and 12 per cent oil mixture. OSRD, Series 1, box 13, RDX file, Report Frank Whitmore to US Ordnance, 20 Dec. 1941.
28. NAC, Papers of the National Research Council (NRC), Vol. 106, file 4-C-9-28, No. 1, Maass to Mackenzie, 12 Aug. 1941.
29. OSRD, 32, NRC, Mackenzie to Bush, 2 Sept. 1941; ibid., Maass to Ralph Connor, Secretary RDX Committee, NRDC, 1 Oct. 1941. Baxter, *Scientists Against Time*, pp. 255–6.
30. OSRD, Series 1, Box 13, RDX file: Minutes of the meeting of the RDX Committee, University of Michigan, 28 Dec. 1941. Responsibility for the always delicate matter of patents was handled at the highest level of the OSRD and the NRC. OSRD, 32, NRC, Webster to Haskins, 11 Jan. 1943; ibid., Bush to Mackenzie, 30 Nov. 1942.
31. The American military were initially rather hesitant about switching from TNT to RDX. However, a series of OSRD tests with RDX anti-aircraft shells and depth-charges soon changed their mind. OSRD, Series 1, Box 13, RDX file, Report of the American RDX Committee, 24 April 1942.

32. In the United States, the DuPont Corporation, Western Cartridge and Tennessee Eastman all had RDX contracts, while the only Canadian plant was located at Shawinigan Falls, Quebec. By 1943 the estimated production of these plants was 80,770 tons for the United States and 1,248 tons for Canada. NAW, Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 12-11-42, Report of the Combined Production and Resources Board, 11 Dec. 1942. Eggleston, *Scientists At War*, pp. 80–1; Baxter, *Scientists Against Time*, pp. 47-89, 255–60.
33. OSRD, Series 1, Box 13, Frank Whitmore, Chairman Section B to Bush, 29 April 1942.
34. For a profile of how the RCMP monitored Communist activities in Canada see Reg Whitaker and Greg Kealey (eds.), *R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins, The War Series, 1939–1941* St. John's, 1989).
35. By 1935 the Canadian Armed Forces had established a procedure for circulating secret files. Three years later, as the clouds of war gathered, the Chief of the General Staff sent a memo to all district commanders instructing them to make sure their officers and men were fully aware of 'the provision of the Criminal Code of Canada regarding official secrets'. NAC, transcript of the evidence presented to the Royal Commission on Espionage (microfilm), 'Exhibit 58, 64': H.Q. 124-1-25, Lieutenant Colonel N. O. Carr, memorandum, 7 Jan. 1935; ibid., H.Q. C.1233, circular letter, 2 Feb. 1938.
36. Norman Veall had become part of the Montreal Laboratoryjoint Anglo-Canadian atomic research project in 1943. His left-wing background and his familiarity with Alan Nunn May soon brought him to the attention of the GRU agents in Canada. There is, however, no evidence that he actually became involved with either the GRU or the NKVD. RC, Espionage, *Report*, pp. 505–7.
37. University of Chicago Archives, Federation of American Scientists Papers, Box 21,4, Norman Veall to Dr Melba Phillips, 28 March 1946. The most threatening part of the Official Secrets Act of 1939 was section 3(2): 'On a prosecution under this section, it shall not be necessary to show that the accused person was guilty of any particular act tending to show a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, and notwithstanding that no such act is proved against him, he may be convicted if, from the circumstances of the case, or his conduct, or his known character as proved, it appears that his purpose was the purpose prejudicial to the safety of the state; ...' cited in the RC, Espionage, *Report*, p. 313.
38. By 1944 it was the United States which basically determined what military scientific information would be exchanged within the alliance. A memorandum in November 1945 of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff provides a useful example of how specific weapon systems were categorized: (a) chemical warfare: top secret ..., no information regarding it should be released, except as defensive measure'; (b) explosives-RDX: secret: 'Limited Access'. (c) guided missiles: top secret: 'No information should be released'. (d) VT, Proximity Fuse: top secret: 'Information regarding it should not be released under any circumstances'. (e) radar: top secret and secret: 'Clearance by the Armed Forces and OSRD is required'. NAW, Joint Chiefs of Staff Collection (JCS), file 6-24-42 No. 2, memorandum, JCS, 9 Nov. 1945.
39. RC, Espionage, *Report*, Exhibit, Dr D. W. R. McKinley to Supt. G. E. Rivett-Carnac, Intelligence Branch, RCMP, 3 April 1946.
40. H. Montgomery Hyde, *The Atom Bomb Spies* (London, 1980); Chapman Pincher, *Too Secret Too Long* (London, 1984).
41. Whitaker and Kealey, *R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins*, pp. 1–15; Andrew, *Secret Service*, pp. 504–6, 569–70.
42. Throughout the war years there were various attempts on the part of the military to improve security procedures. On 2 October 1940, for example, General H. D. G. Crerar issued a warning to all personnel 'not to discuss information, the knowledge of which comes to them in the course of their duty, and that this applies to members of their families as well as other civilians'. RC, Espionage, transcript, 'Exhibit 64': H.Q.C. 171, Vol. 2.

43. NA, Mackenzie Diary, 27 Jan. 1941; ibid., 17 June 1944; NRC, Vol. 106, 'RX file', R. P. Linstead, British Central Scientific Office to Otto Maass, 18 Sept. 1941.
44. There were a number of complaints about missing documents and unauthorized visitors. In May 1944 General J. V. Young, Master General of Ordnance, issued a comprehensive set of security guidelines which included: the appointment of directorate and branch security officers; posting of guards at the entry points of restricted buildings; the registration and safeguarding of documents; identity cards and the fingerprinting of all personnel. RC, Espionage, transcript, 'Exhibit 64', NDHQ, General Young memorandum, 29 May 1944.
45. Larry Hannant has argued in a recent article that even before the outbreak of war the RCMP were conducting 'at least a rudimentary security screening on every newly hired permanent civil servant,' a procedure which included 'fingerprinting and a check of the RCMP's own records,' and often 'a full field inquiry into the person's background'. Hannant also points out that throughout the inter-war years the RCMP frequently sought advice from MI5 about how best to combat Communist subversion and improve its security operations. On the other hand, the fact remains that in 1939 the Intelligence Section of the RCMP was a six-man operation attached to the Criminal Investigation Branch; many of the officers moved between the two fields of investigation. Larry Hannant, 'Inter-war Security Screening in Britain, the United States and Canada', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1991), pp. 711–35; C. W. Harvison, *The Horsemen* (Toronto, 1967), pp. 93–4, 122–67, 205–7; Charles Rivett-Carnac, *Pursuit in the Wilderness* (Toronto, 1965), pp. 301–20.
46. RCMP authorities regarded their responsibilities for guarding strategic facilities throughout the country as one of their most onerous responsibilities, especially in Quebec. In January 1944, for example, Commissioner S. T. Wood warned C. J. Mackenzie that the Force would have great difficulty in protecting the new RDX production plant if it were located in Quebec. Harvison, *The Horsemen*, pp. 95–6; Mackenzie Diary, 17 June 1944.
47. During the first years of the war, the RCMP apprehended some 500 members of various Nazi and fascist organizations, as well as over 130 members of the Communist movement. Harvison, *The Horsemen*, pp. 94–6; Reg Whitaker, 'Official repression of Communism during World War II', *Labour/Le Travail*, 17 (1986); J. L. Granatstein, *Man of Influence* (Ottawa, 1981), pp. 75–90.
48. A number of the scientists accused by the Royal Commission on Espionage were granted top level security clearance. Durnford Smith was the NRC Radio Branch liaison officer with the 'Rad Lab' at MIT; David Shugar had access to restricted naval research laboratories in both Britain and the United States; Raymond Boyer visited all of the major explosive facilitiesin the US; and Allan Nunn May was a frequent visitor to the Argonne atomic research laboratory. For the wartime activities of atomic spy Klaus Fuchs see Christopher Andrew & Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (London, 1990), pp. 254–7.
49. Nor was only a Canadian problem. In Britain, MI5 was equally hard pressed and found it 'impossible to vet thoroughly all ... (its own) recruits'. Christopher Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London, 1985), p. 460. In the United States, the FBI expanded the number of its agents from 1,596 in 1941 to 4,886 in 1944, 'but even these numbers were inadequate for the Bureau to supervise security throughout the defence industry and to maintain watch over subversive activities across the country'. Richard Powers, *Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover* (New York, 1987), pp. 255–6.
50. British radar scientist Dr E. W. Bowen provides a vivid account of how he almost lost the trunk carrying the secrets of the Tizard Mission just before their departure from Liverpool's crowded harbour; *Radar Days* (Bristol, 1987), pp. 150–5.
51. In June 1942 Dr Lee DuBridge, Director of the Radiation Laboratory at MIT, informed C. J. Mackenzie that one of the visiting Canadian scientists had returned to Canada with a highly sensitive 'spiral computation notebook'. Although the notebook was subsequently returned, American security authorities remained unhappy about this type of

carelessness. NRC Papers, 77/88-89, 046, file 3-25-4-3 DuBridge to Mackenzie, 22 June 1942; Colonel Wallace to W. R. Wilson, 25 June 1942.

52. NAC, DND, Records of the Directorate of Chemical Warfare (on microfilm) file 4354-22-5., W. W. Stewart, technical adviser chemicals and production branch, Munitions and Supply. to Dr Otto Maass, 25 Sept. 1942.
53. In his report Dr Mason provided a vivid account of this apparent case of espionage, which he reported to the FBI office in Chicago. Ibid., HDQ 4354-26-1-1- Report by E. I. Davies, Chief Superintendent,Suffield including statement by Dr S. C. Mason, 15 Feb. 1944. Yet despite these and other incidents, in July 1945 Dr Otto Maass claimed that Canadian CW security measures during the Second World War had been conducted 'in so satisfactory a manner that it excited the admiration of the United States Chemical Warfare Service by reason of its efficient operation'. NRC, Vol. 106, 'CW Research', Major Gay Report, 5 July 1946.
54. Public Record Office (London) CAB 122/937, War cabinet, Allied Supplies Executive Report, 30 May 1944; Foreign Office (FO) 371/36928, 'Notes on the Working of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement', 28 June 1943.
55. A. J. P.Taylor, *Beaverbrook* (London, 1972), p. 495; Gabriel Gorodetsky, *Stafford Cripps' Mission to Moscow, 1940–42* (Cambridge, 1984).
56. In his capacity as Chairman of the Radio Policy Sub-Committee Tizard had already been a strong advocate of full co-operation with the USSR, and had effectively countered Air Ministry arguments for a restrictive policy. Imperial War Museum (London) Sir Henry Tizard Papers, file 320, memorandum to the War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee, 1 June 1942; ibid., file 390, Minutes of the fourth meeting of the Moscow Mission held at the Ministry of Supply, 20 May 1943.
57. Tizard was very insistent that the Mission included both prestigious scientists and high ranking military officers: 'I am sure it produces the right impression when the other countries see how closely scientists work ... with members of fighting services.' He also acknowledged the useful liaison work of the 30 Military Mission which had been sent by the War Office in July 1941 to co-ordinate the movement of military equipment to the Soviet Union. Tizard Papers, file 390, Tizard to Oliver Lyttleton, Minister of Aircraft Production, 29 Jan. 1943; ibid., Tizard to Sir Andrew Duncan, Minister of Supply, 19 March 1943; ibid., Tizard to Blackett, 20 April 1943. Gorodetsky, *Stafford Cripps' Mission*, pp. 181–4, 290.
58. Lord Cherwell (Professor Frederick Lindemann) and Tizard had been bitter opponents during the pre-war debate over Britain's air defence strategy. Cherwell gained the upper hand in 1940 when he became Prime Minister Churchill's personal scientific adviser. Clark, *Tizard*, pp. 133–48,244–54; The Earl of Birkenhead, *The Prof in Two Worlds: The official life of Professor F.A. Lindemann, Lord Cherwell* (London, 1961), pp. 211–76; CAB 122/104, Sir Vivian Dykes (Washington Military Mission) to Cherwell, 1 Jan. 1943.
59. The Air Ministry were primarily interested in information about bomb and torpedo sights, aircraft gun turrets and ammunition, rockets and incendiary bombs; the Admiralty were primarily concerned about naval rockets and depth-charges; the War Office had the longest lists, but the subject which was of greatest interest was chemical warfare. CAB 122/104, Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10 March 1943, 'Note by the representative of the British Chiefs of Staff'.
60. Both the Chief of Army Intelligence, General George Strong, and J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI were quite suspicious of a secrets exchange system with the Soviets. As early as August 1941 the FBI had expressed concern about 'the facilities being granted to Soviet experts inspecting U.S. factories engaged on armament orders'. CAB 122/104, telegram Viscount Halifax to Foreign Office, 7 Aug. 1941. E. H. Beardsley, 'Secrets Between Friends: Applied Science Exchange Between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union During World War II', *Social Studies of Science*, Vol. 7 (1977), pp. 447–73.
61. British military officials and scientists expressed amazement that neither the White House or the State Department had fully briefed the American JCS about the Anglo-Soviet

Accord. Tizard, however, felt that British authorities had greatly contributed to the confusion. Tizard Papers, 'Memorandum on agreement between the British and Soviet governments on the exchange of technical information, 23 July 1943'.

