PERSIAN INTERVENTIONS

The Achaemenid Empire, Athens & Sparta, 450–386 BCE

JOHN O. HYLAND
Persian Interventions
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Translations are my own unless otherwise noted. Citations of Greek and Roman sources follow the abbreviations laid out in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*. Achaemenid royal inscriptions are cited by the king’s and location’s initials and a lowercase letter to distinguish between multiple texts from a single site (for example, DNa = Darius Naqsh-i Rustam, first inscription; B = Bisitun, P = Persepolis, S = Susa). For abbreviations for published Achaemenid documentary sources, see the list in Amelie Kuhrt’s *The Persian Empire: A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period* (910–18).

The onomastic diversity of Achaemenid Persia and classical Greece imposes unavoidable inconsistencies in the spelling of proper names. In most cases, I follow the convention of writing Persian names in Latinate form rather than the original (e.g., Darius instead of Dārayavauš); for a few individuals, I prefer Greek to Latin spellings (Pharnabazos instead of Pharnabazus). For Persian or Near Eastern names from non-Greek sources, I avoid specialized characters in the interests of greater clarity for nonspecialist readers (Arshama instead of Aršāma). For Greek individuals and place names, I prefer Hellenized names to the Latin forms (Alkibiades instead of Alcibiades; Knidos instead of Cnidus). But I follow the traditional exceptions where the modified form has become most familiar to English-speaking audiences (Thucydides instead of Thoukydides; Corinth instead of Korinthos).

Approximate routes and distances are estimated from consultation of the *Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World*. By personal preference, I employ U.S. English rather than metric units of measure. Ancient monetary sums are of particular importance to the topic. Readers new to the subject should be aware that inhabitants of the ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean world measured large sums of silver in talents, the weights of which differed according to regional standards; on the Athenian scale, most relevant to figures used in this book, one Attic talent equaled six thousand drachmai, and one drachma equaled six obols. For Achaemenid weights and measures and metric equivalents, see Kuhrt’s *Persian Empire: A Corpus of Sources*, table 4.
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Persian Interventions
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From the sixth to the fourth centuries BCE, the Achaemenid Persian dynasty ruled the largest empire yet seen on earth. Among its most distant and troublesome subjects were the Yaunā, or Greeks, whose numerous city-states dotted the Anatolian coast, the Aegean islands, and the mountainous landmass beyond. The Great Kings Darius I and Xerxes laid claim to all Greeks, including the “Yaunā across the sea,” but in 480-79, a coalition of overseas poleis including the prominent cities of Sparta and Athens repelled a massive Persian invasion. Sparta proved content with this defensive victory, but a more aggressive Athens broke free from Sparta’s hegemony and struck back at the Persians, using its powerful navy to establish a protectorate over the islands and most of the Greeks on Persia’s side of the Aegean. Subsequent Persian monarchs discarded projects of trans-Aegean conquest and sought more effective means of wielding influence beyond the sea.

Artaxerxes I concluded hostilities with Athens just after midcentury, choosing to tolerate its taxation of Ionian Greeks, who had once paid imperial tribute. The peace lasted for decades, marked by increasing economic and cultural contact between the Athenians and Persia’s eastern Mediterranean subjects. In 431, Sparta and its Peloponnesian allies launched a war to overturn Athenian power and hoped that Persia might come to their aid. Artaxerxes received Spartan embassies but made them no promises, and his son Darius II renewed Persian friendship with Athens soon after coming to power in 423.

A decade later, as Athens flirted with Persian rebels in Anatolia and lost most of its warships in an ill-conceived invasion of Sicily, Darius changed course and intervened in the Peloponnesian War. The king reclaimed the Ionian cities, and his representatives crafted an alliance with Sparta, offering subsidies for a fleet that could overcome the remnants of the Athenian navy. But rumors of Athens’s collapse proved premature. Darius’s intervention lasted eight years and was marked by bitter wage disputes, Spartan naval disasters, and the cancelation of a planned campaign by Persia’s Phoenician
Map 1. Achaemenid Persia and the Greeks across the Sea
fleet. In the end, massive dispensations by Darius and his son Cyrus decided the war in Sparta’s favor. Yet the king’s death in 404, along with Cyrus’s rebellion against the new monarch, undermined Persia’s role as Sparta’s patron.

By 399, Artaxerxes II faced war with Sparta, now asserting hegemony over rebel Ionians who had been isolated by Cyrus’s failure. The simultaneous secession of Egypt from the empire posed even greater challenges. For half a decade, despite repeated negotiations, Persian generals failed to push Spartan forces out of Ionia. The tide turned in Artaxerxes’s favor when his fleet interrupted a nascent Spartan-Egyptian partnership, and overseas Greek resentment of Spartan dominance erupted in the Corinthian War. The Spartans withdrew across the Aegean in 394 and Persia’s navy rose to the occasion, destroying the Spartan fleet at the Battle of Knidos and recovering the Ionian cities. Rather than stopping there, it bestowed promised funds on Sparta’s Greek opponents and rebuilt Athens’s defenses. But when Sparta tried to submit to Persia in 392, Athens balked at the peace terms, and Artaxerxes refused to close the deal with Sparta alone. After five more years, he resolved the impasse by restoring naval support to Sparta and coercing Athens into compliance. Both cities and their allies accepted the King’s Peace by early 386, setting a precedent for Persian arbitration of overseas Greek wars and ensuring Persia’s ownership of the Ionian Greeks for the half century until the rise of Alexander the Great.

The interventionist period presents a rich case study in ancient imperialism, more intricate than that represented by the famous invasions of Greece. Persia’s involvement in the Peloponnesian and Corinthian wars ended Athens’s Aegean hegemony, checked Sparta’s efforts to take its place, and displayed the Great Kings’ ability to shape events at the margins of their universe. This is not to say that Greece was Persia’s primary concern—relations with Egypt and other regions were often of greater importance. But Persia’s Greek encounters are better documented than any other aspects of its foreign relations. Its activities between 450 and 386 provide valuable insights into the interplay between imperial ambition and pragmatic restraint on a distant frontier.

That being said, the complexity of both the topic and the surviving evidence makes interpretation of Persian foreign relations a daunting task. The principal sources are historical works by Athenian contemporaries—Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War and its continuation in Xenophon’s Hellenika, along with the Anabasis, Xenophon’s memoir of mercenary service.
in Cyrus’s rebellion and its aftermath. Both authors make shrewd and sometimes sympathetic conjectures regarding the reasons for Persian actions, but they are also capable of committing errors and omitting information outright and present the Achaemenids as supporting actors in Hellenocentric narratives. The same can be said for other relevant texts, including the anonymous, fragmentary manuscript known as the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia*, a fourth-century history of Greece that also continues Thucydides’s work but differs from Xenophon on numerous points; extant quotations from the lost fourth-century historians Ephoros and Theopompos; Diodorus’s first-century BCE universal history, relying heavily on Ephoros; and Plutarch’s first-century AD biographies. A Byzantine epitome of Ctesias’s fourth-century *Persika*, famed for salacious anecdotes of Achaemenid court life, preserves a few plausible details on the succession struggles of Darius II and Artaxerxes II but nothing on the Peloponnesian War intervention. Overall, the Greek sources provide the foundations for a detailed but still incomplete and one-sided story of Persian-Greek interaction.

The Persians left no accounts of wars with the Greeks. Unlike their Assyrian predecessors, the Achaemenids did not compose chronicles of royal campaigns, and their palace correspondence and military records have not survived. But extant documentation illuminates some relevant facets of Persian imperialism, from methods of economic extraction to the ideology of world rule, which offer valuable contexts for understanding the Greek diplomatic and military narratives.

D. M. Lewis’s *Sparta and Persia* pioneered an integrative approach to the Greek and Achaemenid evidence, drawing on the newly published Persepolis Fortification tablets to illuminate the roles of bureaucratic organization, intelligence gathering, and communication networks in the formulation of imperial policy. But forty years later, Lewis’s brief study remains the only full-length treatment of the interventionist period, despite the subsequent evolution of Achaemenid studies as an academic discipline. A few new sources have come to light, above all a customs record from Persian Egypt, invaluable for the study of the empire’s Mediterranean economy. New interpretive work has helped to illuminate others, such as the Lycian inscription on the Xanthos stele, which speaks to the Peloponnesian War activities of Persian client rulers in southwest Anatolia. Interdisciplinary approaches have shed new light on Near Eastern views of Greeks, cultural exchange between Persia and Athens, and trade networks that crossed imperial boundaries. Above all, scholars have given fruitful attention to the Achaemenids’ royal
imagery, perceptions of the surrounding world, and ideological display in their relations with subjects and neighbors.¹²

These advances in Achaemenid historiography permit a conceptual shift in the study of Persia's Greek relations between 450 and 386. The traditional view, expounded by Lewis and others, envisions Persia's chief objective in western Anatolia as the reclamation and defense of Ionian Greek territories in the face of Athenian and Spartan encroachment.¹³ But the theory that Persian leaders achieved this goal through defensive balancing strategies, provoking and prolonging Athenian-Spartan conflict while trying to avoid direct confrontation, rests on weak evidentiary foundations.

Persian ideological evidence hints at more ambitious motivations, and this study reexamines the empire's Greek interventions with particular attention to two tenets of the Achaemenid worldview, the claim to universal supremacy and the mandate to ensure stability in chaotic regions at the edge of the world. These symbolic aspirations, alongside the pursuit of economic and political interests, are crucial to the argument that the following chapters develops in detail—that Achaemenid rulers were interested not only in controlling Ionia but in finding new ways to extend imperial hegemony over the poleis beyond the sea. Persia had more to gain from the achievement of a trans-Aegean peace, which would allow it to display imperial power through patronage to Athens, Sparta, or both, than from perpetual wars among the Greeks.

The Traditional Model: Balancing Athens and Sparta

The assumption that Persia tried to secure Ionia and weaken Athens and Sparta by fueling their protracted conflict, denying decisive victory to Greek allies and enemies alike, recurs throughout modern scholarship.¹⁴ It originates in Thucydides's discussion of the near collapse of Persian-Spartan partnership in 411, when Darius's general Tissaphernes fell behind on payment of subsidies to the allied fleet and Phoenician triremes that he had promised to bring into the Aegean failed to complete their voyage. Explaining that the Peloponnesians suspected Tissaphernes of a duplicitous preference for Athens, Thucydides proposes an even more sinister explanation—the Persians meant to keep both sides waiting on the expected reinforcements, wasting resources while failing to fight a battle that could have established the victor's dominance in Ionia.¹⁵ Thucydides's hypothesis stumbles over the fact that only the king could call off the Persian fleet's deployment, but many scholars ascribe the plans to Darius and treat Tissaphernes as a mere
executor. Some even present Cyrus’s later support of Sparta as a contradiction of Persia’s natural interest in sabotaging all Greek combatants.

Scholars have also advanced similar theories for the periods preceding and following the Peloponnesian War, suggesting that Artaxerxes I permitted Athens’s temporary control of Ionia while waiting for future Athenian-Spartan conflict to permit reclamation, that Artaxerxes II rejected a separate peace with Sparta in 392 because he feared Athens’s defeat would deprive him of a counterweight, and that the king aided Sparta in 387 to prevent a reviving Athenian navy from retaking parts of Ionia. The cumulative effect of such arguments makes defensive balancing the default Persian response to Greek crises.

The balancing model casts Achaemenid monarchs as practitioners of strategic realism, who made and broke alliances as needed to protect points of weakness and forestall future dangers. Realist interpretations, stressing the centrality of fear and self-interest in international relations, have offered productive approaches to several periods of ancient history, from classical Greece to the Hellenistic kingdoms and the expanding Roman Republic. But a typical realist framework requires hegemonic rivalry between multiple states in an “anarchic” world in which competitors strive to preserve their own positions and prevent other powers from gaining sufficient strength to upset the balance. Such a hegemonic rivalry did not exist in the region, however, at least not before Egypt’s period of independence in the fourth century. Achaemenid Persia was a “unipolar” world power, surrounded by much smaller satellites such as the Greek city-states, none of which had the capability to supplant its dominance. The application of a balancing policy to Persia’s Greek relations runs the risk of inflating Athens and Sparta into full-fledged rivals of empire. Although both caused localized trouble in western Anatolia and occasionally Cyprus or Egypt, it is doubtful that the Persians considered either an existential threat to their empire. Nor is it safe to assume that Persian rulers after Xerxes thought themselves incapable of suppressing Greek challenges through direct military action, especially as the setbacks of the early fifth century, downplayed in court circles, receded in memory.

Under closer scrutiny, the balancing theory breaks down at numerous points. As Antony Keen argues in his incisive essay, “Persian Policy in the Aegean,” the evidence is limited, and the principal cases admit other interpretations. Most supposed instances of balancing prompt further questions. If Artaxerxes I meant to profit from Athenian-Spartan division, why
did he take no steps to promote their naval parity when the Peloponnesian War began? If the objective of playing Athens against Sparta was to secure Ionia, why did the satraps of Darius II invite a Peloponnesian fleet to their coasts instead of leaving the underfunded Spartans to wear down Athens’s weakened forces on the Greek mainland? If the king called up and then dismissed the Phoenician ships to deny Sparta a decisive victory, why did he later send Cyrus to help them win? After the Persian fleet defeated Sparta at Knidos, when both Greek powers had been driven from Ionia and lost their naval capacities, why did Artaxerxes II interfere in the Corinthian War?

Such problems undermine views of Persia’s principal focus as the reconquest of the Anatolian Greeks. The kings made no attempt to achieve this supposed goal for almost four decades after the mid-fifth-century peace. In 413 and 393, they committed resources to overseas Greek conflicts, even though Athenian and Spartan weakness should have permitted unilateral action to secure the coastal frontier. The question of how the empire’s defensive interests intersected with more far-reaching objectives requires a stronger interpretive model. To reconstruct what Persian kings expected to gain from agreement with Athens or alliance with Sparta, it is necessary to consider how they understood their empire’s place and purpose in the larger world.

The Image of Persian World Supremacy

Darius I crafted an imperial ideology with lasting implications for Persian foreign policy. Its cornerstone was the creed of Persia’s unequaled power and universal rule, “far and wide,” with which it was endowed by the creator god Ahuramazda. This rhetorical equation of empire and world drew on Iranian religious thought and long-standing traditions of Mesopotamian royal self-representation, and rulers in later empires, including the Hellenistic kingdoms, Rome, and China, would describe their authority in similar terms. It implied a claim to ownership not only of Persia’s provinces but of distant, autonomous communities such as the overseas Greeks, subject to influence rather than direct control.

Darius’s inscriptions assert the obligation to punish enemies of stability across the world, portraying the alternative as a universal chaos in which the lowly did not respect their superiors, the strong preyed on the weak, and the earth’s peoples battered each other in endemic conflict. To combat such conditions, Ahuramazda raised the king to the throne and made him the perfect judge and warrior, equipped with unique attributes for restorative
action. By crushing threats to world order, the heroic ruler claimed to compel subject communities to refrain from further violence against one another, resulting in an ideal state of “Pax Persica.” This was not a permanent condition, and it required vigorous reinforcement in each generation. Turbulent peoples, such as the Greeks and Egyptians in the west and Saka in the east, repeatedly disturbed the imperial order, providing opportunities for new Achaemenid kings to quell defiance and reintegrate former rebels into the community of loyal subjects. The kings also claimed to maintain universal peace through interventions in disputes between distant peoples. Forceful resolutions of foreign conflicts permitted the Persians to assert a moral high ground as defenders of justice while imposing debts of gratitude on the communities they championed.

Darius and his heirs disseminated this message through numerous means, including the circulation of translated edicts, depictions of royal majesty on coins and seals, bestowals of honorary gifts on faithful vassals, solicitations of tribute, and naval and military campaigns beyond the frontiers. They cultivated support from audiences both internal and external, promoting loyalty to the monarch within the royal family and Persian nobility. In relations with subjects, they sought to deter resistance through illustrations of military might and a divine mandate for conquest, but they also justified and incentivized cooperation by stressing the benefits of a righteous imperial peace for provincial elites.

For all their boasts of omnipotence, Persia’s kings were fully conscious of practical limits on the extension of power. The claim to world rule did not require an actual intention to push direct governance to the ends of the earth. Rather, its symbolic resonance was broad enough to encompass varied political interactions with different types of peoples and territories. The Achaemenids divided their imperial core into provinces governed by Persian satraps, but they also delegated partial autonomy to vassals such as the kings of the Phoenician city-states. They dealt with distant, self-governing peoples through diplomatic exchange, seeking gestures of obedience and respect without directly taxing them, installing governors, or establishing garrisons.

This final category included the Greeks across the sea. From the Persian perspective, recipients of long-distance influence still counted among the members of the imperial world order, although it is helpful to speak of them as “clients” to emphasize their administrative distinction from provincial subjects. By the mid-fifth-century, after the failure of Xerxes’s invasion,
Persian officials adopted the Greek terminology of “friendship” (“philia”) with cooperative poleis rather than stressing submission in as many words.\textsuperscript{36} Yet such diplomatic agreements were rooted in Persia’s greater position and resources, and concessions of autonomy and territory did not overturn the king’s conceptual supremacy, even if that supremacy was asserted in terms of hegemonic patronage.\textsuperscript{37}

Persian encounters with the Greeks were influenced by a symbolic conception of world geography that made the seas dividing lines between zones of cosmic order and anarchy.\textsuperscript{38} Ancient Near Eastern tradition surrounded the civilized world with great bodies of water, beyond which lay dangerous wilderness realms. Only superhuman heroes, as the Great Kings presented themselves, were capable of crossing over to tame the chaos on the far side. Darius I and Xerxes acted out this imperial myth through campaigns and diplomacy on the Aegean and Black Sea frontiers, using encounters with the Greeks to demonstrate the extension of their authority to the ends of the earth.\textsuperscript{39} Herodotus, the father of Greek historical writing, claims that Persians “considered themselves by far the best of mankind in all things . . . and those living farthest away from them the worst.”\textsuperscript{40} Yet that very marginality gave the overseas Greeks a certain pride of place in Persian foreign relations.\textsuperscript{41}

Some scholars question the relevance of expansionist ideology after the momentum behind Persia’s western conquests dissipated.\textsuperscript{42} Yet it is doubtful that military setbacks in the Aegean caused the Achaemenids to discard aspirations to universal power.\textsuperscript{43} Artistic motifs developed under Darius I depicting the world’s peoples cooperating to bear the imperial throne or marching in unison to bear gifts to the world’s ruler recur well into the fourth century. Their retention points to an ideological continuity, even if imperial methods changed with the geopolitical situation.\textsuperscript{44} Xerxes’s defeats, if acknowledged at court, may have offered opportunities for later rulers to exceed ancestral achievement, and military victory was not the sole means of doing so. Peace agreements without a decisive battle or alliances that ended in Greek clients’ success without the commitment of Persian troops or ships could nonetheless advertise the projection of a transformative influence on communities beyond the sea, at less risk and expense than Xerxes’s adventures.

It would be dangerous to attempt reconstruction of Achaemenid foreign policy based on ideological representations alone.\textsuperscript{45} Assertions of benevolent intent in imposing worldwide order obviously glossed over specific objectives and masked unspoken interests. A realist reading might dismiss the
Persians’ claims that they brought stability to the overseas Greeks as a screen for their actual efforts to preempt external threats to their Anatolian defenses. But it would be equally problematic to discount the kings’ ideological stance as rulers of the world when trying to understand how they defined Persia’s defensive capabilities and their perception of how subjects and imperial elites expected them to act toward foreign peoples. Power displays and appeals to moral codes were vital factors in imperial decision making, even if they did not preclude more self-interested definitions of advantage in economic gain or territorial security.46

A New Approach: Ambition and Restraint in Persia’s Greek Relations

This raises a final question, essential to the discussion ahead: how did Persia’s efforts to live up to the image of universal dominance intersect with more pragmatic objectives and limitations on the exercise of power? The study of Persia’s Greek relations requires attention to the interactions between the ideological context and the economic, political, and military aspects of each major encounter.47 Consideration of the last three is essential for explaining the relationship between Persia’s universalizing claims and imperial methods that avoided military engagement, such as the decision to seek peace with Athens and the funding of a Spartan fleet without deployment of Persia’s own warships.

In economic terms, one might expect a Persian king to intervene in foreign disputes out of a desire for territorial gain and increased revenues. A notable outcome of the empire’s involvement in the Peloponnesian War, confirmed in the King’s Peace of 386, was the restoration of imperial taxation in the Ionian cities. Yet hunger for these funds cannot stand alone as an explanation for Persian behavior, since Artaxerxes I and Darius II were willing to go without them for so long in the second half of the fifth century. Rather, it appears that throughout this period Persian rulers weighed the financial advantages of intervention against the expenditures that might be needed to secure a decisive victory and concluded that Ionian tribute was not worth the cost of its recovery. More thorough elucidation of imperial behavior requires the estimation of tribute values and the costs of subsidies and naval operations, as well as attention to the impact of related economic activities, such as long-distance trade between Persian subjects and Athens. It is especially important to consider the mechanics of financial support for Persia’s allies and the pressures that subsidies imposed on satraps and gen-
erals, who often attempted to dispense them without direct monetary support from the king.

At the political level, choices of war or peace on the Greek frontier owed much to the dynamics of interaction between the king and his deputies. It stands to reason that a well-established ruler secure in early victories, such as Artaxerxes I, might adopt less confrontational methods without tarnishing his image. The need to display universal power may have acquired greater urgency in more dangerous political situations. In the aftermath of internal rebellions and civil wars among the Persian elite, such as Pissouthnes’s challenge to Darius II and the conflict between Cyrus and Artaxerxes II, aggressive action that aided clients and punished enemies at the empire’s edge could help the king bolster his support among the nobility and new satraps earn greater favor at court.

Finally, the formulation of Persian policy toward the Greeks depended on the number of troops and triremes available and assessments of their capabilities and logistical needs. Armies and navies facilitated the most impressive displays of imperial power but also incurred substantial costs. For ideological reasons, the kings were unlikely to admit the possibility of military defeat before their courtiers and generals, but several sources note royal reluctance to lavish too much money on military expeditions, and this frugality could play a role in restraining imperial action. It is also likely that a hierarchy of imperial trouble spots affected the distribution of military resources. The demands of the fourth-century conflict with Egypt, for example, drew a Persian fleet away from the Aegean at a moment when it had cleared the seas of opponents but not yet ensured Greek peace.

Roman parallels can help to illustrate the combination of pragmatic restraint with demonstrations of symbolic authority. Emperors who decided to step back from commitments to territorial conquest still couched their decisions in the language of worldwide power. When Augustus averted a new Parthian war through a treaty, acquiring the return of Roman prisoners and the right to select the rulers of an Armenian buffer state, he depicted the outcome as equivalent to a military victory and the independent Parthians as supplicant members of the Roman universe. Tiberius, recalling the too-popular Germanicus from campaigns beyond the Rhine, argued that diplomacy would prove superior to military force in securing the German peoples’ submission. Hadrian retreated from Trajan’s overextended Mesopotamian conquests but conferred authority on a local client king, “maintaining peace throughout the world” without direct occupation. All three
monarchs risked being criticized as timid by accepting limitation, but they justified their actions by appealing to their peace-making authority and the desire to acquire respect from distant peoples incorporated into the Roman world order. Persia’s relations with Athens and Sparta abound with comparable situations, from the mid-fifth-century peace to the conferral of overseas autonomy in 386.

Once Achaemenid decision making is envisioned in these terms, the final step in the analysis of Persia’s Greek relations is to account for structural factors that contributed to occasional gaps between imperial intention and action. Neither Artaxerxes I, Darius II, nor Artaxerxes II visited western Anatolia in person. Instead, they delegated authority to members of the royal family and nobility, including satraps at the provincial centers of Sardis and Daskyleion and sometimes a karanos, a general with responsibility for a wider region defined by the king in accordance with the military circumstances. As a rule, these subordinates required royal approval for any major action, but the more prominent might influence the king’s decisions by lobbying for adoption of particular measures. They tended to undermine rather than cooperate with one another, as each noble treated the pursuit of royal favor as a zero-sum game. Communication between monarch and deputies was frequent, thanks to an exemplary road network and a courier service comparable to the American Pony Express, which allowed a message to travel fifteen hundred miles from the royal palace at Susa to Sardis in only twelve days. This meant that the king was normally in a position to approve of subordinates’ actions. But in an exceptional case in 392, a karanos acted first and asked permission later, harming the empire’s Greek alliances and forcing the king to replace him in an effort to repair the damage. Also problematic was the tendency of satraps and generals to rely on local resources rather than risking royal disapproval by requesting additional aid. These conditions help to explain how efforts to support Greek allies sometimes unraveled to such an extent that Greek historians were led to question the Persians’ commitment to a decisive outcome. In the end, it is necessary to examine how Darius II and Artaxerxes II managed to overcome these problems and orchestrate a path to successful displays of influence.

The following chapters explore the ideological and practical motivations and structural challenges that characterized Persia’s Greek relations from 450 to 386. Chapter 2 begins with the much-debated peace agreement between Artaxerxes I and Athens, best known by the name of its Athenian negotiator, Kallias. Questioning what the loss of Ionia meant to Persia in
financial terms, the chapter proposes that economic advantages of naval re-
duction and maritime trade may have justified the decision not to attempt
reconquest. Examining the tolerance of Athens’s Ionian archē against the
backdrop of the “Pax Persica,” it suggests that Artaxerxes came to view Athens
as an imperial client, notwithstanding tense moments, such as the Samian
Revolt of 440.

Chapter 3 opens with Persia’s restraint in the early years of the Pelopon-
nesian War and suggests that Darius II decided to reassert control of the
Anatolian Greeks not only due to Athenian ties with Persian rebels but also
because of changes in the economic situation such as Athens’s decision to
stop Ionian tribute collection in 413. It differentiates between two royal ac-
tions often lumped together—Darius’s order to Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos
to reclaim Ionian tribute and his subsequent decision, following Athens’s
Sicilian disaster, to support the Spartan alliance in the hope of claiming credit
for the conflict’s outcome.

The book’s middle section examines the Persians’ intervention in the
Peloponnesian War. Chapter 4 argues that the Persians adopted the strategy
of subsidizing Peloponnesian ships against Athens in the expectation of a
short war. This optimistic assessment and Tissaphernes’s competition with
Pharnabazos encouraged the satraps to make funding promises that were
overly generous in the event of a prolonged conflict. The escalation of fleet
sizes due to Sparta’s delay and Athens’s resilience drove Tissaphernes to
cost-saving measures unpopular with the allies. Efforts to shorten the war
through talks with Athens prompted the infamous employment of the Athe-
nian exile Alkibiades, which cost Tissaphernes the trust of Spartans and Io-
nians alike. Chapter 5 deals with the consequences, above all the Ionian riots
against Tissaphernes’s garrisons, which provide a previously overlooked ex-
planation for the recall of the Persian fleet promised to Sparta. Chapter 6
examines the reasons for Darius’s renewed support of Sparta through sub-
sidy instead of naval action, arguing that despite disappointment with the
allies, the king preferred pursuit of decisive victory to the embarrassment of
his clients’ failure. It traces the reasons for Cyrus’s effectiveness as paymaster
of the Spartan fleet but also his near failure in 406 and clarifies how his final
dispensations in 405 facilitated the war’s outcome. A final summary surveys
Persia’s total contributions to the Peloponnesian cause between 412 and 404,
their relative value for Spartan victory, and their meaning for the empire.

Turning to the reign of Artaxerxes II, Chapter 7 examines Tissaphernes’s
fatal blunders and Pharnabazos’s more effective performance during the
Spartan invasion of Ionia. It sets the Persian-Spartan naval war in the larger context of the Persian-Egyptian standoff, explores its interactions with the land campaigns in Anatolia, and reevaluates Artaxerxes’s contribution to its ultimate success. Chapter 8 explores Persian intervention in the Corinthian War, which would have been unnecessary if Ionian defense had been Artaxerxes’s primary objective. It argues that the Persians meant to finish the war with a grand gesture of patronage for overseas Greeks, embodied in the Aegean cruise of 393, but that a grave error, Tiribazos’s unauthorized arrest of Konon in 392, shattered the prospects for renewed Athenian-Persian partnership. Rather than seeking to balance the Greek powers, Artaxerxes sought reconciliation with Athens, before the failure of this policy compelled him to shift support back to Sparta in the interests of peace. The study closes with a consideration of the implications of Persia’s grant of autonomy to Greeks beyond the sea.

A common theme throughout is Achaemenid self-confidence in dealings with Greeks, whether meetings with ambassadors or naval forays. Despite the inherent difficulties in imposing order on the complexity of Greek political relations, Persian rulers adapted over time, enabling them to exert robust forms of influence. They took measures for Ionia’s defense after its reclamation but always sought more from relations with Athens and Sparta than just their expulsion from Anatolian footholds. Through trade, alliance, and arbitration, the Achaemenids attempted to exploit the resources and secure the respect of the overseas Greeks for their universal empire.
Artaxerxes I and the Athenian Peace

Artaxerxes I, no less than his ancestors, staked a claim to universal dominance rooted in martial triumph. Royal seals celebrate his suppression of Egyptian revolt, and victories over Egyptians and their Athenian allies reasserted the empire’s military supremacy after Xerxes’s Aegean defeats. Herodotus’s false etymology of Persian royal names echoes the theme—if Xerxes was “warlike,” his son was “very warlike.” Yet Artaxerxes’s relationship with the Greeks culminated in compromise, permitting Athens to rule Persia’s former Ionian subjects.

The Peace of Kallias is one of the great problems of ancient history, obscured by Thucydides’s omission and attestation in later, lesser sources. Exhaustive modern debate has established its probable historicity, despite lingering questions over its formality and conditions. It is possible to move beyond these arguments and consider the reasons for the peace’s extensive duration. Several modern scholars, challenging ancient depictions of an Athenian diplomatic coup and Persian humiliation, have suggested that the end of hostilities brought Artaxerxes advantage. Yet the details remain ill-defined. Were its chief values security and delay, a chance to cut losses and bide time until a moment came to pass that was favorable for retaking Ionia? Or did Artaxerxes reap sufficient profit to accept coexistence with the Athenian archē?

The ideological and economic contexts point to the latter. Persian kings claimed that their goal was to bestow peace on the world’s peoples, but they usually conceived of that peace as originating in military success. A negotiated end to a long-running war might have implied weakness, proof that Artaxerxes feared the Athenian fleet. To prevent such perceptions from arising, he was likely to frame any agreement as the outcome of victories in Egypt and Cyprus that brought material benefits that surpassed the advantages of further combat. The king was capable of weighing the financial impact of territorial losses in western Anatolia against the economic attractions of an end to naval operations and the revitalization of Mediterranean trade. From
this perspective, the empire’s interests did not require direct control of Ionia, and Artaxerxes may have come to see Athens as a client state, capable of contributing to imperial prosperity. The model of a lucrative peace would explain the king’s disinterest in Ionian reconquest, at least until the Peloponnesian War led the Persians to recalculate the costs and benefits of such a reconquest.

The Peace of Kallias: In Search of a Persian Perspective

Artaxerxes and Athens ended their war just after the middle of the fifth century. They may have attempted an earlier accord in the 460s, after the Athenian victory at the Battle of Eurymedon and Artaxerxes’s succession, but the agreement that lasted took place around 449, in the wake of a failed Athenian attempt on Persian Cyprus.⁵

The monumental decision for peace, though neglected by Thucydides, is discussed in numerous later sources and possibly commemorated by an Athenian sculpture, postdating Xerxes’s invasion, discovered in the Persepolis treasury.⁶ It may never be known whether it included a formal treaty with oaths and stelai, but the fact of an agreement should no longer be in doubt.⁷ The last major attack on its historicity appeared in 1982, and subsequent scholarship has refuted the principal challenges at length.⁸ This would not be Thucydides’s only significant omission, and the selectivity of his Pentekontaetia, as well as the lack of attention to Persian matters throughout the history, are well established.⁹ As for the peace’s apparent denial by some of the fourth-century historians, Plutarch’s report that Kallisthenes did not mention the treaty does not mean that Kallisthenes disputed its existence.¹⁰ Two fragments of Theopompos accuse the Athenians of “lying about” the “treaty of the Athenians with King Darius,” but their brevity and use of the wrong royal name leaves the nature of the charge unclear—do they suggest that no peace occurred, or that Athenian civic memory altered its conditions?¹¹ Theopompos also argued that anachronistic Ionic lettering proved the fraudulence of a public copy at Athens, but the text could have been recopied from a genuine original, and theories of the peace’s fourth-century invention remain unconvincing.¹²

Theories of an early peace in the 460s would pose a greater problem because of the Athenian invasions of Egypt and Cyprus shortly thereafter.¹³ But Diodorus’s account firmly situates the agreement in 449.¹⁴ Occasional recurrences of violence, such as Persian involvement in the Samian Revolt of 440, do not disprove the peace’s existence, as analogy with better-attested
Greek treaties such as the Thirty Years’ Peace and Peace of Nikias ought to demonstrate.\textsuperscript{15}

The peace terms presented in surviving sources are incomplete and sometimes problematic, but their most important point—an agreement to mutual nonaggression—is clear and plausible. The Athenians promised to cease attacks on Achaemenid territories, and the Persians agreed to refrain from making advances toward Athens’s dependents in western Anatolia.\textsuperscript{16} Lykourgos’s and Diodorus’s assertions that the treaty granted “autonomy” to the Asian Greeks may be anachronistic, since references to \textit{autonomia} and the “Greeks of Asia” as a collective only became common in texts of the fourth century.\textsuperscript{17} Nevertheless, they speak to a Persian choice not to invade, install garrisons, overturn governments, or exact tribute, which contrasts with the vigorous response of Artaxerxes’s grandfather Darius to the Ionian Revolt of the 490s.

So why did Artaxerxes make no large-scale effort to overturn Athens’s position in Ionia for the next twenty-five years? A growing number of scholars recognize that he did not equate peace with defeat.\textsuperscript{18} Some suggest that the king bartered Ionia for the security of more important provinces.\textsuperscript{19} Others argue that the cumulative effects of previous defeats convinced him to accept a partial success and that he recognized that overt action was unlikely to overcome the Athenian navy or recover the western Anatolian seaboard. On this view, Artaxerxes was willing to endure Ionia’s loss, while benefiting from an end to attacks on his frontier and waiting for the rivalry between Athens and Sparta to improve the strategic situation over time.\textsuperscript{20}

But such explanations run the risk of overestimating Artaxerxes’s loss of faith in his military capabilities. Waiting “for a further opportunity of picking up pieces dropped by a defeated Athens,” as D. M. Lewis characterizes Persian policy a few decades later, would have required a passivity at odds with the image of the warrior-king.\textsuperscript{21} Ideology aside, Artaxerxes’s confidence should have been bolstered by his victory over Athens in Egypt. The fighting in Cyprus saw mixed results, as the Persian fleet lost a battle off Salamis, but a major city repelled an enemy siege, Athens lost Kimon, its preeminent general, and the invaders’ overall losses may have been substantial.\textsuperscript{22} The naval setback should not have been serious enough to convince Artaxerxes of Athenian invincibility, should he have wished to advance on Ionia by land.

An alternative theory holds that internal troubles, including a Levantine revolt by the Persian general Megabyzos and continuing unrest in parts of
the Nile Delta, sapped resources that the king might have used for a new Athenian war. But these events were limited in scale and duration and insufficient to paralyze imperial forces for a quarter century. If Artaxerxes desired Ionia but balked at taking action owing to the inadequacy of available troops and ships, he could have attempted to build and train a larger force to that purpose. Peace was not the only viable option, and it is best to consider its costs and benefits in economic and ideological terms.

The Costs of Peace: Ionia’s Loss and Possible Countermeasures

Artaxerxes’s peace required acceptance of financial loss in western Anatolia, as most of the Greek cities there, having become Athenian allies, ceased tribute payments to Persian authorities by the late 460s. The annual tribute in silver was Persia’s most visible method of economic extraction in the Mediterranean coastal provinces, displaying royal power and the allegiance of the subjects that paid it. The king’s agents forwarded a portion of these funds to palace treasuries at the heart of the empire and deposited the remainder in satrapal storehouses at centers such as Sardis and Daskyleion, where they might support provincial infrastructure and defense. The decision not to renew hostilities with Athens made such resources unattainable for the immediate future, even though the king never gave up the theoretical right to resume collection.

Several older studies discount the scale of Persia’s loss, arguing that the wars of the early fifth century devastated Ionia and that Xerxes and Artaxerxes abandoned a region whose income was no longer sufficient to justify defense. But more recent work has overturned the theory of widespread Ionian poverty, and several spheres of economic activity saw recovery or continuity through the middle of the century. An inscription from Teos cursing any individual who dared interfere with the city’s import or export of grain suggests ongoing trade with Black Sea emporia. The wreck of a small merchant ship off Tektaş Burnu on the Mimas peninsula provides evidence of a busy local traffic between the Ionian poleis, as well as northern Aegean connections. Thucydides depicts the coastal cities as a major source of Athenian income and labels not only Chios, a major player in Aegean trade networks, but even the small Carian port of Iasos as prosperous. In short, it is likely that Ionia still possessed enough wealth to attract the attentions of local Persian authorities, had the king permitted collections. The problem is how to measure the income that Artaxerxes let go.
Map 2. Achaemenid Anatolia and the Athenian Archē
In the 1960s, Oswyn Murray attempted to derive an answer from Herodotus’s list of Persia’s regional tribute sums, in which Ionia and Caria pay 400 Babylonian talents, roughly 470 Attic talents at a conversion rate of six to seven. This “first” tribute district includes several communities that either did not become Athenian tributaries or paid briefly but stopped by the later 440s. Consequently, Murray guessed that the Persians lost less than half of Herodotus’s Ionian total, but his calculation omitted the third district, which owed 360 talents and included the Hellespontine and Propontic Greeks. Moreover, it is difficult to know how far to trust the Herodotean estimates, which might be broadly plausible for western Anatolia, but as Murray noted, do not prove that such amounts were actually collected.

One can obtain a clearer, if still imperfect, picture by examining statistics from the Athenian tribute lists for actual income from former Persian territories. The restored stelai, documenting the goddess Athena’s one-sixtieth share of annual collections from allied cities, cover most years from 454/53 to 429/28, with fragments dating to the late 420s and 410s. In addition to problematic lacunae, extant payment amounts often vary between years; some quotas were lowered by political unrest or as rewards for loyalty to Athens, while other funds arrived late or went unrecorded for other reasons, such as redistribution to Athenian naval forces and garrisons. Regardless, they offer valuable clues on the number, relative size, and importance of former Persian subjects that had been incorporated into the Athenian tributary system.

Table 2.1 counts Athens’s payers on the Anatolian mainland, ranking them by their largest attested sums in the first decade of the peace (450/49 to 440/39). They add up to 101 communities, 11 large, 30 middling, and 60 small, all of which should have been taxed by the king before they fell under Athenian control. Of the large communities, paying four or more talents per year, non-Greek Lycia contributed only once, in 446/45. The regular payers were Knidos, Miletos, Ephesos, Teos, Erythrai, Kyme, Abydos, Lampsakos, Kyzikos, and Chalkedon. The medium range, paying one to three talents, contains several capable of larger contributions, especially Phaselis, which paid twice as much prior to 449/48, and the cluster of settlements in the vicinity of Halikarnassos, which would synoecize in the fourth century. The rest are small, defined here as those paying less than one talent.

Table 2.2 adds up the highest attested figures for each Anatolian mainland region between 450/49 and 440/39, which yields a maximum annual total of 156 talents, 58 percent of which was collected from the eleven largest
Artaxerxes I and the Athenian Peace

...32 percent from the thirty medium-sized communities, and 10 percent from the remainder. One might raise the amount of tribute loss slightly by noting that a few poleis’ payments in the 440s were lower than they had been between 454/53 and 451/50: Miletos’s tribute was reduced by five talents, Kyme’s by three, Kolophon’s by one and a half, and Phaselis’s by three, for an additional loss of twelve and a half talents. On the other hand, several only appeared in a single year or paid Athens early in the decade but stopped for good by the late 440s. Some may have resumed payments to Persia, in which case the empire’s tribute losses might be lowered by as much as twenty-eight talents.  