62. During the Quebec Conference of August 1943 President Roosevelt, in response to Churchill's special plea, had initially promised that the JCS would further study the possibilities of an exchange system with the Soviets. Beardsley, 'Secrets Between Friends', pp. 454–65.
63. As early as March 1943 the British Joint Intelligence Committee had recommended a much more vigilant approach towards Soviet military missions, particularly since these missions seemed primarily interested in gathering military intelligence which would be 'of value in the post war years'. But it was Lord Cherwell's intervention in May 1944 which marked the real transition in British policy. PRO, CAB 122/104 British Joint Intelligence to American Joint Intelligence Committee, Washington, 20 March 1943; Beardsley, 'Secrets Between Friends', p. 462.
64. The different strategies were as follows: 1) by insisting on Soviet reciprocity in the exchange of weapons; 2) by doling out information on only a few weapon systems at a time; 3) by insisting that the Soviets could only have access to those weapons which did not have top secret classification; 4) by emphasizing that each weapon considered for release mustdefinitely be of use 'by the Russians in the prosecution of the war against Germany'. CAB 122/936, Report of the Allied Supply Executive to War Cabinet, 30 Oct. 1943.
65. The sub-Committee was chaired by Brigadier Firebrace; it submitted a number of reports to the Allied Supplies Executive. CAB 122/936, Report of the Firebrace Committee, 17 Nov. 1943; ibid., 16 Dec. 1943; ibid., 23 Dec. 1943.
66. The research and production facilities of the Ministries of Supply and Aircraft Production were deemed particularly vulnerable, as was the War Office's Chilwell Ordnance Station where Soviet engineers inspected tanks before their dispatch to the USSR. CAB 122/936, Report of the Allied Supply Executive to War Cabinet, 30 Oct. 1943; report of the Firebrace Committee, 17 Nov. 1943.
67. It was also recommended that all Soviet visitors must be accompanied by a special 'conducting officer' who would be appointed by the Ministry of Supply. In addition, the managers of research stations and factories were to be reminded 'that security precautions must not be in any way relaxed because the visitors are Allies'; ibid.
68. In 1945 the British sent only supplemental list about weapons to Moscow; in contrast the United States sent lists almost every month until October, 1945. Beardsley, 'Secrets Between Friends', pp. 464–7.
69. PRO, Cab 122/936, Report of the Allied Supply Executive, 17 Nov. 1943; Eggleston, *National Research*, pp. 186–250.
70. NAC, Canadian Mutual Aid Board Records (CMAB); Aloysius Balawyder, 'Canada in the Uneasy War Alliance', in Aloysius Balawyder (ed.), *Canadian Soviet Relations, 1939–1980* (Oakville, 1981), pp. 1–14; Donald Page, 'Getting to Know the Russians, 1943–1948', ibid., pp. 15–35.
71. In 1942 Dana Wilgress was sent to the temporary Soviet capital of Kuibyshev as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary; in 1943, as the military situation improved, he moved to Moscow where he remained as Canadian ambassador until 1947. During the war years Wilgress was, in general, quite favourably disposed towards the Soviet Union and the possibilities of a post-war detente. Denis Smith, *Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941–1948* (Toronto, 1988).
72. Gusev was,however, being groomed for more important duties. In August 1943 he was appointed as Ambassador in Great Britain; his successor, George Zaroubin, arrived in Ottawa, 26 May 1944. In November 1942 V. G. Pavlov, the chief NKVD agent, assumed his duties as Second Secretary of the Soviet Legation in Ottawa, a position he held until his expulsion from Canada in the spring of 1946. Royal Commission, Espionage, *Report*, Exhibit 543.
73. From all accounts, Colonel Zabotin created a favourable image in his dealings with both

Canadian military officials and politicians. In his reports to the GRU Director, Zabotin also expressed confidence that he could recruit a number of high ranking Canadian Army officers (most notably Colonel Jenkins and Brigadier H. F. G. Letson) into his espionage network. Ibid., Exhibit 19H, Zabotin to Director, 16 Aug. 1945; ibid., Exhibit 20A Zabotin to Director 22 Aug. 1945.

74. Ibid., Exhibit 444, DND Directive, 23 Dec. 1943, Colonel Jenkins for Chief of Staff.
75. Ibid., pp. 621–2. Most of the official requests were quite trivial: training pamphlets, weather reports, the rank structure of the Canadian Army and the like. The only exceptions were some publications 'dealing with the operation and maintenance of radar sets released to the Soviet Union'.
76. Studies analyzing the evolution of the GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie) and its wartime relationship with the NKVD (People's Commississariat of State Security; Narodny Kommissariat Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti) include Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB* and Victor Suvorov, *Soviet Military Intelligence* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984).
77. RC, Espionage, *Report*, pp. 57–77; Bothwell and Granatstein, *The Gouzenko Transcripts*, pp. 187–232, 245–322.
78. In his recollections, Inspector Harvison claims that the RCMP Intelligence Branch had been aware for some years 'that the USSR's Embassy in Ottawa was engaged in espionage and in recruiting espionage agents. On several occasions, warnings and some evidence regarding the penetration of Government departments had been given to the Government'. *The Horsemen*, p. 149. Unfortunately he does not provide any corroborating information to support this contention. Nor does such evidence exist in the papers of Prime Minister King or Minister of Justice Louis St. Laurent. To date, RCMP surveillance documents for this period have not been released.
79. Gala celebrations sponsored by the USSR Embassy were another means of GRU and NKVD recruitment. In his autobiography, *Reading from Left to Right* (Toronto, 1983); H. S. Ferns, a former External Affairs officer, describes how V. G. Pavlov, the chief NKVD operative in Ottawa, tried to cultivate his friendship.
80. CMAB, 8-23-2, J. R. Donald to K. C. Fraser, 21 July 1943; ibid., Donald to Fraser; ibid., 7-3, British Supply Mission (Washington) to British High Commissioner, Ottawa, 4 Aug. 1943.
81. In particular, the Soviets had asked for 'production methods and technical characteristics of RDX ... (and) methods of automatic shell filling with R.D.X'. CAB 122/936 memorandum of the British members of the Combined Sub-Committee on Technical Information, 24 Jan. 1944.
82. RC, Espionage, *Report*, pp. 395–408.
83. CMAB, 7-M3-14, Karl Fraser to Hune Wrong (External Affairs), 8 Sept. 1945.
84. Testimony of Kenneth Cheethan, cited at Raymond Boyer's trial in March 1947; Ottawa *Citizen*, 27 March 1947. Another witness, who had worked at the Shawinigan plant, claimed 'that during 1943 he shipped hundreds of thousands of pounds of the explosive (RDX) to Russia under the Mutual Aid plan.' Montreal *Gazette*, 6 Dec. 1947.
85. Donald Avery, 'Canadian Communism and Popular Front Organizations', paper presented at the meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, June 1983, Vancouver; Paul Dufour, 'Eggheads and Espionage: The Gouzenko Affair in Canada', *Journal of Canadian Studies* (Fall-Winter 1981), pp. 188–98.
86. Donald Avery, 'Canadian Communism and Popular Front Organizations', paper presented at the meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, June 1983, Vancouver.
87. Public Archives of Ontario, Workers Educational Association Papers, 11/5, Minutes of the NCSSF meeting, 6 Dec. 1943.
88. The Executive of the Science Committee included Dr Leopold Infeld (Mathematics, University of Toronto), Dr B. H. Speakman (Director of the Ontario Research Foundation), Dr Christian Sivertz (Chemistry, University of Western Ontario) and Dr David Shugar of the Royal Canadian Navy). Ibid.

89. Roy and Kay MacLeod, 'The Contradictions of Professionalism: Scientists, Trade Unionism and the First World War', *Social Studies of Science*, Vol. 9 (1979), pp. 1–32; Goldsmith, *Sage*, pp. 51–152; William McGucken, *Scientists, Society State: The Social Relations of Science Movement in Great Britain, 1931–1947* (Columbus, Ohio, 1984).
90. Donald Avery, 'Atomic Cooperation and Competition: The Anglo-Canadian Montreal Laboratory and the Manhattan Project, 1942–1946', paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the History of Technology, Uppsala, Sweden, 18 Aug. 1992.
91. Scattered minutes of the Montreal and Ottawa CAScW chapters, as well as copies of the Montreal and Ottawa *Bulletins* and the *Canadian Scientist*, are located in the Hazen Sise collection at the National Archives in Ottawa.
92. *Canadian Scientist*, April 1946; ibid., Dec. 1945.
93. Montreal *Bulletin*, April 1945; Ottawa *Bulletin*, March 1945.
94. RC, Espionage, *Report*, pp. 74–8; Avery, 'Canadian Communism'.
95. Mackenzie Diary, 25 Oct. 1944; RC, Espionage, *Report*, pp. 171–225.
96. Mazerall's work involved research on 10cm and microwave radar, while Smith's duties included liaison with the MIT 'Rad Lab'. Interview with Gordon Lunan, 31 Aug. 1990, Ottawa; RC, Espionage, *Report*, pp. 57–70, 123–61.
97. Ibid., pp. 57–70, 263–445.
98. Colonel Motinov's primary responsibility was co-ordinating the work of Alan Nunn May. Colonel Sokolov's major contact was Raymond Boyer; he also had the dubious distinction of being the only GRU operator to come to the attention of Canadian military intelligence, largely because of his improper 'direct enquiries of technical units' at the Canadian Radar Training Centre in Kingston. RC, Espionage, *Report*, pp. 118, 356; ibid., p. 268.
99. Lunan also described how the original contact between himself and Rogov was arranged: 'I accepted Freddie's offer to meet Rogov. He (Rose) claimed the Russians wanted to gain insights into Canadian life, Canadian customs'; Lunan interview. Soviet espionage codes of conduct are described in Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, pp. 223, 243.
100. Rogov also claimed that Smith was so 'desirous to work for us' that he 'promised to do everything' – including waiting for a proposed rendezvous in 'a torrential downpour'. RC, Espionage, *Report*, pp. 123–59.
101. Several of the agents whose code names appeared in Colonel Zabotin's notebook were not identified in 1946. Perhaps the most controversial was 'Elli' who Gouzenko claimed was connected with British intelligence. Andrew and Gordievsky in *KGB*, pp. 245–6, provide a convincing argument that Elli was actually Leo Long of MI5, not Roger Hollis as Peter Wright (*The Spycatcher* (New York, 1987) and Chapman Pincher, *Too Secret Too Long* (London, 1985) have alleged.
102. In our interview of August 1990 Lunan described himself as 'the reluctant spy. I tried in my naive way to improve the situation; it was an illegal act, motivated by idealism'.
103. Durnford Smith in his testimony before the Commission claimed that the microwave zone position indicator set 'was at one time considered for sale to the Soviet government' and that 'certain Russian officers were taken through the set'. RC, Espionage, *Report*, p. 298.
104. Neither Shugar nor Halperin was prepared to co-operate with Commissioners Kellock and Taschereau despite being threatened with contempt under the terms of The Inquiries Act. They also bitterly denounced their long incarceration (28 days for Shugar) at the RCMP Rockcliffe barracks. NAC, John G. Diefenbaker Papers, 1940–1956 Series, Shugar to Mackenzie King, 10 March 1946; Shugar to Diefenbaker, 12 April 1946; ibid., Shugar to Diefenbaker, 21 July 1946; RC, Espionage, *Report*, pp. 671–3.
105. RC, Espionage, *Report*, p. 316. During the subsequent trials three of the accused scientists were convicted: Boyer (two years), Edward Mazerall (four years), Smith (five years). Lunan and Rose also received five years. Among those acquitted were Halperin, Shugar and Nightingale.
106. RC, Espionage, *Report*, pp. 616–17.