Table 2.1

Athenian Tribute Payers on the Anatolian Mainland (450/49–440/39)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polis Size (Tribute Scale)</th>
<th>Pamphylia-Caria</th>
<th>Ionia-Aeolis</th>
<th>Troad-Propontis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large (4–12 T)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (1–3 T)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small (&lt;1 T)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2

Maximum Athenian Tribute Totals on the Anatolian Mainland (450/49–440/39)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polis size</th>
<th>Pamphylia-Caria</th>
<th>Ionia-Aeolis</th>
<th>Troad-Propontis</th>
<th>Totals by size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large (4–12 T)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>34.05</td>
<td>90.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (1–3 T)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7.54</td>
<td>49.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small (&lt;1 T)</td>
<td>9.27</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>15.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals by region</td>
<td>49.27</td>
<td>62.47</td>
<td>44.17</td>
<td>155.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the Athenian tribute list figures suggest a yearly Persian tribute loss for the mainland Anatolian settlements between 140 and 168 Attic talents. The total is relatively low, and past arguments for Ionian poverty were based in part on the disparity between these sums and the greater amounts collected in the Cyclades and Thrace. On the other hand, Darius’s and Xerxes’s agents had not only taxed the Ionian coast but also the offshore islands and the cities on the far side of the Hellespont and Bosporus. In the early 440s, the three poleis of Rhodes were paying almost thirty, Byzantion fifteen, Perinthos ten, and Selymbria and Kos five talents per year in Athenian tribute. Persia’s losses from Samos, Chios, and Lesbos, Athens’s tribute-exempt naval allies, can only be guessed but should have been at least in the same range as Rhodes. These figures, to say nothing of various smaller islands and Thracian and Cycladic communities, would raise Persia’s annual tribute loss closer to three hundred talents.
The scale of loss increases further still when one considers that there were other categories of income in addition to silver tribute. Persian authorities could no longer exploit the natural resources of the lost coastal territories, such as the pine forests of Mount Ida above Antandros, claimed by Athens’s allies on Lesbos. The loss of control over the Hellespont and Bosporus straits meant the Persians could no longer toll the traffic between the Aegean and Black Sea, and although Miletos’s exchange with its Black Sea colonies was declining, coastal trade between the Ionian poleis lay beyond the reach of Persian customs agents.

Therefore, Artaxerxes’s decision for peace involved genuine economic sacrifice, not to mention the loss of a potent symbol of imperial power over the former tribute payers. It may have disappointed the satraps at Sardis and Daskyleion, given their vested interests in maximizing regional profits. Proximity to untouchable Greek revenues would have been a frustrating reminder of their predecessors’ powers of collection, and it would not be surprising if some solicited royal approval to take back Ionian sites when opportunities arose. Samuel Eddy argues that Artaxerxes encouraged satraps to reacquire defectors from the Athenian alliance in parts of the Troad and the Carian-Lycian borderlands while avoiding sufficient provocation to restart an open war. Yet recapture of significant communities during the peace was not a frequent occurrence, and alternative responses to loss of tribute were available.

The king’s officials in western Anatolia probably looked for alternative sources of revenue in more accessible territories. One was the cultivation of inland poleis that owned large expanses of farmland in fertile river plains and remained under the control of loyal Greek clients. Xerxes gave Pergamon and Teuthrania to the exiled Spartan king Demaratos, and Artaxerxes bestowed Magnesia on Themistokles, the deposed Athenian general. Themistokles, his son Archeopolis, and the Demaratid family all minted silver coinage and probably paid a percentage of this wealth back to the Persian crown in exchange for the maintenance of their grants.

Another possibility was to increase the revenue extracted from Persia’s other Anatolian subjects. Herodotus’s first and third tribute districts include numerous non-Greek communities, and he estimates the tribute of populous Lydia at five hundred talents, higher than either of the coastal regions. The province might have been capable of sustaining heavier tax burdens, at least until a devastating drought struck Lydia at an undated point in Artaxerxes’s reign. Parts of the Daskyleion satrapy such as the
Granikos valley were also teeming with agricultural wealth after population growth in the first century of Achaemenid rule. More importantly, despite their lack of direct port access, Persian agents could impose fees on goods traded overland with the coastal poleis and their Athenian patrons. Excavations have uncovered numerous fragments of fine Athenian vase ware in mid-fifth-century levels at Daskyleion and Gordion, and finds of northern Greek transport amphorae at Gordion suggest a continuous traffic in wine between Propontic harbors and the Anatolian interior. The booming Anatolian slave trade, whose victims are well attested in Athens in the second half of the century, may have provided another revenue source through sales taxes, attested in Persian Babylonia and Idumaea.

In short, Artaxerxes could expect his deputies to make up for some of the lost tribute revenues by other means. But he also benefited from a comprehensive worldview, one in which western Anatolia was only a part of a much larger imperial universe. Herodotus’s Ionian, Hellespontine, and Lydian tribute sums add up to 1,260 talents, less than a tenth of his estimate for Persia’s overall income. If the king perceived a connection between peace and larger economic gains, this might have helped him to accept the transfer of Ionian funds to Athens.

The Savings of Peace: Naval Reduction and Economic Gains
The most immediate economic benefit of peace was the downsizing of Persia’s substantial naval forces. Many studies trim down Xerxes’s Greek invasion fleet from Aeschylus’s and Herodotus’s twelve hundred warships to a more plausible total of six or even three hundred, but even the lowest estimates are larger than any Athenian fleet that ever sailed. The sources report that over the next three decades the Persians sent three hundred or more warships to the Eurymedon, Egypt, and Cyprus, always outnumbering their opponents. Athens, in turn, mobilized considerable forces to limit Persia’s advantage (in the same campaigns, its smallest fleet numbered 140 and its largest, including Ionian allies, 200 or 250). Yet after the peace, when the Samian crisis threatened a renewal of Persian-Athenian naval warfare, Perikles sailed to confront an anticipated Persian fleet with only sixty triremes. No battle took place, but the minimal scale of the Athenian demonstration suggests awareness that Artaxerxes had not rebuilt or attempted to man as many ships as he did in his earlier campaigns. Both H. T. Wallinga and George Cawkwell, despite disagreements on several aspects of the Persian fleet, suggest that the cessation of naval warfare may have
resulted in savings for royal treasuries, and this idea deserves further examination.\textsuperscript{59}

The lack of surviving documents hampers reconstruction of Persian naval infrastructure, but Diodorus suggests that the king supplied materials and harbor infrastructure for warships built and manned by coastal subjects.\textsuperscript{60} The most numerous vessels, and perhaps the “best-sailing,” were based in the harbors of the Phoenician client kingdoms, Sidon, Tyre, Arwad, and Byblos.\textsuperscript{61} Other contributors included the Cypriote city-states and Cilician Tarsus, where an artificial harbor known as the Rhegma served as a large naval assembly point.\textsuperscript{62} Imperial support for shipbuilding in these ports might include dispatches of silver, release of materials from provincial depots, and authorization to draw on forests and mines that belonged to the royal domain.\textsuperscript{63}

Persia’s warships, like their Athenian counterparts, were triremes, fast galleys propelled by three tiers of oars and armed with rams on their prows. There were some divergences between trireme models. Phoenician triremes lacked the outriggers used in Athenian ships for the highest level of oarsmen, and fourth-century ship sheds at Cypriote Kition suggest shorter vessels than those docked in Athens’s Piraeus, about 100 instead of 120 feet in length.\textsuperscript{64} Most Persian triremes were built from cedar rather than the lighter fir preferred by Athens. But Herodotus suggests that some of Xerxes’s ships had the edge in speed in the battles of 480, and the evidence does not suggest their automatic inferiority in combat.\textsuperscript{65}

The Persian empire possessed bountiful resources for trireme construction and should have been able to build vessels at a lower cost than the Athenian polis, which drew significant amounts from its silver reserves to purchase ship timber from Macedonia. It is difficult to establish an average value for Athenian triremes due to variations in prices and availability of materials, but the city charged trierarchs five thousand drachmai for the replacement of lost ships, and some cost a talent or more.\textsuperscript{66} In contrast, the king’s direct access to the forests of Lebanon, the Taurus Mountains, and Cyprus minimized silver costs for hulls, oars, and masts.\textsuperscript{67} The Athenians had to import other necessities, such as Egyptian papyrus for rigging and sails and Cypriote copper for bronze rams, which the king could acquire by simple requisition.\textsuperscript{68}

Yet despite these material advantages, surges of shipbuilding were liable to deplete the contents of coastal storehouses, where Persian officials stock-piled timber and other relevant items. The storage system is best illustrated
in a document from Elephantine in southern Egypt, dated to 411, recording the repair of a Nile patrol boat with permission of the satrap Arshama. Although the vessel was smaller than a trireme, the supplies required to repair it were considerable, and complex bureaucratic procedures governed their release. The captains made an initial repair request to another “boatman.” He reported to his superiors at the Elephantine fortress, who forwarded the details to the satrap (presumably in his seat at Memphis, more than five hundred miles away). Arshama ordered an investigation by accountants, estimators, and carpenters, who wrote back to confirm the need for repairs and who itemized the relevant materials, including beams and planks of new and aged cedar, more than 414 cubits (679 feet) in total; 20 cubits (32 feet, 9 inches) of bronze plate; 825 bronze and iron nails; 180 karsh (33 pounds, 5 ounces) of linen; 10 karsh (1 pound, 13 ounces) of sulfur; and 100 karsh (18 pounds, 8 ounces) of arsenic. What damaged material could be salvaged was returned to the storehouse in the fortress, partially replenishing its supplies. The detailed accounting and effort to conserve spare parts serves as a reminder that such resources were finite. Much larger amounts were required for the new construction of a single warship, to say nothing of an entire fleet.

Triremes had to be replaced all too often, as their fragile hulls rarely lasted more than twenty years, and new “first-class” ships were faster and more maneuverable in combat. Seaworthiness might be extended by maintenance in ship sheds in home ports, but lengthy campaigns exposed triremes to the ravages of Mediterranean shipworm as well as storms and battle, hastening the need for replacement. In theory, a naval power could maintain its fleet’s size by adding a handful of ships on an annual basis, but even Athens seems to have engaged in major overhauls every few decades. Persia’s Greek naval wars demanded even more frequent bouts of construction, and the capture or destruction of Persian ships limited the recycling of used materials to offset the drain on storehouse contents.

The triremes that survived Xerxes’s Battle of Salamis had left the dockyards by 481 at the latest and would have been old for active combat by the Eurymedon campaign of 466. The scale of the Eurymedon fleet implies recent construction, and its disastrous fate, with two hundred or more ships lost, required another replacement in short order. Diodorus reports an attempt to build new triremes before the end of Xerxes’s reign in 465, as well as another construction phase around 460 in response to the Egyptian revolt. The resulting fleet assembled on the Cilician coast and played a critical role
in Artaxerxes’s Egyptian reconquest. But it was aging again by 450, and Diodorus claims that it lost more than a hundred ships in combat off Cyprian Salamis. The rest, even younger triremes built for the Egyptian campaign, would have been inadequate by 440. If Artaxerxes wished to launch a new campaign against the Athenians, he would have needed another fleet, the fourth in only two decades. The only comparable effort attested in the ancient world is that of the Romans in the First Punic War, and Polybius emphasizes the financial sacrifice that their final victory demanded. The king’s enthusiasm for avoiding additional depletion of his forests and stockpiled timber reserves would be understandable.

The costs of trireme navies included not only ships but the men who rowed them. Given the Cypriote ship-shed evidence suggesting that Phoenician triremes were shorter than Athenian, it is not certain that a typical crew was as large as two hundred men, as Herodotus estimates for Xerxes’s warships. Still, the total manpower for three hundred triremes was enormous. Even at a reduced estimate of 170-man crews (140 rowers, fifteen marines, and fifteen deck crew and officers), its personnel would number 51,000. Feeding them posed significant logistical burdens, as triremes lacked room in their holds for cargo. If sufficient grain rations and water could not be guaranteed at regular way stations along the fleet’s projected route, it was necessary to transport them on supply ships, adding to the fleet’s overall required manpower. Herodotus claims that Xerxes’s army and navy required three thousand cargo vessels to support them, and one three-hundred-ship fleet of the fourth century was accompanied by five hundred merchantmen. The Persians might have assembled some of the food required through local taxation in kind but probably drew a large percentage from reserves in royal storehouses, and repeated deployments would have added to strains on this infrastructure.

It is likely that the king also paid his trireme crews in silver, as Artaxerxes II would in the early fourth century. The Persepolis Treasury tablets, dating to the first half of the fifth century, show that Persian administrators had started to calculate laborers’ wages in silver shekels, and although they often provided the payments in sheep and wine of an equivalent value, they sometimes paid at least a portion of the wages in actual silver. There are additional indications that Xerxes and Artaxerxes I provided compensation above and beyond rations in kind—for example, the agora set up to support the construction of the Mount Athos canal implies that sailors and laborers were able to pay for goods provided by the crown. Greek poleis paid tri-
reme rowers as early as the final quarter of the sixth century, and by Artaxerxes’s time, it might have been hard to motivate Persian crews to serve without pay against an enemy fleet known to reward its personnel in coin.\textsuperscript{85} Even if the king counted food distribution as part of sailors’ wages and paid less silver accordingly, the sums would have been onerous. At only one obol a day (compared with the three to six later earned by Athenian rowers), fifty-one thousand men would earn forty-two and a half talents per month, and four months’ wages would outstrip the annual tribute total of the Anatolian Greek cities.

That being said, it is not certain that financial support for the fifth-century navy came directly from royal treasuries. Wallinga argues that Darius I instituted naval pay before the Greek invasions, supporting it by minting gold darics and silver sigloi at Sardis. But these royal issues continued long beyond the end of naval combat on the Ionian coast, and no minting took place in Phoenicia, despite its importance for Achaemenid fleets, until midcentury.\textsuperscript{86}

Rather than offering competitive wages for volunteers as the Athenians did, the Persians and their clients may have preferred mass conscription of rowers. Evidence is lacking that would help to reconstruct the mechanics of recruitment in Phoenicia, but compulsory military service was intertwined with the tax system in Achaemenid Babylonia and the southern Levant and would have been a plausible source of naval manpower.\textsuperscript{87} The Babylonian model organized urban families and owners of so-called bow land, as well as members of certain professions, into tax units of ten or fifty households, each of which bore an annual obligation to provide a soldier for the crown. Taxpayers were allowed to hire individuals willing to perform their service, giving them a fixed sum of weighed silver to meet anticipated expenses, or pay a recruiting officer to assemble the men directly.\textsuperscript{88} If Persia gathered naval crews along similar lines, this might have limited the need for direct expenditure by the king, transferring the wage burden to imperial subjects. But even such an approach would have come with costs for the Phoenician ports and their dependent communities down the Levantine coast.\textsuperscript{89} Repeated imposition over a short period would have likely increased tensions between Persian authorities and the coastal population, and losses of hired professionals in repeated naval defeats might have diminished the ability to muster effective crews for replacement fleets.

A final problem, noted by Wallinga, was the potential for interference with the manpower needed for civilian merchant shipping.\textsuperscript{90} Although the
rowers might not have had prior nautical experience, each trireme’s deck crew contained about fifteen men whose skills were transferable to merchant ships—the helmsman, boatswain, ship’s carpenter, and permanent deck hands with expertise in ropes and rigging. A three-hundred-trireme fleet thus needed forty-five hundred professional sailors, and when it required accompaniment by supply convoys, the numbers grew greater still. A major campaign could withdraw thousands of personnel and hundreds of cargo vessels from maritime trade networks, with ripple effects on trade volume and customs income.

In summary, the burdens of trireme replacement and naval recruitment were enough to encourage restraint by the mid-fifth century, even if Artaxerxes did not question his ability to win naval battles. The peace meant that he no longer had to replace every trireme lost to combat, storms, or age. The naval motifs on Sidon’s early coinage might imply the construction of a few new Phoenician warships for display. But it was no longer necessary to man all the rowers’ benches or divert merchant vessels from more lucrative activities. The king did not have to fear Athens to see further fleet-building as wasteful, and his nautical frugality could help outweigh the Ionian concessions. A wave of profit followed as Persia’s Levantine and Egyptian subjects intensified economic contacts with Athens.

The Profits of Peace: Persia’s Athenian Trade

The end of the Persian-Athenian war promoted a surge in civilian shipping between Achaemenid ports and the Aegean. It is well established that the second half of the century saw Athenian silver tetradrachms travel to the Levant and Egypt in massive numbers, while numerous Achaemenid cultural items came into fashion in Athens. Several scholars have noted the value of peace for Persia’s Mediterranean economy, but once again, it is possible to expand on the implications. More trade meant more toll income, and rising imports of Attic silver enhanced Egyptian and Phoenician tribute potential. Calculations of future trade benefits might not have motivated the king’s initial deal with Athens, but the financial gains over the following decade should have confirmed the association of peace with long-term prosperity.

It is clear that the volume of Mediterranean merchant traffic decreased in periods of naval warfare and increased in its absence. Although triremes were not capable of extended blockades at sea, coastal bases near busy straits or ports allowed the interception of civilian ships, and a few successful sei-
zures could spark panic and limit use of the threatened shipping lanes.\textsuperscript{95} Artaxerxes's peace facilitated safer travel on the traditional routes between Persian ports and the Aegean, one from Egypt around the Levantine and southern Anatolian coasts to Rhodes, then through the Cyclades to Athens, and the other from Egypt and Cyrenaica to Crete and around the Peloponnesian. Ships might trade at other locations on the way or follow divergent routes, but the growth of Athens's harbor facilities at Piraeus after midcentury made it an unparalleled destination for the unloading of diverse goods and acquisition of valuable cargoes.\textsuperscript{96}

Persian subjects’ trade with Athens or acquisition of Athenian goods through contacts with Aegean middlemen was visible to Artaxerxes through the ubiquitous Persian toll stations around the eastern Mediterranean. The critical piece of evidence is a customs record from the eleventh year of Xerxes or Artaxerxes (475 or 454), listing sums collected from forty-two ships that entered or exited a single Egyptian port, most likely Thonis at the Canopic mouth of the Nile. Thirty-six are characterized as Greek (\textit{ywny}), the rest as Phoenician, and the Greeks paid 20 and the Phoenicians 10 percent of their cargoes to the “house of the King.”\textsuperscript{97} The Greek vessels exported the valuable Egyptian sodium carbonate known as natron.\textsuperscript{98} In return, they brought in a great variety of commodities, including wine, oil, wool, lumber, bronze, tin, iron, gold, and silver. A summary section reveals the crown's profit, including thirty-three and a half karsh (335 shekels) of gold, and more than eleven hundred karsh of silver (11,000 shekels equals thirty and a half Babylonian talents or thirty-six Attic talents).\textsuperscript{99} It is worth comparing the Persian rates and profits with Athens’s 2-percent toll on cargoes entering or exiting Piraeus, which brought in a comparable amount of silver, between thirty and thirty-six talents, in 402 and 401.\textsuperscript{100} The Athenians raked in much larger sums before the Peloponnesian War, but Achaemenid Egypt had many other exports unattested in this document, notably grain and papyrus, and similar tolling structures are likely to have been in place at harbors in Phoenicia, Cilicia, and Cyprus.\textsuperscript{101} An estimate of the king's annual take is impossible, but multiplication of the sums in the customs record suggests a figure in the hundreds of talents. Furthermore, the account predates the peace and the resulting increase in merchant shipping.

Silver occupies a prominent role in the customs record, which is not surprising given that Greek silver had been long been prized by Persia’s Mediterranean subjects. In the middle of the fifth century, Athens took its minting to a new unprecedented level, issuing millions of drachmai per year. The
surge of Athenian “owls” resulted in widespread distribution in Egypt and parts of the Levant during Artaxerxes’s peace, and both regions paid them the ultimate compliment of imitation toward the end of the century when the Peloponnesian War cut short the supply. These imports were directly relevant to the Achaemenid tributary economy. Herodotus reports Egypt’s tribute rate as seven hundred Babylonian talents, but its scarcity of indigenous silver is notorious. Although Darius I celebrated the intake of Egyptian silver for the palace at Susa, and local mines produced a gold-silver alloy that could be used in the production of luxury goods, pure silver was rare enough to be valued at a two to one ratio against gold in contrast to the fourteen to one scale common in much of the empire. Egypt’s increasing reception of Athenian coinage in the wake of Artaxerxes’s peace makes it likely that some found its way to the king’s treasurers in Memphis.

A similar trend would have been possible in Phoenicia, whose Herodotean rate of 350 talents also contrasted with the lack of local mines. Athenian coins were not as dominant here as in Egypt, since Phoenicians also obtained silver from the Taurus Mountains and the western Punic colonies. But enough Phoenician merchants interacted with Aegean communities to bring back Athens’s owls in meaningful numbers, and it may be no coincidence that the Phoenician city-states began to issue coins at midcentury. Josette and Alain Elayi propose that Attic tetradrachms, melted down and restruck on Phoenician weight standards, were an important source for the silver content of Phoenician coins. Early issues probably served a political purpose as celebrations of local authorities on the tokens used to pay the Achaemenid king. In other words, Athenian silver thereby facilitated displays of loyalty by Persia’s Levantine clients.

Such benefits bolstered the value of long-term accommodation with Athens. Not only could they help to soften the impact of Ionian tribute losses, but they situated the Athenians among other contributors of valuable goods from the margins of the empire to Artaxerxes’s treasuries, a crucial point for the reconciliation of the Athenian peace with Persian ideology.

The Ideology of Peace: Persian Victory and the Athenian Client State

Artaxerxes’s decision to seek peace required expression in terms that did not diminish his authority. He had come to power in the wake of his father Xerxes’s assassination, and no one was more aware than he was of the consequences if other members of the Achaemenid family or court perceived
royal weakness. It is vital to ask how the king and his advisers, raised on the creed that Persia ruled the world, approached a policy that brought in wealth at the expense of territorial and naval limitation. Did they attempt explicit ideological revision, discarding claims to power beyond the sea? Were they tacitly embarrassed at the loss of Ionia, and did the rejection of reconquest tarnish Artaxerxes’s image? Isokrates would have it so, depicting his restraint as fearful and passive. Diodorus claims that Artaxerxes made peace prematurely, despite continuing resistance on Cyprus, suggesting that the campaign fulfilled Kimon’s hope of exposing the king to widespread contempt. Many historians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were harsher still. George Grote dubbed the Peace of Kallias a “humiliation” comparable to Marathon and Salamis; George Rawlinson wrote that it “was necessary, perhaps, but disgraceful to Persia”; and Percy Sykes commented that “had Artaxerxes been a man of character, the Greek colonies in Asia Minor would again have become subject to Persia.” According to such formulations, the Persians themselves must have seen the contrast between concessions to Athens and the glories of their past.

More recent studies are better attuned to the differences between Greek and Persian perspectives, and some have suggested that Artaxerxes saw the peace as a defensive victory that protected the Levant and Egypt. But it is possible that the king’s representations were even more ambitious, reasserting traditional Achaemenid claims to world supremacy. The ideology of Persian power encouraged Artaxerxes to view Athenian embassies as evidence of submission, the war’s end as an imposition of order, and restraint in Ionia as a voluntary grant rather than a forced concession.

A triumphalist characterization of the peace seems likely in light of Artaxerxes’s iconographic choices, which share common themes with his predecessors’ visual programs. The royal coinage minted at Sardis continued to illustrate heroic action against the empire’s enemies. Xerxes’s type IIIb depicts the king in a running posture, gripping a bow in his left hand and thrusting a spear with his right, perhaps an allusion to the empire’s distant reach. Type IV, probably issued by Artaxerxes, is no less jingoistic for the replacement of the king’s spear with a sword—one might compare the Spartan boast that the use of short swords required greater proximity to the enemy and thus braver men by implication. Christopher Tuplin warns against associating the change of weapon with a symbolic reduction of power and argues that simultaneous issues of types IIIb and IV in the second half of the century perpetuated ongoing claims to military might.
A similar continuity marks depictions of combat on seals and gemstones, many featuring a Persian warrior killing an enemy in Greek dress. The motif is well attested for the reigns of Xerxes, Artaxerxes, and Darius II, and at least thirty-five such images survive, accounting for slightly more than half of the surviving combat scenes in Persian imperial art. Most originate close to the scene of conflict in Anatolia, but a few appear in Mesopotamia and Iran as well. Defeats are never acknowledged—the Persian hero stands unscathed, defeating the Greek on every occasion. There is no evidence for association of any of these images with a single event, but they are suggestive of the long-term claim that Persia restored stability whenever a turbulent subject group threatened Achaemenid order, a conceptual framework well suited to the conclusion of peace after victories over Athens. The use of these images as status items among Persian and subject elites indicates successful dissemination of the king’s claim to military victory and an ongoing willingness of provincials to buy into the idea that Achaemenid rule suppressed the potential chaos at the empire’s margins.

Artaxerxes’s monumental artwork also replicates his predecessors’ hegemonic imagery, which includes scenes of court visitation by envoys with gifts from distant lands and the cooperative lifting of the royal throne by imperial subjects in diverse ethnic costumes. At Persepolis’s Palace H, begun by Xerxes and completed by Artaxerxes, the tribute procession relief on the northern stairway re-creates a motif from the Apadana of Darius I but doubles the number of figures and increases the foreign delegations from twenty-three to thirty. Its fragmentary nature prevents identification of all the subject groups, but the Greeks’ presence can be assumed, and the expanded image of universal dominance gives the lie to any supposed admission of imperial limits. Artaxerxes’s tomb façade at Naqsh-i Rustam, next to those of Xerxes and Darius, reproduced their throne-bearer imagery, including Greeks among the king’s subjects.

Diplomatic interactions with Athens were likely to reinforce Persian ideological preconceptions. Diodorus presents the king’s initiative in requesting the peace as a sign of Persian weakness, but the sequence of communication and response fits the symbolic language of Achaemenid royal strength. Artaxerxes ordered his generals, Artabazos and Megabyzos, to send envoys to Athens to propose talks, and in response, Athens sent Kallias with powers to conclude an agreement. In Persian terms, the king issued a summons and Athens obeyed. The embassy’s traveling to Susa at royal invitation, accepting the king’s escorts and hospitality, further illustrated royal supremacy.
If Tonio Hölscher is correct in interpreting the Persepolis Penelope sculpture as an Athenian diplomatic gift handed over to mark the peace agreement, then it was a formal symbol of respect for royal authority, comparable to the imagery in the Persepolis gift-bearer reliefs. If Tonio Hölscher is correct in interpreting the Persepolis Penelope sculpture as an Athenian diplomatic gift handed over to mark the peace agreement, then it was a formal symbol of respect for royal authority, comparable to the imagery in the Persepolis gift-bearer reliefs. The king’s largesse to selected guests, hinted at in an anecdote regarding a fine levied against Kallias on his return to Athens for accepting bribes, also expressed paternal benevolence.

Persian texts stress the royal obligation to reward good behavior and cooperation. Territorial grants are well attested in this context, as in an anonymous Persian monarch’s bestowal of Dor and Joppa on a sixth-century king of Sidon. But there is also evidence of kings displaying their power by conferring lands or authority on former enemies who ceased to challenge them, like the sons of Inaros and Amyrtaios in the Nile Delta. Herodotus reports that Xerxes offered Athens autonomy and possession of additional Greek territories if it ceased its opposition to his invasion. Ar- taxerxes bestowed lands on Themistokles near the start of his reign, and he was likely to see his decision to tolerate Athens’s Ionian hegemony as a similar benefaction, albeit on a larger scale, as bestowed on an enemy chastened in Egypt and Cyprus. Allowing the Athenians to collect revenues in Ionian cities did not require conceptual severance of the Ionians’ connection with the Persian empire—Persian land grants, after all, were alienable if the recipients lost royal favor.

Athens may have viewed the situation differently, but its emulation of Persian tribute collection and methods of control in Ionia, not to mention aesthetic and cultural borrowings, played into the imagery of Achaemenid influence. Perikles might boast that the king’s ships no longer prowled the waves, but to Artaxerxes, the delegation of Ionia to a submissive Athens meant that there was no longer a need for naval campaigns across the sea. His influence beyond the Aegean was evident in the reception of the Greeks’ most precious resources. The Susa foundation inscription of Darius I illustrates the extent of royal power by listing goods acquired from his distant possessions for the adornment of the palace. Had Artaxerxes drawn up a similar register of imperial extraction, it would have been tempting to include the flow of Athens’s silver owls into his coastal treasuries.

In a perceptive summary, Antony Keen suggests that “Persia wanted a strong ally in Greece. . . . Persian policy, like that of most empires, preferred the frontiers to be ringed by strong and loyal client states.” The evidence for the continuity of Achaemenid universalist ideology, paired with the economic
advantages of naval reduction, tolls, and trade, indicates the applicability of Keen’s formulation to Artaxerxes’s peace. Athens’s client status, enriching the king and confirming the achievement of imperial peace, explains Artaxerxes’s disinterest in renewing the war, despite occasional quarrels on the Anatolian frontier.

Adherence to Peace: The Cold War Model and the Samian Revolt

A positive royal conception of peace did not end tensions on the boundaries between empire and archē in western Anatolia. Artaxerxes’s satraps may have encouraged small communities to stop paying Athenian tribute, and the Samos crisis of 441-39 raised the danger of a greater conflagration. Samuel Eddy’s characterization of Artaxerxes’s peace as a period of “cold war,” in which the king authorized deliberate encroachment on the lost Ionian territories, has been influential in studies of the period. Yet this interpretation runs the risk of mistaking sporadic episodes for an overarching strategy. It depends not only on the misleading premise of a standoff between rivals of relatively equal scale but, above all, on the assumption that Athens had forced the Persians into unwilling concessions. The evidence that Artaxerxes profited from peace requires us to reevaluate his supposed wish to destabilize it.

Anatolian satraps, resenting limited access to Ionian revenue, may have jumped at occasional chances for profit when a polis considered desertion from Athens and could have sought the king’s approval to extend protection to those supplicants who requested it. For his part, Artaxerxes may have been willing to endorse limited action, humbling Athens as needed and defending the “weak” against abuse by the “strong.” But there is no concrete evidence that Persian authorities encouraged Ionian defections between 449 and 441. The Athenian decree at Erythrai, laying out regulations after suppression of a revolt and forbidding readmission of those who have “fled to the Mede,” either predates the peace or belongs to a Peloponnesian War context, and provision of shelter to fugitives does not prove the Persians played a part in Erythraian resistance on the ground. Some of the tribute list absences might have resulted from Persian action but could also be explained by other means. If the satraps did recover a few minor communities and their tribute payments, it is doubtful that the profits were significant. As noted, if every community that stopped paying Athens between 449 and 439 resumed Persian tribute at a comparable rate, the total would not have exceeded twenty-eight talents.
The Samian revolt is the one clear event in which Persian interference challenged Athenian power, when the Sardis satrap Pissouthnes, a cousin or nephew of the king, supported an important polis’s rejection of Athenian hegemony.\textsuperscript{131} Thucydides’s narrative and the heavily derivative versions of Diodorus and Plutarch leave many questions unanswered but suggest that Pissouthnes and Artaxerxes sought to demonstrate their lasting regional superiority while stopping short of war.

The crisis began when two Athenian allies, Miletos and the tribute-exempt island of Samos, fought each other for control of nearby Priene. Samos won the initial clash, but Athens sided with Miletos, overthrew the Samian oligarchy, and installed a small garrison, probably less than six hundred men.\textsuperscript{132} Plutarch claims that Pissouthnes tried to dissuade the Athenians from these actions with a bribe of ten thousand darics but that Perikles refused the offer.\textsuperscript{133} Samian fugitives then fled to the mainland and made an alliance with Pissouthnes, who helped them acquire seven hundred soldiers. Together, the exiles and mercenaries stormed Samos and restored the oligarchy, taking the Athenian troops prisoner and sending them to Pissouthnes.\textsuperscript{134}

The satrap’s active role ended when Athens responded to the Samian challenge in force, committing 215 triremes and spending more than fourteen hundred talents to besiege the rebels for nine months.\textsuperscript{135} Samos requested naval aid from Persia, but Pissouthnes lacked either ports or the authority to deploy a royal fleet, a decision that belonged to Artaxerxes. The Samians sent five triremes to meet the Phoenician fleet, a threat that caused Perikles to cruise toward Kaunos with sixty triremes, but Thucydides does not specify whether any of the king’s ships actually set sail.\textsuperscript{136} If they did, their numbers were limited and they did not engage. Perikles returned to the siege after only two weeks and kept up the pressure until Samos surrendered.

Persia’s initial interference might be taken as a violation of the Athenian peace, but the lack of battle implies the king’s unwillingness to escalate too far, and Ernst Badian rightly comments that peace “lasts as long as both parties agree that it should.”\textsuperscript{137} The Persians may have viewed Pissouthnes’s aid to Samos as a dispensation of justice on behalf of an injured party.\textsuperscript{138} The attempted gift to Perikles suggests an effort to pose not only as Samos’s protector but also Athens’s potential benefactor if it should renounce its misbehavior. The return of Samos’s traditional government and the taking of Athenian prisoners asserted Persia’s prerogative to overrule and punish its client’s unjust actions. Thus it is plausible that Artaxerxes approved of
Pissouthnes’s behavior on ideological grounds. Nevertheless, the conditions that made an Athenian peace attractive to the king had not changed. Samos had not paid tribute to Persia since the 470s, and its defeat by Athens did not threaten financial loss to royal treasuries. It would have taken time to expand the Persian fleet back to combat size and assemble and train the crews, even if the king had been willing to accept the expenses of an expedition.

Samos’s fall may have embarrassed Artaxerxes, who had let down a prominent Greek community that looked to him for protection, while Athens defied his satrap. But the Persians retained crucial leverage in possession of the Athenian prisoners. Although the sources are silent on their fate, it is most likely that Pissouthnes kept them as objects of negotiation. Athens might reclaim a dissident island, but it was in no position to march on Sardis and rescue its men by force. Athenian tradition demanded efforts to secure prisoners’ freedom, and just a few years before, they had evacuated Boiotia in exchange for the return of captives taken at the Battle of Koroneia. A request for the garrison’s release would have acknowledged the Persians’ strength and put them in position to extract diplomatic concessions.

In the wake of the fighting, Athenian embassies to Susa demonstrated renewed respect for the king. One or more missions traveled to Persia in the 430s, and the rapid journey of the envoy Diotimos through Syria (instead of Pissouthnes’s Lydia) may belong to the aftermath of the Samian siege. Scholars have suggested that the Athenians gave up claims on some of their unwilling Carian allies, and the Persians may have interceded for the unscathed settlement of Samian exiles at Anaia, just across the bay. These diplomatic encounters seem to have salved any royal loss of face over Samos. It would take far more to convince the king to abandon the profits of Aegean peace. The Peloponnesian War would put more strain on the Persian-Athenian relationship, but Artaxerxes maintained his policy until the end of his reign. His son’s decision to intervene in 413 was an act of imperial opportunism, but of a different variety than usually assumed—not an exploitation of a rival’s decline but an effort to reconfigure Persian influence over the Greeks after Athens lost its value as an imperial client.
The Peloponnesian War and the Road to Intervention

The Persian-Athenian peace endured until the end of Artaxerxes’s reign, despite the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War among the overseas Greeks in 431. Sparta and its allies declared war on Athens in hopes of overthrowing its Greek hegemony, but they lacked sufficient triremes and funds to challenge Athens’s control of the sea unless Persia intervened on their behalf. They sent embassies to plead for aid, but the king was unlikely to abandon his policy while Athens had the upper hand. While the war increased Persian-Athenian friction in western Anatolia, and Pissouthnes supported anti-Athenian activities in several locations, Ionian complacency and the absence of Spartan forces limited the scale of the fighting at the Sardis satrapy’s margins. Artaxerxes was willing to continue diplomatic conversations with Sparta, but he did not engage in a serious challenge to Athens’s Ionian archē. When the king died in 424, Athens was preparing a diplomatic mission to Susa, hoping to secure his lasting forbearance.

The decisive change in Persian-Athenian relations occurred under Darius II, the victor in a bloody succession struggle among Artaxerxes’s sons. The new king first renewed ties with Athens in the so-called Peace of Epilykos, and the Peace of Nikias in 421 brought a temporary halt to Athenian-Spartan conflict, but neither agreement lasted long. As Darius dealt with internal rebellions, including a challenge by Pissouthnes and his son Amorges in western Anatolia, Athens invaded Sicily but faltered in the siege of Sparta’s ally Syracuse. Sparta struck back at Attica in 413, seizing a permanent base at Dekeleia and devastating the Athenian economy. Only then did Darius abandon his father’s restraint, ordering the reclamation of direct tribute from the Ionian cities and finally beginning the partnership with Sparta to overthrow Athenian power.

The causes of Darius’s intervention are poorly attested. Thucydides does not attempt to elucidate royal motives, and the only explanation appears in Andokides’s early fourth-century speech On the Peace, which claims that the king helped Sparta out of anger that Athens rejected his friendship and
aided Amorges. Most scholars have accepted Andokides’s account, despite his otherwise poor reputation for historical veracity, due to the plausibility of a rash Athenian action and vengeful royal response. But there was probably more at stake than the orator understood. It is preferable to situate the king’s decision against a broader deterioration of the peace’s advantages for Persia, a deterioration to which both Athens’s connection to Pissouthnes’s and Amorges’s rebellions and the economic difficulties that arose from its Sicilian and Dekeleian wars contributed.

The intervention’s initial methods raise additional questions. Why did the king not commit large military forces to retake the coastal cities? Why did he decide to work with Sparta instead of leaving the Greeks across the Aegean to their own devices, and what prompted his satraps’ hasty offers to subsidize Sparta’s fleet without a formal treaty of alliance? Their behavior suggests that Ionia was not Persia’s only objective. In the wake of Athens’s Sicilian disaster, Darius and his agents shared the Greek assumption that Athens would submit to Sparta in a matter of months, and they wished to extend patronage over the Spartans before they won the war. Success would advertise Darius’s influence beyond the sea at limited cost to the empire, but neither the king nor his western satraps suspected how long it would take to achieve.

Artaxerxes I and the Peloponnesian War

Persian-Athenian relations during the war’s initial years are poorly documented, only attracting Thucydides’s attention on a few occasions, but conform to a broad pattern of tension without open confrontation. Sparta’s diplomatic advances were not enough to persuade Artaxerxes to abandon the benefits of peace with Athens, and Pissouthnes made shows of force in Ionia and Caria but did not seek to participate in the larger Greek conflict. Samuel Eddy’s theory of a “cold war” between Athens and Persia interprets these frontier skirmishes as part of a royal plan to exploit Athenian distraction and destabilize the archē. Yet there is little evidence that Persia made a coordinated effort to undermine Athenian power. It is safer to interpret Pissouthnes’s clashes as periodic assertions of Persia’s right to support local order and fend off Athenian aggression.

Pissouthnes’s involvement began in 430, when Thucydides reports that a “barbarian” named Itamenes, probably his subordinate, led troops into the Ionian city of Kolophon after the outbreak of a local civil war between pro- and anti-Athenian factions. The Persians put anti-Athenian partisans in
charge, and when the struggle spread to Kolophon’s port of Notion, eight miles to the south, Pissouthnes dispatched mercenaries to seize, fortify, and garrison it. Both the city and the port were valuable acquisitions, giving the satrap harbor access and control of roads between northern and southern Ionia and between Lydia’s Kilbian plain and the Mimas peninsula.

Further south, Ephesos remained an Athenian bastion, but a few miles beyond it was the outpost of Samian exiles at Anaia, and on the far side of Mount Thorax, the Persian-influenced polis of Magnesia on the Maeander, the former site of Themistokles’s exile. Pissouthnes probably sought to aid these communities against Athenian argyrologoi, small squadrons sent out to plunder funds in support of the war effort. The satrap had nothing to do with the destruction of an Athenian raiding force by a minor warlord in eastern Lycia in the winter of 430-29, but the news may have piqued his interest. Shortly thereafter, he appears to have stationed a governor named Hystaspes—possibly his son—at the Carian city of Kaunos, which had recently revolted against Athenian control. Recent interpretations of a Lycian dynastic inscription suggest that Hystaspes ordered Pissouthnes’s son Amorges and the “people of Thorax” to battle an enemy “Ionian” army. This event may be connected to Thucydides’s report that Anaaians and Carians destroyed an Athenian expedition that marched up the Maeander from Myous in the summer of 428. If Pissouthnes’s sons played a part in this massacre, their success displayed the satrap’s personal commitment to his dependents’ defense.