107. On 13 March 1947 MI5 provided a gloomy assessment of how the wartime arrangements had facilitated Soviet espionage operations in Great Britain. Andrew, *Secret Service*, p. 490.
108. Ibid., pp. 617–19.
109. NAC, DND, file TS 711-270-16-1, C. J. Mackenzie to O. M. Solandt, 24 Aug. 1946; ibid., Mackenzie to Solandt, 19 Sept. 1946. Klaus Fuchs, also a Soviet spy, had no direct connection with the Montreal Laboratory. Norman Moss, *Klaus Fuchs: The Man who Stole the Atom Bomb* (Toronto, 1987).
110. Ibid., Mackenzie to Solandt, 19 Sept. 1946.
111. These included the following: (1) The function of individual A/S Research and Development Establishments, testing plants and trial bases, in the United States and United Kingdom, together with their relation to the overall Anti-Submarine organization. (2) General description of the function of audio equipment installed in Naval craft and use of type 1479 as a depth determining equipment. (3) General description of the application of audio equipment in the defence of harbours and Naval bases. (4) Information as to general purpose of production test laboratories and location in Canada at Renfrew, Ont. (5) General information on functions of audio recorder paper and experiments under investigation for its improvement. Ibid., Report of Lieutenant Commander R. M. Battles, 7 Sept. 1946.
112. RC, Espionage, *Report*, Exhibit, Dr D. W. R. McKinley to Supt. G. E. Rivett-Carnac, Intelligence Branch, RCMP, 3 April 1946. There is no evidence that either Mackenzie or Solandt were concerned that the Soviets had penetrated Canadian signals intelligence research and development, or gained access to Allied Sigint secrets.
113. Ibid., p. 616.
114. RC, *Report*, pp. 70–1.
115. In August 1945 the CAScW included an impressive number of Canada's leading scientists. Particularly well represented were physicists and chemists from the joint Anglo-Canadian nuclear research and development programme in Montreal.
116. RC, Espionage, *Report*, pp. 375–409; Mackenzie Diary, 11 July 1945.
117. Maurice Goldsmith, *Sage: A Life of J. D. Bernal* (London, 1980), pp. 92–123. Bernal's most influential publication *The Social Function of Science* appeared in 1939; in 1944 he became the President of the British Association of Scientific Workers. During the 1930s Bernal made three trips to the Soviet Union (p. 64).
118. National Archives, Washington, Manhattan Engineering District Records, 333.5, General Groves to Secretary of War, 24 March 1947.
119. Despite periodic investigations of Communist espionage in wartime Washington, the FBI generally concentrated on German and Japanese spies and sympathizers. Powers, *Secrecy and Power*, pp. 238–40. Nor were British security agencies any more active in moving against NKVD or GRU operations. Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, pp. 218–78.
120. The status of 'left-wing scientists would, of course, change dramatically after 1945. British security authorities led the way when on 15 June, they abruptly ordered eight prominent British scientists – including J. D. Bernal and P. M. S. Blackett – not to attend the 220th anniversary celebrations of the Soviet Academy of Science in Moscow. Despite the outrage of Britain's scientific community, this policy was justified on the grounds of national security. Churchill College Archives, A. V. Hill Papers, 4/77, Hill to E. A. Milne, 18 June 1945.

The Early Years of State Surveillance of Labour and the Left in Canada: The Institutional Framework of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security and Intelligence Apparatus, 1918–26

GREGORY S. KEALEY

This study is intended to describe the institutional framework of RCMP Security and intelligence work at the force's inception in February 1920. The context of the First World War and the Canadian labour revolt of 1917–20 are assumed.[1] Beginning with an institutional reconstruction of the internal workings of the new security apparatus, I then turn to the force's relations with other security agencies and with other government departments. Throughout this institutional reconstruction, readers should keep in mind that the evolution of the RCMP as the key Canadian institution in the realm of security intelligence was a series of accidents far more than any considered plan on anyone's part. Indeed the continuing existence of the force itself was often in doubt in the years under consideration. In 1917 it appeared that the force was being phased out and had no post-war future. The post-war labour revolt provided it the chance, as one of its romantic chroniclers termed it, to rise 'phoenix-like' from the ashes.[2] Even after the creation of the new RCMP from the merger of the Royal North-West Mounted Police (RNWMP) and the Dominion Police (DP) in February 1920, its prospects were less than great. A number of provinces showed little enthusiasm for a federal police force with a nation-wide presence. Indeed, the federal Liberal Party's support for the force was an open question and in the aftermath of the 1921 election many questions were asked about the force's utility. For example, in 1922 during the debate to create a new unified Department of National Defence, the proposed legislation placed the RCMP under DND control. Ironically, only the expression of civil libertarian concerns for maintaining the separation of policing from the military and the necessity of Progressive support for the minority Liberal government ensured the ongoing separate existence of the RCMP as a civilian agency.[3]

Responsibility for security and intelligence in the First World War had been shared by an extensive and confusing array of government departments and agencies. The Dominion Police carried overall responsibility inside the country (and, on occasion, in the US) and simultaneously performed the necessary liaison work with foreign intelligence agencies, especially the British. Sir Percy Sherwood, Canada's Chief Commissioner of Police, headed the DP until his retirement late in the war, when he was replaced by Albert Cawdron as Acting Chief Commissioner. The DP had only a tiny intelligence section of its own and thus of necessity sought the co-operation of the RNWMP in the western provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan and of other provincial and municipal police forces across the country. In addition, the DP hired investigators from various private detective agencies, often American firms such as Pinkerton and Thiel, both famous for anti-labour activities.[4] In 1917 the RNWMP role shifted to border duty in the west after it ceased to police the western provinces. Then, after American entry into the war ended the fears of German infiltration across the border, most members of the force were allowed to join the Canadian Expeditionary Force. With the RNWMP smaller than it had been in many years (only 303 at its smallest), most people, including Commissioner A.B. Perry, anticipated that it had no post-war future.[5]

The rapid increase in labour militancy in 1917 and 1918, however, re-invigorated the RNWMP and in January 1919 it became solely responsible for the enforcement of federal laws from the Lakehead west. In effect the country was cut in two at Fort William and Port Arthur with the DP maintaining its security function in the eastern half and the RNWMP taking it over in the west. This confusing bifurcation of authority was made worse by the fact that the DP reported to the Minister of Justice, while the RNWMP was responsible to Prime Minister Borden himself until the President of the Privy Council, Newton Rowell, took over after the election of the Union government in 1917.

This bureaucratic confusion was compounded by the fact that a number of other departments held important security and intelligence functions during the war and after. These included the Secretary of State with responsibility for Press Censorship, the Department of Justice, both for the DP and for the brief period in 1918 when C.H. Cahan headed the Public Safety Branch, the first attempt at a security and intelligence co-ordinating body, and, of course, the Department of Militia, which had extensive military intelligence operations across the country and responsibilities for internment camps and enforcement of the Military Service Act. This amazing array of agencies was augmented by specific individuals in other government departments including the Post Office, Immigration, and Customs.

C.H. Cahan's Public Safety Branch represented an unsuccessful effort to create a central security agency to fight the Bolshevik menace. The reasons for his failure have been analysed elsewhere, but it seems clear that if he had managed to hold out until the spring of 1919 the history of Canadian security intelligence might well have been quite different.[6] Newton Rowell, one of the most prominent of the English Canadian Liberals in the Union Government, by giving such responsibilities to the RNWMP in the west, instead created a logic that was to lead, one year later, to the creation of the RCMP out of the unequal merger of the RNWMP and the DP.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

While the new RCMP did not come into existence until February 1920, its attitudes and procedures in the realm of security and intelligence work were shaped in 1919. The RNWMP had some previous experience in running secret agents in the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan from early in the First World War, but it was primarily after their jurisdiction expanded on 1 January 1919 that they began to address the security realm with a new consistency of purpose.[7] While Commissioner Aylesworth Bowen Perry demonstrated a keen interest in the security area, he also recognized that the new workload, especially the paper flow, demanded some delegation of authority.[8] Thus a new Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) was established at Regina headquarters under the control of Assistant Commissioner W. H. Routledge. Staff Sergeant C. Prime became the Chief Detective with special responsibility for secret agents.[9]

Procedures were established to increase internal security with regards to the running of secret agents and their payment and concerning the use of undercover RNWMP detectives.[10] For all intents and purposes the only security and intelligence specialists on the force became the secret agents and the regular Mounties operating underground. As we shall see, this gave the field agents considerable latitude for creative spying and exaggerated reports. Routledge, for example, warned his Officers Commanding Districts (OCDs) as early as September 1919 of 'the absolute necessity for periodically checking up Secret Agents, especially foreigners'. He cited as evidence a secret agent who had written an alleged document connecting the One Big Union with German agents. When discovered, the secret agent explained he had done so in an effort 'to hold his job'.[11] While we have limited information on the initial performances of the first cadre of RNWMP secret agents, we know almost nothing about their subsequent careers.[12] The underground Mounties, however, remained experts only as long as they maintained their secret identities in the field. Once used in court as witnesses in the prosecution of radicals or if their cover was otherwise blown they simply returned to the regular Mounted Police life. Examples include F.W. Zaneth (aka Harry Blask and subsequently as James LaPlante) and even John Leopold (aka Jack Esselwein), who was initially sent to the Northwest Territories for a number of years after his identity was discovered by the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) in 1928.[13] (Of course, Leopold was to prove the partial exception to this rule after his testimony in the CPC trials of 1931. In April 1932 he joined the CIB in Ottawa, but only in 1933 after he was investigated for misuse of RCMP funds did he become a full-time analyst of security files and field reports. I think, given the circumstances, it is fair to say he backed into the job.[14])

With the move to Ottawa in 1920 the Director of Criminal Investigations (DCI), the head of the CIB, was given responsibility for three sections, Criminal and Secret Service, Fingerprints, and Tickets of Leave. In the field the CIB sections of each division and subdivision had total responsibility for the security realm. Each Divisional Officer Commanding had to file a confidential monthly report regarding security and subversive activities in his area. In the field the CIB detectives were given full responsibility in this realm without any specialized expertise in this area; indeed, they had almost no training whatsoever in any of their areas of responsibility. Detectives ran secret agents in the field but undercover RCMP officers reported directly to the Officer in charge of CIB work in each division or to the Divisional OC. Thus CIB detectives had a bizarre mix of activities; one day they would be working on prostitution and drug enforcement, the next on smuggling and counterfeiting, and the next they would be concerned with political radicals and labour unrest. C.W. (Cliff) Harvison's autobiography, which describes his first years in the force as a young detective in Montreal in the early 1920s, demonstrates this eclectic combination well. One of only 12 other members of the CIB in Montreal he was sent out undercover with no prior training.[15]

The second aspect of the new Ottawa RCMP operation that involved security and intelligence work was the Central Registry, which Betke and Horrall describe as 'the key to any successful intelligence agency'. The file systems that had been established in early 1919, 175 (Subversive organizations), 175P (subversive personal history files), and 177 (subversive publications) were transferred *en masse* to Ottawa where they were continued and put under the control of only one or two members of the Central Registry staff. The first such designated individual was George Hann, but when he was appointed Department Secretary the job went to Constable John Hart, who later during the Second World War worked with William Stephenson in the United States.[16] The other member of the force with registry responsibilities was Corporal E.F. Inglis, who also handled C.F. Hamilton's correspondence and reports and was in charge of coding and decoding. In 1927 a final addition was made to the registry operation when Ms M. Babuka joined in the role of translator with particular responsibility for Ukrainian language materials.[17]

The third and final element of the security operations in the 1920s was the Liaison and Intelligence Officer, a position created in early January 1922 and filled by only one person in RCMP history, Charles Frederick Hamilton. This position represented the one significant intelligence specialization. Hamilton, originally a prominent Toronto journalist, had joined the RNWMP in 1914 as Assistant Comptroller, but with the outbreak of the First World War had become Deputy Chief Press Censor. He returned to the force in 1919 and became Secretary of the new RCMP in 1920. Building on his wartime intelligence experience, he took on a security role from the time of his return to the force. In 1919, for example, he replaced Perry on a trip to Washington to discuss sharing security and intelligence materials. The Liaison and Intelligence Officer's job description read: 'Under the direction of the Commissioner of the RCMP to have charge of the secret and confidential correspondence of the Department, to make confidential reports on such matters to the government, to have control of all negotiations with Scotland Yard and similar institutions with regard to the Secret Service of Canada.' At a minimum salary of $3,000 per annum, Hamilton's pay was second only to the Commissioner's.[18]

Hamilton's role included the production of the weekly summaries of security intelligence materials collected by the force. These bulletins commenced in November 1919 and continued in one form or another through the 1950s. Originally simply entitled 'Notes on the Work of the CIB Division', by 1926 they carried the much catchier title 'Weekly Summary: Notes Regarding Revolutionary Organizations and Agitators in Canada'.[19] Intended for circulation to the Prime Minister, members of cabinet, and other senior government officials, these bulletins allowed the RCMP to keep their political masters informed and to proselytize at the same time.

Hamilton also represented the RCMP on various inter-departmental committees and appears to have been responsible for helping to establish, albeit very slowly, RCMP hegemony in this area. Initially, for example, military intelligence maintained a high interest in security work. To cite but one example the Military Intelligence Officer in Military District 4, Montreal, established secret surveillance of the One Big Union, Bolshevik organizations, and of various Irish nationalist organizations and continued to report on them at least through 1920.[20] While Perry was the official RCMP representative on the Defence Committee of Canada, Hamilton generally attended as well and when its new Intelligence Sub-Committee was created in January 1922, Hamilton was chosen as its Secretary.[21]

Thus, the structure of the RCMP security apparatus in the 1920s consisted of three parts: the CIB under the DCI in Ottawa with complete control of all field investigations, detectives, and secret agents; the Central Registry in Ottawa with its control of all the material gathered in the field; and the Liaison and Intelligence Officer, who co-ordinated with other Departments, the Force's political masters, and other countries. This decentralized system, which de-emphasized expertise and specialization, had evolved directly from the immediate war and post-war experience of the RCMP and remained static throughout the 1920s; indeed, significant change came only in the 1930s after the arrival in the Commissioner's office of General J. H. MacBrien and the death of Hamilton.[22]

The relationship between Hamilton and the various DCIs remains a matter for speculation only, but there was considerable potential for conflict given the Force's broad mandate and its extremely limited resources.[23] The fact that the first DCI was former Acting Chief Commissioner of the Dominion Police, now Superintendent A. J. Cawdron, who was extremely unhappy in the new force, would not have helped. It is also suggestive that after Hamilton's death his successor, Inspector Arthur Patteson, became not the LIO, or even the Director of Intelligence as Hamilton had come to be commonly known, but simply the Intelligence Officer. Moreover, he was placed under the supervisory control of the DCI, unlike Hamilton who had reported directly to the Commissioner.[24]

While the above must remain speculative, far clearer, however, is the massive disequilibrium between the collection of field material and the emphasis put on organization and analysis in Ottawa. Throughout the 1920s the RCMP ran a massive collection agency of reports on radicals and on radical organization. The literally thousands of files (6767 subversive subject files, 4806 subversive personal history files, and 610 subversive literature files to be precise) accumulated in that decade, which included millions of pages, could not possibly have been absorbed and analysed by the central headquarters staff of only two or three individuals, including Hamilton himself.[25] (I hasten to add that I make this claim on the hard experiential basis of trying to come to grips with only a small, extensively severed segment of this material.)

This is not to claim that Headquarters did not take the incoming material seriously. Each security report submitted by a District Officer Commanding (DOC) was scrutinized in Ottawa and often resulted in a request for further inquiries. Indeed as one works through the extraordinary cumulation of materials, one can only be struck by the extent and degree of this meticulous surveillance of labour and the left. The question remains, however, whether an overview of the red forest was not totally lost in the underbrush of tens if not hundreds of thousands of reports.[26]

Similarly, the field found these demands a trial. The Edmonton OC, for example, noted in his confidential monthly reports for April 1921 that 'the activities of our CIB Department have been confined almost entirely to attending special meetings of different organizations'. Two months later he noted that 'all principal meetings of the different organizations in the city and outlying districts were attended by our Special Agents and reports submitted'.[27]

The problems described by the OC Edmonton are not surprising when placed in the context of the RCMP's general financial difficulties in the 1920s. The one constant in RCMP *Annual Reports* throughout the decade was the continuous complaint of understaffing. In 1926, for example, Commissioner Starnes noted that the Force had fallen from 1,532 members in 1920 to only 876 in 1926, a decline of over 42 per cent. Meanwhile, the number of cases investigated had almost tripled from 10,808 to 28,828. The extraordinary emphasis the RCMP placed on security and intelligence work throughout the 1920s must be placed within this overall framework of fiscal restraint and the reduction of personnel.[28] The diminution of the force was reversed slightly in the late 1920s when the RCMP regained provincial policing duties in Saskatchewan.

The efforts of the RCMP in the area of security intelligence represented anything but the force's major activity. The bulk of the force was spread across the country in cavalry units 'set up across Canada as reserves of strength to be used by the government to control such civil disturbances as might occur'.[29] The youthful experience of C.W. (Cliff) Harvison suggests much about the RCMP in the formative years 1919 to 1923. Harvison joined in October 1919 at the age of 17, claiming to be 18. Training experience was at best limited and focused on one of the RCMP's major roles in the new post-Winnipeg scheme of things: riot control:

> Riot training is designed to accustom the horses to noise, shots, quickly moving figures, and obstacles on the ground. It achieves this purpose but only after several sessions of lessening bedlam. Dummies with bells attached were suspended from the ceiling of the riding school so they hung just above ground level. Logs and strips of white cloth were placed at various angles on the tanbark. A squad of men carrying shotguns, tin pans, drums, and umbrellas, took up a position in the centre of the menage.... a mounted troop entered the riding school.... Then just as the troop was getting into some semblance of order, the dummies started swinging, shotguns blasted off, tin cans clanged, and men rushed towards the horses raising and lowering umbrellas and waving white cloths. All hell broke loose as horses, with or without their riders, galloped madly about in a

> desperate effort to break clear of the uproar, and as thrown riders tried to avoid being run down.[30]

After this training, Harvison moved east to Ottawa as part of a squad based in the Capital ready for assignment anywhere in case of domestic disturbances. There, while the new musical ride training provided some diversion, 'the emphasis remained on the handling of riots and unlawful assemblies'.[31]

Subsequent service experiences for Harvison in the short years he stayed in the RCMP on this first round of duty included guarding deportees in Quebec, a further round in Ottawa of riot duty ('monotonous and to some extent meaningless without a clearly defined future'), CIB work in Montreal, and supervision of individuals on the harvest excursion making their way from Atlantic Canada to the west.[32] Harvison left the force in 1923 to marry, a privilege denied to RCMP recruits until they had served for seven years and even then only with the permission of the Commissioner and on the understanding that at least 50 per cent of the force remained single. When the numbers of married men increased, Starnes subsequently raised the number of years before marriage to twelve.[33]

Another contemporaneous RCMP memoir by former Assistant Commissioner Vernon Kemp suggests another major difficulty faced by the force in its first few years. The absorption of the Dominion Police, which on paper appeared simple, proved very difficult. Kemp, a newly-commissioned Inspector, was sent to Ottawa to integrate the DP into the new RCMP. With the exception of the Canadian Identification Bureau, Canada's fingerprint clearing centre, and a small investigation branch with security and police experience, this proved most difficult.[34] The problem was accentuated by the attitude of A.J. Cawdron, the former Acting Chief Commissioner, who had expected at the very least to become Perry's chief assistant. Instead he received the rank of Superintendent and was placed in charge of CIB. In response he lobbied politically in opposition to the RCMP and generally made a nuisance of himself. When Starnes succeeded Perry in 1923, he tried to have Cawdron retired, but initially he was only successful in reappointing him as Supply Officer, a far less sensitive post.[35]

EXTERNAL RELATIONS

If the politics of the merger proved troublesome, there was also the question of interdepartmental and intergovernmental relations to be worked out or established. Relations between the RCMP and other governments are extremely difficult to document because of the various exemptions in the Access-to-Information legislation. To date, the following seems clear.

The RCMP, after its creation in 1920, took over from the DP the direct relationship with British security operations. This relationship involved contact with the Special Branch of Scotland Yard. Material from these sources came via two channels, the Governor General (the old, established and more formal route with available coding and decoding facilities) but increasingly directly from the appropriate British agency to the RCMP or the military.[36]

Recent research at the Public Records Office sheds somewhat more light on this relationship as it developed after the First World War. The earlier connections which had revolved around imperial concerns, especially Ireland and India, were displaced gradually by a focus on International Communism, and especially the Comintern.[37] On the British side, the Canadian labour revolt in 1919 generated considerable interest, as did the counter-revolutionary possibilities of the Citizens' Committees.[38] Similarly, the Canadians expressed interest in receiving consistent security and intelligence materials from late 1918 on, and began to receive them in May 1919.[39] Regular Canadian reporting to Britain appears to have started in late October 1920, after which weekly Canadian security and intelligence reports were forwarded to Sir Basil Thomson and his successors, with the Governor General's despatches.[40]

By far the most interesting evidence, however, concerns one errant file that has found its way, no doubt by oversight, into the PRO. In 1922 an extensive discussion took place between RCMP Commissioner Starnes and Sir Basil Thomson's replacement Sir Wyndham Childs concerning the nature and potential threat of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC).[41] The contents of the discussion need not detain us here but they are derived from British intercepts of CPC documents destined to Moscow for the Comintern archives. The materials include detailed budget information and the most secret internal party documents, all ironically labelled, 'To be read to group and destroyed'. No doubt, British intelligence services still possess much Canadian material. Accessing it, however, may prove impossible. Indeed, assuming the materials reached Moscow, we may access them there first.

The relationship with the United States is more difficult to trace. In September 1919 Comptroller Maclean complained to Rowell: 'we are constantly encountering matters upon which consultation with the U.S. Secret Service is advisable, and often the formal channel not only takes time, but presents inconvenience.' The obvious answer was 'a direct connection', and Colonel Hamilton was sent to Washington to make the arrangements.[42] The results of Hamilton's visit remain unknown at this time. Hamilton visited Washington in 1919 to establish co-operation. In addition, however, A.J. Andrews, the Winnipeg General Strike trials prosecutor, also visited Washington in 1919 to arrange further co-operation with the Department of Justice and with state efforts such as New York's Lusk Commission. Nevertheless, apparently a formal relationship was not fully developed until 1937 after General MacBrien entered into an agreement with the FBI after visiting J. Edgar Hoover in Washington.[43]

If the evidence at this point is rather thin on intergovernmental developments, we have somewhat more to go on in the realm of interdepartmental relations. The RCMP was included in the Defence Committee of Canada (DCC) from its inception in October 1920. This Committee represented part of the concerted efforts of Generals Gwatkin, Currie, and MacBrien to develop a comprehensive post-war peace defence plan. Such peace planning, especially with the events of 1919 still reverberating in the Canadian polity, initially demanded that a high 'priority ... went to internal security because of the fear of communism and extended labour unrest'.[44] Hence, the new RCMP enjoyed a place at the table along side the Chief of the General Staff, the Director of the Naval Service, and the Inspector General of the Air Force. The ostensible aim of the DCC was 'to co-ordinate efforts in pursuit of a common policy, and, especially, to ensure co-operation ... in the event of war or other emergency'.[45]

The RCMP role came to the fore in spring 1921 when at the sixth meeting of the DCC Commissioner Perry reported on the 'threatened disturbances in British Columbia'. While there is no available detail presented as to the composition of the threat, it seems clear from later minutes and materials that it centred on the unemployed and fears that agitators might exploit the situation. The DCC action was certainly clear. It authorized the formation of a local defence committee to be composed of the GOC MD No. 11, the Senior Naval Officer, the Assistant Commissioner of the RCMP, and the Senior Officer Canadian Air Force. The DCC ordered the Committee to report on local conditions and to recommend appropriate actions to be taken with the available forces in an emergency. Such resources consisted of 100 naval personnel with six machine-guns, 200 permanent force with 10 machine-guns in Victoria, and 162 RCMP with four machine-guns. Also available were 700 reinforcements from the Prairies and about another 400 from Winnipeg, although it was noted the latter might well be needed there. In addition the DCC recommended that the Canadian Naval Squadron be retained on the west coast, that all government arms be called in or protected, that the Air Force be prepared to supply aircraft, and finally that all militia units be asked what units would be available 'in case of an attempted revolt in British Columbia'.[46]

While such plans now seem excessive, they suggest the tenor of the times.[47] Indeed the GOC, MD No. 11 responded from Esquimalt that the 'situation warrants precautionary measures' and also recommended the retention of the naval squadron. The local defence committee had prepared a 'concentrated striking force approximately 500 strong' which included the RCMP. No reinforcements were needed at present as the 'situation was not imminent'. A second telegram indicated that while 'not as serious as two years ago', it 'should not be ignored' and 'all counter measures should be taken'.[48] Simultaneously, the Director of Flying Operations, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Leckie, brought machine-guns and ammunition from Victoria to protect the Air Station. He looked to May Day as the 'critical date' because 'certain elements in this city' threatened to hold meetings despite the Mayor's denial of permits.[49] Such concerns were not unique to Vancouver. In Toronto General Williams decided to pursue a Citizens' Committee style strategy à la Winnipeg 1919.[50]

When the DCC met again in mid-May Perry reported that Assistant Commissioner Starnes indicated that 'the situation at Vancouver had improved; but that a recurrence of trouble, later on in the year, was not unlikely'.[51] In early September Perry warned the DCC:

> Recent information from Vancouver indicates the continuance of a disturbed condition of public opinion. Alarming rumours are numerous, one being that an outbreak will take place about October 1st. These do not seem worthy of much credence, the organization of the revolutionists not being sufficiently advanced to make such early action probable. They probably, however, are symptomatic of deep unrest and uneasiness.[52]

Not surprisingly then at its first fall meeting, especially in light of Commissioner Perry's report of serious problems in MDs No.2, 4, and 11 (Ontario, Quebec, B.C.), the DCC decided to accept a RCMP recommendation and to create a Local Defence Committee (LDC) in each Military District. These LDCs were to mimic the DCC in composition with each of the three military services and the RCMP on each. At this same meeting Perry warned the military of possible communist attempts to infiltrate the armed forces through the 'germ cell method'.[53]