It is possible that Hystaspes also supported Kaunos’s defiance of an Athenian effort at reconquest. A Persian exile named Zopyros, son of the late general Megabyzos and a daughter of Xerxes, had taken up residence in Athens after breaking with the king for unknown reasons. Ctesias reports that the renegade sailed to Kaunos with several Athenian ships and that the city denied the Athenians entry but admitted Zopyros, only for a Kaunian citizen to assassinate him as he entered. Unfortunately, Ctesias says nothing of Persia’s response to Athens’s support for a prominent rebel, despite the similarity to its later backing of Amorges. Athens continued to claim Kaunos, hiking its tribute rate from three thousand drachmai to ten talents in the reassessment of 425, but it may have been unable to regain control for several years.

Pissouthnes’s activities in Ionia and Caria enhanced his reputation as a source of help against Athens. Lesbian and Ionian exiles predicted that he could be counted on to support a Spartan landing and larger Ionian uprisings. But the failed rebellion of Lesbos and its aftermath illustrated his lack of interest in the wider Greek war and the vulnerability of his few coastal
acquisitions. There is no evidence that Pissouthnes sent aid to Mytilene during its unsuccessful defense against Athenian siege in 428-27, and he may have learned a lesson from Samos about the danger of promising aid to islanders without access to naval resources. By the time a Peloponnesian fleet of forty triremes arrived, the rebels had already surrendered, and the Spartan commander Alkidas refused to risk exposure to Athenian counter-attack by seizing an Anatolian port and making contact with Pissouthnes. Cheated of battle with the fleeing Spartans, the Athenian general Paches descended on Notion instead. Pissouthnes’s mercenaries should have been secure behind their fortifications, rare in fifth-century Ionia, but Paches seized their Arkadian commander under a fraudulent truce, stormed the walls, and put the garrison to the sword. This blow to Pissouthnes’s prestige marks his last appearance in Thucydides, although Spartan envoys may have passed through Sardis en route to the king.

The historian has less to report of the Daskyleion satrap Pharnakes, although he was familiar enough to Athenians to earn a passing reference in Aristophanes’s *Birds*. A Spartan embassy, betrayed in Thrace in 430, was trying to reach him, and he may have helped in later diplomatic exchanges, but further details are lacking. In 424, the Athenian general Lamachos and the crews of ten triremes, shipwrecked on the Black Sea coast near Heracleia, marched overland to Chalkedon on the Bosporus, but Pharnakes did not oppose their progress. His only recorded action was receiving a group of refugees that Athens expelled from Delos in 422 and installing them in a land grant at Adramyttion on the south side of the Troad. But this occurred early in the reign of Darius, around the time of the Peace of Epilykos, and did not necessarily mean that he was hostile to Athens.

The scarcity of evidence prevents further comment, but nothing supports a major Persian effort to weaken Athens’s hold on the Anatolian Greeks. Pissouthnes’s acquisitions were not among Athens’s highest tribute payers, and there was no general advance on Ionia’s unwalled poleis while the Athenians weathered Spartan ravaging in Attica or suffered from the great plague between 430 and 428. It is hard to escape the impression that Pissouthnes and Pharnakes could have done more if Artaxerxes viewed Ionia’s recapture as a serious goal.

Meanwhile, the king’s eastern Mediterranean subjects kept up trade with Athens, a link implicit in Thucydides’s claim that the Athenian plague originated in Ethiopia and passed through Egypt and Libya. Merchant traffic may have slowed on a few occasions, due to the effects of the epidemic in
Persian and Athenian territories and an upsurge of wartime piracy around the Lycian coast. But Athens’s continuing naval dominance meant that maritime links with Persian-held ports remained intact, as illustrated by a famous comic fragment, Hermippus’s catalog of international goods for sale in Piraeus, including Egyptian ropes and rigging and Phoenician dates and flour. Athenian patrols might have escorted important Levantine cargoes past the most dangerous points of the southwest Anatolian coast, and merchantmen could proceed with greater safety between Rhodes and Athens. In 424, the Athenians interdicted Peloponnesian access to Egyptian goods by seizing Kythera off the Lakonian coast, perhaps increasing direct trade between Egypt and Piraeus in the process. On the whole, it is doubtful that the conflict cut off Athens’s financial connections with Artaxerxes’s coastal subjects or customs officials or that the king saw benefit in their disruption.

Neither the military nor the economic situation encouraged Artaxerxes to grant the requests of Peloponnesian diplomats. Despite Athenian efforts to stop them, including the execution of the six envoys caught in Thrace in 430, more than one delegation reached the king. But although Spartan appeals for support played into the image of Persia’s influence beyond the sea, the Spartans could offer nothing to outweigh the value of Athenian cargoes taxed in imperial ports, nor could they prove their ability to challenge the Athenian navy, especially after surrendering an entire Peloponnesian fleet at Pylos in the summer of 425. The king was willing to engage in further communication, scoring ideological points without serious cost, but complained that the Spartans contradicted each other and would need to make their wishes clearer in subsequent talks. Instead of trusting the Spartan envoys to bring his message home, he ordered a Persian noble named Artaphernes, possibly a kinsman of the Sardis satraps of Darius I and Xerxes, to carry a royal letter to the Peloponnese. The Athenians intercepted Artaphernes at their Thracian port of Eion in the winter of 425-24, brought him to Athens, and translated the king’s missive.

Was Artaphernes’s journey a first step toward intervention? Artaxerxes might have been responding to Athenian provocations such as the skirmishes with Pissouthnes, support for Zopyros, or a claim to funds from the Persian-owned ports of Aspendos and Kelenderis in the tribute reassessment of 425. On the other hand, not only did the royal message refrain from offering a specific commitment to Sparta but the method and route of its conveyance raise questions about the king’s sincerity. It should have been possible to send clandestine copies via Greek agents in royal service, ideally
by multiple routes to increase the chances of reaching their destination. Surely there were couriers less conspicuous than an actual Persian grandee. If it was necessary to send a royal deputy, the sea-lane between Egypt and the Peloponnese would have offered a safer route, as the Athenians did not take Kythera until the following summer. Instead, Artaphernes went via Athenian-held Thrace, almost guaranteeing capture. Perhaps Artaxerxes sent him in this expectation, intending to apply diplomatic pressure to Athens by hinting at patronage of Sparta, in order to compel a counterembassy and renewal of Athenian respect for Persian authority. This was exactly what happened. The Athenians might have been willing to challenge Pissouthnes on a limited scale, but when confronted with the possibility of genuine royal intervention, they sought to conciliate.

Artaxerxes never learned the outcome of Artaphernes’s sojourn in Athens. The Persian ambassador and his Athenian counterparts sailed to Ephesos but halted there on news of the king’s death. Once the resulting succession conflict in the Persian heartland resolved itself, Athens resumed the effort to pay its respects to the winner, but its improving relations with Pissouthnes quickly endangered its tenure as imperial client.

Darius II and Athens: From Philia to Enmity

Darius II had won the contest to succeed Artaxerxes by February 423. Greece might not have ranked among his highest priorities, but Andokides suggests that he bestowed early attention on an Athenian embassy that included the orator’s uncle Epilykos. They agreed to a state of permanent friendship (philia), but despite this positive start, their relationship quickly soured, culminating in Darius’s momentous decisions to collect tribute from the Ionians and forge an alliance with the Spartans. Andokides blames Athens’s senseless entanglement with Amorges, but he probably oversimplifies. It is likely that Pissouthnes’s rebellion first implicated Athens in disloyalty to the king and that both rebellions, as well as a reconsideration of the economic situation, contributed to Darius’s reassertion of power over the Greeks of coastal Anatolia.

Understanding of the period is hampered by Thucydides’s silence, the brevity of Andokides and the Ctesias epitome, and the lack of a fixed chronology. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the Peace of Epilykos preceded the revolts in Lydia and Caria and that despite Andokides’s penchant for error, the orator’s pride over his uncle’s role supports its historicity. There would be no point in boasting about a familial contribution to a treaty that never
took place.\textsuperscript{31} It is also plausible that an Athenian decree honoring Herakleides of Klazomenai for assisting in communication with the king relates to these negotiations.\textsuperscript{32} Edward Harris doubts the inscription’s relevance to Epilykos’s embassy on the grounds that its reference to “presbeis para tou basileos” should mean ambassadors “from the king,” not “to the king.”\textsuperscript{33} But its mention of \textit{spondai} indicates conclusion of a formal Athenian-Persian agreement, and that Persian envoys might have traveled to Athens is not incompatible with Andokides’s story. Perhaps Darius followed Artaxerxes’s precedent by dispatching preliminary messengers to request that Athens send back a formal embassy to conclude a treaty.\textsuperscript{34} Artaphernes might have returned to court with news that the Athenians were hoping for an accommodation with Persia, prompting Darius to issue the invitation.

Epilykos’s treaty is best situated between 423 and 421, soon after Darius’s succession and before the Peace of Nikias.\textsuperscript{35} It not only reaffirmed Persian tolerance of the Athenian lease on Ionia and indicated that the king would not support the Spartans but may have reestablished peace after Athens’s clashes with Pissouthnes.\textsuperscript{36} From the Persian perspective, its conclusion would have advertised Darius’s image as patron of earthly stability, his authority over peoples beyond the sea, and completion of his father’s efforts. This was a message of particular importance given the initial opposition to Darius’s succession by a portion of the royal family and Persian elite, which pressured the king to strengthen his image as a legitimate Achaemenid monarch in full conformity with ancestral ideals.\textsuperscript{37}

As well as formalizing friendship between Darius and Athens, the treaty probably improved Pissouthnes’s relations with his erstwhile opponents. The previous embassy’s choice of Ephesos indicates a plan to travel through Pissouthnes’s territory, and if Epilykos’s mission followed the same itinerary, it would have required the satrap’s assistance en route.\textsuperscript{38} It is doubtful that Pissouthnes was already in revolt, in which case Athens’s recognition of Darius would have indicated rejection of the rebel, followed by a sudden reversal in his son’s favor. A more plausible sequence makes Pissouthnes accept Darius as king and send the Athenians up to court before falling out with the new monarch. The provision of security and hospitality for the ambassadors, as well as the treaty itself, might have defused some of the long-standing enmity between Pissouthnes and Athens and would help to explain their subsequent association.

Pissouthnes’s rebellion, reported only in Ctesias’s epitome, occurred at some point between the Epilykos treaty and 413.\textsuperscript{39} Its goals and extent remain
obscure. The satrap’s Achaemenid ancestry has persuaded some historians that he harbored a desire for the crown, but it is doubtful that his claim, as a cousin or nephew of Artaxerxes, was comparable to that of Darius. It is equally possible that Pissouthnes resisted a court summons or attempt at replacement. The satrap’s motives mattered little once Darius identified him as a rebel and sent Tissaphernes to bring him to justice.

The Ctesias epitome’s account is formulaic and does not say whether Pissouthnes engaged in open battle with royalist forces. It reports only that he fell because he placed too much trust in Greek mercenaries, who betrayed him in exchange for gifts and land grants, and that assurances of safety on surrender did not protect him from execution. The circumstances were surely more complex than Ctesias’s remnants let on, and the image of exclusive dependence on Greek soldiers may be exaggerated. Yet even if Pissouthnes drew on a broader base of support, a significant Greek presence in the rebel forces was likely to color Darius’s perceptions of Athens, especially in the case of an Athenian named Lykon, identified as the mercenaries’ leader.

Several scholars have guessed that Athenian support for Pissouthnes explains Lykon’s presence. Others argue that his mercenary status and acceptance of Persian bribes precluded employment by the Athenian demos. Yet polis generals often engaged in paid service on behalf of foreign associates during the following century, and it is unsafe to assume that Athenian civic officers were immune to corruption. It is impossible to prove whether Athens aided Pissouthnes or Lykon acted alone, but the mere impression of aid to the rebel should have been sufficient to provoke royal anger. Andokides blames Darius’s rage on Athens’s subsequent ties to Amorges, but Pissouthnes had been a prominent imperial official for more than two decades, and his challenge to the king was more significant than the resistance of a surviving son who had never held satrapal office. For reasons unknown, it was Amorges whom Andokides remembered, but it is likely that Athens had already earned Darius’s displeasure, regardless of whatever aid it sent to the lesser rebel after Pissouthnes’s downfall.

The report of Darius’s wish for revenge is ideologically plausible. The royal image demanded the rapid defeat and punishment of rebels, as well as efforts to regain subjects’ loyalty and show that imperial power could still reach across the world. Athens’s support of Zopyros in the previous reign had not provoked Artaxerxes to war, but Darius faced a more contentious internal situation. Multiple challenges by Persian elites, combined with the sense that Athens had betrayed an agreement so recently concluded, de-
manded a severe response. On the other hand, Darius retained flexibility when it came to how to react and did not deploy a fleet or order direct attack on Athenian positions in Ionia. If the rebellions provided sufficient grounds to cancel Athens’s coastal tribute rights and reassert the king’s, it remains unclear when Darius gave the orders, and he may have delayed until a moment that seemed most appropriate for other reasons. Further considerations, including reports on Athens’s economic difficulties and the news from Sicily, probably influenced the tribute decision and the choice to intervene in the war.

Sicily, Tribute, and Darius’s Intervention

Most scholars explain Darius’s turn against Athens by reference to Pissouthnes or Amorges, but some prefer to view it as an exploitation of the disaster at Syracuse, where Athens lost two hundred ships and tens of thousands of soldiers and sailors in September 413. D. M. Lewis challenges this connection on the grounds that Darius would not have heard the final news from Sicily until at least the middle of November, allowing little space for deliberation, communication with satraps, and diplomatic engagement with Sparta before the spring of 412. Lewis proposes instead that the king recognized that Athens had overextended itself at an earlier stage in the Sicilian expedition and acted on a combination of this impression and his anger at the Amorges alliance.

Lewis’s argument gives due credit to the complexity of royal policy making, but the timeline may not have been as tight as he suggests. Thucydides implies that Darius did not announce the reclamation of Ionian tribute and support for Sparta at the same time. The historian characterizes the idea to back Sparta as originating with a satrap, probably endorsed at a subsequent date by the king. Using the Achaemenid imperial post, satraps or other imperial agents could inform Darius of new developments in the Aegean very soon after their occurrence. A recent study estimates that a message from Sardis could reach Susa in twelve days and Babylon in less. It is plausible that the Sicilian news, arriving some time after Darius’s tribute decision, tipped his hand toward intervention in the Peloponnesian War.

Darius may have decided to collect Ionian tribute not only in reaction to Pissouthnes’s and Amorges’s revolts but also to Athens’s changing economic behavior in the spring and summer of 413. Sparta’s fort at Dekeleia began to threaten Athenian access to the vital Laureion mines and encourage the flight of the slave labor essential to their output, and rumors of a dwindling
silver supply may have reached Persian agents. Even more noteworthy was Athens’s sudden announcement of an end to tribute collection in the cities of the archē, to be replaced with a 5 percent toll on all imports and exports in allied harbors. The shift to maritime tolls might have annoyed the Persians by cutting into customs collection on inbound merchantmen from the Aegean, whose cargoes would be diminished by Athens’s collection before the king’s agents could take their share. At the same time, as Lisa Kallet suggests, the abdication of Ionian tribute played into Darius’s hands. The king had delegated collection rights to his principal Greek client, in token of their friendly relations. If Athens discarded this privilege, especially while defying the king in other respects, Persian reclamation was a logical response.

Darius made his decision sometime before the winter of 413-12, when Thucydides reports that he had “recently” (“neōsti”) commanded his general Tissaphernes to submit tribute from territories in western Anatolia. The adverb of time implies a date earlier in 413, probably before the arrival of the news from Sicily. When Darius’s demand reached Tissaphernes, he was “unable to accomplish this in the Greek poleis on account of the Athenians,” and Pharnabazos, the new satrap of Daskyleion, faced a similar situation. In other words, the king had restored the coastal cities to the satraps’ financial and administrative domains, but it was some time before they were able to follow through on his orders.

Darius does not seem to have envisioned a project of military reconquest, despite his expectation of not only renewed tribute but collection of sums in arrears, perhaps in the hundreds of talents or more. If the Persians had attempted to take this money by force, the Ionian cities should have been vulnerable, since most lacked walls and thousands of soldiers had left the region for Sicily by the spring of 413. But before the conclusion of the Sicilian campaign, they were unlikely to defect and risk reprisals. The satraps possessed numerous garrisons and military colonies for territorial defense but lacked ships and troops in the numbers required to coerce dozens of unwilling cities into paying large sums. Perhaps Darius thought that Athens’s Sicilian diversion would limit Ionian resistance, or maybe he was reluctant to waste funds on a full campaign, but more resources would be necessary before Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos could act.

The simplest solution would have been a royal dispatch of reinforcements to western Anatolia to occupy the cities in Athens’s moment of distraction. This could have been done without any need for a deal with the Spartans, who lacked funding for their navy and had rarely shown interest in the cities east
of the Aegean since 479. Instead, Thucydides suggests that the satraps proposed a partnership with Sparta in the expectation of winning Darius’s favor. Tissaphernes decided that he could “collect the tribute more effectively by harming the Athenians, and at the same time, make the Spartans allies with the King,” which would help in both respects. Pharnabazos came to a similar conclusion, hoping to “achieve what Tissaphernes was eager for” by winning the cities’ tribute and obtaining credit for a Spartan alliance.\textsuperscript{59}

The satraps’ interest in Sparta probably stemmed from the news of Athens’s final catastrophe at Syracuse, which transformed regional dynamics by suggesting that the archē was on the verge of collapse. Many Greeks expected Athens’s surrender within months, and as Sparta emerged as the victorious leader of the overseas Greeks, its potential to assist the Persians increased. Peloponnesian ships and troops, if summoned to Ionia by the promise of satrapal funds, might help to complete the reversion of the cities to Persian control without the need for royal reinforcements. The logic was irresistible and likely won Darius’s rapid support, offering ideological gain and the reclamation of Ionia’s tribute at very little cost. When Athens fell, the king could claim credit for Sparta’s victory and show off his influence beyond the sea and provision of peace to subjects at the edge of the world.\textsuperscript{60}

This sequence resolves the problem with the timeline that worries Lewis, since the satraps could have written Darius about the possibility of patronizing Sparta as soon as they learned about Athens’s disaster. If the king received and endorsed their plans in mid-November, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos could have gathered further intelligence and prepared embassies while awaiting his response. They should have been ready to contact the Spartans by December, hurrying to establish a relationship before the Greek war could end. The prospective alliance promised lucrative rewards for whichever official could bring it to fruition.

Agents of Intervention: Darius’s New Satraps

Darius’s Anatolian satraps were eager to seize the opportunities that had eluded their predecessors—to punish Athenian insolence, reestablish control over the rich coastal cities, and support new Greek clients across the sea. But promotion to office in the wake of political turmoil brought pressures as well as prospects. The fear of failure in meeting Darius’s tribute demands combined with hopes of increased royal favor, encouraging Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos to trust the most optimistic predictions of the intervention’s ease and spurring their competition in premature generosity.
Persian Interventions

Tissaphernes had arrived in western Anatolia as a royal general assigned to suppress Pissouthnes, with the aid of two colleagues, Spithridates and Parmises, who did not rise to his subsequent stature. Thucydides calls him Darius's “commander over the lower countries” (or the Anatolian coast), but Persian nobles could combine civic and military posts, and Ctesias reports his succession to the Sardis satrapy. The satrapal office had the potential to last for decades if all went well—the contemporary Arshama may have governed Egypt for almost half a century. A fragmentary passage at the end of the Xanthos stele’s Lycian inscription implies that Tissaphernes had at least one son, and the presence of heirs would have raised the possibility of a dynastic seat at Sardis.

It is unclear whether Tissaphernes possessed previous ties to the region. His patronym, Hydarnes, is attested on the Xanthos stele and may connect him to a distinguished father-son pair of the same name who served under Darius I and Xerxes. The younger of the two led the elite infantry unit known as the “Immortals” in the invasion of Greece and also held a military post in Anatolia at an undated point in Xerxes’s reign and could have sired Tissaphernes late in life. But the name is common enough to prevent a certain association between Tissaphernes and the famous family, not to mention another Hydarnid clan, massacred for disloyalty by Darius II. It is not impossible that Tissaphernes stemmed from an otherwise unattested background. Valued service in the succession struggle or other events of Darius’s early reign rather than particular familiarity with Anatolian or Greek affairs might have prompted his appointment to the Sardis post. Being a recent arrival would have exacerbated the natural difficulties in assumption of authority over such a large region, overseen for at least two decades by a powerful predecessor. A newcomer in the wake of rebellion had to tread carefully in rebuilding relationships with Persian and local landowners, garrison communities, and social and religious institutions, acquiring new allegiances without disrupting local structures more than necessary.

Pharnabazos’s inheritance of satrapal office at Daskyleion in 414 or 413, in succession from his father Pharnakes, contrasted with Tissaphernes’s dramatic ascendance. He was probably somewhat younger than his colleague, but his power rested on six decades of family governance in northwestern Anatolia and an Achaemenid bloodline stretching back to the uncle of Darius I. Pharnabazos’s confirmation indicates his father’s fidelity to Darius II during Pissouthnes’s rebellion, although there is no evidence that the old satrap or his son played a direct part in defeating their renegade col-
league. On assumption of office, Pharnabazos was surrounded and advised by kinsmen, including an uncle and half brother, and may have already had a son. He possessed networks of local support that Tissaphernes lacked. Yet it is telling that the Spartan treaty of 411, two years into his office, still referred to the “sons of Pharnakes” instead of using Pharnabazos’s name. He was not subordinated to Tissaphernes, but he did not yet possess the greater prestige inherent in his rival’s military command or a reputation to measure up against his father’s achievements.

Despite their different circumstances, both men recognized the danger of losing royal favor, vividly illustrated by the fall of Pissouthnes and other great nobles who had chosen the wrong man in the succession or challenged Darius thereafter. This king valued subordinates’ ancestry less than their scrupulous loyalty, as evidenced by his unusual appointment of Belshunu, an ethnic Babylonian rather than an Iranian prince, as Syrian satrap. Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos must have been sensitive to the threat of replacement if they did not meet Darius’s expectations, and in this context, the demand to secure extensive tribute arrears from the Anatolian Greeks was a burden as well as an opportunity. The longer it took to accumulate the funds, the greater the chance that Darius would lose patience. Tissaphernes faced additional pressure from Amorges’s stubborn resistance in Caria. His status at court depended on victory, and the rebel’s elimination had to be followed by the reimposition of taxes to demonstrate regional allegiance to the crown. If Amorges remained undefeated for too long, a request for reinforcements might encourage Darius to send another general in his stead.

Earning the potential credit for Spartan victory over Athens and for assisting in retaking Ionia tempted both satraps. Some of Tissaphernes’s potential subjects and clients had once cooperated with Amorges and Pissouthnes against Athens, and a new campaign to end Athenian dominance might help to reclaim their allegiance. For Pharnabazos, participation in a brief but glorious war offered the possibility of garnering the esteem he needed to elevate his status in comparison with his peers. Their competition, perhaps endemic in relations between neighboring satraps, was intensified by the wish for glory and fear of losing the king’s confidence while Amorges’s revolt dragged on and the Greek war rushed toward a conclusion. Both showed initiative in cultivating Ionian contacts, trying to secure Spartan military support, and preparing for Athens’s overthrow, but they made promises that would prove difficult to fulfill when the war lasted longer than expected.
Negotiating Intervention: The Satraps, Ionia, and Sparta

In the winter of 413-12, both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos began two-pronged diplomatic offensives. They began to court Anatolian Greek elites who might be amenable to reunion with Persia, encouraging them to lead their communities in rejecting Athenian rule and preparing for the renewal of Persian tribute claims. Simultaneously, they issued competing invitations for the Spartan fleet to sail over to the Anatolian coast in exchange for Persian financial aid. The satraps’ support would empower the Spartan alliance to complete Athens’s defeat by cutting off its maritime grain supply, while victory would put Sparta in Persia’s debt and advertise Darius’s universal power. Each satrap offered to foot the bill out of his own resources, a gamble rooted in overconfident expectation of the war’s rapid conclusion.

Tissaphernes’s new jurisdiction contained six of Athens’s highest-paying Anatolian Greek poleis (Knidos, Miletos, Ephesos, Teos, Erythrai, and Kyme), while Pharnabazos’s satrapy included the other four (Abydos, Lampsakos, Kyzikos, and Chalkedon). Thucydides does not explicitly comment on the satraps’ initial communications with coastal Greek representatives, but it is likely that they sent out feelers to these cities in particular. Their ambassadors to Sparta must have sailed from Greek ports, and Tissaphernes’s representatives at Sparta worked in tandem with envoys from Erythrai and Chios, implying careful prearrangement. Pharnabazos’s envoys, Timagoras of Kyzikos and Kalligeitos of Megara (Chalkedon’s metropolis), were Greek exiles with close ties to the Hellespontine poleis and may have assisted in local negotiations before the voyage.76

Despite Athens’s recent disaster, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos faced several obstacles in winning over the cities. They needed to prepare the Ionians for significant financial exactions but also to bring them back to the fold as willing subjects. Many of the residents either sympathized with Athens or feared naval reprisal, and the satraps would have negotiated in secret with representatives of political factions rather than formal governments.77 To assuage their concerns, the Persian officials could promise soldiers for defense against Athenian counterattacks—not only their own forces but also the Peloponnesian fleet. Payments to the Spartans would thereby aid the Ionians as well, and the construction of an Aegean-wide coalition might ease Ionian discomfort with the idea of returning to the Persian empire. The satraps probably assured factional leaders of support for their local power and relative autonomy, in contrast with Athens’s intrusive behavior. A later
passage in Thucydides hints that they explained tribute demands in the short term as a financial sacrifice to support the expulsion of the common enemy. In the special case of Chios, which had not paid tribute to Athens and now owned the only sizeable fleet in the region despite losses in Sicily, the Persians may have substituted a promise of friendship and alliance for tributary status. They are likely to have offered personal gifts to Ionian representatives in exchange for their help in bringing the masses into cooperation.

If the prospects of winning Spartan aid helped the satraps to court the Ionians, the reverse applied to their diplomats in Sparta, where joint appeals alongside Ionian envoys may have reduced the stigma of Medizing. Pharnabazos added the incentive of money up front, sending twenty-five talents for Timagoras and Kalligeitos to provide for Sparta’s crews on the condition that they sailed to the Hellespont instead of Ionia. There is no evidence that Tissaphernes’s representatives brought comparable sums to the table, but their cooperation with the envoys from Chios proved more effective, probably due to the island’s offer of additional triremes. Sparta declared alliance with Chios and Erythrai and accepted Tissaphernes’s promise to pay its fleet’s wages once the ships arrived on the Ionian coast. Pharnabazos’s men withheld their silver but stayed in Sparta to continue negotiations for the dispatch of a separate fleet in exchange for Daskyleion’s gift and the promise of further funds.

Both satraps’ motives for inviting the Spartans to Anatolia are clear, but one might ask why they were so generous in promising subsidies when the king’s tribute order had placed them under financial pressure. Darius does not seem to have offered royal funds, and the satraps were investing their own local resources in intervention. Yet this money was the most effective way to exert influence on the overseas war without access to Persian triremes. If Greek observers were correct in predicting the war’s end in months, a royal fleet could not be organized, manned, and deployed in time to make a difference, even if Darius was willing to make such an extensive commitment. The satraps’ silver, on the other hand, could prove the deciding factor in a rapid conflict, and a success that cost Darius little might impress the king enough to earn them later compensation. Not only that, but the forces involved were relatively small. The Spartans had just begun to plan the construction of a hundred new triremes in a dozen Peloponnesian and Boiotian ports, but the fleet that they ordered to Ionia numbered only forty (the fleet would join a force of sixty that the representatives from Chios
claimed were at their city’s disposal). In ideal circumstances, Tissaphernes would only have to make a limited gift, a pittance compared to the Ionian revenues and royal rewards that victory would bring.

The invitation to the Peloponnesian fleet set the course for a new stage in Persian-Greek relations, which would establish a new relationship between the empire and its Spartan clients while re-imposing satrapal authority over the Ionian Greeks. There is no indication that the Persians considered a policy of balance, equalizing the forces of the Athenians and their Spartan rivals. The winter talks suggest instead that Darius’s satraps intended to show off Persian power by overseeing Athens’s utter defeat as quickly as possible. In the spring of 412, Tissaphernes seemed poised to bring about this triumph at minimal cost. But the intervention would deviate from its expected course as Sparta fumbled its naval deployment and the Athenians fought back with unexpected vigor. Contrary to Tissaphernes’s hopes, the costs of the war would mount quickly, and the campaign against Amorges’s rebels would prove far easier than the coming diplomatic battles with the Spartan allies.
The satraps’ rush to extend patronage over Sparta was thwarted by protracted delay in the spring of 412, as the allies wavered on the date of their Ionian expedition and the number of ships they were willing to send. Tissaphernes was finally able to enter the fray after the arrival of a token Spartan force in late summer, and his intervention increased in intensity over the following autumn and winter. Asserting the empire’s claim to the Ionian cities, planning the assault on Amorges’s rebels, and negotiating official terms for the Spartan alliance, Darius’s favored general traveled almost a thousand miles across the roads of southwest Anatolia before concluding the formal treaty in April 411.

Tissaphernes achieved notable successes, acquiring numerous coastal cities without resistance and suppressing Amorges with Spartan aid, but he faced an unexpected challenge in the enemy’s ferocious resilience. Rather than surrendering quickly as predicted, Athens manned more triremes and launched a series of naval counterattacks, devastating Chios and using Samos as a base for descents on the Ionian coast. The Peloponnesians increased their own ship numbers but lacked the strength to bring about a decisive battle. By late 412, hopes for victory through subsidies alone appeared untenable, giving rise to new plans for Darius’s imperial fleet to assist Sparta.¹

Thucydides asserts that Tissaphernes was already beginning to develop a strategy of balance, encouraged by Alkibiades, the notorious Athenian exile and fugitive from Spartan justice, who claimed to have warned the satrap of Sparta’s hegemonic intentions in Ionia. This theory of Achaemenid Realpolitik has influenced numerous modern interpretations, earning Tissaphernes praise as “the ablest and most unscrupulous diplomat that Persia ever produced.”² But Thucydides’s speculation about Tissaphernes’s motives not only reflects the distorting effects of Alkibiades’s boasts but gives insufficient credit to Darius’s power over his general’s actions.³

It is more plausible that the king and Tissaphernes meant to resolve the war in Sparta’s favor as soon as possible but adjusted their methods in response...
to its unexpected costs and duration. The decision to lower allied pay owed much to Tissaphernes’s reliance on private resources rather than royal grants. Darius’s decision to commit a Persian fleet to the war originated in the Greek stalemate of winter 412-11. Tissaphernes’s last-minute talks with Athens suggest that the Persians viewed this commitment as a last resort, but when Athens proved unwilling to accept Persian terms, they entered a treaty with Sparta that laid out firm plans for joint naval action. The subsequent collapse of these plans does not prove that the Persians intended their failure.

The Ionian War and Athenian Resilience

Tissaphernes entered the war in the late summer of 412 with three goals—to bring the Ionian cities into full tributary allegiance, defeat Amorges, and work together with Sparta’s fleet to break up the Athenian archē. He undertook to accomplish these missions without reinforcement from the king, and much depended on the promised cooperation of Sparta’s forty warships. One may imagine his frustration at their late arrival in pitiful numbers. Five Spartan triremes, joined by a few ships from Chios, were enough to inspire the poleis of the Mimas peninsula and Miletos to renounce Athenian mastery, but they did not provide sufficient strength for a move against Amorges or the Athenian triremes gathering at Samos. Instead, Tissaphernes devoted initial efforts to the complex task of reclaiming the Ionian cities without provoking their resistance. This objective was well served by his agreement with the Spartan commander Chalkideus, but Athenian counterattacks at the end of the summer interfered with his efforts.

Tissaphernes’s own field army was not large considering the number of cities, spread out along 250 miles of coastline, that he set out to control. Thucydides’s account of the Battle of Miletos, where the satrap committed both cavalry retainers and mercenary infantry, allows a rough estimate. It is unlikely that the horsemen numbered more than six hundred or the foot soldiers many more than three thousand, since they joined eight hundred Milesians and a handful of Peloponnesians in unsuccessful combat against only thirty-five hundred Athenian and Argive troops. The need to maintain Lydian garrisons and support anti-Athenian efforts in northern Ionia may have constrained Tissaphernes’s ability to gather significant forces for a campaign against Amorges in the south.

This military weakness increased the difficulty of reestablishing Persian rule in the Ionian poleis, as talks with cabals of anti-Athenian elites did not
guarantee broader support. The demand for tribute arrears on top of regular payments, which Athens had canceled the year before, was likely to prove unpopular. Therefore, rather than attempting immediate occupations and collections across the region, Tissaphernes huddled his forces for selected displays of power, posing as a liberator rather than stressing Ionia's subjugation to its former masters. The satrap's troops seem to have approached Ionian cities only after they repudiated Athenian control rather than making premature advances that might be characterized as invasion. In late summer, after the Spartans arrived and the uprisings began, Tissaphernes's deputy Stages brought a small contingent to Teos once it welcomed other Ionian troops from Erythrai and Klazomenai. The Persians helped the Ionians tear down an Athenian-built wall on the city's landward side, an action that might have appeared more sinister if Tissaphernes's men undertook it alone. Tissaphernes then traveled to Miletos in person, but not until after its friendly reception of the Spartan commander Chalkideus and his adviser, the Athenian renegade Alkibiades.

The satrap's rapid agreement with Chalkideus, the first attempt to lay out treaty terms, bolstered his courtship of Ionian loyalty. Although it was never ratified, it defined expectations for both sides' behavior until its later revision. A few modern scholars, scandalized by its bald statement of Spartan approval of Persia's territorial claims, have proposed that the document remained secret. But Thucydides says nothing of the sort, and Tissaphernes had every reason to circulate its conditions among his new subjects.

The first clause asserts Darius's possession of ancestral territory, without naming locations or making explicit reference to the need for reclamation: "Whatever country or poleis the king has, or the king's ancestors had, shall be the king's." It presents Persian intervention as a benefit to Ionia, on the grounds that the king, the Spartans, and their allies will take joint steps to prevent further Athenian exploitation of the cities' "money or anything else." The next section guarantees a joint Persian-Spartan war against Athens, in which neither ally will make peace without the other's agreement. By implication, this requirement extended Persian influence to the far side of the Aegean. Should Athens ask Sparta for a settlement due to events in mainland Greece, the Persians would need to give their permission. The king's reciprocal promise sought to assure the Spartans that they would not be abandoned once separate Persian interests, such as Amorges's defeat, were satisfied. It makes no direct reference to subsidies for Sparta's fleet, since the ships had not yet arrived in force.
The pact concludes with the statement that Sparta and its allies will treat all rebels against the king as their enemies and that the king will do the same in connection with any anti-Spartan rebels. Modern commentators have taken this promise as implausible, or in the words of D. M. Lewis, “simply a courteous balancing clause.” But Tissaphernes may have meant to highlight Persia’s willingness to take any step to protect its friends’ interests, even to intervene on the Greek mainland, despite the lack of such plans in the immediate future. In turn, Sparta’s promised hostility to Persia’s internal opponents required more than just cooperation against Amorges. Darius’s claim to the Ionian Greeks meant that resistance to Persian tribute impositions would be categorized as rebellion. The treaty draft served to deter any Ionians unwilling to rejoin the empire by showing that they could expect no help from Persia’s faithful Spartan clients.

Agreement in hand, Tissaphernes led his troops back toward northern Ionia and supervised the removal of a remaining section of wall at Teos. This should not have required the army, given the previous efforts of Stages and the Ionians. Teos was about a hundred miles from Miletos and fifty from Magnesia, in the opposite direction from Amorges’s rebels. But the Chians had just suffered a minor naval defeat, and perhaps Tissaphernes wished to give a boost to Ionian confidence. More importantly, the march allowed him to inspect the reclaimed cities, show off his strength, and spread the news of Sparta’s endorsement of Persian rule. The probable route would have taken Tissaphernes through wealthy Ephesos, offering him an opportunity to strengthen connections with its influential Artemis cult. The final demolition at Teos served as a symbolic display of Athens’s eradication from the Ionian landscape.

But Tissaphernes’s Ionian tour endangered Miletos, vulnerable to the Athenian fleet. When the first Spartans arrived, there were only eight Athenian triremes at Samos, but thirty-two more soon joined them, while only ten additional vessels joined the Peloponnesian fleet. A twenty-five-ship squadron thwarted Chios’s attempt to bring Lesbos into the rebellion, seized Klaizomenai and settled its residents on an offshore island, manned two forts in the territory of Erythrai, and began to ravage Chios’s countryside. Tamos, an Egyptian-Carian deputy of Tissaphernes, joined Ionian and Peloponnesian forces for a counterattack but achieved only mixed success, taking Phokaia and Kyme but losing Klaizomenai for good. Meanwhile, a separate force of twenty Athenian triremes seized Lade, an island in the bay of Miletos, and launched a raid that killed the Spartan general Chalkideus.
Finally, in September, forty-eight triremes and thirty-five hundred soldiers landed to assault Miletos itself. Sparta’s navy was still nowhere in sight, and Tissaphernes’s army left Teos to the Athenians and repeated its hundred-mile march in the opposite direction just in time to come to the defense of Miletos.

The Battle of Miletos demonstrated the difficulty of protecting Ionia from Athenian retribution. Riding at the head of his cavalry, the satrap was willing, but his troops were weak, fleeing before the Athenian phalanx. Only the Milesians stood their ground, routing Athens’s Argive allies. The battle lost, they retreated behind recently erected city walls and prepared for a siege. The contrasting performance of Tissaphernes’s soldiers and his new subjects was anything but flattering.

Things took a turn for the better a few hours later, however, when the Spartan general Therimenes put in nearby with the long-awaited fleet, including thirty-three Peloponnesian and twenty-two Sicilian triremes. Learning of their approach, the Athenians withdrew to Samos. Tissaphernes jumped at the opportunity to take action against Amorges that could redeem his troops, but he would need to give greater thought to overcoming the Athenian naval challenge.

**Victory over Amorges**

The Peloponnesian fleet empowered Tissaphernes to seize the offensive against Amorges, which the rebel’s strong position had so far prevented, and to improve on Persia’s strategic position in western Anatolia. Before the Spartans’ arrival, Amorges’s forces in Caria were comparable to those that Tissaphernes could bring to bear, probably numbering at least three thousand. A rumor of Amorges’s advance caused the crews of ten Chian ships, two thousand men at full strength, to abandon their cruise toward Miletos, and there were enough survivors of Amorges’s defeat for the Spartans to reemploy as a garrison for Chios. They included Peloponnesian mercenaries, like the Arkadians who had garrisoned Notion for Pissouthnes. It is possible, although direct evidence is lacking, that Amorges derived support from inland communities such as Mylasa, the prominent Carian center only ten miles east of his coastal base. The harbor at Iasos allowed the Athenians to land supplies or reinforcements, and Thucydides claims that the rebels never expected the arrival of hostile ships. At the same time, Amorges was not tethered to Iasos, and Chalkideus had been apprehensive about the threat he posed to Miletos, twenty-five miles to the northwest.

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The geography of Caria limited Tissaphernes’s offensive options. The satrap’s cavalry was of little use in mountainous country, and the Iasos region was only accessible by a few routes across the Menderes massif. The principal road through inland Caria followed the Marsyas valley from its confluence with the Maeander, near Tralles, to the southern town of Idyma. It is unknown whether Tissaphernes could access the entire route or if Amorges blocked it in force, but to reach Iasos, an army had to climb from this valley onto a rough mountain path to Mylasa, a route on which the terrain was likely to favor the defenders. The acquisition of Miletos offered an alternative approach, but the roads from this direction were still dangerously narrow, pinched between the slopes of Mount Grion and the coast and probably watched with vigilance.

The fleet provided a third option, and Tissaphernes exploited the chance for strategic surprise. After failing to catch the Athenian fleet as it withdrew from Miletos, Therimenes’s ships returned to their initial landing point at Teichioussa to pick up spare rigging left ashore in anticipation of a naval action. This put them within easy striking distance of Iasos, and Tissaphernes rode over to meet the Peloponnesians and convinced them to descend on Amorges by sea. Their attack was a total success; they captured the rebel leader and much of his army. Thucydides highlights the bravery of the Syracusan crews, but some of Tissaphernes’s soldiers may have followed by land and joined in the fighting. Even if this was not the case, the fact that the satrap planned the operation and paid the allies who carried it out allowed him to take credit for victory. Tissaphernes sent Amorges to court to meet his fate, proving his own aptitude for command and good judgment in cultivating the Spartan alliance.

While increasing his standing with the king, Tissaphernes made an immediate profit by purchasing all of the Iasos prisoners from the Spartans, except for those mercenaries that his allies wished to rehire. At one daric per captive, equivalent to twenty Attic drachmai, the purchase was a notable bargain. At Athens in 415, auctions of slaves from the confiscated estates of the hermokopidai brought in average sums between 170 and 180 drachmai, and the lowest recorded amount was 72 for a Carian child. Tissaphernes’s behavior bears comparison with that of his colleague Arshama, Egypt’s satrap, who ordered his land agent to exploit local uprisings for his private advantage:

The officials who are in Lower Egypt are being diligent in the disturbances, and are forcefully guarding the personnel and goods of their lords. They
are also seeking others from elsewhere, and are adding to the estates of their lords. But you and your colleagues are not so doing. Now I have also previously sent to you concerning this: “You are to be diligent. Guard my personnel and goods forcefully, so that there shall not be any loss from my estate. Also, from elsewhere, personnel of artisans of every kind, seek (in) sufficient (numbers), and bring (them) into my courtyard, and mark (them) with my brand, and make them over to my estate, just as the [previous] official were doing.”

The labor forces associated with estates formed an important portion of a Persian grandee’s wealth, and wartime offered unparalleled opportunities for their augmentation. Xenophon reports that Tissaphernes later came into possession of a Carian oikos, perhaps as a result of a royal grant in the wake of Pissouthnes’s and Amorges’s defeats, and if such land was newly obtained, the Iasos survivors could have added to its productivity. Alternatively, Tissaphernes could have obtained large amounts of coin through the resale of prisoners at regular slave prices.

Amorges’s removal not only added to Tissaphernes’s wealth but facilitated new contacts with subjects and revenue sources inaccessible during the rebellion. While the allied fleet returned to Miletos, Tissaphernes stayed at Iasos to restore its defenses, possibly installing a garrison. He probably used this time to either reclaim the loyalties of Amorges’s Carian supporters or replace them with more trustworthy elites.

It was now safer to travel the Tralles-Idyma road to southern Caria, which may have made possible Tissaphernes’s sponsorship of Knidos’s revolt from Athens, completing his acquisition of the highest Greek tribute payers on the Ionian and Carian coasts. Kaunos came over as well, facilitating communication with the family of Kheriga, ruler of Xanthos, whose cooperation with Tissaphernes is celebrated in the Xanthos stele’s Lycian inscription. After reverent mention of the “royal decrees of Darius and Artaxerxes,” the Lycian text boasts of connections with Tissaphernes and the Spartans during the war against Athens, celebrates Persian confirmation of the dynasts’ land rights or military authority at Xanthos, and commemorates an exchange of reciprocal honors. Lacunae and obscure vocabulary prevent complete translation, but enough survives to show Tissaphernes’s successful extension of patronage over the region. The appearance of his name (zis[aprнима]) on a Lycian silver stater, with that of Xanthos (aɾнима) on the obverse, strengthens this impression. Tissaphernes’s legend accompanies the head of a helmeted goddess,
Athena or her Lycian equivalent Maliya, suggesting divine endorsement of his authority, while the link between the city’s name and the image of a rider in Iranian costume celebrates Persian-Lycian partnership.

Control over coastal Caria and Lycia offered both financial and strategic benefits. The cooperation of Anatolian elites could increase Persian tribute income. When they were still paying Athens in the 440s, the Lycians had contributed an annual sum of ten talents, higher than most of the Carian and Ionian poleis. Moreover, Tissaphernes now held ports essential to the passage of Persian warships toward the Aegean. Flush with success, he returned to Miletos to revise the terms of the Spartan alliance.

Revising the Terms of Alliance

By November 412, it was clear that the Athenian war would last well into the coming year, and the Peloponnesian fleet, larger than promised but still unable to dislodge the enemy from Samos or end the harassment of Chios, would remain in Ionia for an extended period. The extended Spartan presence posed a double threat to Tissaphernes’s private finances and tribute collections, and he sought to mitigate the problem by reducing wages and crafting a diplomatic prohibition on Spartan fund-raising in the Ionian cities. Around the same time, he took in Alkibiades, who had fallen out with Spartans disappointed at the war’s lack of progress. The fugitive had already assisted him on several occasions, speaking up on behalf of his initial embassy at Sparta and encouraging friends at Miletos to galvanize the city to defect from Athens. Once he joined Tissaphernes’s entourage, Alkibiades warned him of potential Spartan encroachment in Ionia, and Thucydides suggests that he persuaded the satrap to stop the Spartans from gaining the advantage over Athens. But Tissaphernes’s behavior is more explicable in terms of the economic difficulties of supporting the growing allied fleet. The requirement that Tissaphernes’s decisions be endorsed by the king must also be taken into account. There was little cause for Darius to desire anything other than Athens’s rapid defeat, and one of the items discussed by Alkibiades and Tissaphernes suggests that the king now began to consider a deployment of Persian warships to break the Aegean impasse.

Tissaphernes provided the first month’s pay to the Peloponnesian crews at Miletos at the promised rate of one Attic drachma a day per man, adding up to one talent per trireme and fifty-five for the entire fleet. But he announced the reduction of future wages by 50 percent. His envoys had agreed to the drachma rate at Sparta the previous winter, probably intend-
ing to match the fee that Athens paid its rowers during the earlier part of the
war, but the financial crisis after the Sicily debacle caused the Athenians to
lower their wages. Tissaphernes’s decision brought his allies’ pay back in
line with the enemy’s new half-drachma rate. Therimenes accepted these
terms, but the Syracusan general Hermokrates complained, and so Tissa-
phernes agreed to a slight increase above three obols per man, promising
thirty talents (instead of twenty-seven and a half) per month for fifty-five
triremes. He promised to contact Darius for confirmation of the new rate or
orders to restore the old. Thucydides never reports a royal response, but the
three-obol wage, perhaps including the minor modification, remained in
place for years thereafter.

Tissaphernes’s most likely motive for reducing wages was financial pres-
sure stemming from the war’s duration. Thucydides claims that Alkibiades
convinced the satrap to reduce the Spartan fleet’s power, thereby taking
vengeance on his former patrons. But the historian also makes Alkibiades
excuse Tissaphernes’s actions by referencing the satrap’s expenses: “He ex-
plained that Tissaphernes, now making war by means of his private funds,
was thrifty by necessity, but whenever financial support came down from
the King, he would give them the pay in full.”

Despite the speaker’s untrustworthiness, the description of Tissaphernes’s financial situation is
credible in the Achaemenid economic context. The king rewarded his fa-
vored nobles with lucrative estates, which Pierre Briant describes as “a for-
tune that existed somewhere on the borderline between state structure and
personal property.” The possessors of such lands had to turn over some of
their profits to the crown, but they kept the rest to compete with their elite
rivals through conspicuous consumption and display, and as noted, they
could increase their income through intensified exploitation. At the end of
Tissaphernes’s career in 395, the confiscation of his household resources
would produce at least 920 talents in silver. In 412, he probably owned enough
capital to issue a few payments to the Peloponnesians without royal reim-
brursement, but he surely would have wished to conserve the greater part of
the wealth that symbolized his status.

When Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos first offered to pay the Pelopo-
nesian fleet, most observers anticipated that the war would end before the
conclusion of summer. Its extension spoiled plans to finance Athens’s defeat
at limited cost. The forty triremes that Sparta was supposed to send should
have cost Tissaphernes forty talents a month for three or four months’ ser-
vice. Instead, he paid fifty-five the first month, and after that there was no
end to his obligation in sight. Two month’s wages at the drachma rate, if the fleet’s numbers held steady, would have equaled the annual tribute of roughly 110 talents that the Athenians extracted from the Ionian and Carian coastal poleis at the height of their power. The Spartans and their allies were still outfitting additional ships, twenty-three of which arrived a few weeks after the funding decision and twenty-seven more the following month. If Tissaphernes paid them all at the original wage, without relief from the crown, his expenditure would exceed 920 talents in only ten more months.

Payments over an extended period at the drachma rate would have forced Tissaphernes to request financial support from Darius. Given his success against Amorges, it was not unthinkable that the king would grant some assistance. The most efficient solution would have been a royal command to reallocate incoming tribute to meet the allies’ needs, making the Ionians contribute to their own defense and following Achaemenid precedents for reallocation of taxes in support of military garrisons. But this would not have been sufficient for extensive operations. By late January, the Peloponnesian fleet comprised a total of ninety-four ships, and a full year’s pay at the drachma rate would have equaled about ten years’ worth of Ionian and Carian tribute. It is doubtful that the king, after initial assurances of intervention’s limited cost, would have been willing to sacrifice expected profits to his Spartan clients, whose naval tardiness had contributed to Athens’s partial recovery. Tissaphernes’s wage reduction, therefore, was not the first step in a secret plan to weaken the Peloponnesians but a measure he took to ensure his economic and political self-preservation that was acceptable to Darius. Far from prolonging the war further, he was trying to reduce the cost of its duration.

At the same time, neither Tissaphernes nor the king wavered in their intention to bring about Athens’s defeat. A few weeks after the pay announcement, at the Spartans’ request, Tissaphernes agreed to a revised treaty draft that clarified several terms of their partnership, and reasserted Persia’s patronage of Sparta’s fleet. The Spartans seem to have been dissatisfied with the previous draft’s lack of reference to naval wages and worried that the reduction might be a step toward total withdrawal of aid, now that the Persians no longer needed help against Amorges. The introductory line dismisses this concern, stressing the permanence of Persia’s commitment as the will of both Darius and his sons, the empire’s future rulers. A new clause expands on the promise of joint action in war and peace by mentioning subsi-
dies, avoiding naming specific amounts but stating that the king will provide support for the entire army present in his country by his invitation. On the other hand, this implies a prerogative to deny payment to forces arriving without royal approval. It seems unlikely that the purpose was to discourage reinforcement, as, despite the rising expenses, it was clear that more ships were needed to confront the Athenian threat. But Tissaphernes may have learned of Pharnabazos’s continuing appeals to Sparta to send a separate fleet to the Hellespont and so included wording intended to discourage cooperation with his rival, associating the king’s legitimate invitation with his own sphere of command. It is also likely that this language alludes to the end of the war, reminding the Spartans that their stay in Anatolia at the king’s expense would not be permanent.

The bulk of the second agreement set out new rules for Peloponnesian behavior in Persian territory, opening and closing with mutual nonaggression clauses that may seem jarring in light of the recent cooperation and that possibly hint at a rise in tension between Tissaphernes’s troops and the allied crews. It forbid the Spartans and their allies from attacking the land and cities that now belong to Darius or had belonged to his father and his ancestors and enjoined them to punish any renegade allies that attacked the Persian empire without approval. The king promised likewise to abstain from attacking them and prevent his subjects from doing so. Above all, it prohibited the Spartans and their allies from collecting tribute in the coastal cities, indicating that the king had no intention of putting Sparta in Athens’s former place as Ionia’s overseer. Sparta was not a trade center of Athens’s caliber, lacked its own silver supplies, and could offer no tangible benefits that would justify a long-term delegation of authority and taxation rights along the Anatolian coast. The Persians preferred to limit Spartan funding sources in order to increase their dependence on the king and their status as imperial clients.

The tribute clause may have been related to Tissaphernes’s Ionian collection efforts. Thucydides does not state whether he had begun to gather the arrears that Darius expected. But around this period, Chios and several mainland Ionian cities petitioned him for money. Tissaphernes delegated the task of responding to Alkibiades, who reminded the Chians of their wealth and the fact that others were already fighting on their behalf and who told the Ionians that they had once paid tribute to Athens and should be willing to contribute as much or more to the war of liberation. The Ionian requests may have included pleas for tribute remission, and it is likely
that Miletos’s strong military showing and the presence of sympathetic Peloponnesians encouraged their boldness. Thucydides comments that while the fleet was camped there, the Milesians supported the war with enthusiasm, implying that some made donations to the allied captains. If this was the case, they were in a position to retort that they had been supporting the war by funding the men who were doing the actual fighting. This was a scenario that Persia needed to prevent from unfolding, on both financial and ideological grounds. Tissaphernes’s agreement with Therimenes ensured that Ionia would pay the satrap’s agents alone and that he would remain Sparta’s sole paymaster.

Once again, it is safe to assume that Darius approved the terms. The absence of direct comment on Thucydides’s part should not be mistaken for evidence of limited royal involvement, and his brief references to Tissaphernes’s communications with court show only the tip of the iceberg. Correspondence between the king and his general must have been frequent, and Darius was likely to convey his expectations before diplomatic initiatives were undertaken. Between August and December 412, there were least four occasions that demanded an exchange of letters—the first treaty draft, the victory over Amorges, the wage issue, and the second treaty draft—and Tissaphernes probably sent additional reports whenever he occupied additional cities. His letters could reach the imperial capitals in twelve days or less, and a royal response was possible in less than a month, although deliberations and other business might cause some delay. By the time of the second agreement with the Spartans, Darius should have possessed detailed knowledge of the Aegean situation.

Around the same time, it is likely that the king and Tissaphernes began correspondence about the commitment of a Persian fleet. Thucydides mentions that Alkibiades discouraged Tissaphernes from bringing Phoenician warships into the Aegean. The decision belonged to the king and not his subordinate, but the reference suggests that planning was under way by the time of the second treaty draft, as a major naval campaign in the spring or summer of 411 would have required logistical preparations many months in advance.

The Persians had not originally offered to send a royal fleet to aid the Spartans. If the war had ended as expected in the summer of 412, it would have been difficult to gather and man Persian ships in the Levant in time for them to take part in the fighting. But the war’s continuation and the minimal numbers of the initial Spartan force in Ionia probably raised Persian
Tissaphernes’s War and the Treaty of 411

concerns over the allies’ ability to win at sea, and the Spartan fleet’s failure to take the offensive from its encampment at Miletos would not have allayed their fears. Tissaphernes’s acquisition of Ionian, Carian, and Lycian ports also meant it would be easier for a Persian fleet to move toward the Aegean. It made strategic sense for Darius to contemplate direct naval action.

It may have been too late to order construction of triremes in the fall of 412, and the existence of a large fleet by the summer of 411 implies that Persia had engaged in a new phase of naval construction sometime in the last twenty years. The small fleet that Artaxerxes retained at the time of the Samian crisis in 440 would have been aging out of service by 420. New shipbuilding may have taken place during Artaxerxes’s final years or Darius’s first decade, perhaps spurred by moments of tension with Athens and the possibility of an Aegean war. Darius might have still been reluctant to commit the ships to an active campaign, given the resources needed for their logistical support, but their arrival would give the Spartans overwhelming numbers and might end the war and its mounting costs.

In the meantime, the Aegean conflict was starting to cause complications for the king’s maritime revenues. Seaborne trade continued, as Athens’s desperate need to import supplies that could not be interdicted by the Spartans at Dekeleia offered great profit to merchantmen willing to risk the journey. The most active route connected Black Sea grain exporters to Athens via the Propontis and Hellespont, but some ships still sailed from Persia’s eastern Mediterranean provinces, via Anatolia’s southern coast. In December 412, around the time of the second treaty draft, the Spartans tried to intercept Athens-bound cargo ships from Egypt by stationing six triremes at Triopion point, the tip of the Carian Chersonese west of Knidos. The Athenians foiled them, capturing the squadron off Triopion in a surprise attack, but six remained at Knidos, and the Spartans may have attempted to interfere with merchant traffic in similar ways after they moved to Rhodes in January.

It is sometimes assumed that the ships in question sailed from parts of the Nile Delta in revolt against Persian rule, but it is doubtful that Persians had lost control of Egypt’s ports, and there is no reason to believe that the king prevented his own subjects from trading with Athens. The war in the Aegean led to a conflict of interest between eastern Mediterranean merchant captains and the Peloponnesian generals who hoped to choke off Athens’s access to overseas supply. The resulting threat to Aegean trade and royal toll income added to the urgency of a resolution to the wasteful conflict. The sooner Athens accepted defeat, the sooner traders could transport
goods to Aegean locations and pay the king’s collectors without threat of interference. Darius’s fleet offered a way to resolve such complications, but Tissaphernes took diplomatic measures in early 411 that offered a speedier, less expensive close to the conflict through direct talks with Athens.

Quarrel with Sparta and Contacts with Athens

Tissaphernes received an Athenian embassy following a downturn in his relations with the Spartans in January 411 and the movement of the allied fleet from Miletos to Rhodes. Thucydides views the negotiations with Athens as the fruit of Tissaphernes’s balancing policy but also argues that the satrap meant the talks to fail because he feared the Spartans would retaliate against him for his betrayal. Several scholars have considered the alternative explanation that the king and Tissaphernes were exploring a genuine avenue for the war’s resolution, not merely bluffing to coax the Spartans back into allegiance. A deal might have ended the fighting on Persian terms, but the talks broke down, more likely because of the combatants’ conflicting objectives than Tissaphernes’s fear of his own allies.

Tissaphernes’s contacts with Athens began toward the end of 412. Only forty-five miles from Miletos, the satrap’s winter quarters at Magnesia allowed rapid communication with the Peloponnesians but also the coastal towns on the far side of Mounts Mykale and Thorax, facing the enemy base on Samos. Around the time of the second draft treaty, Alkibiades wrote to contacts in the Athenian fleet, alleging that he could convince Tissaphernes and Darius to shift support to Athens if they permitted him to come back from exile and changed their government from democracy to a form more amenable to the king. The Athenian generals responded favorably, sending a preliminary embassy to which Alkibiades repeated his claims. Thucydides depicts him as acting alone, promising what he could not deliver in the hopes of securing a pardon, but the meeting implies Tissaphernes’s awareness. Alkibiades was in danger from the Spartans and unlikely to stray far from his satrapal protector. The most likely site of the meeting was Magnesia itself, which would have required a safe conduct from Tissaphernes for the Athenian envoys’ passage. Tissaphernes, in other words, was the actual host, and his consideration of the idea of holding talks with Athens predated the falling out with the Spartans at the Knidos conference.

This initial discussion elucidates why Tissaphernes favored Alkibiades. Thucydides guesses that the satrap valued his opinions and took him as his “instructor in all things.” Plutarch, calling Tissaphernes “a man of evil
thought and lover of wickedness” and the “greatest Greek-hater among the Persians,” claims that he was so impressed by the Athenian’s wiles and flattery that he named his most beautiful paradise garden after him. But it is most likely that the satrap used Alkibiades as a source of information about Athenian leaders and their decision-making processes and as an effective means of communication with the enemy fleet. The exile appeared capable of promoting dissent among his countrymen, and the response to his letters raised the possibility of Athens’s submission without further fighting. But Alkibiades’s true goal was an Athenian pardon, and Tissaphernes seems to have trusted him too much. The satrap might have allowed Alkibiades to offer Persian friendship on the condition of goodwill gestures like an Athenian governmental reform, but he probably imagined the outcome as the bestowal of peace on a humbled client, not an extension of military or economic aid against Sparta. Yet that was the misleading impression that the Athenian naval delegation brought back to Samos at Alkibiades’s instigation. Phrynichos, the general who had ordered the retreat from Miletos and a personal enemy of Alkibiades, denounced the offer of Persian alliance as a fantasy, but most of the other commanders on Samos were willing to make the attempt. A prominent Athenian named Peisandros returned home in January or February to make the case before the assembly, privately plotting an oligarchic coup while openly advocating political sacrifice in order to win the war with Persian support. The stage was set for diplomatic misunderstanding, as Athens gained a new hope of victory instead of preparing for surrender.

Tissaphernes’s Athenian outreach took the Spartans by surprise, prompting their fleet commander, the navarch Astyochos, to seek his own audience at Magnesia. Astyochos informed the satrap of a letter from Phrynichos betraying Alkibiades’s plan to convert Persia to the Athenian side. Pleased at the apparent division among Athens’s leaders, Tissaphernes reassured Astyochos of his continuing devotion to Sparta, and the navarch kept in frequent communication thereafter, prompting detractors to charge him with acceptance of satrapal bribes. It is possible that Astyochos’s information undermined Tissaphernes’s faith in Alkibiades, but the fact that he kept the exile in his employment suggests a continuing belief in his usefulness and a willingness to overlook his liabilities.

While the Athenians prepared for negotiations with Persia, Tissaphernes set off from Magnesia in mid-January to meet a new Spartan squadron, twenty-seven triremes strong, on the coast of southern Caria. It had sailed from the Peloponnese to Kaunos to avoid interception, and Astyochos took his entire
fleets from Miletos to meet it, while Tissaphernes probably traveled via the Tralles-Idyma road. The Peloponnesian ships united, defeated a small Athenian force at Syme, and put in at Knidos, where Tissaphernes arrived after a journey of about 150 miles. The new ships delivered eleven Spartan diplomats, sent to audit Astyochos’s conduct of the war and inform Tissaphernes of their disappointment with the existing treaty drafts. Lichas, the most prominent envoy, rejected the references to Darius’s power over the lands that his ancestors used to rule, claiming that this would amount to the enslavement of the Aegean islands and mainland Greece as far as Boiotia, returning the Greeks to the rule of the Mede instead of freedom. He demanded a new agreement and stated that the Peloponnesians did not need Persian pay on such insulting terms, at which point Tissaphernes left the conference “in fury.” The entire Peloponnesian fleet then sailed to Rhodes, where it won control of all three cities but failed to raise sufficient funds to replace the satrap’s wages.

Thucydides writes that the argument led Tissaphernes to fear that the Spartans were planning to attempt to liberate Ionia, but he fails to make Lichas express discontent with Persian authority over the Anatolian Greeks. The satrap’s anger more likely sprang from the semantic challenge to the king’s authority. It seems clear that Tissaphernes’s early treaty drafts did not seek to pave the way for direct Persian rule beyond his coastline. Nevertheless, Achaemenid ideology dictated the king’s world supremacy, whether direct or indirect, and the equation of Darius’s power with that of his ancestors had particular meaning in light of the revolts that characterized the early years of his reign. Lichas’s protest sounded like a denial that Darius was as strong as previous Achaemenid rulers or that he deserved to claim universal hegemony. Several scholars have proposed that Lichas was picking a fight as a negotiating technique to strengthen Sparta’s hand, and it was natural for a royal representative to react in anger to such an affront from clients in imperial pay.

Tissaphernes also had reason to be irritated at the growth of the Peloponnesian fleet. First, it increased his financial obligation by fifteen talents per month. Second, the reinforcements had sailed at the behest of Pharnabazos’s emissaries, still lobbying Sparta to transfer its ships from Ionia to the Hellespont. For the better part of the year, Tissaphernes had succeeded in keeping his colleague at arm’s length, but that now appeared no longer possible. One of the new arrivals was Klearchos, the proxenos of Byzantium, and the Spartan commissioners brought orders to detach part of the fleet for a northern campaign. Not only would this weaken a force already
unwilling to attack the Athenians at Samos, but until the move to the Hellespont occurred, Tissaphernes would have to use his own personal resources on ships meant to benefit Pharnabazos.\textsuperscript{10}

These factors probably contributed to Tissaphernes’s perception that it would be to his advantage to engage in diplomatic efforts to acquire Athens’s speedy surrender. He returned to Magnesia or another convenient site, and in February or early March, received a formal embassy of eleven Athenians, led by Peisandros.\textsuperscript{11} This time, Tissaphernes sat down with them in person, while still employing Alkibiades as his mouthpiece, and laid out terms for the restoration of Persian-Athenian friendship. They met on three occasions, and during each meeting Alkibiades communicated a Persian demand and requested Athens’s approval. Peisandros’s ambassadors duly agreed to surrender all of Ionia and the offshore islands, but the talks foundered on acknowledgment of Persian naval rights in the Aegean. “To let the King construct ships and sail beyond his own land, wherever and with however many he wished,” was more than the Athenians were willing to concede, and they broke off the negotiations and returned to Samos.\textsuperscript{12}

Thucydides blames Tissaphernes and Alkibiades for the talks’ failure, guessing that the satrap meant them to fail as part of his balancing game and had come to fear the Spartans more than the Athenians. According to Thucydides, Alkibiades, recognizing this, saw that his own influence with Athens would diminish if Persia ended the talks, and so presented terms designed to provoke the Athenians into walking out first.\textsuperscript{13} But once again, the theory of deliberate sabotage suffers from several flaws, above all the failure to account for royal involvement. There was enough time for Tissaphernes and Darius to correspond between Alkibiades’s preliminary interview with the Athenians from Samos and the meeting with Peisandros’s embassy. It is even possible that they exchanged letters between the Knidos meeting and the Athenian talks.\textsuperscript{14} Tissaphernes was obligated to inform his sovereign of such an important development as a direct conference with enemy ambassadors, and it is doubtful that the king left him without instruction in composing Persia’s terms or that the satrap gave Alkibiades carte blanche for their invention. During the negotiations, Tissaphernes could have employed his own translators to verify Alkibiades’s accurate rendering of the Persian conditions. The terms that Peisandros rejected almost certainly reflected the royal will.\textsuperscript{15}

If a Persian balancing policy influenced the talks, it must have derived from Darius rather than Tissaphernes alone, but a royal wish that the talks
should collapse is implausible, as is the idea that the king dreaded the Peloponnesian fleet. Delay through insincere negotiations would only increase the war’s interference with Ionian tax collection and maritime tolls and would hardly serve the image of Persian imperial influence. If the Spartans were to betray their patrons and attempt seizure of the Ionian cities, the absence of funds could be expected to limit their effectiveness, and if they tried to ravage the countryside, their lack of cavalry would make them vulnerable to Persian counterattack. Meanwhile, Darius’s own ships were under preparation on the coast of Phoenicia. With plentiful resources available for military action, the king was unlikely to let a fear of Spartan misbehavior dictate his policy. Furthermore, even if Tissaphernes was overcome with such worries, he could hardly have admitted as much to Darius, in light of the Achaemenid ideological emphasis on fearlessness in wartime.

Tissaphernes’s talks with Peisandros are better understood as a genuine effort to persuade Athens into surrender and acknowledgment of Persian supremacy. Darius may have been willing to restore a state of philia, as envisioned in the Peace of Epilykos, if the Athenians atoned for their misdeeds by accepting a redefinition of their relationship and the loss of the territories that Persia had once allowed them to exploit. This would explain the king’s conditions, reasonable in a surrender document but unacceptable to Athenians who thought they had come to negotiate a military alliance. They could envision territorial concessions in exchange for aid, but the demand for non-interference with the royal navy showed the king’s lack of interest in deserting his Spartan clients and helping Athens’s ships win the war. Alkibiades still bore some culpability for the meeting’s failure, but not in the way that Thucydides suggests. His fault was to propagate unreasonable optimism before the talks and confusion over their purpose rather than misrepresentation of Persian terms during the actual conference.

If Athens had accepted all the Persian demands, Tissaphernes would have been in a strong position to request Sparta’s participation in a common peace accord, similar to the later King’s Peace. The alliance treaty drafts required Persia and Sparta to conclude peace jointly, but if the Spartans refused, Darius could withdraw permission to operate in Achaemenid territory, justifying a total stoppage of pay and even attacks on the Peloponnesians’ coastal positions. The growing fleet in Phoenicia would have provided further leverage to compel Sparta’s compliance.

The probable outcome of a successful negotiation with Athens would have been the end of the war, demonstrating Darius’s power over the sea, bene-
faction to his Spartan clients, and protection of Ionian subjects. Persia’s victory would have come at limited cost, increasing royal profits and making a naval campaign unnecessary. It need not have included a future balancing of Athenian and Spartan power, but it would have encouraged a renewal of profitable maritime trade with Athens by removing the impediments of naval warfare.

The talks’ failure cost Darius and Tissaphernes an unparalleled chance to bring their intervention to a brilliant close and forced them to intensify preparations for the Phoenician fleet. Yet there were silver linings. Peisandros went home to launch his coup despite Persia’s disinterest in Athens’s form of government, and the overthrow of the democracy in the summer of 411 undermined the enemy war effort. In the meantime, news of negotiations helped to push the Spartans into a more submissive stance, as they realized that Persia’s support was not only indispensable, but might be lost in the case of the king’s displeasure. In this context, Tissaphernes resumed talks with the allied fleet on Rhodes, leading to the treaty of 411.

The Treaty of 411

Thucydides claims that Tissaphernes negotiated the treaty because Sparta’s wage shortage on Rhodes led him to fear both Athenian victory and Spartan raids on his coastline. But just as in the case of the Athenian talks, it is necessary to consider the formal Persian-Spartan accord as an expression of royal policy. It is doubtful that Darius confirmed the grant of aid out of worry over the damage Sparta might cause if it betrayed him and more plausible that a perception of Spartan naval vulnerability influenced his decision. The king was likely to be embarrassed if the clients he endorsed lost their war while a weakened Athens defied him. With Athenian surrender off the table, a Persian show of strength was the obvious reaction. The resulting agreement placated Lichas and his colleagues; it improved their attitude toward Persia because it recognized the autonomy of Greeks outside Asia but at the same time it strongly reiterated the king’s rights within his sphere of direct control. Above all, it promised that Darius’s navy would enter the war and cooperate with the Spartans to overcome the Athenian challenge. Despite Thucydides’s doubts in its sincerity, the document offers strong evidence of the royal wish to bring the intervention to a rapid, victorious end.

The road to the treaty began in March, just after the Athenians’ departure, when Tissaphernes set out for Kaunos to reestablish contact with the Peloponnesians on Rhodes. The journey from Magnesia, his fourth major trip across the reclaimed territories in just eight months, was once again
about 150 miles by the Tralles-Idyma road. Since the intervention began, Tissaphernes had ridden at least a thousand miles on diplomatic and military business, advertising his wealth, power, and dedication to the war before his subjects and allies. The satrap would have traveled in state with advisers and friends, dependents, military escorts, and servants to drive wagons, care for the baggage animals, and attend to every other need. A fourth-century document from Persian Bactria illustrates the foodstuffs needed to support such an itinerary—thousands of pounds of flour and fodder, flocks of sheep, chickens, and geese, herds of cattle, and even horses for meat on the hoof. Some of the resources might have been released from Tissaphernes's estates, since official storehouses would not have been as numerous in the recently acquired Carian-Lycian border region as they were on the royal roads closer to Sardis. The general could also obtain sustenance from elites along his route who wished to demonstrate their allegiance to Persian power. At Kau-nos, he is likely to have continued communications with Kheriga of Xan-thos, perhaps even inviting a Lycian representative to sit in on talks with the Spartans, thereby using his patronage of foreign allies to impress and honor Anatolian vassals.

Tissaphernes occupied a superior negotiating position as he hosted the Spartan envoys, who sailed forty miles to Kaunos to request a renewal of pay. Their capture of Rhodes had been a major victory, enhancing their ability to disrupt Athens’s trade with the eastern Mediterranean, but fund-raising efforts fell far short of the fleet’s needs. Thirty-two talents, gathered over eighty days, was not enough to pay all the sailors for a single month at Tissaphernes's rate, and they were relieved at the money he now offered, although it is unclear whether it included back wages for the period during which he had ceased to pay them. Tissaphernes was now ready to promise the royal fleet’s arrival, and the same commissioners who had challenged him at Knidos accepted the show of generosity. The Peloponnesian fleet sailed back to Miletos and Tissaphernes returned to the Maeander valley, where Spartan dignitaries joined him to finalize the treaty in late spring of 411. The interval may have allowed Tissaphernes to communicate the final wording and Sparta’s approval to Darius and receive a royal endorsement before the concluding ceremonies. An official named in the treaty, a certain Hieramenes who also appears alongside Tissaphernes in the Xanthos stele, may have been Darius’s brother-in-law, attending as an extra royal representative. There was also enough time for the arrival of representatives from the Daskyleion satrapy, two hundred miles north of Magnesia.
squadron that Pharnabazos had requested made up more than a quarter of the Peloponnesian fleet, and the Spartans may have requested his inclusion in the formal treaty before they expanded the war to the Hellespont.\footnote{131} It is also plausible that Darius ordered Pharnabazos to take part, wishing to retake coastal cities in the north as well as Ionia and pressing the satraps for greater cooperation to win the war.\footnote{132} Even so, the treaty cemented Tissaphernes’s preeminence over his rival, mentioning his responsibility for the subsidies and the royal fleet while making no reference to what Pharnabazos might offer. It is doubtful that the Daskyleion satrap was pleased with the terms. One explanation for the document’s reference to the “sons of Pharnakes,” instead of Pharnabazos himself, might be that he sent his half brother rather than submit to the indignity of a personal meeting with Tissaphernes.\footnote{133}

The treaty opens with a statement of Darius’s rights over the country under his direct territorial control, defining it by means of the Greek term Asia, to reassure the Spartans that he was not pressing claims beyond the Anatolian coast.\footnote{134} It may have seemed desirable to stress the continuing autonomy of Chios and Rhodes, the most important islands supporting the allied war effort, where the Persians decided not to assert direct control.\footnote{135} Nevertheless, the treaty does not renounce the possibility of expanding the king’s territory to possessions across the sea or limit his theoretical worldwide power.\footnote{136} The document’s avoidance of the word “poleis” and its reference instead to the king’s chorà may reflect a sensitivity to lingering Spartan discomfort with Persia’s ownership of Ionia, but the phrasing requires Sparta’s agreement to the principle of total royal authority over Persian subjects, Greek or otherwise.\footnote{137}

An additional imperative reinforces Darius’s supremacy: “And regarding his own country, let the king decide however he wishes.”\footnote{138} Several modern

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Tissaphernes’s Travels, Summer 412–Spring 411}
\begin{tabular}{lllll}
\hline
Initial location & Destination & Distance & Date & Source \\
\hline
Sardis? & Miletos & 110 miles? & Aug. 412 & Thuc. 8.16.4 \\
Miletos & Teos & 100 miles & Aug./Sep. & Thuc. 8.20.2 \\
Teos & Miletos & 100 miles & Aug./Sep. & Thuc. 8.25.2 \\
Miletos & Iasos & 25 miles & Sep./Oct. & Thuc. 8.28.2–4 \\
Iasos & Miletos & 25 miles & Oct./Nov. & Thuc. 8.29.1 \\
Miletos & Magnesia & 50 miles & Oct./Nov.? & Thuc. 8.50.3 \\
Magnesia & Knidos & 150 miles & Jan. 411 & Thuc. 8.43.2 \\
Knidos & Magnesia? & 150 miles? & Jan. & Thuc. 8.43.4 \\
Magnesia? & Kaunos & 150 miles? & Mar. & Thuc. 8.57.1 \\
Kaunos & Magnesia? & 150 miles? & Mar./Apr. & Thuc. 8.58.1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
commentators have treated this as a redundancy, and D. M. Lewis calls it an “angry outburst,” suggesting the king’s annoyance at the limitation of his country to Asia. But similar language is not unheard of in Greek treaties, and in the Persian context, the phrase probably implies the king’s power to exact tribute, which is closely connected to his ownership of peoples in the royal inscriptions. Persian authorities, committed to the Achaemenid worldview of benevolent kingship, were unlikely to assume a connotation of anger in reference to the royal will and may have associated it with images of the just king. The epitaph of Darius I at Naqsh-i Rustam proclaims his wishes for the empire as the victory of right over wrong, security for weak and strong alike, punishment for wrongdoers, and rewards for the good. A statement that Darius II would do as he wished in Ionia might not have been meant to convey petulance but to insist that the king would oversee his lands according to his moral code, while receiving whatever tokens of subjects’ allegiance he judged fitting.

The next section rephrases the previous draft’s nonaggression pact, removing direct reference to the possibility of Spartan tribute collection in Ionia. Instead, it inserts a broader prohibition of any harmful act toward the king’s country, while promising an equal Persian forbearance toward the Spartans and their allies. It repeats the enjoinder that Sparta and the king will seek to prevent their dependents from engaging in any hostile acts toward the other and render mutual aid in the event of such hostile acts. Like the previous draft, it omits the requirement of mutual assistance against internal rebellion that had appeared in the initial agreement with Chalkideus, perhaps due to Amorges’s removal from the scene. Yet it does not specify whether the Spartans are supposed to help Persia suppress Ionian unrest. In hindsight, greater clarity on this point would have been useful.

Finally, the treaty lays out the conditions of Persia’s new naval commitment. The assistance of Darius’s fleet would surpass monetary gifts in value, and the document explains that Tissaphernes’s obligation to pay the Peloponnesians would conclude with the Persian ships’ arrival. Royal resources would presumably support the king’s fleet from that point on, but if the Spartans still required money, they might receive it from Tissaphernes in the form of loans, to be repaid at the war’s end. The outcome is envisioned as a joint victory over Athens, achieved by the king’s decisive action and amenable to empire and client alike.

The treaty laid the foundations for the king to claim the credit for final victory. Scholars have remarked on the extent of Sparta’s concessions, accused
its negotiators of incompetence, and suggested that Thucydides quoted the full text, as well as the earlier drafts, to indict Sparta’s cynical betrayal of the Ionian Greeks. In light of the clear advantages that the agreement offered the Persians, Thucydides’s insistence that Tissaphernes had a secret plan to leave it unfulfilled and prolong the war ought to raise serious doubts. The historian’s conspiracy theory depends on the subsequent dwindling of Tissaphernes’s payments to the allies and the cancelation of the Persian fleet’s voyage en route to the Aegean. But the explanations for these later developments lie in the events that followed the treaty.

In the spring of 411, adherence to the terms of alliance seemed the most direct way to complete Darius’s Greek intervention and promote his image as the world’s ruler, capable of rewarding supporters, punishing enemies, and restoring peace across the sea. The planned naval campaign paved the way for the outcome that Darius had sought when he authorized support of Sparta and still desired, despite a year of vexation and delay. But Tissaphernes’s worsening relations with Ionian subjects and Peloponnesian allies would, regardless of Persian intentions, prevent the treaty terms’ realization.
The King’s Navy and the Failure of Satrapal Intervention

Just months after the treaty of 411, Persia’s intervention plan fell apart, squandering its chance to exploit the short-lived oligarchic coup at Athens. As Tissaphernes struggled to maintain influence over the allies, Alkibiades rejoined the Athenian fleet, Peloponnesian sailors rioted over inadequate wages, and Miletos and other Ionian poleis attacked their Persian garrisons. Darius’s fleet sailed more than five hundred miles from Phoenicia to Aspenos but then turned for home without joining the Spartan fleet. Blaming Tissaphernes for this alleged betrayal, the Spartans left Miletos to seek Pharnabazos’s aid in seizing the Hellespont, only to suffer a series of crushing naval defeats. In the aftermath, Pharnabazos promoted allied recovery, but the royal fleet’s absence offered Persia’s clients little hope of success against their galvanized enemy.

The Phoenician naval withdrawal marks the climax of Thucydides’s Persian balancing theory. Many Greek contemporaries believed, as Alkibiades boasted, that Tissaphernes sent the ships home because he came to mistrust Sparta and sympathize with Athens instead. Thucydides’s assessment was even more damning, suggesting that the satrap was not inclined toward either side but preferred to weaken all the Greeks for Persia’s benefit. His hypothesis has attracted many followers, but it rests on the flawed premises that Tissaphernes’s insufficient payments could only stem from malevolent intent and that he possessed the power to summon or dismiss royal ships at will. Some scholars have ascribed the balancing strategy to Darius himself, but Thucydides’s theory does not explain why the king would have tried to prolong the Greek war instead of swiftly defeating Athens as he first intended. The scale and cost of his naval preparations are inexplicable if he never meant to commit Persian ships to combat. It may be, as D. M. Lewis long ago suggested, that crises in Egypt or other parts of the empire diverted Darius’s attention. Yet there is a simpler explanation, rooted in events that Thucydides describes without recognizing their full implications. The Ionian assaults on Tissaphernes’s garrisons, encouraged by the Peloponnesian
crews, insulted imperial authority, breached the terms of the treaty, and undermined the logistical infrastructure that had been prepared for the Persian naval campaign, offering plentiful reasons for Darius to cancel the Phoenicians’ voyage to the Aegean.