Following the September meeting LDCs were created in most major MDs. Perry ordered his Divisional OCs to arrange meetings with their military counterparts to discuss 'the serious state of affairs ... in several parts of the Dominion caused by unemployment, the machinations of revolutionary agitators, and other factors of unrest'. OCs were warned, however, that such discussions were to be 'absolutely confidential and personal' to ensure that the 'public was not alarmed even by the bare fact of the existence of the Committee'. RCMP OCs were free to share with the LDC information on unrest and the disaffected but they 'must not, however, disclose the source of your information or the means by which it was obtained'. The new LDCs were to report on (1) 'the dangers to be anticipated or apprehended from the several disturbing factors, such as unrest, the activities of extremist agitators, etc.', (2) 'the force available in the district to deal with any dangerous situation which may develop', and (3) 'the action to be taken if any emergency arises'.[54]

Responses from RCMP Divisional OCs across the country indicate that such LDCs were set up in the fall of 1921. They also provide sketches of concerns in various districts. Reports from Vancouver, for example, indicate some improvement over the fall but also suggest continuous high alert:

> The situation, as far as we are concerned, would be to repress any demonstration. In short notice a company of the Princess Pat's machine gun section and the available flying force could be mobilized.... In the meantime, I am having our own men and horses constantly practiced and kept in shape.[55]

Two months later the OC again noted 'in the meantime, the men are being quietly trained for any disturbance that may arise'.[56] Similar meetings and planning sessions took place in Alberta with LDCs set up in Edmonton, Calgary and Lethbridge, and in Manitoba.[57] Meanwhile in Atlantic Canada, a LDC was created and immediately began to worry about the coal mining situation.[58]

Unfortunately, this source peters out in early 1922, and attempts through the Access legislation have failed to turn up subsequent materials. One other major initiative, however, emerged from the DCC in this period. In late September General Gwatkin wrote to C.F. Hamilton suggesting that Canada needed a more centralized intelligence bureau and indicating that the issue should be discussed by the DCC.[59] At the tenth meeting of the DCC in December 1921 the idea received support 'to avoid duplication of work, and to ensure that intelligence is communicated, quickly and regularly, to Departments interested'. Ironically, it was at the same DCC meeting that all member agencies, including the RCMP, endorsed the plan for a new Department of National Defence, 'charged with the administration of the Navy, the Militia, the Air Force and the RCMP' as 'conducive to efficiency as well as to economy'.[60]

The first meeting of the new Sub-Committee on Intelligence took place at RCMP Headquarters on 13 January 1922. C.F. Hamilton was appointed Secretary of the new body by the other members, Commander W.H. Eves of the Naval Service, Lieutenant Colonel H.H. Matthews of the Militia Department, and Flight Lieutenant F.C. Higgins of the Air Board. After an exchange of memoranda describing each department's intelligence efforts, the parties agreed to the following objects:

1. To arrange for complete liaison and interchange of information between the several departments represented upon it; and to eliminate duplication of effort.
2. To consider what details of Intelligence are required as a basis for the work of the Defence Committee, and for the security of Canada, both internal and external.
3. To consider whether these details are now being obtained, and, if not, by whom they should be obtained.[61]

This proposal received the subsequent support of the DCC at its meeting in early February 1922.[62]

The memoranda exchanged at the first meeting provide full descriptions of each group's efforts in the realm of security and intelligence. The two with by far the largest effort were, not surprisingly, the Militia Department and the RCMP.[63] The degree of their overlapping mandate as outlined by each in 1922 was considerable. Lieutenant Colonel Matthews described the Military Intelligence branch of which he was Assistant Director as reporting to Colonel J. Sutherland Brown, the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence. Beneath Matthews were District Intelligence Officers in each of the country's 12 Military Districts. Parallel on the flow chart to the DIOs were Special Agents ('if any'), who reported directly to the ADMI.[64] The organizational flow chart also showed Area Intelligence Officers who reported to the DIOs. Like most government flow charts, however, the reality was at some variance, as Matthews admitted candidly:

> Owing to the lack of funds, DIOs have only been appointed in 5 of those 11 Districts. Two Districts have an officer of the Permanent Force detailed in an acting capacity, and in the remaining 4 Districts the General Staff Officer personally has charge of the work. In large Districts it is intended that the DIO should be assisted by area Intelligence Officers ... but no appointments have been made.

In describing the functions of Military Intelligence the replication of RCMP concerns became most clear: 'Thirdly. – The keeping in touch with the political and internal or domestic situation in Canada sufficiently to insure that military aid to the civil power can be promptly furnished if, and where, required.' Matthews, no doubt anticipating a critical response from the RCMP, immediately added: 'The attitude of the Militia Intelligence Branch to the question of the co-ordination of, and prevention of duplication in, the work of the Intelligence Service of the Defence Forces is entirely sympathetic.' Indeed, after defining the appropriate areas of concern for the various military agencies, he added: 'The RCMP should be entirely responsible for secret service work generally.'[65]

The RCMP memorandum simply summarized its sources of information. Indicating its British and 'to some extent' American foreign sources, Hamilton then outlined their internal structure, which he typified as 'decentralized'. He identified the 11 RCMP Districts and explained that each DOC had 'a sufficient investigation staff'. Headquarters possessed 'a staff which collates, controls, and uses the information obtained'. While 'decentralized', the system was also 'flexible' and agents could be moved around the country as warranted. In addition, he noted proudly the force could undertake investigations in 27 languages.[66]

The RCMP submission to this Committee appears sparse to say the least. In addition, it should be noted that Perry had warned his OCs that their co-operation in LDCs was not to include any revelation of sources or techniques. At this stage of research it is perhaps too early to stake a great deal on this, but the RCMP appears in the 1920s already to be initiating its protective attitude to sources, especially living ones.

The longevity of the DCC Sub-Committee on Intelligence is not known. Minutes are available for the second and third meeting in March and June 1922 respectively. Aside from an interesting Comintern document circulated through the Committee by Naval Intelligence, which had received it from its British counterpart, the major issue in those months was the surveillance of two Chinese aviation schools in Victoria and Saskatoon. These pilot training institutes were suspected of involvement with the Chinese National League and, more specifically, of preparing aviators for the nationalist forces of Sun Yat Sen.[67]

CONCLUSION

In 1922 Commissioner A.B. Perry felt that he had had enough. While some secondary accounts imply that his departure at least partially stemmed from his general unhappiness about the nature of the new RCMP and more specifically about the proposed realignment with the creation of the DND, there appears to be little supportive evidence.[68] Indeed, it should be remembered that to a large degree Perry was the architect of the new RCMP. His memorandum of August 1919 to Prime Minister Robert Borden became the blueprint for the new force.[69] Moreover, if Perry was not happy with the shift in emphasis implicit in the new DND, there is no available evidence to document this unease. All we know with any certainty is that Perry in the DCC supported the proposal and agreed to lobby his Minister on its behalf.[70]

Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the future of the force was an open question. Perry's successor, Cortland Starnes, the Winnipeg bourgeoisie's hero of the General Strike, had a rough ten-year term as

Acting Commissioner and, after 1923, Commissioner. The uncertainties of the Parliamentary debate of 1922, when J.S. Woodsworth moved to have the force limited to the north, were followed by a similar unsuccessful effort in 1923 and then by various revelations about the RCMP role in Winnipeg in 1926.[71] As we have noted from the accounts of Harvison and Kemp, the remainder of the 1920s were dismal for the RCMP. It was only the election of the Bennett government and his subsequent choice in 1931 of General J.H. MacBrien to succeed Starnes as Commissioner that began to change the RCMP's status in the eyes of the government. As Rivett-Carnac put it: 'From almost a question mark in 1923 when I had first joined – no one had seemed entirely certain as to what its future might be – it had found a new growth in a changed age of mechanization, its status greatly increased in Canadian affairs.'[72] The depression decade was to provide the RCMP with considerable support for expansion and modernization under MacBrien's more astute political leadership.[73]

In a recent stimulating paper, Wesley Wark has argued that the most appropriate interpretative framework for an analysis of Canadian security intelligence is that of the 'national insecurity state'.[74] Wark argues that in the Canadian context the 'NIS' is characterized by a record of government fears of external threats and internal conspiracies and subversion, a popular mentality that stresses insecurity at home, an insecure security intelligence service, and parsimonious government support for the security service, which in turn heightens fears of subversion. There can be little question that the 1920s display the four characteristics to which Wark draws our attention. First, it was certainly a decade in which the Canadian government deeply feared the Bolshevik external threat and, as we have seen in the DCC minutes, also harboured real fears of revolution at home. The degree to which these fears were shared by the Canadian people, however, remains the subject for further research. Nevertheless, the Canadian business elite certainly shared and, indeed, often augmented the government's terror, which at least partially confirms Wark's second feature. Thirdly, the entire RCMP, not just its security apparatus, was on the defensive throughout this decade with its very institutional survival often in question. It would have been impossible for the security work to have escaped this uncertainty and the low morale it bred. Finally, while no financial details are available on specific security costs, the RCMP itself faced severe budget difficulties in the 1920s. The minute size of the Headquarters' security establishment suggests that 'parsimony' was a fact of life for the security apparatus from its inception.

NOTES

1. Gregory S. Kealey, '1919: The Canadian Labour Revolt', *Labour/Le Travail*, Vol. 13 (1984), pp. 11–44; 'The State, the Foreign Language Press, and the Canadian Labour Revolt of 1917–1920', in Christiane Harzig and Dirk Hoerder (eds), *The Press of Labor Migrants in Europe and North America, 1880s–1930s* (Bremen, 1985), pp. 311–45; 'Introduction', to Gregory S. Kealey and Reg Whitaker (eds), *The R.C.M.P. Security Bulletins: The Early Years, 1919–1929* (St. John's, 1993); 'The Surveillance State: The Origins of Domestic Intelligence and Counter-Subversion in Canada, 1914–1920', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1992), pp. 179–210; and 'State Repression of Labour and the Left in Canada, 1914–1920: The Impact of World War I', *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (1992), pp. 281–314.
2. T. Morris Longstreth, *The Silent Force: Scenes from the Life of the Mounted Police in Canada* (New York, 1927), pp. 293–309.
3. This summary is drawn from Longstreth, *The Silent Force*, pp. 313–23; Nora and William Kelly, *The Royal Canadian Mounted Police: A Century of History, 1873–1973* (Edmonton, 1973); Vernon A. M. Kemp, *Without Fear, Favour or Affection: Thirty-Five Years with the RCMP* (Toronto, 1958), pp. 78–84; and Kemp, *Scarlet and Stetson, The RNWMP on the Prairies* (Toronto, 1964), pp. 7–8. See also Lorne and Caroline Brown, *An Unauthorized History of the RCMP* (Toronto, 1973). On the creation of DND see: James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression* (Toronto, 1964), pp. 224–69 and Stephen J. Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860–1939* (Toronto, 1988), pp. 141–91.
4. NAC, RG 18, 83-84/321, Vol. 1, file 2–6 (1951), Perry to Borden, 7 Aug. 1919. See also RG 18, Vol. 592, file 1099/19, Perry to Rowell, 11 and 12 Feb. 1920.
5. General accounts of the First World War and immediate post-war experience include S. W. Horrall, 'The Royal North-West Mounted Police and Labour Unrest in Western Canada, 1919', *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 61 (June 1980), pp. 169–90; and the pertinent parts of his 'Canada's Security Service: A Brief History', *RCMP Quarterly*, Vol. 50 (Summer 1985), pp. 38–49; and, by far the most important, his and Carl Betke's *Canada's Security Service: An Historical Outline, 1864–1966* (Ottawa, RCMP Historical Section, 1978), released by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) in response to Access-to-Information request 117-90-107. On size see 'Annual Report for 1919, RNWMP', *Sessional Paper*, No. 28, 1920, p. 8.
6. Kealey, 'The Surveillance State'.
7. For early experience see RG 18, 83-84/321, file G-26-22, Comptroller to Commissioner, 25 Aug. 1914. 'You are authorized to employ men for special service to gather information with reference to the movements, disposition, etc. of the foreign settlers in the above provinces [Alberta and Saskatchewan], particularly those of German and Austrian extraction.'
8. Perry was born 21 August 1860 in Napanee, ON of United Empire Loyalist stock on both sides. After graduation from RMC in 1880, he joined the Royal Engineers. After retiring owing to ill health he joined the RNWMP in 1883 and served in the North West Rebellion. He was appointed Commissioner on 1 August 1900 and took one year's leave in April 1922, before retiring in 1923. See Henry Morgan, *Canadian Men and Women of their Time* (Toronto, 1912).
9. Betke and Horrall, *Canada's Security Service*, p. 319.
10. RG 18, Vol. 592, file 1073/19, Maclean to Perry, 3 Dec. 1919.
11. Routledge to OCS, 18 Sept. 1919 in RG 18, Vol. 2380, C.I.B. Circular Memorandum, No. 123. One subsequent commentator, H. Darling, the Assistant Superintendent for DCI, wrote to the Commissioner in 1934 that the Director of CIB 'should go carefully into those employed as Secret Agents and the value of their work. This cannot properly be judged from their reports coming into Headquarters. It is found that some Secret Agents have been taken on without very careful examination in regard to them and that their work has been of little or no value after engaged.' RG 18, 85-86/574, Box 9, G-537-1 'Organization of the CIB', Darling to Commissioner, 22 May 1934.