The fleet’s recall brought disastrous results for the Persians as well as their clients. It destroyed what remained of Tissaphernes’s credit with the allies and led the Spartans to engage in pitched battles without the overwhelming forces they needed to beat the superior Athenian navy. As the king’s allies came close to losing the war, Persia appeared unable to shape Greek events without drastic new measures.

**Darius’s Ships and Tissaphernes’s Wages**

The Peloponnesian fleet grew hostile to Tissaphernes in the summer of 411, as the Ionian War sank into stalemate despite the dramatic overthrow of the Athenian democracy. When Peisandros’s conspirators seized control of the city and established an oligarchic government known as the Four Hundred, the Athenian fleet at Samos responded with outrage, raising the possibility that it might abandon the Ionian front to fight for a democratic restoration at home. Yet the Spartan navarch Astyochos kept his ships idle, and his men blamed this inaction on Persian intrigue. According to Thucydides, Tissaphernes made a brief show of fulfilling the treaty terms but then began to execute a secret plan to weaken Sparta’s fleet by withholding part of its pay and postponing the Phoenician ships’ arrival, thereby preventing a decisive battle.¹

Neither aspect of Tissaphernes’s alleged sabotage holds up to close scrutiny. The Persian fleet’s movements depended on the will of Darius, and its initial voyage to Aspendos shows few signs of untoward delay, while Tissaphernes’s short payments are explicable in the context of his rising expenses and lack of financial support from the king. Factors beyond Tissaphernes’s control contributed to the allies’ dissatisfaction, although his blunders in the handling of Alkibiades worsened the situation. It is doubtful that he was plotting to overturn a treaty that he had worked so long to bring to completion and more likely that he planned to pay the Peloponnesians as best he could and lead the fleet into action when the king gave the order.

Darius’s authorization was required for the Persian fleet to set sail from Phoenicia, and the inspection, repair, and construction of ships may have been under way since the fall of 412.² Despite the plan for Tissaphernes to take command at Aspendos, most of the preparations depended on governors and vassals along the Levantine coast—Belshunu or his predecessor as
Syrian satrap, the kings of Sidon and the other Phoenician cities, Syennesis of Cilicia, and the monarchs of the Cypriote city-states, along with a host of captains, secretaries, carpenters, storehouse managers and treasurers. Darius’s fleet was the largest to cruise the eastern Mediterranean in forty years, outnumbering both its Greek counterparts. Thucydides is certain that 147 triremes sailed to Aspendos but notes that Tissaphernes later claimed that this number fell short of expectations. The Persians may have planned for a total closer to the three hundred mentioned in Diodorus. Darius’s officials probably gathered trireme crews soon before the voyage, perhaps even after the Spartans agreed to the terms of the treaty, to avoid excessive logistical expense. This was when the Greeks noticed Tissaphernes’s apparent preparations for the fleet’s arrival. The stockpiling of flour, wine, and other supplies at potential ports of call such as Miletos, Knidos, and Kaunos, would have attracted allied attention while serving a valuable strategic purpose. Stops at friendly bases, where the crews might obtain food and water, permitted a fleet to do without the large number of cargo ships required to support invasions of hostile territory.

The fleet’s logistical needs were extensive, and the potential for delay immense. The Spartans had been four or five months late in sending one-third as many ships across the Aegean in 412. The imperial post’s efficiency mitigated communication problems, permitting rapid contact between Darius, Tissaphernes, and the Levantine ports. Royal orders from Babylon, Ecbatana, or Susa could reach Sidon within a week, and Tissaphernes may have been able to get a letter there even faster. But rivalries between local administrators had the power to interfere with timetables and ship numbers, and regional tensions may have been running high after the recent coup of Euagoras at Cyprian Salamis, launched from a base in Cilicia, which ousted a king with close connections to Kition and Tyre. Religious observance could also impede plans, as Phoenician maritime cults included departure rituals that could keep ships in port until the proper omens were obtained. Furthermore, the crews needed training. Given the Achaemenid navy’s inactivity since the reign of Artaxerxes, it is doubtful that the majority of Phoenician, Cilician, or Cypriote rowers had ever experienced combat. Practice was critical for acquiring the skills of coordinated rowing, and the prospect of battle with the Athenian navy should have encouraged captains to put their men through weeks of preparatory drills.

Yet despite all of these impediments, Darius’s ships sailed by the second half of June, only two months after the treaty negotiations were concluded,
and reached Aspendos before the upheaval in the Athenian fleet. Their voyage from Phoenicia, against the prevailing winds, should have taken a week or slightly longer, as the distance from Sidon with a shortcut across the Gulf of Issos was about 520 miles, with an abundance of safe harbors. So far, there was little reason for complaint at their progress, but the fleet’s prolonged halt at Aspendos fueled the charge that Tissaphernes was wasting a chance to take advantage of Athens’s weakness. The timing suggests that Darius may have ordered a pause when he received the news of the Athenian coup, as it was conceivable that the war might come to an end and remove the need for further naval expense. Likewise, it is plausible that Tissaphernes delayed his own departure for Aspendos to gather more information and keep the king informed about the Athenian situation. There is no evidence, beyond Thucydides’s conjectures, to support the theory that the Persians meant to prevent the Spartan fleet from winning the war.

Peloponnesian claims that Tissaphernes “was doing evil to the fleet by giving wages neither on time nor in full” are similarly problematic. Thucydides reports that Alkibiades had long advised Tissaphernes to weaken his allies by not paying them enough, but they were content with his funds at the time of the second treaty draft, and there is no hint of irregularity in the payment at Kaunos just before the formal treaty. The real pay problems started thereafter. Darius, preparing his own fleet, was even less likely to remit revenues to support the allies, and Tissaphernes probably continued to cover costs out of his private resources while waiting to take command of the king’s ships. Thucydides’s language suggests that the payments in April, May, and June were later and smaller than expected and that the sum provided in July, just after Astyochos declined an Athenian challenge to battle, was lower still.

Yet there are no grounds for inferring that Tissaphernes was hostile to the allies or to credit the allegation of a treasonous collusion between the satrap and the unpopular navarch to undermine the Spartan cause. By early summer, the Peloponnesian fleet had grown from 94 to 110 triremes, increasing the financial pressure on Tissaphernes. If he was still paying the fleet at the compromise rate, slightly over three obols a day per man, Tissaphernes would have owed the allies between 50 and 60 talents a month, amounting to roughly 215 talents from the time of the treaty to the midsummer riots. In July, just before the outbreak of violence at Miletos, forty allied triremes left for the Hellespont to alleviate the growing wage crisis and solicit pay from Pharnabazos. This should have lowered Tissaphernes’s obligation
by twenty-two talents a month, but a storm forced three quarters of the ships to return to port.\textsuperscript{21} Overall, even assuming that he paid only 50 to 75 percent of the allies’ wages between April and June and 25 to 50 percent in July, his total subsidies over the eight months since the first payment at Miletos would have come to between 240 and 295 talents, and the scale of expenditure helps to explain delays in payment.

Inefficiencies in resource distribution have precedents in the Achaemenid documentary record. The Persepolis Treasury and Fortification archives demonstrate that large payments to workers in the empire’s heartland did not always follow a strict monthly schedule. Two tablets, for example, order the release of laborers’ wages for the previous five- and seven-month periods.\textsuperscript{22} Another ordering the dispensation of more than ten talents to 313 Syrian laborers is sealed by the necessary administrators four months after the end of the construction period.\textsuperscript{23} A text that deals with nonmonetary wages complains that “at that time, the (women) workers (for) two months did not receive rations.”\textsuperscript{24} Such problems were common, even in a system of centrally managed supply for much smaller groups than the tens of thousands of rowers dependent on Tissaphernes.

A decade after Tissaphernes’s difficulties with the Peloponnesian fleet, Cyrus the Younger was even less successful in paying Greek mercenaries during the first stage of his rebellion. Despite Xenophon’s claim that “it was not characteristic of Cyrus if he had the money to refuse to pay,” the prince provided no salary for more than three months, and the soldiers “were going up to his doors many times to ask for it,” before a gift from the Cilician queen enabled him to make good his promise.\textsuperscript{25} The pay rate of one daric per month added up to an obligation of $43\ 1/3$ talents a month for thirteen thousand men, which meant that Cyrus would have had to come up with at least 130

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Tissaphernes’s Subsidies to the Peloponnesian Fleet, 412–11}
\begin{tabular}{lllll}
\hline
Date & Location & Ship numbers & Sum in talents$^a$ & Source \\
\hline
Nov. 412 & Miletos & 55 & 55 & Thuc. 8.29.2 \\
Dec. 412 & Miletos & 78 & *42 & Thuc. 8.23.1, 33.1, 35.1, 36 \\
Mar. 411? & Kaunos & 94 & *50 & Thuc. 8.44.2, 8.57.1–2 \\
Apr.–May 411 & Miletos & 94 & *50–75 (100 owed) & Thuc. 8.59, 78 \\
June 411 & Miletos & 110 & *30–45 (60 owed) & Thuc. 8.63, 79.1, 80.1 \\
July 411 & Miletos & 100 & *13.75–27.5 (55 owed) & Thuc. 8.80.1–3, 83.2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\footnote{Asterisks designate figures derived from pay estimates and ship numbers but not explicitly stated in the sources.}
\end{table}
Talents to cover his debt. The sum is comparable to Tissaphernes’s shortfall and serves as a useful reminder that underpayment of a large military force does not prove the employer’s desire for its ruin.

Yet Tissaphernes’s image was compromised, not only by the wage shortage and allied irritation at the pace of Persia’s naval deployment but also by a growing fear that he might trade Peloponnesian for Athenian friendship. This suspicion encouraged the sailors to interpret Tissaphernes’s actions in the worst possible light and was closely connected to Alkibiades’s defection to the enemy, an event that did more than anything else to trigger the crisis at Miletos.

The Ionian Garrison Expulsions

The Milesian attack on Tissaphernes’s garrison was the first of three similar uprisings in the summer and fall of 411. The others occurred at Knidos and Antandros almost two months after the initial outbreak. The garrison expulsions represented the first internal challenge to Persian authority since Tissaphernes reasserted ownership of Ionia, and the Peloponnesian allies appeared culpable in their support. It is probable that the satrap reported the attacks to Darius and that both Persians regarded them as violations of the Spartan treaty.

Thucydides does not specify when Tissaphernes established the coastal garrisons, but such outposts of imperial rule were ubiquitous in the landscape of Achaemenid Anatolia, and the Persians probably saw them as a natural consequence of Ionia’s reclamation. Tissaphernes may have fortified positions with an eye to defending against Athenian raids, such as a two-day assault on Knidos in late 412 that was warded off with the aid of hasty overnight wall building. It was especially important to protect Miletos, which the Spartans abandoned for three months during their Rhodian adventure, despite the proximity of the Athenians at Samos. Of course, the satrap’s motives were not purely altruistic, as a permanent military presence would also facilitate tribute collection. Finally, the troops could maintain the security of the foodstuffs prepared for the royal fleet’s arrival.

Tissaphernes would have placed garrisons in prominent locations that displayed his authority and offered practical oversight of harbors and the surrounding terrain. At Antandros, where his deputy Arsakes established a garrison after a Peloponnesian force marched past in the summer of 411, the Persians camped on the city’s acropolis. At Miletos, the garrison’s fall to surprise attack implies that it was located close to the urban center, which would have minimized its response time, and it may have overlooked the
Map 3. Persia’s Intervention in the Peloponnesian War, 412–4
The King’s Navy and the Failure of Satrapal Intervention  83

harbor from the Kaletepe hill just to the west. 33 The garrisons need not have been large, but their visibility would likely have inflamed tensions with Ionian residents.

It is doubtful that simple anger at reintegration into the Persian empire motivated the Milesian attack. 34 Miletos had accepted Tissaphernes’s aid in 412, and a decade later, its political exiles would seek his protection, indicating a lack of endemic hostility to satrapal patronage. But Ionian attitudes to Persian authority depended on the perception of relative local autonomy, and the establishment of garrisons carried dire connotations. Greek custom restricted land ownership to citizens, and so any appropriation of local soil to support foreign soldiers was bound to raise hackles. 35 Furthermore, the Athenians had often installed garrisons in conjunction with the replacement of local governments. Regime change and occupation forces went hand in hand at Samos, Erythrai, and Miletos itself. 36 When it joined the Spartans and the king, Miletos retained the democracy established with the aid of Athenian troops just a generation before, and neither Tissaphernes nor the Spartans demanded that their political system be altered. But a permanent Persian military presence was likely to raise fears of eventual interference with the city’s self-government. 37

Tissaphernes’s desire to collect the king’s tribute arrears was also likely to worsen relations, especially while Miletos hosted a surplus military population. The Peloponnesian move to Rhodes offered a temporary respite, but the fleet’s return must have strained local food supplies. For four months, the city supported more than twenty thousand hungry Peloponnesian rowers and soldiers, and Tissaphernes’s short payments would have reduced the sailors’ ability to purchase local goods (and limited the Milesians’ ability to benefit from sales at inflated prices). 38 Under such conditions, Persian financial exactions and logistical stockpiling were certain to provoke public anger. The Milesians, like the Antandrians later that fall, may have felt that Tissaphernes was “burdening them with conditions that they were unable to bear.” 39

Finally, memories of the previous fall’s battle may have encouraged contempt for Tissaphernes’s mercenaries, whom the citizens had notably outperformed. The situation was already ripe for violence when the city received news of Alkibiades’s betrayal.

Tissaphernes had authorized Alkibiades’s journey to Samos in the hope of exploiting the division in the Athenian state, but his trust in the infamous exile proved an irreversible error in judgment. Due to the failure of Tissaphernes’s
talks with Peisandros, now a leading member of the Four Hundred, it was unlikely that Athens’s oligarchs would accept the Persian terms that they had rejected the previous winter. The arrival of emissaries from Athens’s fleet opened a new avenue for negotiation. Tissaphernes may have seen advantage in encouraging the Athenian democrats’ hostility to their internal rivals, as a civil war could shorten the path to Persian and Spartan victory. When the envoys requested that Alkibiades visit their fleet, which had voted to recall and pardon him in hopes of receiving Persian aid, Tissaphernes had two choices—to deny them and hold Alkibiades against his will or allow him to go and attempt to exploit the unrest in the enemy camp. The answer seemed obvious, but Alkibiades’s instinct for self-promotion trumped any attachment to the satrap. Arriving at Samos, the exile boasted that “Tissaphernes promised him that so long as anything remained to him, if he could trust the Athenians, they would never lack for pay, not even if it came to breaking up his own bed for silver, and that he would bring the Phoenician ships already at Aspendos to the Athenians and not the Peloponnesians.”

Alkibiades claimed that Tissaphernes’s only condition was the cancellation of his protégé’s exile sentence, and the Athenian sailors promptly voted to welcome Alkibiades with the rank of general. In return, he advised them not to engage the oligarchs directly but to retain their position of strength at Samos and continue the war. It is doubtful that this was Tissaphernes’s intention, and it is unclear why he did not imprison Alkibiades when he returned on a temporary visit in an attempt “to intimidate the Athenians with Tissaphernes and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.” Perhaps the satrap still hoped that his former guest could undermine the enemy from within or keep him abreast of developments in the Athenian camp. But regardless of Tissaphernes’s purpose, his protégé’s open defection and the failure to punish him destroyed the satrap’s remaining credibility with the Milesians and the Peloponnesian fleet.

The news of Alkibiades’s treason, compounding the wage complaints, sparked a gathering of sailors who denounced both the Spartan navarch and the satrap. When Astyochos threatened to strike a popular officer, the crowd exploded into riot, throwing stones and forcing him to take refuge at a nearby altar. At the same time, the men of Miletos stormed Tissaphernes’s fort. Alkibiades’s Milesian guest-friends, who had led the initial revolt against Athens and may have advocated for Tissaphernes’s interests, had presumably lost any remaining influence. The Milesian attack was successful, although Thucydides does not elaborate on details of resistance or casualties.
It is unclear whether the Peloponnesians were directly involved, but some overlap between the simultaneous riots is likely. Thucydides reports allied approval of the Milesian action, especially from the Syracusan contingent, which led the charge against Astyochos. Only the Spartan Lichas dissented, telling the Milesians after the riot to “enslave themselves to Tissaphernes, within reason, and be subservient until the war should turn out well,” a comment that understandably failed to impress its audience.44 Once the dust settled, Miletos dispatched a formal embassy to Sparta, accompanied by Hermokrates of Syracuse, to lodge formal charges that Tissaphernes had betrayed the alliance. Tissaphernes responded by sending a personal envoy to Sparta with Astyochos, whose term now expired, making way for the new navarch Mindaros. The satrap’s messenger, a Carian named Gaulites, denounced the Milesian attack and defended Tissaphernes against charges of conspiracy with Alkibiades.45 But Astyochos seems to have spoken up on Hermokrates’s behalf, perhaps in an effort to clear his own name, and the Spartans believed the accusations.46 Meanwhile, Tissaphernes set out for Aspendos, inviting Lichas to accompany him and trying to demonstrate his intention of bringing up Persia’s fleet.47 It is likely that he informed Darius of the deteriorating situation.

It is not difficult to ascertain how the Milesian riot would have appeared from a Persian perspective. The king’s subjects, defying the satrap, had risen up and attacked a fort installed for their own protection. Tissaphernes could represent their behavior as an act of rebellion deserving of Darius’s anger.48 The damage was not only symbolic but practical, as the Milesians surely did not return whatever stores they found in the fort and, until they repledged their loyalty, were unlikely to turn in their tribute, a serious loss, since Miletos was capable of making some of the highest payments in Ionia.49 Even more troubling was the behavior of the allies, which appeared to violate the treaty. Technically, it had not required the Spartans to take action against revolts by royal subjects, as the clause to that effect in the first draft had been dropped after Amorges’s suppression.50 The iteration of the king’s rights over his subjects in Asia made Persia solely responsible for responding to internal unrest, and the Spartans might have been able to argue that Miletos’s misbehavior was not their concern. But if Peloponnesian troops incited the attack, and especially if they took part in it, this would fit the definition of going against the king’s country with intent to harm, which the treaty took pains to prohibit. Sparta was required to prevent its allies from taking such an action, and it had failed to do so, despite Lichas’s scolding of the Milesians.51
Darius would have received word of the allies’ behavior shortly before deciding whether to order the Persian fleet to continue on. It is unclear when Knidos also attacked and expelled its garrison, but the king may have learned of this incident while his fleet remained at Aspendos. The assault on the Antandros garrison, recounted by Thucydides in greater detail, occurred after the Spartan fleet had moved to the Hellespont and therefore too late to influence Darius’s judgment, but it confirmed an emerging pattern.\textsuperscript{52} The Antandrians rose up in resentment of Persian “burdens,” probably tribute payment and the appropriation of their acropolis, as well as the unpopularity of Tissaphernes’s subgovernor Arsakes, who had overseen a previous massacre of Delian colonists at Adramyttion. But Thucydides states that the Antandrians were unable to overcome the Persian garrison alone. The other attackers were hoplites, who crossed Mount Ida from Abydos, the new base of the Peloponnesian fleet, in a march of sixty-five miles that must have taken three to four days to complete.\textsuperscript{53} Their involvement represented another egregious failure to prevent Sparta’s dependents from assaulting the king’s country. It would have been surprising if Darius remained eager to fulfill his offer of naval cooperation under such conditions.

The Royal Fleet’s Recall

The reasons for the cancelation of the Persian naval campaign were controversial in Thucydides’s day and have prompted multiple interpretations by modern scholars. Most have favored some version of Thucydides’s balancing theory, with a minority following Lewis’s preference for Diodorus’s explanation. Yet none have considered the most direct solution, that the king acted in response to the garrison expulsions. This possibility would raise the further question of why Tissaphernes did not take a stronger line in confronting the Spartan commanders instead of giving superficial excuses for the ships’ withdrawal. But there were good diplomatic reasons, if Darius still desired Persian credit for Athens’s defeat, to maintain some support for Sparta and avoid a total break, despite anger at the treaty’s violation.

Tissaphernes began the journey to Aspendos in mid- to late July, leaving Tamos to manage affairs in his absence. Two Spartan ships, captained by Philippos and Hippokrates, sailed to meet and escort the Persian fleet into the Aegean, but Tissaphernes probably traveled overland via the imperial roads.\textsuperscript{54} Given recent events, it would have been foolish to entrust his security to a Peloponnesian crew, and his invitation to Lichas makes little sense if a Spartan vessel was the means of transport. His most likely route ran
from Sardis or Magnesia to the upper Maeander valley and the town of Kolossai, before curving southeast through Pisidia toward the Pamphylian coast, a journey of about 260 miles and at least seventeen days, not counting pauses en route. The Pisidian leg of the journey may have required a show of military force against highland communities known for periodic resistance to Persian authorities.\textsuperscript{55}

Upon Tissaphernes’s arrival in August, if the king’s orders were not already waiting, he probably corresponded with Darius as well as the officers who had brought the fleet this far.\textsuperscript{56} It is unclear how soon he received the command to send the ships back to Phoenicia and conceivable that he waited in Aspendos for multiple weeks before learning of Darius’s judgment. He seems to have given the bad news to the Spartans by late August or early September, when Philippus and Hippokrates sent word to Miletos that the ships were not coming and “they were being wronged in every way by Tissaphernes.”\textsuperscript{57} On receipt of their reports, the new navarch Mindaros led his entire fleet out of Miletos and sailed for the Hellespont. When Tissaphernes heard of the Peloponnesian departure, he broke up camp and began the return journey, while the king’s ships sailed back to Phoenicia.\textsuperscript{58}

Tissaphernes attempted to explain the fleet’s withdrawal to his allies, but with little success. According to Thucydides, he reported that the fleet was smaller than the king had wished, but the historian rightly stresses that it should have been large enough to win the war while saving Darius the expense of additional triremes.\textsuperscript{59} A different version appears in Diodorus, whose garbled narrative confuses Tissaphernes with Pharnabazos and makes the wrong satrap claim that he sent the ships home after “learning that the king of the Arabs and the king of the Egyptians were plotting against the affairs of the Phoenicians.”\textsuperscript{60} Despite the variance, the sources agree on the fundamental point that the Persians offered false excuses, concealing the genuine reason for their action.

Thucydides reports several rumors about Tissaphernes’s actual motives, including his alleged sympathy for Alkibiades and Athens, which Isokrates and Diodorus later repeat as fact.\textsuperscript{61} He also includes a story about how Tissaphernes wished to extort money from the Phoenicians in exchange for their dismissal, suggesting some Greek familiarity with Persian satraps’ acquisitive instincts. But Thucydides believes that the satrap withheld the ships “for the dissipation and obstruction of the Greeks,” denying the advantage to either the Spartan or the Athenian fleet by forcing them to deplete their supplies and avoid battle during his Aspendos trip.\textsuperscript{62} Although Alkibiades
sailed for Aspendos to spread the impression of Tissaphernes’s partiality, Thucydides denies that the Athenian persuaded the satrap to favor his countrymen, instead preferring an interpretation of Persian enmity to both sides. He offers no opinion on Tissaphernes’s ultimate goals, beyond indefinite extension of the Greek war.

Many scholars have accepted the balancing hypothesis on Thucydides’s authority. Yet it fails to consider the advantages that Tissaphernes might have gained from a Persian fleet’s presence on the Ionian coast—enhanced authority in the Greek cities, reduced dependence on the Spartans for achievement of military objectives, the right to support the allies through loans instead of grants, and a chance to flaunt a glorious command that Pharnabazos lacked while bringing the war to an end. Above all, Thucydides and the other Greek authors appear unaware that Tissaphernes could not cancel the expedition of a royal fleet without Darius’s permission. While Tissaphernes might have recommended the decision, explanation of the naval withdrawal requires attention to royal motives and why the king would have wasted the effort and expense that went into the fleet’s initial voyage.

Without tackling the problem of Darius’s role directly, Lewis argues that Diodorus’s version contains a kernel of truth because of its reference to the broader Achaemenid context. Surviving petitions from Elephantine indicate that the satrap Arshama was absent from Egypt, perhaps on an extended visit to court, from 410 to 407. As several undated letters in Arshama’s correspondence refer to unrest in parts of Egypt, Lewis proposed that Diodorus’s “king of the Arabs and king of the Egyptians” were rebel leaders who had seized control of the Nile Delta. He argues that their threat could have justified Tissaphernes’s transfer of the fleet and that Arshama’s ability to travel in 410 indicates that the rebels were subsequently suppressed. The appeal of Lewis’s hypothesis lies in the connection he draws between events in different parts of the empire, but the Arshama letters do not provide explicit testimony regarding the scale of the rebellion, and Diodorus’s reference to a plot against Phoenicia remains difficult to explain. Lewis’s theory has won some support, but several important studies reject it, and one even argues that Ephoros, Diodorus’s source, invented the story based on events of the fourth century. It is possible that there was discussion of Persia’s naval activities and the Greek intervention during Arshama’s court visit, perhaps raising concerns about the threat to Egypt’s lucrative Athenian trade. But there is insufficient evidence to support the theory that Egypt played a decisive role in the fleet’s withdrawal.
Some of the studies that reject Lewis's explanation have modified Thucydides's balancing theory by suggesting that the strategy of feint and withdrawal originated with the king rather than Tissaphernes. Donald Lateiner argues that Darius and his general agreed on such a strategy because this was the best way to weaken the Greeks, since the Phoenician fleet had lost numerous battles to Athens before and could not be trusted to win an actual encounter. But it is dangerous to assume that Darius or his courtiers retained such a negative perception of the empire's previous Greek wars or to that they would have forgotten its naval success during Artaxerxes's reconquest of Egypt. Such royal defeatism is hard to credit in terms of Achaemenid ideology and especially in the wake of Athens's naval disaster at Syracuse, which must have taken some of the luster off the enemy's reputation. George Cawkwell proposes instead that Darius did at first intend to use the fleet to secure Athens's defeat on the grounds that it was too expensive to send it out otherwise but that he changed his mind midcampaign in favor of a balancing policy to deny Sparta outright victory. Yet he offers no reason for such a puzzling shift in policy or the sudden willingness to discount resources already spent on the Persian fleet.

Only the Ionian garrison expulsions provide the required explanation, a clear reason for Darius to reverse his naval plans after extensive preparations. The loss of Persia's forts at Miletos and Knidos posed a serious impediment to the campaign's further progress. Triremes did not spend the night at sea, and a fleet's progress required safe harbors at regular intervals. The most direct route from Aspendos to the planned junction with the Peloponnesian fleet was about 365 sea miles, requiring a minimum of three stops and maybe more in the face of prevailing winds. It was a fifty-five mile voyage to Phaselis, a hundred more to Xanthos, then sixty to Kaunos, sixty-five to Knidos, and eighty-five to Miletos. But the attacks on Persia's soldiers in the last two ports must have raised the possibility that they would refuse the fleet admittance. This threatened major logistical problems, especially if a supply convoy did not accompany the ships due to the expectation that Tissaphernes would furnish provisions.

It would have been risky to send the fleet without evidence that the situation in Ionia had changed for the better. Even if Sparta and the Ionians backed down and offered restitution in the face of Tissaphernes's complaints, it would have taken multiple weeks to assemble troops, march them to Miletos and Knidos, and refortify and restock the positions, to say nothing of the alternative, requisitioning merchantmen to carry food and water
from the Levant to support the final leg of the voyage. Once this was complete, reporting to Darius and waiting for authorization to resume the campaign might have taken another month. Such activities would have pushed the calendar well into autumn by the time the fleet could reach Ionia, exposing it to dangerous late season storms. In short, the timing of the Ionian riots threw the entire practicability of a naval campaign into question.

Darius’s reversal makes further sense in an economic context. Thucydides and the Oxyrhynchus historian are not wrong to emphasize the king’s interest in conserving funds. His storehouses had already expended enormous resources on the crews from spring through late summer, covering their assembly, training, voyage, and prolonged encampment at Aspendos. At a conservative estimate of 170 men per small Phoenician-style trireme, the fleet included almost 25,000 men, and at the daily average of one choinix (1.84 pounds) per man, six months of flour rations would have amounted to almost 8,280,000 pounds. If Darius also paid them in silver, as his son would do sixteen years later, and gave them the same rate as the Peloponnesian allies alongside whom they expected to serve, this would have come to nearly 74 talents a month, for a total of 441, almost 100 talents higher than Herodotus’s estimate of Phoenicia’s annual silver tribute. But even if the king saved on silver payments through a conscription plan that shifted costs to the coastal populations, the scale of foodstuffs needed to support the crews through the fall and winter made a strong case for cutting his losses.

Finally, Darius had grounds for fury at the Peloponnesian betrayal in Ionia. The alliance was predicated on Sparta’s recognition of royal authority over the Anatolian Greek cities and canceling the naval campaign was a natural reaction to the violation of this promise. It is also possible that he was disappointed in Tissaphernes for losing control of the allies and failing to defend his Ionian positions, neither of which spoke highly of his ability to supervise a joint campaign with the Peloponnesian fleet.

The combination of factors demanded the fleet’s recall to Phoenicia. Darius could not have known that it would prompt the Peloponnesians to leave Ionia for the Hellespont, but their reaction offered additional, if unintentional, benefit by removing a major source of the troubles at Miletos and reducing the danger to trade routes between the Levant and the southern Aegean.

The only problem with this interpretation is the question it raises about the explanations Persia proffered for why it did not send its fleet and why it continued to provide financial support to Sparta. If the king withdrew his
naval support because of the Peloponnesian role in the garrison expulsions, why did he allow his satraps to continue funding the allied fleet, and why would Tissaphernes have offered excuses instead of informing Sparta that the ships had gone home in retaliation for their misconduct? The answer may be that Darius, despite his anger at Spartan behavior, saw little benefit in such a confrontational stance, which would have threatened a permanent breach in the alliance, exacerbated instability in the Ionian cities, and displayed Persia’s lack of influence over its clients and inability to decide the Greek war. While Darius had good cause to recall the fleet, it was still possible that the Spartans might win because of Athens’s internal division, and if this occurred after a total withdrawal of aid, the king would lose the opportunity to claim responsibility for the outcome. So instead, he permitted Pharnabazos to continue providing subsidies, keeping his options open.

The Satraps at the Hellespont

The fleet’s withdrawal signaled a new phase of the Persian intervention and a symbolic demotion for Tissaphernes, who lost the prestige of the naval command while Pharnabazos gained the chance to patronize allied success. Black Sea grain shipments through the Hellespont were more essential to Athens’s survival than goods from the Levant or Egypt. If Mindaros could win a decisive battle in these waters with Pharnabazos’s funding, the Daskyleion satrap stood to take credit for ending the war. Despite his misunderstanding of the dynamics behind the naval recall, Thucydides shows an acute grasp of the satraps’ escalating competition, and the final passage of his history explores Tissaphernes’s worry that his rival might “in less time and at lower expense . . . prove more successful against the Athenians.” Tissaphernes rushed to reassert his authority, but his outreach to the Peloponnesian fleet foundered on lasting resentments over the Phoenician ships and Alkibiades. Pharnabazos, on the other hand, would learn that no amount of money and martial posturing could guarantee victory against Athens’s still dangerous fleet.

Since his initial failure to bring the Spartans to his shores, Pharnabazos had persisted in fruitless efforts to increase his influence. Most of the Ionian cities fell under Tissaphernes’s control, but Pharnabazos waited for months as Daskyleion’s unwalled Greek neighbors refused to declare against Athens and risk seaborne reprisal. His envoys finally obtained a promise from Sparta of forty ships, but their arrival was no less delay-ridden than that of their predecessors. The expected squadron instead sailed south, met Tissaphernes for
the Knidos conference, detoured to Rhodes, and returned to Miletos for the
treaty of 411. After that agreement, which pointedly omitted Pharnabazos
from the discussion of the king’s fleet, the Spartans sent a small force north
by land, commanded by an officer named Derkylidas. This led to Pharnaba-
zos’s first success in late spring, when Abydos and Lampsakos declared for
Sparta and Persia, offering two bases on the Hellespont and the prospect of
closing the straits.79 Yet the satrap was not strong enough to hold his new
acquisitions. It is unclear whether he tried to install garrisons, although the
proximity of a client dynast, Zenis of Dardanos, may have allowed him to
keep mercenaries in the vicinity without offending Abydos by directly im-
posing on its territory.80 Regardless, Athens’s reaction was swift. A force of
twenty-four triremes retook and sacked Lampsakos and established a base
at Sestos to threaten Abydos across the straits.81

Only a fleet would be able to dislodge them, but the Spartans did not
attempt to send ships north until late June or July, and only ten of the prom-
ised forty arrived. Their appearance inspired anti-Athenian revolts at Byzant-
tion and its sister city of Chalkedon on Pharnabazos’s side of the Bosporus, but
more aid was needed for the region’s defense.82 It may have taken longer for
Pharnabazos to win over Kyzikos in tandem with the Spartan general Klear-
chos, perhaps on the latter’s late summer march to take up a post as Byzant-
tion’s governor.83 Despite these delays, the lack of heavy combat limited the
financial pressure on the Daskyleion satrap, giving him more time to set
aside funds in preparation for a larger Hellespontine campaign. When Tiss-
saphernes’s quarrels with the Spartans worsened, Pharnabazos was confi-
dent enough to offer to pay Mindaros’s fleet in full and finally succeeded in
outbidding his rival.

Pharnabazos’s subsidies must have seemed an improvement to the Spar-
tans, as Tamos failed to pay them at all during Tissaphernes’s time at Aspends.
It is unlikely that Pharnabazos increased the wages from Tissaphernes’s
three-obol rate, which the Spartans would have noted several years later in
negotiations with Cyrus. He probably outperformed Tissaphernes in the
regularity of pay. It helped that he had less triremes to support.85 Almost
ninety arrived at the Hellespont in September 411, but before Pharnabazos
had time to issue wages, the Athenians defeated them in the Battle of Kynos-
sema, eliminating a quarter of the Peloponnesian fleet.86 Reinforcements
offset some of the damage by November, giving Mindaros’s force at least
seventy-six triremes, and Dorieus of Rhodes brought thirteen or fourteen
more, although a second defeat off Abydos cost them either ten or thirty.87
This reduced the number of Peloponnesian ships to either eighty or sixty, so that by early 410, Pharnabazos’s obligation was not much higher than thirty or forty talents per month. On the other hand, he paid subsidies over a slightly longer period than Tissaphernes, probably resulting in a higher overall expenditure.

Yet neither Pharnabazos’s generosity nor his direct military involvement was sufficient to turn the tide in Sparta’s favor. A few days after the defeat at Kynossema, an Athenian squadron retook Kyzikos, which lacked walls, and extorted money from the residents. Pharnabazos’s troops were nowhere to be seen, despite the city’s proximity to Daskyleion. They arrived in time for the Battle of Abydos, where Pharnabazos “rode his horse down into the sea as far as he was able,” rushing to aid the Peloponnesian triremes near the beach as the enemy tried to tow them away. But despite this display of equestrian skill, the satrap’s tactical achievement was limited. Even if Pharnabazos repelled Athenian attempts to land, as Diodorus reports, he neither drove the enemy into the sea nor prevented them from capturing allied ships.

Soon thereafter, Tissaphernes arrived at the Hellespont, trying to repair his ties with the Ionians and Peloponnesians and minimize Pharnabazos’s encroachment. He had spent more than a month on the road, covering about

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Ship numbers</th>
<th>Sum in talents</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 411</td>
<td>Sparta</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Thuc. 8.8, 39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 411</td>
<td>Abydos</td>
<td>65–70</td>
<td>*35–38</td>
<td>Thuc. 8.103.1, 104.2, 106.3; Diod. 13.39.3, 40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 411</td>
<td>Abydos</td>
<td>76–84</td>
<td>*41–45</td>
<td>Xen. Heli. 1.1.2, 7, 11; Diod. 13.45.6–7, 46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 411</td>
<td>Abydos</td>
<td>60–80</td>
<td>*32–43</td>
<td>Xen. Heli. 1.1.7, 16; Diod. 13.50.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 411</td>
<td>Abydos</td>
<td>60–80</td>
<td>*32–43</td>
<td>Xen. Heli. 1.1.7, 16; Diod. 13.50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 410</td>
<td>Abydos</td>
<td>60–80</td>
<td>*32–43</td>
<td>Xen. Heli. 1.1.7, 16; Diod. 13.50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 410</td>
<td>Abydos</td>
<td>60–80</td>
<td>*32–43</td>
<td>Xen. Heli. 1.1.7, 16; Diod. 13.50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 410</td>
<td>Kyzikos</td>
<td>60–80</td>
<td>*32–43</td>
<td>Xen. Heli. 1.1.7, 16; Diod. 13.50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 410</td>
<td>Kyzikos</td>
<td>60–80</td>
<td>*32–43</td>
<td>Xen. Heli. 1.1.7, 16; Diod. 13.50.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: *333–416

*Asterisks designate figures derived from pay estimates and ship numbers but not explicitly stated in the sources.
480 miles from Aspendos to Abydos. En route, he stopped at Ephesos, attempting to mitigate the damage of the garrison expulsions. Ephesos was one of the largest tribute payers that Tissaphernes had recovered, and like Miletos, was probably still a democracy and sensitive to threats to its civic institutions.\textsuperscript{92} Thucydides does not mention whether Tissaphernes had installed a fort there, but it was an obvious place to station troops, and he may have hoped to prevent an uprising like those in the other cities.\textsuperscript{93} More importantly, its temple of Artemis housed the most famous cult in all Ionia. Conducting a magnificent sacrifice to the goddess would display Tissaphernes’s piety and allow him to claim divine backing for his governance and the Athenian war.\textsuperscript{94} The ceremony would have been officiated by the chief priest of Ephesian Artemis, who bore the Persian name Megabyzos as a cult title and whose local influence could bolster Tissaphernes’s claim to Ephesian allegiance.\textsuperscript{95} Given Artemis’s importance in Lydian and Lycian religion, Tissaphernes may have also intended the gesture for consumption by a wide range of Anatolian peoples, choosing a symbol of his diverse subjects’ unity under Persian patronage.\textsuperscript{96}

After the Ephesos sacrifice, which also marks the abrupt conclusion of Thucydides’s history, Tissaphernes went on to the Hellespont. It is unfortunate that no source records whether he had to bypass Antandros, where the attack on his garrison had occurred shortly before, or whether he met with Pharnabazos on arrival. Diodorus, while mistaking him for Pharnabazos, seems to report the conference Tissaphernes held with Spartan commanders to excuse the royal fleet’s withdrawal.\textsuperscript{97} Given his interest in reconciliation, he may have offered to continue payments to the allies once they returned to Ionian waters, as renouncing further subsidies would have ceded the field to Pharnabazos.\textsuperscript{98}

At the same time, Tissaphernes tried to show off his devotion to the cause by capturing Alkibiades, who chose this moment to visit with gifts, attempting to exploit their private guest friendship to deepen the rift between Tissaphernes and the Spartans.\textsuperscript{99} It would have been astonishing if Tissaphernes

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Tissaphernes’s Travels, Summer–Fall 411}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
Initial location & Destination & Distance & Date & Source \\
\hline
Aspendos & Ephesos & 275 miles & Sep./Oct. & Thuc. 8.108.3, 109 \\
Ephesos & Abydos & 205 miles & Nov./Dec. & Xen. Hell. 1.1.9 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
failed to exact vengeance, especially as Pharnabazos was nearby and might
denounce him to the king if he let the traitor go again. Proclaiming Darius’s continued orders to wage war on Athens, he took Alkibiades into custody and sent him to Sardis. It is unclear why he did not execute him on the spot, which would have done more to impress the allies, but perhaps he still hoped that the prisoner could offer useful information on the enemy. But only a month later, Alkibiades and another captive acquired horses and fled to Athenian-held Klaizomenai, spreading a rumor that Tissaphernes was assisting him to further damage the satrap’s reputation. There is no conceivable reason why Tissaphernes should have helped him, which would have ruined his own efforts to regain influence and suggested either incompetence or disobedience to the King. Yet the escape route was seventy miles long, on a Persian road guarded by forts and watch stations, and Alkibiades may have exploited help from officials hostile to Tissaphernes for reasons unknown.

Pharnabazos, for one, must have enjoyed Tissaphernes’s embarrassment, but Alkibiades’s return to the Athenian fleet brought disaster in its wake. Over the winter, Pharnabazos’s “large army” of mercenaries and satrapal retainers helped Mindaros recapture and fortify Kyzikos, this being a less exposed base for the fleet. The enemy followed in early spring, with Alkibiades leading the decisive attack. They caught the Peloponnesians at sea and sank or captured several triremes before driving the remainder ashore. Athenian troops landed at multiple beachheads, and some of Pharnabazos’s troops held their ground at a place called Kleroi, while his mercenaries followed the Spartan Klearchos to defend a separate location. They started to surround an Athenian landing party but broke at the appearance of enemy reinforcements, and after Mindaros’s death near the beached ships, a joint Peloponnesian and Persian retreat ended the battle. Despite the sources’ suggestion of a panicked flight, the Peloponnesians had time to burn all their remaining ships on shore to prevent them from falling into enemy hands, and Pharnabazos’s cavalry covered the withdrawal.

Alkibiades stayed at Kyzikos for twenty days and requisitioned yet more money from its citizens, directly interfering with Pharnabazos’s claim to tribute. Unopposed, an Athenian squadron next sailed up the Bosporus past Byzantion and Chalkedon and built a fort at Chrysopolis on Pharnabazos’s side of the straits, where it began collecting a 10 percent toll on all Black Sea shipping, a further financial opportunity lost to the Persians. The Peloponnesian fleet’s annihilation and Pharnabazos’s inability to defend the
major coastal cities suggested that Persia’s alliance with Sparta was destined for failure.

Pharnabazos’s Timbers

Kyzikos almost ended the war with an Athenian victory. The oligarchy of the Four Hundred had already collapsed in the face of internal resistance, and Athens now restored its democracy, while Sparta sent an embassy seeking peace.\textsuperscript{108} Despite the requirement of joint negotiation in the treaty of 411, it cannot be assumed that Sparta would have brought Persia into the peace talks if Athens accepted the offer.\textsuperscript{109} A Spartan-Athenian deal might have removed Spartan forces from Anatolia altogether, leaving the Athenians in charge of the cities they still held and Persia with the rest. Although Darius held more coastal cities than he did before the intervention, his clients’ defeat would have marked a dismal conclusion to his Greek adventure. Instead, an overconfident Athens rejected Sparta’s terms, and Pharnabazos bestowed new benefactions on the survivors of the allied fleet. The Daskyleion satrap’s actions kept the war effort alive and even repaired some of the damage of the garrison expulsions while profiting at Tissaphernes’s expense.

Xenophon highlights the contrast between Pharnabazos’s show of optimism and the Spartans’ despair, as expressed in an infamous letter that fell into Athenian hands: “Ships gone. Mindaros lost. Men hungry. At a loss what to do.”\textsuperscript{110} The satrap came to the rescue, telling survivors “not to be downhearted over timber, of which there was plenty in the lands of the King, as long as their bodies were safe.”\textsuperscript{111} Despite the sting of losing Kyzikos’s revenues, he dispensed two months’ salary and a new cloak for each man. It is doubtful that the total amounted to more than forty or fifty talents, a modest sum in relation to the gratitude it secured. He also offered temporary employment in an ingenious solution to the problem of coastal defense, deploying the Peloponnesians in place of his own mercenaries to garrison strategic sites and thereby strengthening control over settlements still in his hands while removing the stigma of Persian occupation that had contributed to Tissaphernes’s troubles.\textsuperscript{112}

Most importantly, Pharnabazos stationed the Syracusan crews at Antandros, reasserting his father’s claim to the southern Troad on the far side of Mount Ida.\textsuperscript{113} They built new walls for the city, and the Antandrians thanked them with a grant of citizenship.\textsuperscript{114} This demonstration of harmony allowed a polis that had expelled its Persian garrison to show that its quarrel had been with Tissaphernes, not the king, and that it was willing to cooperate with
the dependents of a different satrap. Pharnabazos’s maneuver implied that Tissaphernes was at fault for the previous year’s unrest and rewarded the Syracusans, who had been most outspoken in denouncing his misbehavior. He pleased them further by taking in Tissaphernes’s vocal critic Hermokrates, recently deposed by decree of the Syracusan city assembly but still popular with the men of the fleet. Tissaphernes supposedly gloated over Hermokrates’s downfall, claiming to have rejected his demand for bribes that would help restore his position, but Pharnabazos welcomed the exile with lavish gifts.115 Two years later, he provided a monetary grant to cover Hermokrates’s acquisition of five triremes and a thousand mercenaries for an ill-fated attempt to retake his native city.116 Aside from these intrigues, Pharnabazos concentrated on a shipbuilding project that would maximize the benefits of his friendship with Syracusans and Antandrians alike.

In the summer of 410, Pharnabazos authorized the Peloponnesian and Sicilian crews to use Antandros for the rebuilding of every one of the sixty (or eighty) triremes lost at Kyzikos.117 The southern ridges of Mount Ida were famous for the quality of their fir trees, which provided ideal wood for trireme hulls.118 Pharnabazos was only now able to assert a monopoly on these forests, since like Antandros itself, they belonged to Athens’s ally Mytilene before the Ionian War. His generosity provided at least three thousand tons of timber, felled by teams of axmen and dragged down to Antandros’s market by mule trains and probably observed and recorded by satrapal agents en route to construction sites.119 No clear evidence survives for the average cost of Anatolian firs in the classical period, but the gift was priceless, permitting the rapid rebirth of the allied fleet. Within a year, the workers at Antandros succeeded in rebuilding all the Sicilian ships, which took part in the Ephesos campaign of 409, and probably many others.120 The Spartans would also build ships at Gytheion on the Lakonian coast, but Pharnabazos’s Antandros project provided a crucial number of triremes, which would play a major role in the coming years’ campaigns.121

That being said, it had been two years since Persia entered the war, and a positive outcome was still far from sight. The rebuilding at Antandros helped sustain the alliance, but Darius showed no inclination to resume the plans for the imperial fleet’s involvement. It would take a renewed royal commitment, and a new commander, to move beyond life support and empower the Spartans to retake the initiative.
Chapter Six

Cyrus the Younger and Spartan Victory

The Persian prince responsible for Sparta’s ultimate triumph was Darius’s second son but the first born after his father’s succession. He was ten years old when Darius first decided to intervene in the Greek wars and twelve when Persia’s clients lost their fleet at Kyzikos. One can only wonder how much the adolescent Cyrus heard of the distant conflict that would shape his future career. His father, let down by both allies and deputies on the Aegean frontier, paid less attention to the Greek situation between 410 and 408, dealing instead with matters closer to home such as a Median revolt, known only from Xenophon’s passing reference to its conclusion. In the meantime, Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes continued to support the Spartans as best they could, rebuilding the ships lost at Kyzikos and repelling Athens’s attack on Ephesos in the summer of 409. But lingering suspicions and wage disputes limited Tissaphernes’s influence over the allies, while Pharnabazos faltered in coastal defense and began to show interest in a negotiated settlement. Receiving a Spartan embassy at court in 408, the king decided that a new infusion of aid was needed to save his Greek dependents from defeat. Launching a measured escalation, Darius appointed his teen-aged son as karanos over western Anatolia, with five hundred talents and instructions to help Sparta win. Cyrus would learn statesmanship while trying to rectify a frontier crisis that had proved too daunting for his father’s satraps.

The decision displayed the king’s commitment to bringing the intervention to a successful end but limited his costs and risks by keeping Persia’s ships in port, avoiding any repetition of the naval fiasco of 411. Once he used up the royal grant, Cyrus had to resort to provincial and private resources to achieve his father’s objectives, and success depended on Sparta’s acquisition of naval skill rather than direct Persian action.

The sixteen-year-old Cyrus’s arrival at Sardis in 407, often regarded as the beginning of the end of the war, did not make the outcome inevitable. His partnership with the navarch Lysander and increase in the rate of pay
improved allied morale on the eve of Sparta’s initial victory at Notion. But
the king’s talents ran out before a greater success was possible, and by the
summer of 406, Cyrus was under financial pressure and quarreling with
Lysander’s replacement. The allied disaster at Arginousai showed that Per-
sian silver did not guarantee victory at sea, and a summons back to court in
the spring of 405 threatened to curtail Cyrus’s role in the war. It was his
contribution at this late moment that proved truly decisive, bringing about
Lysander’s reinstatement, helping to restore the Spartan fleet to its pre-
Arginousai size, and dispensing payments in advance on an unprecedented
scale. Lysander’s victories would earn Cyrus well-deserved recognition for
facilitating the overthrow of Athens.

The Satraps on the Defensive
Xenophon and Diodorus cover the period between 410 and 408 in limited
detail, but their accounts do permit a sketchy outline of the western satraps’
activities. Pharnabazos lacked sufficient forces to secure the long Helles-
pontine and Propontic coastline, and despite his support for the naval con-
struction at Antandros, he was unable to draw Peloponnesian ships back
into northern waters. Tissaphernes, on the other hand, seems to have rees-
tablished some allied naval contacts and proved his mettle in the Battle of
Ephesos, but he could not regain enough Spartan trust to support a long-term
partnership.

The defense of Chalkedon pulled Pharnabazos away from the rebuild-
ing efforts at Antandros. The Daskyleion satrap set out for the Bosporus in
summer 410, responding to the danger posed by Athens’s fort and triremes
at Chrysopolis, and probably helped to fortify Chalkedon as well as paying
the Megarians and Peloponnesians who served in its garrison. He may have
also tried to calm regional tensions that exacerbated the danger to the
city. Chalkedon and Byzantion had recently fought an ugly war, notable
for massacres of noncombatants, against the neighboring Bithynians. The
Bithynians populated most of the 190-mile route between Chalkedon and
Daskyleion, especially the vicinity of Astakos, a former Athenian colony
seized by the indigenous chieftain Doidalses. Despite occasional quarrels,
they often provided Pharnabazos with military levies, and their support was
vital for the safe passage of satrapal messages, funds, supplies, and troops to
the Bosporus. Pharnabazos had good reason to act as arbiter, and his influ-
ence may lie behind Chalkedon’s deposit of movable property among the
Bithynians for safekeeping in 408.
It is less likely that Pharnabazos committed atrocities to suppress Athenian sympathizers inside Chalkedon, despite a passage in Arrian’s lost *Bithyniaka*, claiming that he gelded the city’s young boys and sent them to Darius. The incident is difficult to reconcile with Pharnabazos’s positive relations with the Peloponnesians. Arrian’s fragment offers no context, and he might be confusing Pharnabazos with an earlier Persian general, perhaps in the context of the Ionian Revolt or a late sixth-century sack of the polis. But whatever actions Pharnabazos took, he was unable to dislodge the enemy from Chrysopolis. None of the new ships from Antandros risked the dangerous voyage through the Hellespont and Propontis, and Chalkedon’s fate remained unclear.

Meanwhile, Tissaphernes was trying to reestablish a partnership with the Spartans in Ionia. In late 410 or early 409, the Spartan government exiled an officer named Pasippidas, in charge of a small squadron at Chios, for the crime of conspiracy with Tissaphernes. The charge, that Pasippidas and Tissaphernes were responsible for the expulsion of Spartan troops from the island of Thasos, appears outlandish in light of the distance from Chios and the Anatolian coast. But a proposed textual emendation from Thasos to Iasos is also unpersuasive, as its seizure from the Persians and occupation by a Spartan garrison seems unlikely after the war’s shift to the north. It is most likely that the Spartans blamed Pasippidas for failing to respond to a plea for help from Thasos’s governor, since he had the only ships that could have made a difference. They probably accused Tissaphernes of persuading Pasippidas to shirk his duty, just as they blamed him earlier for Astyochos’s refusal to take part in battle. The appearance of reciprocity between the attacks on the satrap’s forts and the removal of a Spartan garrison may have lent the charges credibility.

Yet the episode gives an important clue to understanding Tissaphernes’s behavior. For the charge of collaboration to carry any weight, the satrap and Pasippidas must have been in contact. It is possible Pasippidas attempted to solicit money; the desperate circumstances after the defeat at Kyzikos may have convinced some pragmatic Spartans to consider dealings with their former paymaster. Tissaphernes’s involvement suggests that he was still trying to reassert patronage over an allied naval force, which would have helped him compete with Pharnabazos’s benefactions to the shipbuilders at Antandros. Pasippidas’s force was small enough to subsidize with greater ease than the fleet he had hosted at Miletos. But his lasting unpopularity at Sparta made it difficult for the initiative to bear fruit.
The defense of Ephesos in 409 improved Tissaphernes’s image in parts of coastal Anatolia, even if it did not dispel Spartan suspicions. Just before the summer harvest, the Athenian general Thrasyllos launched the most dangerous assault on the Ionian cities since the Miletos campaign of 412. His invasion force included a thousand hoplites, a hundred cavalry, an unspecified number of peltasts and slingers, and enough additional arms for five thousand rowers to disembark and fight in support. They began by attacking the coastal town of Pygela and slaughtering two hundred Milesian hoplites that came to its aid. The next day, they sailed past Ephesos to Athens’s coastal enclave at Notion and marched eight miles inland to raid Kolophon, which had remained in pro-Persian hands since the days of Pissouthnes. After night fell, the Athenians marched further inland to target the Kilbian Plain in Lydia’s upper Kaystros valley, burning numerous villages, plundering, and abducting residents as slaves. These depredations threatened a source of Tissaphernes’s agricultural tax revenue and challenged his ability to protect the king’s country. He rose to the occasion, aided by his deputy Stages, whose horsemen drove off some of the marauders despite the Athenian cavalry’s efforts to cover them. The skirmish left only seven enemy dead, but the Persians also took a prisoner who probably supplied crucial intelligence on enemy numbers and plans. While Thrasyllos’s army paused for two weeks at Notion before reembarking, Tissaphernes ascertained that Ephesos was their next target and ordered cavalry patrols to spread the word and rally support for Artemis’s defense.

Persian forces assembled across the Sardis satrapy and moved fast enough to beat the Athenians to Ephesos. Xenophon calls Tissaphernes’s army “large,” and it must have outnumbered the hoplites of Ephesos itself. The satrap was joined by the crews of twenty-seven triremes, which sailed about 170 sea miles from Antandros. Five were recent arrivals, but the others were Pharnabazos’s replacements, manned by Kyzikos survivors. It is somewhat surprising that the Syracusans cooperated effectively with Tissaphernes, given their previous involvement in the Miletos uprising and connections to the Daskyleion satrap. But Tissaphernes may have sent news of Ephesos’s danger in the hope of stealing away Pharnabazos’s dependents, a gesture that at the same time showed his willingness to put aside old differences for the common good. It is possible that the new Syracusan generals preferred Tissaphernes because they resented Pharnabazos’s friendly reception of the exiled Hermokrates.
Tissaphernes’s army assembly was crucial for the victory that followed. Thrasyllos attempted a two-pronged landing, but the defenders counter-attacked at both sites, killing four hundred Athenians and pursuing the rest back to their ships, and the chastened invaders sailed off to the Hellespont. Xenophon leaves Tissaphernes’s tactical role unclear, instead stressing the Sicilians’ heroics, while the Oxyrhynchus historian and Diodorus ignore the Persians and highlight Ephesian courage. But the battle displayed Tissaphernes’s military initiative and bolstered his claim to Artemis’s favor, which would have appealed to the religious sentiments of Lydians and Ionians alike.

The boost to Tissaphernes’s reputation may be reflected in a bronze coin series from northern Aiolis, plausibly dated to the Ionian War. The obverses depict a bearded head in profile, labeled with the satrap’s abbreviated name (TISSA-). The reverses show a cult statue of Artemis and the label ASTYRA, identifying the minting location as a small polis near the Gulf of Adramyttion, which also possessed a shrine to the goddess. If Tissaphernes was responsible, the issue might have served for payments to soldiers in lieu of silver, while simultaneously advertising his devotion to Artemis. But it is unclear why he would have highlighted the obscure cult at Astyra instead of the Ephesos temple. It is preferable to interpret the coin as an issue by Astyra’s temple elites, who hoped thereby to elevate their cult’s status by courting Tissaphernes’s favor and alluding to the victory he had won in Artemis’s name. Astyra’s location, just a few miles from Antandros, suggests that Tissaphernes was making new inroads in a region that had so recently defied him.

Over the next year, Tissaphernes resumed subsidies to Peloponnesian crews, a fact ironically apparent from the resumption of Spartan wage complaints in 407. It is doubtful that these referred to the sums that Tissaphernes was supposed to pay in 411, and Xenophon’s phrasing points to a new shortfall. The Spartans increased their naval presence in Ionian waters in 408, despite the Syracusans’ sudden, permanent departure in response to a Carthaginian invasion of Sicily. Pasippidas’s triremes may have joined forces with the remaining Antandros ships, and a navarch named Kratesippidas employed twenty-five triremes to settle a civil war at Chios. It is likely that Tissaphernes offered pay to some of these but then fell behind again, a situation exacerbated by the fleet’s growth with the arrival of the new navarch Lysander in early 407.

While Tissaphernes struggled to pay the Spartan fleet, Pharnabazos suffered the effects of its absence, as Athenian forces ravaged his lands in the Troad and Propontic coast at will. In the winter of 409-8, Thrasyllos’s de-
feated troops joined Alkibiades’s veterans at the Hellespont and marched against Abydos. Pharnabazos rode to meet them with “many cavalry” but lost a battle to Alkibiades’s Athenian horsemen, who pursued him until nightfall. For the next few months, the Athenians launched frequent raids into the Daskyleion satrapy. Finally, in spring or summer 408, they sailed east to begin a full-fledged siege of Chalkedon. Pharnabazos arrived too late to prevent them from encircling the city with a stockade. Persian forces camped at Chalkedon’s Herakleion, but Herakles did not prove as kind to Pharnabazos as Artemis had to Tissaphernes. Impeded by a river and the Athenian field fortifications, the satrap watched from the sidelines as the enemy repelled a sortie by Sparta’s garrison and killed its commander.

After his allies’ defeat, Pharnabazos opened negotiations with the Athenian generals, admitting his inability to protect Chalkedon by force. He purchased its safety from further attack at a price that cannot have pleased the king, paying twenty talents and agreeing to Athens’s tribute rights in the city, including arrears from its three years in Persian possession. The Athenians may have promised to stop attacks on Daskyleion’s territory, but they continued hostilities with the Spartans, laying siege to Byzantion across the straits soon thereafter. Pharnabazos’s truce, even if intended to buy time, was a diplomatic humiliation.

A few weeks later, Pharnabazos made an additional pact with Alkibiades, who had missed the first agreement while on a fund-raising mission. Both men swore to respect the truce and exchanged tokens of personal fidelity. The satrap then invited all the Greek combatants to contribute to a joint embassy that he would escort from Kyzikos to Darius’s court. Among those who came, there were five Athenians, including at least two friends or kinsmen of Alkibiades; two representatives of Athens’s ally Argos; the Syracusean exiles Hermokrates and Proxenos, seeking additional aid for their planned return to Sicily; and several Spartans, including Pasippidas, who might have been recalled due to Tissaphernes’s partial rehabilitation after Ephesos. The inclusion of all sides offered the possibility of a compromise peace and marked an abandonment of the commitment to a clear Spartan victory. Meanwhile, Byzantion fell at the beginning of winter, after its commander Klearchos had attempted to reach Pharnabazos in the vain hope of further aid.

It is unclear why Pharnabazos gave up instead of petitioning Darius for greater support. He may have sensed allied war weariness and hoped to retain personal influence by securing the king’s involvement in the peace process. But a separate Spartan embassy, led by a certain Boiotios, had already
set out for Darius’s court to request increased support. Xenophon reports a surprise encounter between Pharnabazos’s party and Boiotios’s returning diplomats at the beginning of spring 407 but says nothing else about the timing of Boiotios’s mission. Any travel on the imperial highways required a local satrap’s permission. Perhaps Pharnabazos actually forwarded two embassies with conflicting goals, concealing Boiotios’s mission from the Athenian ambassadors and stalling the second embassy to win the first more time. Alternatively, despite the Spartan complaints in 407, Tissaphernes might have assisted an embassy in early 408 to assure the allies of his continuing dedication. In either case, the outcome was a loss of influence for both satraps.

**Darius and the Embassy of Boiotios**

Darius’s apparent inattention to Greek relations from 410 to 408 may be related to the Median revolt or other events unattested in Greek sources. But he is also likely to have felt residual indignation at the Ionian garrison expulsions and disappointment over the Spartans’ ingratitude and incompetence. He had little reason to fear them as a serious threat to his territories, especially after Kyzikos, and it may have been only the prospect of embarrassment at their defeat that prevented their outright repudiation. As we have seen, several scholars view Darius’s decision to increase aid to Sparta in 408 as a reversal of a previous balancing strategy that attempted to secure his hold on Ionia by preventing either Athens or Sparta from winning. A better explanation is that Darius had long intended Athens’s defeat but deemed other matters more urgent and was unwilling to take greater steps to help Sparta win until it showed greater respect for his authority. Once Boiotios’s embassy satisfied this condition, Darius was content to reward his prodigal clients. The appointment of Cyrus and the accompanying grant sent the diplomats home in excitement, having “acquired everything that they wanted from the king.”

By escalating his commitment to Sparta, Darius rejected the option of a compromise settlement that might have brought the intervention to a faster but less satisfactory ending. The imperial post should have made him aware of Pharnabazos’s departure with the joint peace embassy by early fall, and the encounter between the two groups of diplomats suggests that Boiotios’s envoys left Darius’s court around January 407. The intervening period was long enough for the king to consider receiving the Athenian delegation to see what it might offer. Instead, he chose to pursue a decisive victory for Sparta.

The prospect of a negotiated peace was not without advantages. It might have been compatible with Darius’s image as arbiter for the Greeks and re-
storer of universal order, and there were potential financial benefits as well. Persia’s toll collectors were still deriving some revenue from merchant traffic between the eastern Mediterranean and Athens, which may have enjoyed a partial revival during the absence of large-scale fleet operations in the southern Aegean between 411 and 408. There were also opportunities for trade between Persian subject ports and former Athenian dependents such as Rhodes, which would soon consolidate into a single polis and expand its economic activities. The sooner the naval war ended, the faster the king could expect an increase in his profits from customs.

On the other hand, undertaking a longer campaign to expel the Athenians from their Anatolian footholds was more likely to increase tribute income from the coastal poleis. Some of Tissaphernes’s cities must have started contributing to Persian coffers by 408, although it is unclear how soon Miletos and Knidos resumed cooperation after the troubles of 411. On Pharnabazos’s coast, Athens still impeded Persian taxation at Kyzikos and Chalkedon, collected tolls on Bosporus traffic at Chrysopolis, and controlled Lampsakos, the highest tribute payer on the Asian side of the Hellespont. Athens’s negotiators would doubtless attempt to retain these positions, and the destruction of Athenian naval power was the surest guarantee of restored Persian access.

Moreover, in ideological terms, Spartan victory would proclaim Persia’s power more effectively than a negotiated truce after a series of allied defeats, which might have indicated the king’s inability to carry out his original threats against Athens. Given Sparta’s recent record, its transformation into a naval power capable of overcoming Athens would be a miraculous achievement, powerfully demonstrating Persian ability to shape the surrounding world.

Darius’s increased support for the Spartans arose from the recognition that their victory was in his best interests. It is doubtful that he denied the allies extra ships in a continuing scheme to prolong the war for an indefinite period, which would have forfeited the ideological and economic advantages a swift defeat would offer. But his choice not to recommit the Persian fleet suggests that he regarded the naval efforts of 411 as a waste of imperial resources, not to be repeated. A new Phoenician campaign might have hastened victory but only at much greater expense. Fewer Peloponnesian ships were now available for joint operations, and the demonstrations of Athenian skill at sea in the battles of 411-10 may have raised concerns over the damage the Persian fleet was likely to incur. All in all, providing subsidies was preferable as a moderate step to help Sparta pursue naval success while limiting Persian costs.
It is doubtful that the king made his grant without attention to what had gone wrong in 411. D. M. Lewis addresses this problem by proposing that a new Persian-Spartan agreement had been concluded, attempting to reduce tensions in the alliance by conceding a state of autonomy for the Ionian Greeks. This so-called treaty of Boiotios would have freed the cities from offensive symbols of Persian domination, such as garrisons, while still requiring them to make limited payments in support of Cyrus’s household. But a reduction of Darius’s authority in the Ionian cities would have contradicted his stated war aims, and several subsequent studies have rejected Lewis’s hypothesis. The Spartans had not called for Ionian autonomy when they complained at the earlier treaty drafts, and even if they had reason to do so now, they lacked the power to compel the king into a disadvantageous bargain.

It is more plausible that Darius required the Spartans to make a concession of their own in return for new aid. The most obvious was a promise to refrain from any further affronts to his agents or territorial possessions. Short of a formal apology over the garrison expulsions, Darius might have been willing to accept the explanation that Peloponnesian misbehavior arose from a misunderstanding. The cause for their hostility to Tissaphernes had been suspicion of his disloyalty, and they meant no disrespect to the king himself. Darius’s appointment of Cyrus as a replacement for Tissaphernes implied acceptance of this excuse. But the prince would be less easy to disassociate from Darius’s person, and his command implied that the king would not be as forgiving of further trespasses.

Cyrus, therefore, played an essential part in Darius’s solution to old quarrels, and his presence as his father’s representative would magnify the Achaemenid family’s direct association with the coming victory. He was in his mid-teens and inexperienced in command, and many scholars have concluded that he received the position owing to the influence of his doting mother, Parysatis. Others suggest that Darius chose Cyrus in order to neutralize his royal ambitions, giving him a distant post to clear the way for his older brother Arsakes, the future Artaxerxes II. Neither option can be ruled out. It is unclear how early Darius decided on Arsakes as heir, and Xerxes, Artaxerxes I, and Darius II had all been younger sons of the previous ruler. Perhaps Cyrus’s Anatolian command was a test of his aptitude for power, especially the ability to manage economic resources and convert them into diplomatic and military capital over a short time period, constrained by the finite nature of Darius’s five hundred-talent grant. It is unfortunate that
the state of the evidence does not reveal whether Arsakes held posts of equal or greater importance elsewhere in the empire. One cannot assume that Darius foresaw his imminent death, and the succession question may have not been urgent in 408. A simpler explanation is that Darius selected Cyrus because he saw that the prince had charisma and intelligence and judged him ready for the task at hand.58

Cyrus Takes Command

Upon arrival in western Anatolia, Cyrus quickly established his independence from both Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes, while constructing a stronger partnership with the allies. His wage increase was crucial in resurrecting Spartan naval morale and laid the foundations for Lysander’s first victory at Notion. Cyrus’s generosity depended on Darius’s provision of sufficient funds to allow him to outspend Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos without sacrificing his private revenues, at least for the first year of his command. Yet while the king deserves much of the credit, Cyrus proved adept at managing not only his father’s money but the imagery of power, mixing displays of dominance with enthusiasm for the Spartan cause and managing not to alienate his clients.

Cyrus set out by January 407 at the latest, and would have reached Sardis between May and August, probably toward the later date. The journey from Susa to Gordion, where the prince and Boiotios met Pharnabazos, was about 1,320 miles, about three months’ travel at an average pace of fifteen miles a day, without significant halts along the way. They could have covered the remaining 250 miles to Sardis in as little as three weeks, but Cyrus probably paused at major locations to inspect fortresses, storehouses, and assemblies of soldiers.59 Lysander, gathering the Peloponnesian fleet at Ephesos, had to wait for some time before the prince arrived.60

Darius made Cyrus a karanos with authority over military musters in the plain of Kastolos and satrap over the provinces of Cappadocia, Greater Phrygia, and Lydia.61 The title, first attested here but probably held by Tissaphernes as well, is the etymological equivalent of Greek stratēgos. The king could alter its jurisdiction in accordance with the situation, and Cyrus’s powers extended farther than Tissaphernes’s had.62 They probably included the right to give orders to Pharnabazos, demonstrated when the prince denied the Daskyleion satrap’s request to lead the Athenian ambassadors on to Darius’s court.63 Cyrus compelled Pharnabazos to detain them for multiple months, keeping Athens in the dark about his appointment.64
Cyrus’s relationship with Tissaphernes was more complicated, since he planned to take up residence at Sardis, while Pharnabazos retained local mastery at Daskyleion, at a distance from the prince’s person. If Xenophon’s listing of Cyrus’s territories is correct, Tissaphernes lost not only his position as supreme Persian general in western Anatolia but the Sardis satrapy as well. It is possible, however, that Tissaphernes was given a lesser administrative position in part of Lydia or Caria, since he remained capable of bestowing a land grant in early 405. As a subordinate to the karanos, his interaction with Cyrus would doubtlessly have been tense, and Cyrus’s sympathetic hearing of Spartan complaints against Tissaphernes cannot have helped. Shortly thereafter, Tissaphernes attempted to convince Cyrus to meet a new Athenian embassy, despite the detention of the envoys that had traveled with Pharnabazos. Xenophon alleges that Tissaphernes was still pursuing the balancing strategy of preventing any Greek state from becoming strong that had been urged on him by Alkibiades, but it is possible that he doubted the Spartans’ ability to win at sea and considered peace negotiations a better option. He may have hoped to change the king’s mind by winning over his impressionable son. Instead Cyrus took the opportunity to display his personal authority by rejecting Tissaphernes’s advice.

In his first meeting with Lysander, the prince showed off the difference between his and Tissaphernes’s methods, even before he dispensed the king’s silver. During the intervention’s initial years, Tissaphernes had traveled enormous distances in cooperation with the allies, delivering pay and meeting Spartan diplomats at coastal locations and following their fleet to the Hellespont in fall 411. Ephesos was only forty-five miles from Sardis, and Cyrus could have followed Tissaphernes’s lead and visited the fleet in person instead of inviting the navarch to come to him. But he made a conscious decision not to echo his predecessor, selecting a meeting location that emphasized his power over the dependents who sought his generosity. When Lysander arrived, Cyrus took the opportunity to display imperial aesthetics and wealth, giving the Spartan a tour of his ceremonial paradise, boasting of his personal labor in the gardens, and demonstrating his energy and attention to detail in the care of royal land and possessions.

Cyrus responded to Lysander’s denunciations of Tissaphernes by reaffirming Darius’s benevolence toward Sparta and the gift of five hundred talents to cover Peloponnesian naval wages. He also listed reserves available for additional support once the king’s grant ran out, including his own private revenues and even his gold and silver throne, which might be stripped
down for coin as a last resort. Of course he must have preferred to limit the cost to his personal fortune if possible. When the Spartans asked him to return the rowers’ pay to the full drachma first paid by Tissaphernes in 412, he clarified that the king had not authorized a raise in wages. Pay would always be forthcoming, unlike when Tissaphernes held the command, but it would be dispensed at the three-obol rate confirmed by Darius. This firm stance allowed Cyrus to appear generous when he altered the arrangement and granted a small increase, although not as much as the Spartans had first demanded. Banqueting with Lysander, Cyrus promised the navarch any favor he wished, and on Lysander’s request, he agreed to raise the pay to four obols. He then covered Tissaphernes’s arrears and paid an additional month’s salary in advance.

Cyrus remained very much in control, despite Plutarch’s assertion that he acted out of personal admiration for Lysander. His calculated benefaction demonstrated goodwill but limited spending enough to support the allied crews for an extended period. Conservation was important, since the Peloponnesian fleet was approaching the size that Tissaphernes had struggled to fund in 411. Lysander mustered seventy ships by midsummer 407, including reinforcements from the Peloponnese and Rhodes, the Antandros triremes, and Kratesippidas’s squadron, and added an additional twenty by winter. Not counting the back wages, Darius’s five hundred talents would have covered their pay for eleven to fourteen months at the three-obol rate. Returning the rate to a drachma would have limited royal funding to five to seven months, but Cyrus’s four-obol compromise stretched the king’s money for perhaps eight to ten. Assuming that his meeting with Lysander at Sardis occurred in July or August, Cyrus would thus have been able to offer regular pay without tapping into his own reserves through the winter and spring of 406.

The Persian grant allowed Lysander to strengthen his fleet without a premature rush to engage the enemy. While raising its overall numbers, the navarch repaired damaged ships, dried out hulls to improve seaworthiness and speed, drilled the crews, and probably tried to incite enemy rowers to defect with the promise of better pay than the Athenians’ three-obol rate. Scholars debate just how effective this appeal was, but it is clear that Cyrus’s wages raised Peloponnesian spirits and worried the Athenian generals, who were trying to cope with their own financial limitations through coastal raids and plunder. By the time Alkibiades arrived on Samos to prepare a new offensive against Ionia, probably in October or November 407, the Spartans
had been receiving the four-obol rate for several months. The Athenians’ best hope was to destroy Lysander’s ships in battle, forcing the Persians to choose between another period of expensive rebuilding or renewed engagement in peace talks. But with a safe harbor and Persian coin arriving at regular intervals, Lysander could afford to wait out the winter while Athens’s situation worsened.

The result was Alkibiades’s fateful Ionian offensive. Between December 407 and February 406, he set out from Samos to Notion, eight miles west of Ephesos, with a hundred ships, fifteen hundred hoplites, and 150 cavalry. Leaving most of the triremes there, Alkibiades rounded the Mimas peninsula with troop transports, making for Phokaia and Kyme. These cities, despite a Persian presence in 412, had since returned to neutral or pro-Athenian stances. Xenophon reports that Alkibiades took this trip in order to meet Thrasyboulos, who was building a wall at Phokaia, while Diodorus claims that his purpose was to defend Klazomenai against raids by its exiles. It appears that he hoped to strengthen Athens’s foothold in northern Ionia and assumed it was safe to leave because he doubted that the Spartans at Ephesos would take the initiative. But in Alkibiades’s absence, his deputy at Notion sent a group of triremes toward Ephesos and Lysander responded in force. The sources disagree on whether the Athenians were trying to draw a Spartan detachment into an ambush or reconnoiter and taunt the Peloponnesian fleet. Either way, Lysander’s ships won a sharp victory, chasing the Athenians back to Notion and defeating a larger force that came up in sup-

### Table 6.1

**Darius’s Grant and Cyrus’s Subsidies to the Peloponnesian Fleet, 407–6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Ship numbers</th>
<th>Sum in talents</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 407</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>*46</td>
<td>Xen. Hell. 1.5.1, 3, 7, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 407</td>
<td>70–90</td>
<td>*46–60</td>
<td>Xen. Hell. 1.5.1, 3, 7, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 407</td>
<td>70–90</td>
<td>*46–60</td>
<td>Xen. Hell. 1.5.1, 3, 7, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 407</td>
<td>70–90</td>
<td>*46–60</td>
<td>Xen. Hell. 1.5.1, 3, 7, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 407</td>
<td>70–90</td>
<td>*46–60</td>
<td>Xen. Hell. 1.5.1, 3, 7, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 406</td>
<td>70–90</td>
<td>*46–60</td>
<td>Xen. Hell. 1.5.1, 3, 7, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 406</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>*60</td>
<td>Xen. Hell. 1.5.7, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 406</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>*60</td>
<td>Xen. Hell. 1.5.7, 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr. 406</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>*60</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 406?</td>
<td>140–170</td>
<td>*93–113</td>
<td>Xen. Hell. 1.6.18</td>
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Total: > *549–639 (not counting arrears)

*a Asterisks designate figures derived from pay estimates and ship numbers but not explicitly stated in the sources.*
port. They captured either fifteen or twenty-two enemy ships, and the news prompted Alkibiades to abandon the northern campaign. He rejoined his battered fleet and returned to Samos.  

The Battle of Notion was good news for Cyrus, vindicating his decision to raise the allied fleet’s pay. The enemy remained battle ready, and Lysander cautiously declined Alkibiades’s challenge to a rematch. But Spartan success demoralized Athens and, within a few months, resulted in Alkibiades’s second and permanent exile. It is also likely that Cyrus exploited the Athenian defeat to gain ground in northern Ionia. Either just before or shortly after the Battle of Notion, Alkibiades attempted to extort funds at Kyme, but the citizens resisted and chased the foragers back to the ships. Diodorus’s account, derived from Ephoros’s local tradition, has the city complain to Athens that it was a faithful ally and did not deserve hostile treatment. But Cornelius Nepos reports that Persian bribery forced Alkibiades to withdraw, perhaps hinting that Cyrus or a pro-Persian faction had reestablished control of Kyme. Meanwhile, Thrasyboulos departed for the Hellespont, probably abandoning Phokaia. A Persian reconquest may be responsible for the enslavement of the well-born Phokaian woman named Milto and later known as Aspasia, who acquired notoriety as Cyrus’s favorite concubine.

Despite these successes, at least one more campaign was needed to complete Athens’s defeat, and the king’s grant would run out during the spring of 406, forcing Cyrus to turn to other funding sources. Meanwhile, Lysander’s term as navarch expired. Before handing over the fleet to his successor, Kallikratidas, he collected extra funds that he had not yet distributed, and returned them to Cyrus. Kallikratidas was enraged at what he saw as a spiteful effort to undermine his command, but from the karanos’s perspective, Lysander’s gesture showed a laudable respect and may have helped to stretch finances a little further. Parsimony took on a new importance, since Kallikratidas planned to double the size of the fleet and did not share Lysander’s gratitude for Persian aid. In the late summer of 406, his campaign would end in a new disaster that almost ruined all that Cyrus had accomplished.

Cyrus and Spartan Disaster

Cyrus’s relations with Kallikratidas were poor from the start. Their quarrel, perhaps related to the transition from the king’s money to local resources, did not stop Cyrus from funding the Peloponnesians, but it compromised his image as Sparta’s benefactor. The Battle of Arginousai compounded the
damage and led to a lengthy interruption in Cyrus's subsidies, leading Persia to doubt Sparta's ability to win the war and perhaps even threatening Cyrus's retention of the western command.

Cyrus fell out with Kallikratidas in April or May, on the navarch's first visit to Sardis. It is unclear whether they met in person. Xenophon first suggests that they did and that the teenaged prince responded to a request for new wages by telling Kallikratidas to wait for two days. But a later passage makes the Spartan claim that the prince postponed seeing him at all. Plutarch states that a conference never occurred and that Cyrus's palace attendants turned Kallikratidas away at the gates on two successive days, claiming that the prince was busy drinking. Many scholars accept that Cyrus intended to deliberately insult Kallikratidas, wishing either to punish him for replacing the prince's friend Lysander or to remind him of Spartan dependence on Persia. It might be wise to take Plutarch's more dramatic version, rooted in Greek perceptions of Persian decadence, with a grain of salt, but it seems clear that Kallikratidas was offended by Cyrus's delay in paying the subsidy, whether or not Cyrus humiliated him.

Funding troubles were to be expected at exactly this time, as the depletion of Darius's grant coincided with a surge in the size of the Peloponnesian fleet. Even though Lysander had returned Cyrus's spare change, it would not have been enough to cover the wages for much longer. Kallikratidas gathered 50 additional ships from Rhodes and Chios, raising the fleet total to 140 and Cyrus's monthly obligation from fifty-nine to ninety-three talents. To meet the expense, the prince may have begun to turn from his father's money to his own semi-private revenues. Cyrus's later donations to Lysander indicate a substantial fortune and hint that the king was also willing to permit Ionian tribute to be diverted for his son's personal use. But a conversion of landed wealth into coin was likely to take time, and given Persia's incomplete possession of the coastal cities, one month's naval subsidy would absorb the better part of a year's Ionian tax revenues. If Cyrus's situation, not dissimilar from that of Tissaphernes before him, is sufficient to explain the delay in distribution, Kallikratidas was unlikely to sympathize.

The Spartan commander set out to prove that he could win without Cyrus, launching a summer campaign before receiving any Persian aid. He requested some funds from Sparta itself—the amount and source are unclear—as well as contributions from the Ionian cities. Xenophon does not specify the size of Miletos's payment, but Chios provided five drachmai per man, a total of just over twenty-three talents (assuming this covered the
crews of 140 triremes). While modest compared to Persia’s previous offerings, the solicitations reflected poorly on Cyrus’s ability to maintain control of his subjects and allies. Kallikratidas denounced Greek reliance on barbarians in a speech to the Milesian assembly, evoking memories of the violence of 411. He then won a string of victories that seemed to justify his independent stance, including the capture and sack of Teos, apparently regained and fortified by Athens at some point since 412. Kallikratidas’s defeat of the Athenian general Konon off Lesbos was a greater success than Notion, resulting in the capture of thirty Athenian ships and the blockade of forty others in Mytilene. If Kallikratidas could complete the conquest of Lesbos and finish off Konon’s fleet, he would be in a position to threaten Athenian control of the Hellespont, a crucial step toward final victory. It was no accident that Cyrus hurried to send wages to Kallikratidas in early June, shortly after the siege of Mytilene began, attempting to reestablish credit for Spartan success before it was too late.