12. All RG 18 (RCMP) records at the NAC are now fully open, even those that disclose the identity of secret agents. This resolution was negotiated recently by the Information Commissioner of Canada with the NAC and CSIS after many years of battle. My interest in this whole area was initiated by the discovery in the early 1980s that the RCMP documents removed from the PAC in 1971 and returned in 1982 were being subjected to restrictions and later to formal exemptions under the ATIP legislation. One can but express considerable wonder that it took almost a decade to resolve this issue once and for all. For an earlier account of this battle see my 'The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Public Archives of Canada, and Access to Information: A Curious Tale', *Labour/Le Travail*, Vol. 21 (Spring 1988), pp. 199–226. For the final verdict see Information Commissioner of Canada John Grace to G.S. Kealey, 16 April 1991 and Jay Atherton, Access Coordinator, NAC, to G.S. Kealey, 21 March 1991, in author's possession.
13. For exposure of Zaneth as an undercover spy in Montreal by David Rees see Betke and Horrall, *Canada's Security Service*, p. 345 and RCMP Service File, F. W. Zaneth, accessed via ATI request, esp. Zaneth to OC Montreal, 19 Oct. 1920. On Leopold's assignment to the north, see James Ritchie, OC Edmonton to Inspector Moorhead, Fort Simpson, NWT, 9 June 1928, Leopold Service File. 'The whole idea in sending Sgt. Leopold north is to get him out of the way for the time being.' See also Oscar Olson, *I Joined the Mounties* (New York, 1956), pp. 42–4.
14. Betke and Horrall, *Canada's Security Service*, p. 391, and RCMP Service File, John Leopold, accessed via ATI request; there is, however, far more than meets the eye to the illustrious history of the famous Sergeant Leopold. His service file and medical records indicate the following, which can only be mentioned here in passing: (1) syphilis in the early 1930s; (2) an unaccounted-for gun at his death which led to a RCMP investigation; and, perhaps most importantly, (3) an investigation in November 1931 for misuse of RCMP funds to support exorbitant living in Toronto during the CPC trials at which he was the star witness; and (4) another investigation of his financial misuse of RCMP funds in 1933 which resulted in the conclusions that he had been 'drinking excessively' and probably turned over funds to drug dealers and other underworld types unnecessarily. The 1933 investigation recommended that the Commissioner admonish him for this behaviour after he repaid the misused funds, that he be relieved of his detective duties 'until our confidence is restored in him'; and, most significantly, that he became a CIB 'reader' in Ottawa, where his 'intimate knowledge of the Red element throughout Canada particularly, is of real value to the Department.' The Investigator added, however: 'I consider it would not be good policy to take any action which, if coming to the ears of the Communists, would be of great gratification to them and which they would publish far and wide throughout Canada.' Jennings, DCI to Commissioner, 9 Dec. 1933.
15. C. W. Harvison, *The Horsemen* (Toronto, 1967), pp. 34–64.
16. On Hann, see his personnel file, RG 18, Vol. 5057, Reg. No. 5057. See also obituary, *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 Nov. 1959.
17. Betke and Horrall, *Canada's Security Service*, pp. 387–8; on the files see also Kealey and Whitaker, *RCMP Security Bulletins: The Early Years, 1919–1929*, esp. 'Introduction'.
18. Betke and Horrall, *Canada's Security Service*, pp. 384–7. Hamilton was born in Roslin, Ontario in 1869 and died in 1933. He graduated from Queen's in 1890 with an MA and the Gold Medal in English and History. He then moved to Toronto and wrote for the *World, Star, Globe*, and *News*. He enjoyed considerable prominence as a journalist and covered the Boer War for the *Globe*. He later became the Ottawa correspondent for the *News*. He was the co-author with Principal Grant of the latter's autobiography and later published in the field of military history. A 'devoted Imperialist', he was also an Anglican and a church warden. In a moment of enthusiasm, Dr John Reade opined that Hamilton was 'a man whose English equals that of Goldwin Smith'. See Henry Morgan, *Canadian Men and Women of their Time* (Toronto, 1912) and W. S. Wallace, *MacMillan Dictionary of Canadian Biography* (Toronto, 1963).

19. To date only scattered issues from the 1919–29 period have turned up, almost all in various politicians' papers in the NAC. Interestingly Betke and Horrall report that they could not locate any of these. (p. 386) Those we have located appear in Kealey and Whitaker (eds), *RCMP Security Bulletins: The Early Years, 1919–1929*. Subsequent years from the early 1930s on have been acquired via access requests to CSIS and will appear in future volumes. Already published is Kealey and Whitaker (eds), *RCMP Security Bulletins: The War Series, 1939–1941* (St John's, 1989). While it seems extremely unlikely that the rest of these will ever be located, two additional bulletins from the 1920s recently turned up in a personal file acquired from CSIS in response to an access request (John L. Counsell, 90-A-37).
20. RG 24, Vol. 4471, file 20-1-43 and the various reports in Vol. 4472, file 20-1-44.
21. On the Defence Committee of Canada, see Eayrs, *In Defence*, pp. 224–69, esp. 225n, and Harris, *Canadian Brass*, pp. 141–70. For additional detail see below.
22. Betke and Horrall, *Canada's Security Service*, pp. 390–400; on MacBrien see Eayrs, *In Defence*, p. 236ff., Harris, *Canadian Brass*, pp. 152–6, and Norman Hillmer and W. McAndrew, 'The Cunning of Restraint: General J. H. MacBrien and the Problem of Peace-time Soldiering', *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 8 (Spring 1979), pp. 40–7.
23. For suggestive, albeit vague, evidence see Harvison, *The Horsemen*, pp. 14–43, and Charles Rivett-Carnac, *Pursuit in the Wilderness* (London, 1967), pp. 292–4.
24. Betke and Horrall, *Canada's Security Service*, pp. 377–80, 390–1.
25. For numbers of files see Kealey and Whitaker, 'Introduction', to *RCMP Security Bulletins: The Early Years*.
26. This impression is based on a reading of the thousands of pages of reports on the Communist Party of Canada in Montreal, Toronto, and Edmonton in the 1920s. Access to Information request to CSIS, 88-A-61.
27. RCMP, Confidential Monthly Reports, GC-579-27, OC Edmonton, 12 May and 8 July 1921. Acquired from RCMP via access request. Unfortunately all the security materials have been severed from these reports at some unknown date in the past and apparently were destroyed, or so the RCMP and the Information Commissioner assure me.
28. Canada, *Report of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the Year ended September 30, 1926* (Ottawa, 1927), 5. See also, for earlier complaints, RG 18, Vol. 3180, file G-1235-1-24.
29. Harvison, *The Horsemen*, p. 27.
30. Ibid., p. 19.
31. Ibid., p. 26.
32. Ibid., pp. 14–60. For the RCMP and harvest excursions see also R. S. S. Wilson, *Undercover for the RCMP* (Victoria, 1986), pp. 25–7.
33. Harvison, *The Horsemen*, pp. 58–64 and Kemp, *Without Fear*, pp. 85–8.
34. Kemp, *Thirty-Five Years*, pp. 65–77. See also RG 18, 83-84/321, file G-2-6.
35. Betke and Horrall, *Canada's Security Service*, pp. 177–80. On Cawdron and retirement, see also RG 13, 86-87/361, file 1701/24.
36. Betke and Horrall, *Canada's Security Service*, pp. 400–4. Examples of the routing through the Governor General abound in RG 7, NAC. The direct route can be seen in RG 18, Vol. 3161, file G-355-1-22, Basil Thomson, Scotland House to Perry, 31 March 1921. Similarly, the Canadian military also had direct access to military intelligence from the UK, see RG 18, Vol. 3182, file G-355-3, Director of Naval Intelligence Admiralty to Director of Naval Service, Canada, 8 March 1922, 'Comintern Circular to the Bureau of the Western European Secretariat for Propaganda, 8 December 1921'.
37. Christoper Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London, 1985), esp. Chs. 7–10.
38. PRO, CO 42/1011/192554, esp. pp. 250–7, 455–61; CO 42/1014, Secretary of State Colonies to Governor General, 26 July 1919. See also CO 694/28, Register entries for 22 April, 6 May, and 14 May 1919 which reflect Sir Basil Thomson's requests for consistent intelligence information.
39. PRO, CO708/7A. Register, 1919–20. See especially entries for 21 May and 23 June 1919.

40. PRO, CO 335/29, 30, and 31. These registers document clearly the regularity of information supplied by the RCMP to British Intelligence. A brief statistical summary shows the following: Nov. 1920, 3 reports, Dec. 1920, 4; Jan. 1921, 5; March 1921, 5; April 1921, 4; May 1921, 6; June 1921, 4; July 1921, 3; Aug. 1921, 5; Sept. 1921, 5; Oct. 1921, 5; Nov. 1921, 6; Dec. 1921, 8; etc. For the continuation of this tradition, see DO3, Dominions Register, 1928, entry for 2 Jan. 1928 and 22 Dec. 1929.
41. CO 42/1044, 192408. Excerpts from this file appear in *Labour/Le Travail*, Vol. 30 (Autumn 1992), pp. 169–205.
42. RG 18, Vol. 1003, Maclean to Rowell, 11 Sept. 1919 and Rowell to Maclean, 12 Sept. 1919.
43. Betke and Horrall, *Canada's Security Service*, pp. 405–7. On A. J. Andrews' visit see RG 13, 87-88/103, A-1688.
44. Harris, *Canadian Brass*, p. 169.
45. Eayrs, *In Defence*, p. 225n.
46. Proceedings of the Defence Committee, Sixth Meeting, 7 April 1921, RG 18, Vol. 3161, file G-355-1-22. For the military response, see RG 24, Vol. 2656, file 3568.
47. An assessment of the actual situation awaits release of the Vancouver CPC materials by CSIS. I can note, however, that the Confidential Monthly Reports from the OC Vancouver, even in their completely severed form available from the RCMP via an access request, indicate that on 15 Feb. 1921 the OC indicated that he had submitted full reports on the unemployed situation earlier; on 18 March 1921 he reported the situation remained 'unchanged'; and on 22 April 1921 he indicated that 'the unemployed situation is bad and may eventually end in trouble. It is being watched closely'. RCMP, Confidential Monthly Reports, GC-579-27, via Access request.
48. RG 18, Vol. 3161, file G-355-1-22, GOC MD No. 11 to Chief of the General Staff, nd and 12 April 1921.
49. Ibid., Leckie to Air Board, 25 April 1921.
50. RG 24, Vol. 2656, file 3576, HQC 363-47-1.
51. RG 18, Vol. 3161, file G-355-1-22, 7th Meeting, 17 May 1921.
52. Ibid., Perry to Caldwell, Secretary, DCC, 7 Sept. 1921. See also Perry's memo of 8 Sept. 1921: 'The situation is that on the one hand we hear from several sources, apparently unconnected, rumours that an actual outbreak is imminent; and that on the other hand the general conditions among the known revolutionists, such as the present state of their organization and the distribution of their personnel, are unfavourable to such an occurrence.... None the less our agents hear from sundry sources that an outbreak of violence may be expected soon. One story gives the number of revolutionists as 20,000 and the date of "not later than about 1st October".... In my opinion there is little likelihood of immediate disorder; but the persistent unemployment has created a deep-seated unrest which is the real danger. If unemployment deepens into great distress, the danger of an outbreak will be considerable. The revolutionists are straining every nerve to promote uneasiness.'
53. Ibid., 8th Meeting, 9 Sept. 1921. See also Hamilton to Caldwell, 25 June 1921, which indicates that the RCMP received this information 'from an exceedingly confidential source'.
54. For an example see ibid., Perry to OC, Montreal, 13 Sept. 1921.
55. Ibid., OC, Vancouver to Perry. 30 Sept. 1921. Ironically, only six months later the OC Vancouver was quite worried about how he would respond if municipal authorities resorted to repression against the unemployed, see OC Vancouver to Starnes, 22 April 1922, RG 13, Vol. 269, file 1221/22.
56. Ibid., 26 Nov. 1921.
57. Ibid., OC, Lethbridge to Perry, 22 Nov. 1921 and OC, Winnipeg to Perry, 1 Nov. 1921.
58. Ibid., OC, Halifax to Perry, 27 Dec. 1921 and 6 Jan. 1922.
59. Ibid., Gwatkin to Hamilton, 29 Sept. 1921.
60. Ibid., Tenth Meeting, 15 Dec. 1921.