But Kallikratidas wasted Cyrus’s belated investment at Arginousai. Athens strained its resources and manned a relief fleet of 150 ships, which challenged the Spartans in the straits between Lesbos and the mainland in July 406. The Athenians won a crushing victory, sinking between sixty-nine and seventy-seven Peloponnesian triremes. The Battle of Kyzikos had taken place on both sea and land, enabling many of the crews to escape to safety, but the Battle of Arginousai occurred in open water, and a storm in its wake prevented even the winners from recovering their dead. It is estimated that perhaps thirteen to fifteen thousand Peloponnesians died in the sea with their navarch. Cyrus proved no more able to guarantee his clients’ success than Pharnabazos four years earlier.

After the battle, unlike Pharnabazos after Kyzikos, Cyrus seems to have halted support for the Peloponnesian fleet. A blockading squadron had stayed at Mytilene during the battle, and the allies retained between 93 and 101 ships, although they may have only been able to man between 63 and 71 if these included the thirty Athenian ships taken from Konon. Instead of returning to Ephesos or another coastal port, they spent the remainder of summer as well as the fall and winter on Chios, where their crews suffered extreme financial hardship and came close to mutiny. During this desperate period, Cyrus’s payments were apparently short or absent, as Xenophon later mentions that he owed back wages. The battle losses had reduced Cyrus’s financial burden, but it is possible that he resented paying for the Spartan failure and blamed the allies for the defeat.
Arginousei weakened Cyrus’s political standing and may have renewed the satraps’ doubts in the wisdom of granting subsidies to Sparta instead of seeking a negotiated peace.97 We do not possess a full picture of Cyrus’s activities, and he may have launched a military campaign against the Pisidians in 407 or 406 that counteracted some of the damage to his reputation.98 But Cyrus’s heightened insecurity might help to explain the execution of his cousins Mitraios and Autoboisesakes, sons of Hieramenes and a sister of Darius. He allegedly charged them with failing to hide their hands in their sleeves during an audience, a ritual gesture usually performed in the presence of the king, but such cruelty on slight pretext and the open usurpation of royal prerogatives might be a product of later propaganda, circulated by Artaxerxes II. It is possible that Cyrus responded to a more serious threat to his person, real or perceived. Even so, Hieramenes’s complaints as well as the king’s worsening health may have played a part in the prince’s recall to court in the spring of 405.99 Darius had a year or less to live, and to regain prestige and a path to the throne, Cyrus would have to overcome the perception of failure by redoubling his efforts to secure Spartan victory. Should the struggle at court turn against him, a grateful Sparta’s provision of military manpower might help to reverse his fortunes.

Cyrus’s and Lysander’s Road to Victory

Cyrus’s preparations for the Spartan campaign of 405 were more extensive than ever before, and their outcome at Aigospotamoi restored his image as patron, despite his premature departure. Although the Spartans capitalized on his gifts and did the actual fighting, Cyrus exercised a decisive influence in three ways—pressing for the unorthodox reappointment of Lysander as commander, providing additional triremes, and dispensing funds on a scale that dwarfed the king’s grant and the earlier contributions of Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes combined.

The karanos’s role in Sparta’s final naval revival began a few months before Darius’s recall orders arrived. In the winter of 406–5, seven years after the satraps’ envoys had sailed across the Aegean to propose their initial alliance, Cyrus sent an embassy to Sparta to request the return of Lysander, the one Spartan naval leader capable of achieving success. The Persian representatives accompanied envoys from Chios and other cities, probably acting on plans discussed in a meeting of Ionian elites at Ephesos. They issued a joint demand, but Cyrus’s voice was decisive, since the desperate state of the unfunded Peloponnesian fleet gave him unparalleled leverage. Spartan law
limited navarchs to a single term, but after Cyrus’s appeal, the Spartan govern-
ment appointed Lysander nominal deputy to the new navarch Arakos, on the understanding that he would serve as the actual commander.¹⁰⁰

Lysander led the fleet back from Chios to Ephesos around April 405. He ordered construction of new triremes at Antandros, drawing once more on Persian-owned timber, then went up to Sardis.¹⁰¹ Cyrus welcomed him, but indicated displeasure with the amount of Persian money already spent to no avail. Complaining that the allies had used up the king’s gift and much more in addition, he showed Lysander an itemized list of payments that he and his predecessors had made to Sparta’s previous commanders. Cyrus’s patience was not inexhaustible, and he expected greater returns. His point made, the karanos handed over wages, including what he “owed” the sailors, presumably back pay for the Arginousai survivors.¹⁰² If the arrears covered the eight months that had passed since the battle, the salary of sixty-three to seventy-one crews might have cost as much as 336 to 378 talents, and there was much more to come.

Lysander returned to Ephesos, but Cyrus then learned of his recall, and summoned the navarch back to Sardis to provide strategic advice along with a second, larger grant.¹⁰³ The prince was concerned with Lysander’s inferior numbers, since the Athenians at Samos were gathering their largest fleet of the Ionian war, 180 triremes strong.¹⁰⁴ According to Xenophon, Cyrus urged Lysander not to fight until the Spartan fleet was larger and told him that he and Darius had enough money to help man many more ships.¹⁰⁵ Plutarch reports that he promised to bring back the royal fleet from Phoenicia and Cilicia, but despite some scholars’ acceptance of this claim, it probably stems from a misunderstanding of Xenophon’s meaning. Cyrus was traveling to Media, not the Levant, and by the time he reached court in late summer or fall, it would have been far too late to assemble the king’s ships and send them on an Aegean campaign.¹⁰⁶ It is doubtful that he meant the Spartans to wait all year for a Persian fleet. Rather, he wished for Lysander to man more triremes on the Ionian coast, and a clue from the campaign’s aftermath hints at his provision of direct assistance. Lysander’s Delphic victory monument included statues of generals from Ephesos, Miletos, Knidos, and probably Erythrai and Samian Anaia who led contingents.¹⁰⁷ Little Ionian participation is attested in earlier Peloponnesian fleets, and it is likely that Cyrus encouraged the coastal cities to provide ships and crews, perhaps the same twenty-five triremes at his disposal at Ephesos less than four years later.¹⁰⁸ These helped to increase Lysander’s fleet to at least 150 ships before it set sail.¹⁰⁹
Finally, Cyrus ensured that Lysander would not lack money for the rest of the campaign. A journey to court would take the karanos away from his command for at least the rest of the year, and perhaps for good if he gained preference in the succession. He wished to empower the Spartans to win in his absence and to secure the credit for their victory. To that end, Xenophon reports that Cyrus turned over a staggering amount of wealth, including “all the cities’ tribute that was his property, as well as the surplus funds.” Diodorus and Plutarch add that he ceded rights of governance over the cities, but he may have lacked the power to make such a sweeping administrative decision. It is more likely that Darius authorized Cyrus to redistribute local tribute to fund the campaign and that the prince gave Lysander permission to take direct charge of its collection.

But the “surplus funds” mattered even more than the incoming tribute. Unless Cyrus charged vastly more than the Athenians at the height of their archē, it is doubtful that the annual silver tax of all the coastal cities in Persian hands amounted to as much as 150 talents. Even if the poleis also provided other resources to their masters, it was coined silver that Lysander needed. A fleet of 150 triremes would absorb a hundred talents a month at Cyrus’s four-obol wage, and the tribute would not cover it for long, especially if Cyrus only “owned” a portion of the cities’ tribute. The sources do not indicate that Lysander was granted direct collection rights at Sardis or other non-Greek cities, but some tribute funds from Cyrus’s wider Anatolian jurisdictions may have been included in the larger surplus that the prince provided.

Xenophon reports that about sixteen months after the initial payment, when Lysander finally demobilized the fleet at the end of summer 404, there were still 470 talents—almost five months’ wages—remaining from Cyrus’s donation. The fleet’s total wages over this period should have come to more than seventeen hundred talents. Some might have been covered by the spoils of three plundered cities and the defeated Athenian fleet at Aigospotami, but their sums would not have exceeded a few hundred talents. If they are estimated at 300 to 500, and two years’ tribute income at another 200 to 300, that would still require Cyrus’s “surplus” donation to cover 900 to 1,200 talents, as well as the 470 left over. Including tribute, surplus, and the arrears previously handed over, the scale of Cyrus’s gift over 405-4 amounted to perhaps as much as 2,066 to 2,248 talents, more than four times as much as Darius had provided in 407.

This scale requires explanation, especially after the prince’s show of irritation at the expenditure of the royal grant. There is no way to estimate
the worth of Cyrus’s private fortune, but it is plausible that he gave the Spartans a large percentage of his own wealth, in addition to any imperial tribute set aside for redistribution. He probably hoped to strengthen his claim to the throne by bringing the Greek intervention to a successful end while Darius still lived and may have gambled on the chance that the king would name him heir, in which case no one would call him to account for princely extravagance.\textsuperscript{118}

Having laid the foundations for Lysander’s success, Cyrus prepared for the journey east. He would bring Tissaphernes in his entourage “as a friend,” or to keep an enemy close.\textsuperscript{119} Shortly before their departure, an atrocity at Miletos contributed to the growing hostility between the two. A Milesian faction, with Lysander’s approval, exploited a festival to seize the city and overthrow its democracy, massacring hundreds of fellow citizens.\textsuperscript{120} This was the first of a series of coups in Ionian cities in 405 and 404, all of which brought Lysander’s devotees to power. The sources suggest that plans had been in the works since the time of his original command.\textsuperscript{121} While they are silent on Cyrus’s role, it does not appear that he disapproved, and within a few years, he would work closely with the Milesian oligarchs. Some of the “wealthy” victims at Miletos may have been the same men who had donated to Kallikratidas during his quarrel with Cyrus in 406, and he probably took satisfaction at their removal.\textsuperscript{122}

Tissaphernes intervened in support of the losing party, giving a thousand Milesian fugitives a daric per man and land in an Anatolian fortress—according to a plausible emendation, Kalynda in Lycia, although many scholars prefer Blaundos in eastern Lydia.\textsuperscript{123} His action appears surprising, given his earlier relations with Miletos. It may be that some of the democratic refugees included guest-friends of Alkibiades who had brought the

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Ship numbers</th>
<th>Sum in talents\textsuperscript{a}</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>Apr. 405 (8 months’ arrears?)</td>
<td>63–71</td>
<td>*336–378</td>
<td>Xen. Hell. 2.1.11–12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 405–Aug. 404</td>
<td>150?</td>
<td>*1,700</td>
<td>Xen. Hell. 2.1.14, 2.2.9, 2.3.8–9; see n. 115</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left over Aug. 404</td>
<td>*470</td>
<td></td>
<td>Xen. Hell. 2.3.8</td>
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Total: *2,006 –2,248 (assuming 300 to 500 covered by campaign loot)

\textsuperscript{a}Asterisks designate figures derived from pay estimates and ship numbers but not explicitly stated in the sources.
city over to him in 412, or perhaps he jumped at a chance to contrast his own benevolence with the sinister activities of Cyrus’s and Lysander’s supporters. Either way, it is likely that the episode increased the tension between Cyrus and Tissaphernes as they set out for court.

The Persian grandees’ journey from Sardis to Media required a minimum of four months on the royal road, and the news of Lysander’s victory probably caught up with them before they arrived. The Peloponnesian campaign began by sacking Kedreiai and Amorges’s old base of Iasos, which had reverted to Athenian allegiance. Next, evading the enemy off the Ionian coast, Lysander made for the Hellespont to cut Athens’s lifeline and took Lampsakos by storm. Arriving too late, the Athenians drew up their ships across the straits on the beach at Aigospotamoi, where Lysander caught them in disarray and captured their entire fleet. Only a handful of triremes escaped with Konon, who fled to a guest-friend and Persian vassal, the Cypriote dynast Euagoras of Salamis. Cyrus was delighted and sent Lysander a congratulatory gift, a gold and ivory model trireme two cubits long, which the Spartan later deposited at Delphi.

In the meantime, the victorious fleet retook Byzantion and Chalkedon, stopping all Athens-bound grain convoys from the Black Sea, and finally descended on Piraeus. It was eight months before Athens surrendered in April 404, but the outcome was certain. Yet although the prince’s generosity had made Spartan victory possible, Darius was now in irreversible decline, and Cyrus’s success would prove insufficient to outweigh his older brother’s claim to the crown.

Persia’s Victory: Costs and Benefits

The king died between fall of 405 and spring of 404, after the news of Aigospotamoi reached the court, if perhaps before Athens’s surrender. Including the final siege, the intervention against Athens lasted eight years, and its conclusion was among the reign’s most significant achievements. Darius’s passing is a fitting point at which to evaluate the costs and benefits of the empire’s involvement in the Peloponnesian War.

Andokides and Isokrates claim that the king spent five thousand talents to secure Spartan victory, but the figure may stem from a tenfold exaggeration of Darius’s subsidy in 407, and modern scholars have given it little credence. Thucydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus never provide a total, yet their frequent references to individual payments, wage scales, and ship numbers allow partial reconstruction. Previous studies have listed their explicit references to payment without accounting for periods of probable subsidy
less well attested in the sources, such as Pharnabazos’s wages for Mindaros’s fleet, or attempting to estimate overall totals.  But despite the gaps and conflicts in the evidence, it is possible to combine the estimates for Tissaphernes’s, Pharnabazos’s, and Cyrus’s spending in tables 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, and 6.2 and thereby arrive at a plausible range of total Persian expenditures on the Peloponnesian fleets. The results suggest that over eight years of intervention, the king, Cyrus, and the satraps spent between 3,272 and 3,672 talents on subsidies, which includes the redirection of Ionian tribute in 405-4. This does not include such additional expenses as salaries for mercenaries and garrisons, compensation to loggers and shipbuilders at Aspendos, diplomatic gifts, maintenance of ambassadors and exiles, satrapal travel, and the royal fleet’s abortive voyage in 411.

There is no question that this level of funding outstripped the limited economic potential of the Spartans and their allies, who lacked both tribute and treasury reserves to support their efforts. What Persia spent was probably less than what the Athenians spent to keep up naval resistance from 412 to 405, but more than enough to justify the statement that Sparta could not have won without it. It is also important to recognize the role of the triremes built with Pharnabazos’s timber grant and those that Cyrus contributed in 405 in the war’s final battles. J. F. Lazenby downplays Persia’s claim to credit for the Spartan victory by stressing that the Peloponnesians constructed a majority of their own ships. But it is instructive to consider the number of Antandros triremes in comparison with the overall size of Peloponnesian fleets between 409 and 405. Assuming that Mount Ida’s fires permitted the rebuilding of sixty ships lost at Kyzikos, the Sicilians’ departure left thirty-eight triremes that owed their existence to the Daskyleion satrap. At the time of Notion, these made up 42 percent of Lysander’s fleet. Even after

<table>
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<th>Funding period</th>
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<tr>
<td>412–11</td>
<td>Tissaphernes</td>
<td>*240.75–294.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>411–10</td>
<td>Pharnabazos</td>
<td>*333–416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>409–8</td>
<td>Tissaphernes</td>
<td>*100</td>
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<tr>
<td>407–6</td>
<td>Darius II (via Cyrus)</td>
<td>500</td>
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<tr>
<td>406</td>
<td>Cyrus</td>
<td>*93–113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405–4</td>
<td>Cyrus</td>
<td>*2,006–2,248</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total: *3,272.75–3,671.5</td>
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*aAsterisks designate figures derived from pay estimates and ship numbers but not explicitly stated in the sources.
Kallikratidas’s reinforcement, they made up 27 percent of the ships available for Arginousai. Some were doubtless lost in that disaster, but even if only half remained, they still accounted for 12 percent of Lysander’s triremes at Aigospotamoi, where Cyrus’s twenty-five Ionian triremes made up another 16 percent. Given the Spartan disadvantage in numbers in all three battles, it would have been difficult to engage at all if Persian authorities had not made these new ships available.

Overall, the contributions of the king and Pharnabazos were critical, but Cyrus deserved the lion’s share of credit for the outcome. Thucydides’s reference to the war’s end, while blaming defeat on Athenian error, mentions the prince’s funding of Sparta as the most serious of the city’s external challenges. The *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* suggests that the Peloponnesian fleets would have dispersed if it had not been for Cyrus’s enthusiasm, and Xenophon recalls that in 401, when he set out to join Cyrus’s army, Socrates warned that the Athenians would never forgive him for serving the man who had fought so hard for their downfall.\(^{132}\)

Sparta’s victory was Persia’s as well, displaying the empire’s strength and commitment to its clients’ success. It is unnecessary to accept the assertion of older studies that Persia’s security required indecisive continuation of the Greek war or that Cyrus’s actions betrayed the empire’s true interests.\(^{133}\) A more plausible Achaemenid viewpoint appears in a fragment of a lost Greek *Persika*, preserved in Athenaios. It purports to record a deathbed conversation in which the crown prince asks his father how he maintained the kingship. The king responds, “Doing just deeds towards all men and gods.”\(^{134}\) Even if apocryphal, the story resonates with Achaemenid ideology, and the king and Cyrus likely viewed the success of intervention in similar terms.

Beyond the prestige of victory, Persia should have gained substantial economic benefits. In theory, Athens’s defeat permitted a renewal of tribute collection in the Anatolian Greek coastal cities. Their contribution in silver was relatively limited, compared to what had been spent on Sparta’s behalf. Calculated in the vicinity of 140 to 170 talents per year, it would take between fifteen and twenty years to match Persia’s Peloponnesian War subsidies. But other financial opportunities, including exploitation of natural resources and tolls on coastal shipping, should have increased the profits of reclamation. Direct maritime trade with Athens came to a temporary halt with the siege of Piraeus but resumed by 402 after the resolution of the postwar civil conflict between Athenian oligarchs and democrats.\(^{135}\) It would take time to approach prewar volumes, but Persian toll collectors could make up some of
the difference from growing trade with newly liberated ports, above all Rhodes, which issued a surge of new silver coinage between its 408-7 synoecism and the early 380s.¹³⁶

Yet a rapid turn of events interfered with Persia’s acquisition of Greek profits. Darius’s death sparked a succession struggle within the Achaemenid family and a major rebellion in the Nile Delta, compromising the empire’s ideological, territorial, and economic gains. Cyrus soon exploited his Greek client base to bid for Artaxerxes’s throne, while Egypt’s new rulers took advantage of the new king’s distraction to secure independence and prevent a Persian reconquest. Cyrus’s spectacular failure and death sowed the seeds of further turmoil in western Anatolia, setting many of the Ionian cities and their Spartan allies against Persia’s legitimate leadership. The result was a new, lengthy Greek war, which threatened to spill over into the looming conflict with Egypt.
Artaxerxes II and War with Sparta

Artaxerxes II ought to have inherited Darius’s rule over the Anatolian Greeks and patronage over a victorious Sparta, but both were entangled with Cyrus’s ambitions. The new king’s estranged brother rallied support in the Ionian cities, called on Spartan aid, and enrolled Greek mercenaries to help him fight for the crown. Artaxerxes managed to defeat and kill Cyrus at Kounaxa in 401, but his reappointment of Tissaphernes to the Sardis command brought about further Ionian resistance. Sparta came to the aid of the rebels in 399, forcing Artaxerxes to battle his father’s clients to reassert imperial power in the Aegean.

The resulting conflict was prolonged by Tissaphernes’s cautious strategies, which were caricatured as cowardly by Xenophon, but probably influenced by Artaxerxes’s initial preference for diplomatic resolution over large-scale combat. Tissaphernes secured a lengthy truce in 397, but Sparta rejected his peace terms, sought alliance with Egypt, and dispatched Agesilaos, one of its two kings, to escalate the campaign in Anatolia. Agesilaos raided the countryside of the Daskyleion satrapy in 396, looted the outskirts of Sardis in 395, and marched as far east as Gordion before chasing Pharnabazos from his satrapal seat in the winter of 395-94. Fortified positions repelled Spartan attacks, but the satraps were unable to protect their agricultural hinterlands from devastation, and Tissaphernes paid for failure with his head.

Persia’s ultimate victory over Sparta required the commitment of a fleet that Artaxerxes had probably constructed for the looming confrontation with rebel Egypt. At first the king sent only forty Cypriote ships, entrusted to the Athenian exile Konon, to the Aegean war. But in 395, reinforcements under the king of Sidon permitted the capture of Rhodes and severed Spartan-Egyptian contacts in the process. The larger Persian fleet suffered economic distress reminiscent of that which the Spartan navy experienced under Tissaphernes during the Peloponnesian War, but Artaxerxes stabilized its situation with additional funding in winter 395-94. Finally, the outbreak of the Corinthian War among the overseas Greeks compelled Agesilaos to abandon
Anatolia. At the Battle of Knidos in August 394, Persian warships led by Pharnabazos and Konon crushed the Spartan fleet that Agesilaos left behind and restored imperial power over Ionia, setting the stage for a new intervention across the Aegean.

The Persian-Spartan war poses numerous interpretive problems, including the reasons for Tissaphernes’s blunders and downfall and Pharnabazos’s rise to royal favor despite his political disadvantages and military setbacks. The chronology of the naval campaign is especially difficult, and the decisiveness of the final victory is somewhat surprising given the tardiness of the initial deployment and the fleet’s financial struggles on Rhodes. Above all, it is necessary to explain why Artaxerxes’s empire took so long to defeat Sparta and did not deploy greater resources on land and sea at an earlier date. The answers have much to do with royal attention to multiple fronts and the desire to reestablish Persia’s authority over the Greeks at limited cost.

**Cyrus and the Second Loss of Ionia**

Cyrus’s western command almost ended at Artaxerxes’s succession, when Tissaphernes accused the prince of an assassination plot against the king, prompting his temporary detention. Parysatis, the queen mother, secured Cyrus’s pardon, but it is doubtful that the king permitted his return to Sardis until 403.1 In the meantime, Lysander, finishing off resistance at Samos after Athens’s surrender, sailed to Sparta and gave his government the 470 talents remaining from Cyrus’s war funds. The Spartans could not have been sure that Cyrus was coming back.2

The prince’s absence reduced Persian authority in Ionia to a minimum until at least the end of 404. As Lysander’s Ionian political cliques, the so-called dekarchies, seized power in numerous cities, and his associates continued to gather tribute on the strength of Cyrus’s former authorization, Persian rule appeared to give way to a new Spartan archē.3 Pharnabazos challenged this state of affairs, and Tissaphernes prepared to begin Ionian revenue collections, before Cyrus’s return upset their plans.

Soon after the end of the war, probably in the summer of 404, Pharnabazos sent envoys to Sparta to complain of ill treatment by Lysander. When Lysander attempted to conciliate him in a face-to-face meeting, Pharnabazos allegedly gave him a letter that appeared to withdraw the charges but in fact contained a coded message repeating them.4 Plutarch reports that the satrap was outraged at plundering in his territories by Lysander’s crews, which would have been particularly egregious in light of the fleet’s pay surplus from
Perhaps he also resented Sparta’s decision to keep a garrison at Chalkedon, but he cooperated with authorities there just a few years later. Spartan tribute collection was a more likely cause for dissatisfaction. Cyrus’s revenue gift probably included poleis such as Antandros, claimed by Daskyleion but used for Lysander’s shipbuilding in 405, and it would have been natural for Pharnabazos to contest the legality of Spartan taxation after the expiration of Cyrus’s command. Although Lysander’s subsequent decline in influence at Sparta owed more to internal jealousy over his power, the episode may have contributed to a Spartan governmental decision to limit involvement in the Asian cities. The decree of the ephors withdrawing support for Lysander’s dekarchies, best dated to 403, restored Ionian government and finance to Persian hands.

For a short time, Pharnabazos was in a position to replace Cyrus as Persia’s principal liaison with Sparta. He may have orchestrated Alkibiades’s murder, which probably took place in fall 404, for this purpose. The Athenian fugitive sailed over from Thrace in the hope of traveling to court, and Pharnabazos allegedly permitted his initial journey but sent troops to kill him at a way station on the royal road in Phrygia. Ephoros claims that Alkibiades was trying to warn the king of Cyrus’s planned rebellion and that Pharnabazos silenced him in order to pass on the warning and take the credit himself. But the assassination seems to have predated Cyrus’s return to the west, and it is implausible that Alkibiades would have known more than the Persian satraps at this date. It is more likely that as Plutarch claims, Pharnabazos was bestowing a favor on the allies by removing their mutual enemy. Yet once Cyrus came back, no other Persian could rival his claim to Spartan gratitude.

Scholars debate whether Artaxerxes permitted Cyrus to hold an administrative position in western Anatolia between 403 and 401. The sources do not specify Tissaphernes’s office in this period, and their description of Cyrus as satrap suggests that Artaxerxes placed him back in charge of Sardis. Yet the end of the Athenian war removed the rationale for Cyrus’s military command. Furthermore, Xenophon admits that a Persian noble named Orontas defended the Sardis acropolis against Cyrus on royal orders before surrendering to his superior force. This might imply that the prince raised troops and seized the city in defiance of Artaxerxes’s attempt to relegate him to a lesser role. In this case, the sources would reflect his rapid victory, granting him a position that he held in practice despite the king’s disapproval.

Xenophon admits that Artaxerxes had granted Tissaphernes authority over the Ionian cities but claims that they preferred to be governed by Cyrus.
The prince gained control of Ephesos and most of its neighbors by the end of 402 and began sending their tribute to court along with letters asserting his right to govern them. But Xenophon’s assertion that Artaxerxes did not care who ruled the cities, so long as he received their funds, is dubious. It is more likely that the king was preparing forces in Syria and Mesopotamia to defend against Cyrus’s aggression, while also gathering information on the worsening situation in Egypt. In the meantime, he relied on the Anatolian satraps to contain his brother.

Xenophon downplays the coercive aspects of the cities’ acquisition. Cyrus regained Ionia at a chaotic moment, while the dekarchies were crumbling after the withdrawal of Spartan support. The evidence is limited, but Ephesos offers a telling case. After Aigospotamoi, Lysander’s adherents erected his statue in the temple of Artemis, but by 402, the Ephesians were welcoming fugitives expelled by the oligarchs he had installed at Samos. Antony Andrewes suggests that Cyrus established control through political pragmatism, allowing the dekarchies to fall in exchange for the cities’ allegiance. But factional conflict probably continued, with some of Lysander’s supporters exploiting Cyrus’s return to reclaim power. More importantly, Cyrus relied on great numbers of Greek mercenaries. By the summer of 402, he had hired six thousand or more troops to occupy the major cities, not counting the separate contingents recruited by his agents in the Chersonese and mainland Greece for the coming war with the king. A force on this scale deterred serious resistance, whether or not the Ionians desired Cyrus’s rule. He may have justified the seizures as protection against Tissaphernes’s mallevolence, but the mercenaries could enforce his tribute claims, and their occupation of Ionian acropoleis infringed on local autonomy as much as Tissaphernes’s garrisons had done in 411.

Tissaphernes would have required a large army to stop the forces that Cyrus brought into Ionia, and none was available from the king. Ionia’s official governor was only able to hold one important polis, Miletos, where he restored the fugitives from the coup of 405. Full details are lacking, but Polyæenus preserves a glimpse of the reconquest. Tissaphernes threatened to attack, then lulled the Milesians into a sense of security by pretending to disband his forces, and finally surprised them after many of the citizens returned to the countryside. Xenophon reports that they wished to join the prince, but Tissaphernes found out about this plan and killed or exiled their leaders, probably Lysander’s chief Milesian adherents. Miletos then resisted Cyrus’s takeover, and the rebel besieged it with as many as twenty-one hundred
mercenaries, while his admiral Tamos, Tissaphernes’s former deputy, sailed from Ephesos to threaten its seaward defenses with twenty-five triremes. These may have been the same Ionian ships that sailed with Lysander in 405, and their acquisition was another measure of Cyrus’s overall success in conquering the region. Miletos held out through the winter of 402-1 until Cyrus recalled his troops for the army assembly at Sardis, but the most Tissaphernes could do in response was to ride for Babylon with five hundred cavalry.

While Tissaphernes failed to hold Artaxerxes’s Ionian possessions, Cyrus stopped short of launching attacks on Pharnabazos’s poleis. The Daskyleion satrap was not inclined to help Tissaphernes and probably tried to stay neutral, waiting to see how Cyrus’s claims would turn out. It is possible but not certain that he warned the king of Cyrus’s intentions. In 402, the Spartan renegade Klearchos, sentenced to death for a coup and massacre at Byzantium, traveled through his territory to enter Cyrus’s service, and Pharnabazos did nothing to interfere. Alkibiades’s death illustrates his power to interdict unwelcome travelers, and Klearchos’s safe passage suggests that the Daskyleion satrap was taking care not to anger the master of Sardis and perhaps providing assistance in case he emerged victorious.

Cyrus’s final plans for rebellion included a diplomatic mission to Sparta, which requested its service in return for his previous aid against Athens. The Spartans complied, sending thirty-five triremes under the navarch Samios to join Tamos at Ephesos. In the summer of 401, the combined fleet sailed to the borders of Phoenicia to help Cyrus’s land forces outflank royalist defenses, landing a Spartan officer and seven hundred hoplites at Issos to join the march upcountry. If he won, Cyrus could boast the allegiance of the leading Greeks across the sea.

Scholars have long speculated about the impact the Battle of Kounaxa would have had on Persian-Greek relations if it had ended differently. George Grote imagines Cyrus, like Philip of Macedon, conquering a divided Greece with Greek arms at his disposal, a vision indignantly rebutted by George Rawlinson. Yet a renewal of Persia’s Greek invasions was unnecessary so long as a Spartan client dominated its neighbors and obeyed his requests. It is plausible that Cyrus’s seizure of the crown would have stabilized Persian authority and revenue collection in western Anatolia, and there is no reason to think that the Ionians would have risen against Cyrus’s successful armies or that Sparta would have challenged his rule over Greek cities in the wake of victory. His employment of Spartan ships and troops in the succession
campaign makes it plausible that he would have called on their services again in a campaign to retake Egypt, as Artaxerxes III would do with his Greek allies six decades later.\(^3\) Cyrus had the potential to complete the extension of Achaemenid influence over Greece. Instead, his defeat and death severed connections between the empire, the Ionians, and Sparta, curtailing Artaxerxes’s authority beyond the Aegean until a new war could restore it.

**Tissaphernes and Spartan Invasion**

After Cyrus’s failure, Artaxerxes needed to reestablish control of western Anatolia to complete the rebellion’s suppression. The submission of Cyrus’s elite supporters in exchange for royal pardons indicated that this might be possible without a major campaign or battles.\(^3\) In cases of ongoing defiance, there is no reason to doubt the king’s willingness to authorize the use of force.\(^3\) But once the Spartans invaded Ionia in 399, even if Artaxerxes considered them “the most shameless of all mankind,” he allowed his generals to engage them in repeated truces and negotiations.\(^3\) The employment of such diplomatic strategies may have reflected Artaxerxes’s wish to reintegrate the Anatolian Greek and to rebuild authority over the trans-Aegean Greeks at limited cost.

Artaxerxes’s restraint can help to explain Tissaphernes’s unaggressive behavior from 400 to 397. Despite the proclaimed intention of retaking Ionia, he made minimal efforts against the coastal poleis and avoided battle with the Spartan invaders, perhaps hoping that the expense of the conflict would wear them down and encourage negotiation. Xenophon accuses him of cowardice, but the fact that Tissaphernes retained his command suggests that his behavior was amenable to the king. Nevertheless, his approach underestimated Sparta’s willingness to engage in a prolonged Anatolian war.

In the wake of Cyrus’s death, Artaxerxes granted Tissaphernes Cyrus’s satrapal office and military command over the rebel’s former provinces, Sardis, Greater Phrygia, and Cappadocia.\(^3\) The appointments rewarded his faithful service at Kounaxa and deft management of the talks and skirmishes with Cyrus’s Greek mercenaries in the battle’s aftermath.\(^3\) Xenophon paints a diabolical picture of Tissaphernes’s treachery in seizing and executing Klearchos and other Greek generals. From the king’s perspective, the punishment of the Cyreian Greek leaders without the need for a second battle was an impressive achievement, regardless of the mercenary army’s subsequent escape through the lands of the Armenian governor Tiribazos.\(^4\) The combination
of loyalty, success, and prior experience made Tissaphernes the obvious candidate to take Cyrus’s place and restore order to the rebellious satrapies.

Tissaphernes reached his post by the spring of 400. He led back an army smaller than the one that had followed Cyrus, but the rebel’s campaign had drained most of the mercenary manpower from the region, and it is doubtful that he expected much opposition. His troops included Cyrus’s former levies, whose commanders had turned on the Cyreian Greeks to demonstrate renewed loyalty. Most of western Anatolia showed a similar contrition, and Diodorus reports that “satraps,” perhaps the lower-ranking district governors whom Cyrus left behind, hurried to court Tissaphernes’s favor. Recipients of royal pardon, including the Persian noble Ariaios and Prokles, the Demaratid lord of Teuthrania, went home in good standing despite some lingering tensions with the loyalists. In this context, the Ionians’ refusal to submit may have taken Tissaphernes by surprise.

The sources allege broad resistance by Greek cities, but the active holdouts were limited to a core group between Ephesos and Kyme. Further south, Miletos, having been freed from Cyrus’s threat, presumably welcomed Tissaphernes’s return. Near Kyme, Phokaia would also resist the Spartans. In Aiolis and the Troad, Persian mercenary garrisons occupied most of the towns, especially those that belonged to Pharnabazos’s female district governor, Mania of Dardanos. After Mania’s assassination, her killer Meidias remained loyal to Persia, as did a garrison commander at Kebren who rejected his authority. Despite cooperating with Spartan officers at Byzantion to transport the surviving Cyreian mercenaries across the water to Thrace, Pharnabazos now maintained allegiance to the crown, and there is no indication that the Hellespontine and Propontic cities initially defied him. The acceptance of Persian governance by so many coastal Greeks raises questions about the motives of the cities that challenged Tissaphernes.

Xenophon claims that as soon as Tissaphernes arrived at Sardis, he ordered the Ionians to “become his subjects,” and they sought Spartan protection out of a desire for “freedom” and fear of the satrap’s vengeance. D. M. Lewis argues that Artaxerxes was not seeking confrontation, and the general overstepped orders by trying to violate the Greek cities’ autonomy. Yet it is not certain that Tissaphernes threatened serious harm if the cities surrendered or that the king disapproved of his efforts to reestablish control. A demand for tribute was not incompatible with political autonomy and should not have surprised the Ionians, since they paid the king’s fees when Cyrus still claimed to act in his name. What tipped the scale was the fear, despite the
recent displays of clemency, that Tissaphernes would launch violent reprisals against Ionian political elites.\textsuperscript{54} The dekarchies had lost control, but Ly-sandrian sympathizers remained and would have remembered Tissaphernes's overthrow of the Milesian oligarchs. It is also likely that the governments of Ephesos and neighboring cities worked closely with Tamos, who governed Ionia in Cyrus's absence. His decision not to seek a pardon, despite his son Glos's amnesty, and to instead flee to Egypt with Cyrus's triremes may have sparked wider panic.\textsuperscript{55} Tissaphernes's intentions are unclear, but whatever they were, they did not matter once the cities sent embassies to Sparta and the Spartans warned Tissaphernes to desist from aggression.\textsuperscript{56} This effrontery required a counterassertion of imperial rights, despite the inconvenience of a Spartan war in tandem with the worsening Egyptian crisis.

Tissaphernes called Sparta's bluff but attacked Kyme instead of Ephesos, the first step in a pattern of restraint. Kyme had once paid Athens twelve talents a year, the highest rate in the Ionian district, and its wealth may have attracted Tissaphernes, who took in significant profits by plundering its countryside and seizing prisoners for ransom.\textsuperscript{57} Yet he abstained from a lengthy siege, dispersing his troops before the onset of winter.\textsuperscript{58} An unscathed Ephesos lay much closer to Sardis and possessed a higher strategic value than Sparta's old naval base. Perhaps Tissaphernes was reluctant to forfeit his image as Ephesian Artemis's protector and thought that a move in that direction would be more damaging to the chance of a negotiated settlement. But the attack on Kyme failed to deter the Spartans, who capitalized on Ephesos's availability and landed an army there in the late fall of 400 or the early spring of 399.\textsuperscript{59}

With the outbreak of war, Tissaphernes engaged in limited operations to frustrate the invaders, while refraining from further offensives.\textsuperscript{60} The sources do not indicate the size of his army, but he seems to have lacked sufficient infantry for close-quarters engagement with Greek hoplites, making battle risky.\textsuperscript{61} On the other hand, he possessed a cavalry force that numbered in the thousands, which the Spartans could not counter, as well as many archers and slingers.\textsuperscript{62} In 401, Tissaphernes had employed similar troops against the Cyreian hoplites in northern Mesopotamia, slowing their movements and interfering with their foraging.\textsuperscript{63} By repeating these tactics, he might limit Spartan gains, and time was on his side. The previous war might have encouraged Tissaphernes to doubt the enemy's ability to sustain large forces without Persian subsidies. As the Spartans grew frustrated, their internal political quarrels—already visible in the disavowal of Lysander's dekarchies—were likely to increase the pressure on them to withdraw. At this point,
Tissaphernes might bring them to negotiations and compel them to accept
the king’s terms. A delaying strategy required temporary forbearance from the
collection of central Ionian revenues but held out the prospect of a reconquest
with minimal damage to local infrastructure. Artaxerxes’s endorsement of
this approach seems almost certain. Had the king been displeased, he could
have recalled or transferred the offending general, and Tissaphernes had far
fewer resources than Cyrus with which to resist such a removal.

The initial campaign saw a mixture of success and failure. The Spartan
general Thibron assembled five thousand Peloponnesian and two thousand
Ionian hoplites at Ephesos and began to establish garrisons and governors
in some of the cities.\textsuperscript{64} The Persians waited inland, and Thibron made the
first move, crossing the pass over Mount Thorax to Tissaphernes’s sometime
residence at Magnesia. The site was undefended and unfortified, and Thibron
proclaimed its Greek residents’ “liberation,” orchestrating a resettlement at
a new site on the slopes of Thorax.\textsuperscript{65} But at Tralles, about twenty miles to the
east, Tissaphernes’s garrison repulsed a Spartan attack, and his cavalry drove
Thibron back to Ephesos.\textsuperscript{66}

The fighting escalated when Xenophon and five thousand surviving
Cyreian mercenaries, now in Spartan service, invaded the Kaikos valley north
of Ionia. Welcomed by Greek dynasts at Pergamon, they plundered Persian
estates in the eastern part of the valley and, despite counterattacks by local
garrisons, managed to capture the Persian landowner Asidates near Parthenion.\textsuperscript{67} Their union with Thibron brought his total force to twelve thousand,
and they won over several more small poleis. But once again, a Persian
fortress, at Larisa near the mouth of the Hermos valley, checked Spartan
momentum.\textsuperscript{68} The invaders then encountered supply problems and plun-
dered Ionian territory, prompting allied complaints that led to Thibron’s
replacement.\textsuperscript{69}

Tissaphernes met with the new commander, Derkyldidas, who agreed to a
truce before marching to the Troad and deserting Ionia for the better part of
a year.\textsuperscript{70} Xenophon may be correct that Tissaphernes refused to interfere
with Derkyldidas’s northern campaign because he hoped it would harm
Pharnabazos. The recent civil war had intensified their feud, and Tissapher-
nes may have blamed his old rival for doing so little to oppose Cyrus, not to
mention allowing the mercenaries to pass through the Troad.\textsuperscript{71} Derkyldidas’s
northern campaign exploited political divisions in the wake of the local dy-
nast Mania’s assassination, seizing nine poleis and a treasury at Gergis while
securing valuable routes between Ionia and the Hellespont. It also settled a
personal score with Pharnabazos, whose accusations of misconduct had 
tarnished Derkylidas’s reputation in the last war. Pharnabazos agreed to a 
truce for the rest of the winter and renewed it in the spring, allegedly trying to 
protect the satrapy from further aggression. During the pause, Derkylidas 
crossed the Hellespont and spent most of the summer in the Chersonese. 
Meanwhile, the war in Ionia subsided, as Tissaphernes refrained from attack-
ing Ephesos or the other cities.