61. Ibid., Sub-Committee on Intelligence, Report of Meeting No. 1, 13 Jan. 1922.
62. Ibid., 11th Meeting, 2 Feb. 1922.
63. For a general history of Canadian Military Intelligence see Major S. R. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green: A History of Intelligence in the Canadian Army, 1903–1963* (Toronto, 1981), esp. pp. 56–62. See also Wesley Wark, 'The Evolution of Military Intelligence in Canada', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 16 (1989), pp. 77–98. It should be noted that Wark underemphasizes the role of the military in domestic intelligence in the interwar years.
64. The 'if any' remains an open question in 1921–22 but during the First World War and immediately after there were plenty of military secret agents.
65. RG 18, Vol. 3182, file G-355-3, Lieut. Col. H. H. Matthews, Memorandum, 12 Jan. 1922.
66. Ibid., RCMP, probably C. F. Hamilton, 'Memorandum on Sources of Information'.
67. Ibid., Meeting No. 2, 31 March 1922 and Meeting No. 3, 7 June 1922. See also Starnes to Pope, 9 June 1922, and Pope to Starnes, 26 June 1922, as well as various RCMP investigatory reports.
68. Kellys, *The RCMP*, pp. 156–7; Kemp, *Without Fear*, pp. 78–84; Longstreth, *The Silent Force*, pp. 313–23.
69. RG 18, 83-83/321, file G-2-6, Perry to Borden, 7 Aug. 1919.
70. RG 18, Vol. 3161, file G-355-1-22, 10th meeting, 15 Dec. 1921.
71. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 4 April 1922, pp. 675–81, and esp. speeches by Guthrie (660), Meighen (665, 673–5), Crerar (668), Graham (669–70), and Woodsworth (670–3).
72. Rivett-Carnac, *Pursuit*, p. 293.
73. Betke and Horrall, *Canada's Security Service*, pp. 390–9; Kellys, *The RCMP*, pp. 172–82; Harvison, *The Horsemen*, pp. 60–4; Kemp, *Without Fear*, pp. 148–77; Rivett-Carnac, *Pursuit*, pp. 247–50, 292–302.
74. Wesley Wark, 'Security Intelligence in Canada, 1864–1945: The History of a "National Insecurity State" ', unpublished paper, University of Toronto, June, 1990.

Access to the Inside: An Assessment of 'Canada's Security Service: A History'

LARRY HANNANT

Unlike most countries, Canada has no comprehensive scholarly history of its main security intelligence agency, the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The one extensive history is John Sawatsky's *Men in the Shadows*, an admirable study written by a thorough journalist with excellent sources.[1] Although it was written over a decade ago, on some topics such as the RCMP's persecution of homosexuals in the public service in the 1950s and 1960s it has remained the authoritative source until very recently.[2] But Sawatsky's work was aimed at a popular audience and it was written before the Access to Information Act was passed in 1982. And that Act has revolutionized the study of security intelligence in Canada.

No scholar has yet produced a comprehensive history of the RCMP's security intelligence effort with the benefit of the Access Act. But while we wait for that monograph, the act has yielded up a history which will temporarily substitute for – as well as stimulate and guide – the real thing. 'Canada's Security Service: An Historical Outline, 1864–1966' written in 1978 by two RCMP historians, Carl Betke and Stan Horrall,[3] is a mammoth study, 811 pages in length, spanning the major part of Canada's modern history. For a considerable time in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was no single, permanent Canadian security service. Betke and Horrall's investigation first charts the hit-and-miss, uncertain course of state security organization in the years 1864–1918 and then examines the growing sophistication of the structure from the end of the First World War to 1966. For its scope alone this history would be important, but the fact that it was an insiders' project makes it equally valuable for the leads it provides to scholarly researchers.

THE ORIGIN OF THE HISTORY

To understand the uses and the limitations of 'Canada's Security Service' it is important to know how it came to be written. In 1975, when the project was conceived, Betke and Horrall were staff historians at the RCMP, each having pursued doctoral studies in history.[4] Betke later left the RCMP and now works at the University of Alberta; Horrall has recently retired as an RCMP historian. The authors' explanation of how their work was conceived places the origin in the hands of the RCMP Security Service's Training and Development Branch. In a preface, Betke and Horrall write that in 1975 the staff of the branch 'decided to include history among the subjects available. When they looked for suitable material, they found to their surprise that apart from a summary of a few pages, and scattered references in the popular histories of the R.C.M.P., the Security Service had no recorded past.'[5]

What Betke and Horrall fail to mention is that the history which was available in 1975 included a biting indictment of the force. Lorne and Caroline Brown's *An Unauthorized History of the RCMP* set out to destroy the white-knight mythology surrounding the RCMP, which was then a century old.[6] It was a catch-all, muck-raking exposé which did not concentrate on the Security Service. Still, it contained ample criticism of the RCMP's surveillance of domestic dissent. Recently, Stan Horrall has acknowledged the importance of the Browns' book to the RCMP's image of itself and to the creation of the history of the Security Service:

> [T]he RCMP was under constant attack at the time for its past activities in this area [security]. ... It seemed to me that there was a great ignorance both within the RCMP and outside it about the history of internal security in Canada. As an example, during this period I often got phone calls or memos from Mounties around the country who were taking university courses. They had been given the task of doing a review of the Browns' book, or writing an essay on it. They had been to the university library and they had found very little to help them so they turned to me.[7]

In such conditions, a history could assist in training new members of the Security Service and in giving existing members ammunition to reply to critics.

The outcome of the project probably surprised everyone involved. Betke and Horrall decided that an exhaustive history would be a multi-volume work far beyond what was then possible for them to complete, so they settled on an outline history. The 811-page 'outline' which the Training and Development Branch received in 1978 probably went into far greater depth than it had expected, but the branch was able to make it into a booklet for training purposes.[8]

This was not the only end to which the history was put. Once it was written, Betke and Horrall's study was turned to a use which was not at first anticipated. It served as the historical foundation for the report of the McDonald Commission, a federal government inquiry into the RCMP Security Service's handling of the separatist movement in Quebec.[9]

The McDonald Commission itself was under the gun from its birth. During the early 1970s the RCMP Security Service had run amok in its zeal to track down and punish members of the separatist and left-wing movements in Quebec. In 1977, after the Parti Québecois, a legal, independentist party, was elected to power in the province, the Quebec government appointed a commission to bring out the facts of the RCMP lawbreaking, and, not incidentally, to embarrass a federal institution. To short-circuit this provincial commission, the federal government spawned its own inquiry, the McDonald Commission.

There is tangible evidence that the McDonald Commission made extensive use of Betke and Horrall's history. The Commission's report was noteworthy for the depth of its historical background on the RCMP Security Service, especially on the period after the Second World War. By contrast, this historical context was entirely absent from the previous royal commission into Canadian security methods, the Mackenzie Commission, which published an abridged, and far less informative, report in 1969. In parts the McDonald Report presented Betke and Horrall's history almost intact. And although it never referred to their history, the McDonald Commission report cited a statement by Betke and Horrall about the RCMP's rejection of an early suggestion to create a security agency separate from the police force.[10]

Besides its historical strength, the McDonald Commission's report surprised security intelligence specialists by its forthrightness about the RCMP's history. It revealed, for instance, that the RCMP used 'wire supervision' (telephone taps) beginning in the 1930s to gather information about suspected subversives.[11] That information came from Betke and Horrall, who themselves went on to provide greater detail about this early security innovation.[12] So Betke and Horrall's history did not languish, limited to the RCMP's own personnel.

In an abbreviated form it also found its way into the scholarly community. In 1980 Stan Horrall published 'The Royal North-West Mounted Police and Labour Unrest in Western Canada' in the *Canadian Historical Review*.[13] The article was virtually word for word from the history. (Horrall had written the early sections of the history, with Betke concentrating on the post-Second World War years.) Horrall's *CHR* article was the subject of some controversy, as scholars complained that he had benefited from special access to RCMP records. In fact, the records which Horrall used were in the National Archives of Canada, although they were available only on a restricted basis.

Betke and Horrall's history was also the foundation for another article, a synopsis of the RCMP Security Service past which was published in the *RCMP Quarterly* in 1985, immediately after the Canadian Security Intelligence Service took over security duties from the RCMP.[14]

Betke and Horrall's history came to light through the work of Greg Kealey, a historian who has written extensively about RCMP surveillance of labor and left-wing movements. Kealey learned about the history through another researcher, William Kaplan, who has used the Access Act to investigate the Canadian state's campaign to crush the Canadian Seamen's Union in the 1950s. In 1990 Kealey applied through the Access Act to obtain the work from CSIS, which now holds all the secret records of the former RCMP Security Service.[15] Once released to Kealey, the history effectively became public.

CONTENT

Betke and Horrall begin at the beginning – with the Bible and the assertion that 'The idea of intelligence is deeply embedded in our cultural heritage.' It is easy to imagine the value of such a section in the training of uninitiated young RCMP constables whose vision extended no further back than Igor Gouzenko. None the less, it provides nothing new to anyone familiar with the security intelligence literature.

Fortunately, these pre-modern preliminaries are brief, and the authors soon launch into an in-depth probe of the security intelligence initiatives taken by Canada's first Prime Minister, John A. Macdonald. Much of this early section, until the end of the First World War, is based upon public sources – secondary monographs and a considerable amount of spadework in Macdonald's papers in the National Archives of Canada. Only in later chapters, especially on the period after the Second World War, does the history rely mostly upon internal RCMP documents.

One of the issues which readers will find of particular value is a lengthy discussion of the controversial subject of divorcing the Security Service from the RCMP. The history sketches the peculiar development of a security intelligence capacity within what was at its founding in 1873 a paramilitary police force. The force assumed formal security duties only during the First World War. Until 1936, there was no separate intelligence section; security matters were handled by the Criminal Investigation Branch.[16] After 1936, an organizational separation between criminal and intelligence functions began, and this tended to drive a wedge between the criminal and security operations of the RCMP.

Already in the Second World War some critics argued that the logical development was to allow the force's security intelligence arm to become a separate, non-police, civilian agency.[17] The same suggestion was made several times over the next two decades, but the RCMP vigorously fought the proposal. It was achieved only after the McDonald Commission recommended that a distinct agency be created, a proposal the Canadian government acted on in 1984 by establishing CSIS.

A considerable part of the last chapter relates to the conflict between the inertial efforts to keep the security service within the force and the centrifugal forces pressing for separation. Betke and Horrall seem to share senior RCMP officers' rejection of separation.[18] Stiff resistence, however, did not defeat the problem. In the 1950s, civilian members performing security work grew bored because of the lack of any career advancement within the force, and some even suffered severe emotional disturbances.[19] Although too much is made of the differences between police and security work, the RCMP, perhaps because of its tradition and rigid structure, was unable to resolve the conflicts. Betke and Horrall's history ends in 1966, with the appointment of the Mackenzie royal commission into security. Two years later it urged the government to act on the long-simmering dispute by making the security service a separate agency. RCMP intransigence was powerful enough to thwart that thrust, but the issue would erupt again in the 1980s, when it would be resolved by a complete break.

Curiously, although Betke and Horrall spend considerable effort in charting the RCMP's rejection of civilianization, they offer little by way of explanation for the RCMP's dogged determination to hold the line against it. One is left to speculate.

ORIENTATION AND BIAS

The authors make a point of asserting their independence from the RCMP. Their first statement is a declaration that 'The opinions expressed in this study are entirely those of the authors. The RCMP is in no way responsible for these opinions or the presentation of the facts as stated.'[20] Nevertheless, it is clear that Betke and Horrall do not challenge the RCMP's Cold-War perspective, which saw Eastern European countries as the chief post-war threat to Canada's internal security. According to this point of view, western countries that shared Canada's antipathy for the Soviet Union were *ipso facto* close allies. Observers who question the RCMP's Cold-War mentality, however, might note that the world's other superpower had a habit of treating Canada's internal security as a subset of its own interests. This has sometimes harmed Canada's sovereignty.

Nothing reveals this better than the case of Herbert Norman, the Canadian diplomat who was hounded to suicide by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in 1957. In attacking Norman, the SISS relied upon security intelligence obtained from the FBI, which had irresponsibly passed on information which it had acquired from the RCMP. This was a clear abuse of the co-operative arrangement between the two security agencies, according to which intelligence was released with the understanding that it was to be used in strict confidence. Betke and Horrall reveal the RCMP's arrant disregard for the consequences of security violations of this type. They report that the same day that the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, delivered a sharp protest note about the American misuse of intelligence that led to Norman's suicide, the RCMP Commissioner communicated to J. Edgar Hoover 'his continued *complete confidence in F.B.I integrity ...*'.[21]

CONCLUSIONS

The authors say that their study 'did not extend far enough to enable us to reach any definitive conclusions about the history of the Security Service in Canada'.[22] And, in fact, the history is mostly presented in a straightforward account, with few efforts made to set out the significance of events. But one conclusion stands out. It relates to a subject about which the RCMP was very sensitive in 1978. That was whether the security service had become a force beyond political control by systematically violating the law. Its campaign of surveillance and harassment against dissidents in Quebec in the 1970s indicated that it was very much out of control. In examining earlier disturbances and strikes which the RCMP had put down, the Browns drew similar conclusions. But in their examination of the security service up to 1966, Betke and Horrall view the force much more benignly:

> During our work we found nothing to suggest that at any time in the period in question Canada was in danger of becoming a police state, that the Security Service was out of control. We unearthed no evidence that it had deliberately misled governments, become an authority unto itself, operated outside the law as a matter of policy or plotted a coup d'état.[23]

Indeed, they direct their fire at Canadian governments, which have 'not always followed the advice and information of their security service'.[24] The RCMP made the political authorities 'aware of the nature of security operations and the results of them', Betke and Horrall state. Yet the service was never 'the recipient of any set of guidelines or regulations from the government which set out its responsibilities and its objectives'.[25] A sinister motive lay behind this studied government ignorance of the work of its security service: 'in keeping them [the RCMP] at arms length, the government made the R.C.M.P. the principle [sic] butt of criticism for those opposed to its intelligence activities'.[26]

Even on the rare occasions when the RCMP considered stooping to political dirty tricks, it was careful to seek government approval before acting. In 1926, for instance, RCMP Commissioner Cortlandt Starnes proposed a plan to cut the base out from under the Communist Party. The party recruited most of its members and revenues from cultural organizations linked to ethnic communities. Starnes proposed to deport the communities' drama, art, language and choir teachers, since many of them were not citizens. Overlooking the morality of deporting people who, regardless of their political views, were clearly important to their communities and to the integration of new immigrants into Canadian society, Betke and Horrall draw a conclusion which reflects best upon the RCMP: 'Starnes had a good assessment of the situation', but the RCMP dropped the plan when the government did not approve it. 'Commissioner Starnes knew that any significant shift in policy must have its consent.'[27]

The RCMP's respect for due political process, however, did not mean that it was above subtly threatening governments. In 1966, for instance, trying to prevent the the appointment of a royal commission which was certain to raise the issue of stripping the security service from the force, RCMP Commissioner McClellan pointed out to the government that 'the Force could not take responsibility for the potential embarrassment which might attend ... disclosure of R.C.M.P. attention to homosexuals as security risks'.[28] The RCMP knew well the explosive impact of disclosing that it was keeping records on some 8,000 homosexuals as potential security risks, with the full knowledge and consent of the government.

In limited circumstances, the Security Service did seem prepared to forgo fair play and strict legality. In 1950, for instance, the agency indicated to the government that when it came to espionage, it had to 'fight fire with fire' and use 'very unorthodox methods which do not fit in with our regular mode of operation'. The RCMP conveyed this information to the government not out of any concern about the possible politicial consequences, but from concern about the effect on individual members if they were caught in the act.[29]

When it came to one measure to address possible espionage, it was the government, and not the RCMP, which shied away from using dubious methods. As Betke and Horrall say, 'The Counter Espionage Section first noted in 1955 and would continue to regret for years afterward the refusal of the Prime Minister [Louis St. Laurent] to sanction operation "Cathedral", the selective mail monitoring proposal without which espionage communications might continue unhindered.'[30]

In general, according to this history, the security service was not out of control up to 1966. But what about after that point? Betke and Horrall's view that politicians, not the security service, are responsible for heavy-handed security practices might also be true for the situation in Quebec during the 1970s. Documents recently released to the journalist and author Richard Cleroux under the Access to Information Act suggest that federal politicians pressed the RCMP to use extraordinary means to collect information on separatists in Quebec, methods that the RCMP commissioner was initially reluctant to employ.[31] But it is difficult to see how such a mandate would justify arson, theft, breaking and entering, kidnapping and the host of other crimes committed by the RCMP during those years. In short, to assess this crucial decade of RCMP Security Service practice, historians will have to go beyond the Betke and Horrall work.

A related subject which must still be assessed is the question of why the RCMP kept its hands so clean. Betke and Horrall offer no explanation for this honesty, and we are left with no better understanding of the RCMP's internal motivation than the elaborate mythology surrounding the force and its inherent respect for and wish to be guided by the letter of the law.

On another matter – the effectiveness of the security service – the authors draw a conclusion which, on reflection, is highly troubling. They point out that 'The intelligence operations of the R.C.M.P. were probably never more successful than they were in the years between the two world wars.'[32] The secret of this success, the authors believe, was that the force was able to plant agents into key positions in the Communist Party. This is a remarkable finding which speaks volumes about the nature of the RCMP's security role.

By modern security intelligence standards, and even by contrast with the conditions in most other world powers, the Canadian condition in the inter-war years was dead simple. Among domestic groups which could be labelled subversive, there was really only one significant enemy, the Communist Party. The fascist parties were weak and ineffectual, and there was no Trotskyist, anarchist or ultra-nationalist movement to speak of. As for espionage, the RCMP was aware that a potential threat existed, mainly because the Soviet Union possessed hundreds of passports of Canadians who had fought in the Spanish Civil War. But espionage would probably be directed from just one country (two after 1933), and the targets of espionage inside Canada were few. Hence the RCMP devoted very little effort to the problem. Furthermore, there was still only a small active liaison with the security intelligence agencies of other countries. And government departments such as external affairs, which during the Second World War fancied it had some security intelligence expertise which the RCMP should salute, had few such pretensions during the inter-war years. In short, for the RCMP to be regarded as at its peak of effectiveness during such a halcyon era does not speak highly about its capabilities. In the troubled, complex post-war world the force must have yearned for the old verities of yore.

VALUES AND STRENGTHS OF THE STUDY

The fact that this is an internal history makes it particularly valuable. It was never intended to be published, and it was composed years before the Access Act became law, making it possible for the document to enter the public arena. When Horrall began as RCMP historian in 1968, he has since recalled, 'it was made plain to me that I would have access to whatever I needed to do my job. That condition never changed.'[33] So in this project, and even when he published excerpts from the history in the *Canadian Historical Review*, Horrall was never required to have the work vetted by senior RCMP officers.[34] The result is a history which is forthcoming, sometimes frank about RCMP weaknesses, and an accurate reflection of how the RCMP looked at security matters. In short, a dispassionate, although too often bloodless, history written by people who were insiders physically and psychologically. As an internal document, then, the history is a goldmine to contemporary researchers interested in security intelligence history. They should find more leads from the footnotes alone than from most existing studies of the RCMP.

While the original history was not vetted by senior, non-historian RCMP officers, unfortunately the same cannot be said for the version available through the Access to Information Act. The CSIS censors' treatment of the history is appalling. As usual we only know about this because CSIS Access readers appear to be completely ignorant of what is already on the public record.

One example will suffice to demonstrate their narrow-mindedness. Under the Access Act, information which has come in confidence from a foreign source can be withheld from the public. The CSIS censors interpret this in the broadest possible way, and the most lengthy deletions are clearly information which has come from outside agencies. But it too often reaches absurd levels. For example, speaking about the security intelligence reorganization in 1918 which led to the Royal North-West Mounted Police taking over security duties for the western half of the country, Betke and Horrall describe the case of M.J. Reid, who 'had acted for several years as agent for both the Dominion Police ...'.[35] There the over-zealous vetters at CSIS have terminated the sentence. To learn what was cut, one needs only read Horrall's *CHR* article, which says that

Reid 'had acted for several years as agent for both the Dominion Police and British Intelligence'.[36] Other Access material obtained from CSIS displays the same pettiness and ignorance of what is available in public sources. Defying all logic, CSIS censors seem to interpret the clause vetoing the release of information obtained in confidence from a foreign government to mean also any mention of the governments or agencies themselves.

To achieve some sanity in this process, CSIS ought to deposit historical material over 30 years old at the National Archives where Access officers trained in historical research could be assigned to vet it. But if it feels compelled to keep such records and to interpret the Access Act in such a distorted and broad way, is it too much to ask that it assign to the censorship duty people with sufficient knowledge of historical scholarship that information which is already in the public realm is not withheld from Access users?

'Canada's Security Service' is now dated, and, as Stan Horrall has acknowledged, it was intended only to be an historical outline, not a comprehensive examination of the subject.[37] None the less, as a preliminary document, it is an admirable start and should help frame the ambitious history of the modern security service undertaken by Greg Kealey and Reg Whitaker. It has no doubt also served as a base for Horrall and RCMP Assistant Historian William Beahen's work on the early years of Canadian security intelligence activity, which is now close to publication. In the meantime, scholars will be well rewarded by acquiring Betke and Horrall's immensely informative history.

NOTES

1. John Sawatsky, *Men in the Shadows: The Shocking Truth About the RCMP Security Service* (Don Mills, ON: Totem, 1983; Doubleday, 1980).
2. For more recent and more extensive articles on the subject, see *The Globe and Mail*, 24 April 1992.
3. Carl Betke and Stan Horrall, 'Canada's Security Service: An Historical Outline, 1864–1966' (Ottawa: RCMP Historical Section, 1978).
4. People with university education, to say nothing of higher degrees, were still in the minority in the RCMP in the 1970s, although that was beginning to change under the direction of Frank Lindsay, the first RCMP commissioner to hold a university degree.
5. Betke and Horrall, ix.
6. Lorne and Caroline Brown, *An Unauthorized History of the RCMP* (Toronto: James Lewis and Samuel, 1973).
7. Stan Horrall, letter to the author, 27 May 1992.
8. Ibid.
9. Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Second Report, Vols. 1 and 2, *Freedom and Security Under the Law* (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1981). (Hereinafter, McDonald, *Freedom and Security*.)

10. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 670.
11. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 54.
12. Betke and Horrall, p. 469.
13. S. W. Horrall, 'The Royal North-West Mounted Police and Labour Unrest in Western Canada, 1919', *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. LXI, No. 2 (1980), pp. 167–90.
14. S. W. Horrall, 'Canada's Security Service: A Brief History', *RCMP Quarterly* (Summer 1985), pp. 38–49.
15. Once a document has been released through the Access Act other researchers can request it and receive the same censored version. Researchers who wish to obtain a copy of the history can write to the Access Section of CSIS, citing CSIS Access number 117-90-107. A five-dollar Access application fee must accompany the request. No search fees will be imposed, but photocopy costs will be applied.
16. Betke and Horrall, p. 343.
17. Ibid., p. 688.
18. Ibid., pp. 688–9.
19. Ibid., pp. 701–2.
20. Ibid., p. ii.
21. Ibid., p. 741. Emphasis mine.
22. Ibid., p. xiv.
23. Ibid., p. xvi.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., pp. xvi–xvii.
26. Ibid., p. 426.
27. Ibid., pp. 428–30.
28. Ibid., p. 781.
29. Ibid., pp. 636–7.
30. Ibid., p. 643.
31. *The Globe and Mail*, 27 May 1992. The cabinet documents noted that the RCMP used invasive investigative techniques against communists, but Commissioner Len Higgitt was uncertain about doing the same against separatists.
32. Betke and Horrall, p. 443.
33. Stan Horrall, letter to the author, 27 May 1992.
34. Ibid.
35. Betke and Horrall, p. 313.
36. Horrall, 'The Royal North-West Mounted Police and Labour Unrest', p. 177.
37. Stan Horrall, letter to the author, 19 June 1991.

NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS

Articles submitted to *Intelligence and National Security* should be original contributions not under consideration for any other publication at the same time. Any exceptions to this rule must be clearly indicated at the time of submission.

Manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate, typewritten **on one side only** and **double-spaced** with ample margins. All pages, including notes, references, tabular material and appendices, should be numbered consecutively. Where figures, graphs, etc., are presented, they must be produced in black Indian ink ready for photographic reproduction. Tables should be kept to a minimum and must be typed clearly, ready for photographic reproduction.

If the article is typed on a word-processor, the disc should accompany the typescript. Each file should be less than 20k in length, and should if possible be converted into ASCII. Discs should be labelled with the name of the article and the author's name.

The exact length of the article should be stated. There is no standard length for articles, but the *maximum* is 10,000 words. Short notes and documents of particular interest may also be published, and correspondence is welcomed.

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Subheadings should be clearly marked in capitals, ranged to the left above the section. Sub-subheadings, with capitals only for major words, should be underlined and ranged left.

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Bibliographical details

(a) Books: Give author, title (underlined), place and year of publication and page reference.
e.g. David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (London, 1967), p.42.

(b) Articles: Place title of article between single inverted commas and underline the book or journal in which it appears. Give journal volume, number and part and year of publication.
e.g. C.M. Andrew, 'Déchiffrement et diplomatie: le cabinet noir du Quai d'Orsay sous la Troisième République', Relations Internationales, Vol.III, No.5 (1976), pp.3–64.

Jean Stengers, 'Enigma, the French, the Poles and the British, 1931–1940', in C. Andrew and D. Dilks (eds.), The Missing Dimension: Government and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (London/Champaign, IL, 1984), pp.126–37.

(c) Book reviews should be preceded by full publication details including price:
e.g. Kathleen Burk (ed.), War and the State: The Transformation of British Government, 1914–19 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982). Pp.189. £12.50.