Xenophon’s account obscures important political and diplomatic aspects 
of the war in 398, and Tissaphernes may have been waiting on peace nego-
tiations at court. The eyewitness Ctesias reports that a Spartan embassy vis-
ited Artaxerxes during the truce, but whatever message they brought proved 
unsatisfactory. Pharnabazos also used the lull to travel to court, assuring 
Artaxerxes of his allegiance, complaining of his mistreatment by Tissapher-
exes, and advocating for the commitment of royal ships to challenge Sparta at 
sea. The king was impressed enough to send the Daskyleion satrap on a detour 
to Cyprus on his way back to Anatolia, entrusting him with funds for Euago-
ras of Salamis as a step in the assembly of a royal fleet. But he confirmed 
Tissaphernes as the senior general in western Anatolia, with direct authority 
over Pharnabazos. On returning from his twenty-three hundred-mile jour-
ney, Pharnabazos went to meet Tissaphernes in person, promising coopera-
tion and swallowing resentment at subordination to his enemy.

The satraps’ forced reconciliation led to an unprecedented combination 
of their military forces, giving them superior numbers, and Tissaphernes 
used the resulting advantage to seek a diplomatic breakthrough. Derkylidas 
resumed the offensive in spring 397, marching through Ephesos and crossing 
the Maeander River to threaten an unnamed Carian residence of Tissapher-
exes, in the hopes of forcing Persian concessions in Ionia. At the same time, a 
Spartan fleet sailed down the coast, posing a new threat that prompted Tissa-
phernes and Pharnabazos to launch an inspection tour of Carian fortresses.

Xenophon’s allusion to close cooperation between the Spartan army and 
fleet suggests that Derkylidas advanced along the eastern shore of the bay of 
Miletos, while the satraps, seeking to conceal their movements from obser-
vation, probably used the inland route from Tralles toward Idyma. Their un-
expected countermarch back across the Maeander compelled Derkylidas, who 
feared that the Persians had bypassed him and moved on toward Ephesos, 
to retrace his steps, allowing Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos to block his 
path near Magnesia. They deployed Carian, Persian, and Greek infantry in a 
line of battle, with large bodies of cavalry on the wings, and Xenophon claims
that some of Derkyllidas’s Ionian allies broke ranks and fled for home at the sight of the Persian forces. But with combat imminent, Tissaphernes invited the Spartan general to a conference and withdrew his own troops to Tralles. Xenophon is contemptuous of Tissaphernes’s decision to parley, reporting a rumor that Pharnabazos had wished to fight and proclaiming that Tissaphernes feared the Cyreian mercenaries and imagined that the rest of Derkyllidas’s troops shared their qualities. Yet Tissaphernes seems to have been pleased with the opportunity to force the enemy into peace talks, which once again hints that Artaxerxes was interested in such an outcome.

Tissaphernes demanded the withdrawal of all Sparta’s troops and governors from Anatolian cities. Derkyllidas agreed to pass the request to his government if Tissaphernes would inform Artaxerxes of Sparta’s condition, autonomy for all the Asian Greeks. A prolonged truce followed while both reported to their superiors. It is notable that Tissaphernes did not balk at the autonomy request. If he considered it unreasonable or had orders to fight at all costs, it would have been easy enough to break off talks and resume combat. The proposal raised the possibility of continuing Spartan influence in Ionia, but Persian authorities might have expected to resume tribute collections while leaving local governments intact, thereby retaining a stronger presence than they had during the Athenian archē.

It is unfortunate that no source records Artaxerxes’s or Sparta’s response. Almost a year passed between the referral of terms and Agesilaos’s mission to Asia, and Derkyllidas’s army might have shrunk with the demobilization of Ionian militias and even some of the Peloponnesian allies. Sparta only took action to renew hostilities after receiving news of Persian naval preparations in Phoenicia, which they interpreted as evidence of a direct threat. On these grounds, Lysander and his political ally, the new king Agesilaos, made a successful case for expanding the war. Xenophon reports Lysander’s private motive of reinstalling dekarchies in the Ionian cities but credits Agesilaos with nobler goals of liberation and panhellenic unity. Sparta’s interpretation of the autonomy demand, which Agesilaos repeated on arrival in Ionia, may have hardened in this context and come to be understood as including the ability to deny Persia’s right to impose tribute, which would explain the Persian emphasis on the point in later negotiations.

A genuine peace had seemed within reach, and compromise on Ionian autonomy might have allowed the king to claim victory while Sparta saved face. The end of the war on these terms would have demonstrated Artaxerxes’s repossession of royal territory and his clients’ return to obedience, vindicat-
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ing Tissaphernes’s strategy of restraint. Instead, the diplomatic approach failed to deter Sparta’s most aggressive leaders and nullified the possibility of peace without serious combat.

Naval Escalation and Tissaphernes’s Downfall

The renewed Spartan challenge forced a change in Artaxerxes’s approach to the war. A strategy of restraint was no longer viable, and Agesilaos’s expulsion from Ionia would require more forceful measures. The king sent Tissaphernes reinforcements by land but also ordered Persian ships into the Aegean. The Spartans were increasing their forces on sea as well as land and at some point in 396 established a diplomatic friendship with Egypt.88 The rebel province’s reconquest was a crucial Persian goal, and recent studies suggest that the fleet that was being prepared in Phoenicia was actually intended to support an assault on the Nile Delta.89 But the prospect of alliance between the empire’s enemies justified the diversion of some imperial warships to check the Spartans at sea.90 The Persian naval campaign was meant to be secondary to the effort on land, but by 395, it brought about the first significant victories against Sparta, while Tissaphernes fell fatally short of royal expectations.

Tissaphernes’s initial reaction to Agesilaos’s landing was to reopen negotiations. On receipt of a renewed demand for Ionian autonomy, he requested an extension of the truce for three more months while he sent the proposal to court. According to Xenophon, this was a ruse to buy time for reinforcement, and Agesilaos condemned Tissaphernes for impiety, since he did not seek a peace agreement in good faith as he had sworn to do. Yet there was no good reason for Tissaphernes to advocate surrender or for Artaxerxes to concede the loss of Ionian tribute, the payment of which was supposed to symbolize his restored authority over the region. The king may have regarded the Spartans as duplicitous for failing to follow through on the previous year’s talks, and his decision to send fresh troops to Tissaphernes was a natural reaction to Spartan escalation.91

Arriving by late summer of 396, Artaxerxes’s reinforcements bolstered Tissaphernes’s numerical superiority. Agesilaos had between twelve and seventeen thousand hoplites at Ephesos, depending on the size of Derkyloidas’s remaining forces.92 It is impossible to measure the exact disparity between the armies, as Diodorus’ figures of fifty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry on the Persian side are probably too high.93 But once again, Tissaphernes possessed a large cavalry contingent, while Spartan mounted forces were almost nonexistent.94 The satrap’s ultimatum, that Agesilaos should
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evacuate Ionia or face the consequences, indicates confidence in a decisive outcome.95

Artaxerxes’s ships, on the other hand, were outnumbered, which limited their capacity for offensive action.96 Despite Pharnabazos’s advice in 398, the king probably began to reconstruct an imperial fleet because of the new threat from Egypt rather than as a result of a decision to prioritize a naval campaign against Sparta.97 Cyrus’s revolt had prevented an effective response to the Egyptian troubles, giving the rebel pharaoh Amyrtaios a chance to shore up his power. Around 398, a rival leader named Nepherites seized control from Amyrtaios, and Artaxerxes must have hoped to profit from the resulting chaos.98 Yet he needed a fleet to overcome Egyptian maritime defenses. The 147 ships that sailed to Aspendos fourteen years earlier were old for combat missions, and any that remained in royal service had been insufficient to deter Cyrus’s sixty triremes from cruising as far as the northern Phoenician coast in 401. The prospect of a Nile campaign required new triremes, and the Persians set about increasing their fleet to a size not seen since the early reign of Artaxerxes I. In Cyprus in 398, Pharnabazos conveyed royal orders for the preparation of one hundred warships, delivering the king’s grant of five hundred talents to assist in the arrangements.99 In late 397, Herodas of Syracuse told the Spartans that the Persians were gathering three hundred triremes on the Phoenician coast and reported the sight of “some sailing down from elsewhere, others that had been manned on the spot, and still others under preparation.”100 They may not have reached the intended total, as no fleet on such a scale is attested until the following decade, but they were numerous enough to allow a squadron’s detachment to the Aegean.101

Its commander was Konon, an Athenian general who had escaped from Aigospotamoi to the court of Euagoras and won a Persian naval appointment at the time of Pharnabazos’s Cyprus visit. It is doubtful that the king entrusted him with the entire Persian fleet, but Pharnabazos placed him in charge of the Cypriote contingent with Euagoras’s approval. Konon sailed to Cilicia with forty triremes before the main force was ready, probably in the summer of 397.102 No source states exactly when he proceeded westward, but it is doubtful that Artaxerxes sent him on while the Spartans seemed dormant and more likely that orders for the voyage to Kaunos followed Agesilaos’s landing in Asia in 396.103

The king may have transferred Konon to the Aegean because of an increase in Sparta’s naval forces on the Ionian coast as well as its diplomatic ambitions. In 401, the Spartans sent only thirty-five ships to cooperate with
Tamos in the eastern Mediterranean. Xenophon does not indicate the size of the Spartan fleet, which cooperated with Derkyldas’s Carian campaign in 397, but Diodorus claims that it comprised as many as 120 triremes when it concentrated at Rhodes for the campaign against Konon. The number may be an error, but it is possible that the Spartans responded to the rumors of a Persian naval offensive by gathering as many as of Lysander’s old ships as they could put in the water. Many would have been undermanned and in need of repairs, but a potential solution lay at hand. Without a Cyrus at their disposal, the Spartans identified a new source of funding and logistical support in Egypt. Their embassy to Nepherites’s court in 396 secured promises of grain and naval materiel, probably ropes and sails for Spartan triremes.

It is unclear how early the Persians learned of the Spartan-Egyptian talks, but the rumors may have hastened Konon’s 450-mile voyage from Cilicia to Kaunos. Konon’s fleet was too small for battle, but it was large enough to be able to safely observe the enemy fleet and call for reinforcements if needed. In theory, the location would allow communication with Tissaphernes, whose army was about 125 miles away up the Idyma-Tralles road, awaiting an expected Spartan advance into the Maeander valley.

The Spartans attacked by land in late summer, when Tissaphernes’s truce with Agesilaos expired, but they did not move south as expected. Instead, they marched from Ephesos to Kyme, then inland toward Daskyleion. Agesilaos had fresh intelligence on the northern road network from a Persian defector named Spithridates, who was allegedly enraged at Pharnabazos for trying to take his daughter as a concubine, and had joined Lysander during his recent visit to Kyzikos. Thanks to Spithridates’s directions, the Spartans captured and plundered several villages and almost reached Daskyleion itself, but Persian horsemen under Pharnabazos’s half brother Bagaios and an officer named Rhathines mauled Agesilaos’s cavalry in a sharp skirmish. Although casualties were minor, with just twelve Spartans and one Persian killed, Agesilaos decided to turn back to the coast the following day. Xenophon notes his reaction to bad omens but also suggests that Pharnabazos’s superiority in cavalry contributed to Agesilaos’s decision to cut the raid short.

While Pharnabazos could claim a minor victory, Tissaphernes’s inaction was conspicuous. Just as in 399, he made no effort to interfere with the attack on his colleague. Given his recent services, Pharnabazos’s conflicted loyalties in the time of Cyrus were no longer a reasonable excuse for Tissaphernes to fail to support him. Xenophon suggests that Tissaphernes succumbed
to trickery, as Agesilaos sent false orders to southern Ionian poleis to prepare supply depots, and so the *karanos* expected an attack on his personal estates in Caria.\textsuperscript{110} There may have been other strategic reasons for preferring to guard the south. The Spartan fleet was a danger not only to the Carian coast and Konon’s ships but also Miletos, which probably supported Tissaphernes and the Persians throughout the period. But some action against the Ionian rebels should have been possible with the Spartan army more than two hundred miles away, and there is no indication that Tissaphernes even ravaged the Ephesian countryside.\textsuperscript{111}

Pharnabazos’s support for Konon’s fleet a few months later accentuated Tissaphernes’s comparative lethargy.\textsuperscript{112} While Agesilaos returned to Ephesos to recruit extra cavalry and train for the spring campaign, the Spartan fleet took the offensive. It sailed to Rhodes, perhaps seeking funds as well as a base for communication and trade with Egypt, and then crossed to the mainland to besiege Konon at Kaunos.\textsuperscript{113} But a large Persian force, commanded by Pharnabazos and an otherwise unknown Artaphernes, came to the rescue and drove off the invaders.\textsuperscript{114} Some scholars have suggested that Diodorus’s Artaphernes is an error for Tissaphernes, but Diodorus refers to the Sardis satrap elsewhere in book 14 and no longer conflates him with Pharnabazos as in book 13.\textsuperscript{115} Even if Tissaphernes did provide some troops for the operation, Pharnabazos gained greater credit by traveling almost four hundred miles, a journey of a month or more from Daskyleion. Artaxerxes might have entrusted him with continuing authority over naval affairs after the Cyprus mission in 398 but did not appoint him as commander of the fleet until 394, and Pharnabazos’s willingness to leave his own satrapy to help protect the king’s ships offered an impressive display of devotion. It might have called attention to Tissaphernes’s unwillingness to take similar measures when Agesilaos threatened Daskyleion.

The relief of Kaunos set the stage for a more dramatic triumph at Rhodes.\textsuperscript{116} Shortly after the siege, Persian naval reinforcements sailed up to join Konon, indicating that the king had decided to transfer a larger part of his navy to the Aegean theater. An initial squadron seems to have doubled the size of Konon’s fleet, which cruised toward Knidos with eighty ships, but the most significant arrivals were eighty Phoenician and ten Cilician triremes, commanded by Baalshillem II, king of Sidon. If Diodorus’s numbers are correct, this brought the total to 170.\textsuperscript{117} The ruler of Phoenicia’s preeminent city-state had come to power only half a decade before, and Sidon’s first major naval campaign in half a century offered him heightened prestige at home as well
as Artaxerxes’s favor. His pride in the opportunity may be reflected in the change of iconography on Sidon’s group IV silver coinage, which replaced earlier images of a ship with furled sails (groups I-II) and in port beneath the city walls (group III) with that of a trireme surging forward under oar, its absent mast indicating a vessel stripped down for battle. Baalshillem’s warships gave the Persian side a significant numerical advantage and coincided with a surge of anti-Spartan sentiment on Rhodes. As a result, the Spartan navarch abandoned the island and sailed for Ionia, while Rhodes’ populace welcomed Konon and Baalshillem with open arms.

Meanwhile, Nepherites’s convoy was under way, carrying five hundred thousand measures of grain and rigging and building materials for a hundred triremes. Unaware of Rhodes’s capture, it sailed into the harbor and fell into Konon’s hands without a fight, giving Artaxerxes a double victory over his Egyptian and Spartan opponents. The Persian fleet’s hold on Rhodes grew even stronger a few months later, as citizens with Konon’s tacit encouragement overthrew their oligarchic government, killing its principal leaders and establishing an anti-Spartan democracy. Meanwhile, one of Konon’s Rhodian friends, Timokrates, played a key diplomatic role in outreach to Sparta’s more powerful enemies on the far side of the Aegean, addressed further in the following chapter.

The king now had grounds to put his confidence in both Pharnabazos and Konon’s fleet rather than in Tissaphernes. Plans for the karanos’s removal if his performance did not improve may have begun by early 395. Unaware that his career was on the line, Tissaphernes prepared to defend northern Caria but suffered disaster when Agesilaos moved on Sardis instead. Xenophon paints a damning picture of Tissaphernes’s negligence in discounting reports of the enemy’s planned Lydian offensive and failing to gather accurate information from scouts who might have observed the Spartan movements. By Xenophon’s account, Agesilaos ravaged the countryside near Sardis for three days before Tissaphernes marched up and entered the city. The Persian cavalry established a camp outside Sardis, near the Paktolos River, but came under attack by a combined force of Spartan cavalry and hoplites and lost a pitched battle, during which it received no support from Tissaphernes. The Oxyrhynchus historian and Diodorus show greater leniency toward the satrap, reporting that Tissaphernes learned of Agesilaos’s march and harassed the Spartan column in the Hermos valley but retired into Sardis after a clever enemy ambush threw the Persian army into confusion. It is possible, as argued by a recent study, that there were
two engagements, the battle that Xenophon describes, which is similar to one recounted in the fragmentary column 5 of the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia*, and the ambush, which would have occurred during Agesilaos’s march east from Sardis. In any case, all of the sources agree that numerous Persian riders died in the fighting, six hundred by the Oxyrhynchus historian’s count. The Persian camp that fell into Agesilaos’s hands included a large camel train carrying seventy talents as well as military supplies. Compounding Tissaphernes’s embarrassment, although Sardis itself remained unscathed, the Spartans burned several villages within sight of the walls. The Spartans finally marched up the Hermos and around the eastern end of Mount Tmolos, crossing the upper Maeander and considering a move on Kelainai before deciding to return via Magnesia. Tissaphernes followed at a distance without further engagements.

In the wake of the debacle, anonymous Persians accused Tissaphernes of betraying them to the invaders. It is doubtful that he was engaged in a plot to aid the Spartans or rebel against the king. He may have placed excessive trust in prior experience, crediting reports of Agesilaos’s failure in the Daskyleion satrapy during the previous fall because of the Spartan weakness in cavalry. Alternatively, it is possible that a genuine reluctance to expose Miletos and Caria blinded him to the prospect of an attack on Lydia. But regardless of his true motivations, Agesilaos’s marauding in the Hermos and Maeander valleys destroyed Tissaphernes’s credibility with local estate holders. The Spartans employed the same methods they had used against Attica throughout the Peloponnesian War, enraging defenders unable to protect their exposed agricultural wealth. The previous chapters have noted the sensitivity of Persian nobles to financial loss, and Lydian elites such as the influential priests of Sardian Artemis would have been affected as well. The resulting outcry probably signaled to Tithraustes that it was time to begin the prearranged operation for Tissaphernes’s removal, although a rapid communication via the royal road might have allowed Artaxerxes to learn the news from Sardis and confirm Tithraustes’s orders.

The king’s representative sprung his trap on Tissaphernes with brutal efficiency, aided by the former Cyreian rebel Ariaios, now installed as a governor at Kolossai in the eastern Maeander valley. Ariaios invited the *karanos* to a meeting to discuss the war, and Tissaphernes may have gone in hopes of inspecting damage and reassuring a subordinate of his intention to improve defenses. He traveled without the army, restricting his escort to three hundred Milesians and Arkadian mercenaries. Weary from the long journey, Tis-
saphernes accepted the offer of a bath, allowing Ariaios’s men to catch him unguarded. They forced him into a covered wagon for secret transport to Kelainai, fifty-five miles away, where Tithraustes supervised his beheading.\textsuperscript{133}

Scholars have remarked on the unusual nature of Tissaphernes’s downfall, involving a clandestine murder plot instead of a simple recall to court.\textsuperscript{134} Did he enjoy too much support among imperial elites for an open condemnation? None of his attested relations with other members of the Persian nobility suggest that this would have been the case, although Greek accounts say little about his political and familial connections. Several sources blame the malevolence of Parysatis, the queen mother, who allegedly sought vengeance against the enemies of Cyrus, and Polyaeus adds the melodramatic detail that the mothers and wives of the Cyreian Greeks exulted at their persecutor’s fate.\textsuperscript{135} But Artaxerxes may have realized that punishing his failed and unpopular subordinate was the most effective way to reassert his authority in western Anatolia. It was now up to Tithraustes and Pharnabazos to retake control of the war.

Tithraustes’s Truce and Pharnabazos’s Defense of the North

Tissaphernes’s killer served out the year as the king’s chief commander in Anatolia but negotiated with the Spartans and returned to court without leading a new campaign.\textsuperscript{136} His departure left Pharnabazos to face the brunt of Agesilaos’s next offensive without support. Why did Tithraustes return to Tissaphernes’s practice of ignoring Spartan assaults on the Daskyleion satrapy, and how did Pharnabazos retain royal confidence, despite defeats reminiscent of those suffered by Tissaphernes? It may be that the Sardis debacle discouraged Tithraustes from confronting Agesilaos with an unreliable army and that Pharnabazos’s successes outweighed his failures, allowing him to outlast the enemy.

Tithraustes seems to have taken up quarters at Sardis soon after sending Tissaphernes’s head to the king. He promptly sent envoys to Agesilaos to reopen the previous year’s negotiations, attempting to depict Tissaphernes’s death as a favor to Sparta. The basic terms were probably the same as before—a limited Ionian autonomy in exchange for the Spartans’ departure—although Xenophon now adds the crucial detail that tribute was expected to continue. Agesilaos stated he lacked the authority to act on the terms until Sparta’s home government approved them. Xenophon claims that Tithraustes asked him to march into Pharnabazos’s territory in the meantime and contributed thirty talents toward the Spartan army’s purchase of supplies. Diodorus’s
version omits this startling collusion, stating only that they concluded a six-month truce.¹³⁷

Tithraustes’s negotiation with the enemy reversed Artaxerxes’s recent policy of direct confrontation. The sources offer no explanation for reattempting a diplomatic approach that had failed on previous occasions, and it is difficult to believe that the Persians expected Agesilaos to end the invasion just because Tissaphernes had been removed. It is worth asking what happened to Tissaphernes’s large army, and why a new campaign remained out of the question. Infantry losses may have been negligible, but the army’s strength had been its cavalry. If the Oxyrhynchus historian’s casualty count is accurate, and most of the six hundred dead and additional prisoners were horsemen, it is possible that the toll was severe enough to discourage another operation, although it is hard to believe that the Persian mounted arm lost its numerical superiority.¹³⁸ The sources never indicate that the Persians possessed enough heavy infantry to engage Agesilaos’s hoplites in a head-on battle, and perhaps Tithraustes lacked confidence in Carian recruits from the vicinity of Tissaphernes’s estates.¹³⁹ Without a reliable combat force, and in light of the landowners’ outcry at Spartan ravaging, a diplomatic pause probably would have seemed the most sensible policy for the time being.

More surprising is the claim that Tithraustes provided money for the Spartan march against Pharnabazos’s satrapy. But a wish to provide direct logistical support is not the only explanation for why Tithraustes might have paid the Spartans. The Oxyrhynchus historian and Diodorus report that the Spartans took numerous prisoners at Sardis, and on other occasions, Persians are known to have paid high sums to ransom captives from Greek armies.¹⁴⁰ It is possible that Tithraustes’s money was meant to preserve Agesilaos’s victims from the Ephesos slave market.¹⁴¹ As for the claim that he told the Spartans to move toward Daskyleion, Tithraustes may have acted on a private grudge against Pharnabazos or prioritized the security of Sardis over that of the northern satrapy.¹⁴² But a feud is hard to credit in light of the Oxyrhynchus historian’s suggestion that Konon cooperated with both Pharnabazos and Tithraustes and the two generals’ later appointment to a joint command against Egypt.¹⁴³ It is possible that Xenophon repeats a propaganda claim disseminated by Agesilaos, designed to encourage a new rift between the Persian generals like the one that had pitted Pharnabazos against Tissaphernes.

Once Agesilaos marched north, Tithraustes focused on the reorganization and supply of Persian forces between Sardis and the Carian coast. Meeting Konon, he provided 220 talents for the fleet, which had gone unpaid on Rhodes
for a significant period, perhaps a final instance of Tissaphernes’s negligence. He also seems to have promoted Ariaios to a higher military command, in association with an otherwise unknown general named Pasiphernes, and issued seven hundred talents from Tissaphernes’s confiscated estates to support their efforts (unfortunately, the extant sources say nothing more of either man’s activities). With this done, Tithraustes returned to court, while Pharnabazos prepared to meet Agesilaos’s incursion.

The Spartan campaign of fall and winter 395 penetrated as far as central Anatolia, winning support from a rebel Paphlagonian dynast who married the renegade Spithridates’s daughter, before returning to establish a winter encampment under the walls of Daskyleion. Agesilaos drove Pharnabazos from his palace, subjected his estates to plunder, and sacked a satrapal camp. Xenophon depicts Pharnabazos’s outrage in their later meeting: “I can hold no banquet in my own land, unless I scavenge some of what you leave behind, like the wild animals. And all those things which my father left me, beautiful residences and paradise gardens full of trees and animals, in which I used to find joy, I see some chopped down, others burned down.”

Yet for all these losses, Pharnabazos’s military performance was energetic enough to avoid the sort of disgrace that had befallen Tissaphernes. Agesilaos may have caused severe damage to the satrapal countryside, but Persian garrisons repelled Spartan attacks at the strongholds of Leonton Kephalai, Gordion, and Miletou Teichos. It is unclear whether they tried to hold Daskyleion, and the fate of the satrapal palace and treasury on the terrace at Hisartepe, characterized by the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* as a “very strong” fortress, remains controversial. Despite Xenophon’s account of Pharnabazos’s complaints, neither he nor the Oxyrhynchus historian states explicitly that the Spartans captured the fortress and its contents. Recent archaeological studies have connected a large destruction layer across the southern section of Hisartepe with Agesilaos’s activities, but its dating is not ironclad. It remains possible that the Persians retained control of part of the Daskyleion defenses while the Spartans rampaged through the outer settlement and paradise.

Whatever happened at Daskyleion, Pharnabazos performed well in the skirmishing that followed, making wise use of his limited numbers. The satrap possessed only four hundred cavalry and two scythed chariots, supported by light infantry levies from the Mysians and other local subjects, while Agesilaos had a four to one advantage in cavalry, combining four hundred from the Ionian cities with Spithridates’s two hundred horsemen and thousand
Paphlagonian riders. Consequently, Pharnabazos avoided being trapped in the Daskyleion citadel or drawn into a battle that he could not win but “kept moving from here to there through his country, just like the nomads, making camp very much in secret.” He remained close enough to the Spartans to launch a sudden counterattack when they let their guard down near Daskyleion, and a charge of Persian cavalry and chariots scattered a detachment of seven hundred Greek foragers and killed one hundred before Agesilaos could come to their rescue. A short time later, Spithridates’s scouts found Pharnabazos’s campsite at Kaue, a day’s march away, and five thousand enemy troops descended in a surprise attack, but the satrap escaped again. Ironically, the loss of the camp turned in Pharnabazos’s favor when a quarrel over spoils caused Spithridates and the Paphlagonians to abandon Agesilaos’s army. Spithridates is last heard of en route to meet Ariaios at Sardis, because he had been a rebel from the king and survived—presumably Spithridates hoped to secure a similar pardon. The mass desertion returned Agesilaos’s cavalry to parity with that of Pharnabazos and may have contributed to the Spartan king’s decision to demobilize his other troops for winter. He ordered them to rejoin him in Ionia when spring arrived, while summoning ships to Kyzikos to transport his plunder.

The final event of the Daskyleion campaign was the famous meeting between Pharnabazos and Agesilaos in the early months of 394. A mutual guest-friend, Apollophanes of Kyzikos, arranged their conversation in the hopes that Pharnabazos might switch sides and join the Spartans. Xenophon’s account depicts a mutual respect between adversaries. After preliminary greetings and handshakes, the satrap exercises the right of first speech as the older man and denounces the Spartans’ ingratitude for his services in the Peloponnesian War. Agesilaos attempts to persuade him to revolt from the king, and Pharnabazos claims that he will do so if subordinated to another general but that otherwise he will fight the Spartans with all his power. Agesilaos responds that he wishes they could be friends and promises to refrain from future conflict with Pharnabazos out of respect for his honor. At the end of the chivalrous exchange, one of the satrap’s young sons concludes a guest-friendship with Agesilaos. But the political outcome favored the Persians, as Agesilaos failed to win Pharnabazos’s alliance and promptly returned to the coast. Pharnabazos could represent the conference as a victory, which convinced the faltering invader to go back the way he came.

Xenophon claims that Agesilaos planned to march even further across Anatolia in the following year. Yet this hope was unrealistic even if he had
stayed, but just after Agesilaos reached the coast, he received orders recalling him to Greece. The Corinthian War, which broke out in the summer of 395, was spiraling out of Sparta’s control. Lysander had died in battle against Thebes, and Athens, Argos, and Corinth had joined in alliance with the Thebans’ Boiotian League to reject Sparta’s Greek hegemony. His Anatolian adventure at an end, Agesilaos marched for the Hellespont and crossed back into Europe, while Pharnabazos rode south for a climactic rendezvous with Konon and the imperial fleet.¹⁶⁰

Artaxerxes’s Fleet and Victory at Knidos

In August 394, the king’s fleet met Sparta’s ships off the coast of the Carian Chersonese. The resulting battle destroyed the naval power that Persia had bestowed on its client less than a dozen years before. Knidos was a spectacular demonstration of Artaxerxes’s imperial might, the most impressive military victory over Greek opponents since his grandfather’s forces crushed the Athenians in Egypt.¹⁶¹ Yet Greek sources, unsurprisingly, give little credit to Artaxerxes’s naval achievement. Xenophon prefers to focus on Agesilaos’s return to Greece and treats Knidos in a brief digression, noting Agesilaos’s skill in preserving his soldiers’ morale by lying about the outcome.¹⁶² The Oxyrhynchus historian and Diodorus highlight a disastrous shortage in Persian financial aid and the fleet’s near dissolution through mutiny, suggesting that Knidos would never have taken place if not for Konon’s persistence.¹⁶³ Isokrates’s Panegyrikos gives an elaborate expression of this argument, claiming Konon’s victory for Athens instead of Persia.¹⁶⁴

Several modern studies attempt to rectify the imbalance, contrasting Artaxerxes’s fleet building with his father’s naval restraint.¹⁶⁵ The explicit charge of royal negligence in the Hellenika Oxyrhynchia and Konon’s need to appeal for funds might appear to justify Lewis’s comment that “the Persian naval revival seemed mean, inept, and slow.”¹⁶⁶ Yet the fleet’s financial woes were concentrated in 395, and Artaxerxes’s decisive action to rectify the situation made victory possible, reestablishing naval power as a crucial instrument of Achaemenid imperialism.

After their seizure of the Egyptian convoy, Konon’s ships remained at Rhodes and Kaunos for more than a year, until summer 394. As only ninety triremes were present for the Battle of Knidos, it is possible that some returned to the Levant, and the sources do not specify whether Baalshillem stayed for the duration or sailed back to Sidon.¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, reserves may have guarded the nearby ports at the time of the battle, and the fleet still
included a substantial Phoenician contingent as well as Konon’s original Cypriote squadron.\textsuperscript{168} By fall of 395, when Konon visited Tithraustes, the crews of these ships had gone without wages for “many months.”\textsuperscript{169} When he returned with pay, they mutinied at a rumor that it was only meant for marines and deck crews and not the rowers. Executions of ringleaders and general distribution calmed the situation temporarily, but some of Tithraustes’s 220 talents may have gone toward arrears, and more money was needed before the campaign of 394 could commence.\textsuperscript{170} The fleet was not truly stable until Konon returned from a winter journey to Artaxerxes’s court at Babylon, where the king granted all his requests.\textsuperscript{171}

The Oxyrhynchus historian blames Artaxerxes for the troubles, asserting that such neglect was typical Achaemenid practice:

For they were badly paid by the generals, which is always the case for those making war on behalf of the King—since also in the Dekeleian War, when they were allied with the Spartans, they distributed funds in a completely paltry and stingy fashion, and all too often, the triremes of the allies would have had to disperse if not for Cyrus’ enthusiasm. The reason for this is the King, who whenever he starts a war, sends down a little money at the beginning to those in charge, but neglects it over the time that follows, and those in charge of his business, not having enough from their private resources to meet the costs, sometimes have to suffer the dispersal of their armies.\textsuperscript{172}

The critique is scathing, but it oversimplifies. The king’s initial payments should have supported the fleet for a considerable period of time. Even if a fifth of the five hundred talents that Artaxerxes sent to Cyprus went to initial construction costs, this would have left enough to pay the crews of the entire one hundred-trireme force for eight months at a three-obol rate. Since Konon’s forty ships sailed before the main fleet, they are likely to have operated without financial difficulty during their preparations in Cilicia in 397. The pay trouble would not have begun until after the ships arrived at Kaunos, at which point they should have become Tissaphernes’s responsibility.\textsuperscript{173} Meanwhile, there is insufficient evidence to assume that Artaxerxes did not provide support for his principal naval force, the larger Phoenician fleet being prepared in late 397, which sailed to Kaunos with Baalshillem of Sidon in late 396 or early 395. The seizure of the Egyptian grain convoy at Rhodes secured the fleet’s basic sustenance for at least half a year if not much longer and may have limited the Persian authorities’ logistical concerns.\textsuperscript{174} As for
the argument that the king lost interest in the navy or was too distracted by land-based operations to ensure its pay, the dispatch of reinforcements that permitted the capture of Rhodes suggests the opposite.175 The subsequent depletion of funds may have resulted from a failure to anticipate the length of the campaign but possibly also from delegation to Tissaphernes, who perhaps once again proved reluctant to dip into private resources without support from a royal grant.176 As in 411, the increase in the fleet’s size may have contributed to the difficulty. But the wealth that Tithraustes obtained from his confiscated estates indicates that Tissaphernes could have done much more to support Konon’s operations. Tithraustes had no qualms about dispensing the late karanos’s funds, and Artaxerxes proved even more generous, refuting the charge of habitual negligence.177

It is doubtful that Konon’s court visit was the sole reminder of the royal fleet’s existence. Tithraustes had probably reported on the state of the navy as well as the broader military situation when he returned earlier that winter, and Artaxerxes may have been preparing for the following year’s operations even before Konon’s arrival. The king sent him back to the fleet with an official treasurer, authorized to maintain a permanent flow of funds, maybe through requisition from reserves in Anatolian storehouses or redistribution of tribute revenues.178 The fluctuation of naval numbers prevents exact calculation, but Artaxerxes’s contributions to the 394 campaign must have added up to several hundred talents. The king’s dispensation, despite the time it took to set in order, was essential to its successful conclusion.

Artaxerxes’s final contribution was to place Pharnabazos in charge of the fleet, rewarding his spirited defense against Agesilaos as well as his earlier interest in naval development. Diodorus reports that the king allowed Konon to choose Pharnabazos as co-commander, but Xenophon’s suggestion that Konon became the Persian general’s subordinate is inherently more plausible.179 Despite his former experience as a paymaster for allied ships, though, this was Pharnabazos’s first command at sea, and he probably leaned on Konon’s nautical advice. He traveled in late spring or early summer, after Agesilaos’s return to Europe, and would have spent a month or more on the road, 375 miles by the most direct route to Physkos on the Carian Chersonese or 390 miles to Kaunos. At the time of the battle, Pharnabazos cannot have been with the ships for more than two months, but he was fortunate in both his deputy and his opponent.

Agesilaos left only four thousand troops under an obscure officer named Euxenos to garrison the coastal cities.180 These were too few for further
advances on land, and the Spartan fleet that now took the offensive was inadequate for its task. Before his campaign against Pharnabazos, Agesilaos had ordered new shipbuilding to be undertaken in Ionian and island ports, presumably including Chios and Lesbos, where the Spartans maintained garrisons.\textsuperscript{181} Xenophon reports that it was supposed to provide 120 new triremes, despite Diodorus’s claim that the Spartan fleet at Rhodes had already matched this number.\textsuperscript{182} But the former commander had been unwilling to fight, and the fact that the Egyptian convoy carried equipment for a hundred ships suggests that Sparta’s triremes needed significant repairs. There are no other reports of Peloponnesian naval construction between the end of the Peloponnesian War and 395, and it is likely that the fleet included numerous vessels that had served at Aigospotamoi and were now in poor condition. Agesilaos’s program was meant to produce a naval force that could stand a chance in combat with Persia’s newer triremes, but it was not completed in time.\textsuperscript{183} Xenophon makes the telling comment that Peisandros, the brother-in-law whom Agesilaos placed in command as navarch, was “inexperienced in military preparations.”\textsuperscript{184} Manpower was another problem, and Sparta’s new conflict with Corinth and Thebes, both major contributors to the allied fleets of the Peloponnesian War, must have made it difficult to find sufficient crews for as many ships as Agesilaos hoped to maintain. Outnumbered and outclassed, Peisandros sailed to Knidos nonetheless and put out for battle at the Persians’ approach.

Pharnabazos and Konon crossed from Rhodes to the mainland with more than ninety triremes, while Peisandros had eighty-five.\textsuperscript{185} Diodorus’s account suffers from topographical confusion, but the fleets either met in the semi-enclosed gulf between Knidos, the island of Syme, and the Loryma promontory where the Persians made camp or further west between Knidos and Triopion.\textsuperscript{186} Xenophon reports that the Persian fleet rowed forward in two lines, with Konon leading the first and Pharnabazos the reserve, and Diodorus claims that the Spartans were initially successful before the second Persian line came up in close formation.\textsuperscript{187} The allies on Peisandros’s left wing broke and fled back toward Knidos, while the Persians overwhelmed the rest of Sparta’s ships, driving most ashore and killing the navarch. Pharnabazos captured fifty enemy triremes, ending Spartan naval power in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{188}

After the battle, the Persian fleet cruised to the nearby islands of Telos, Nisyros, and Kos, then up to Samos, Chios, Mytilene, and the Ionian coast. In each location, cities expelled their Spartan garrisons and welcomed the
Artaxerxes II and War with Sparta

Victors. Miletos was already loyal to Persia, and the surrenders of Erythrai and Ephesos were especially significant, marking the end of Ionia’s Spartan-backed revolt against the king. On Konon’s advice, Pharnabazos did not attempt to impose new garrisons, seeking to preserve his image as liberator, and the turnover may have been aided by the absence of pro-Spartan Ionians, who had marched back to Greece with Agesilaos. (The sources do not report how soon, or by what means, taxation resumed.) While Konon sailed to the Hellespont with forty ships, Pharnabazos landed at Ephesos and led a triumphant overland march, probably reoccupying the poleis of the Troad that he had lost in 399. He encountered resistance from a Spartan garrison under Derkyldas at Abydos, which held out against a siege despite Konon’s occupation of Sestos on the other side of the straits. But the setback was minor compared to what had been gained, and Pharnabazos returned to Daskyleion for the winter, ordering the fleet to reassemble in spring.

If Artaxerxes cared only for the reacquisition of Anatolian Greeks, the war might have ended after Knidos. Sparta had no outside funder to rebuild its navy, as it did during the previous war, and could no longer pose a serious threat to Persian control of the coastal cities. But the king was not thinking in defensive terms alone. A complete shift of focus to Egypt might have been wiser, but Artaxerxes first authorized a naval campaign across the Aegean and an outpouring of support for Sparta’s enemies on the Greek mainland.
Artaxerxes II had the opportunity to exploit the victory at Knidos and press Sparta for an immediate peace. He could have allowed the Corinthian War to resolve itself, watching it play out as it exhausted the revenues and resources of the major trans-Aegean states, while entrenching Persia’s control over the Anatolian Greeks. But the chance to resolve the conflict across the sea was too tempting to pass up, especially since his generals had encouraged the formation of the anti-Spartan alliance by sending Timokrates of Rhodes across the sea with coin for its leaders. In 393, Artaxerxes followed through on this commitment, sending Pharnabazos’s fleet to ravage the Spartan coast and dispense more money to the allies at Corinth. Pharnabazos extended the campaign further by permitting Konon to take the fleet to Athens and rebuild its defenses. The voyage paved the way for negotiations to secure imperial authority beyond the Aegean, but a peace that should have been a foregone conclusion slipped out of Persia’s hands, due to the diplomatic missteps of a new commander at Sardis.

Tiribazos’s preference for holding unilateral talks with Sparta and his casual expectation of concessions from Persia’s Greek allies alienated Athens and its partners. After his arrest of Konon forfeited the goodwill of the empire’s new clients, Tiribazos’s removal proved insufficient to win Athens back. Fighting between resurgent Athenian and Spartan naval forces spilled over into a growing crisis on Cyprus, where Euagoras’s rebellion, aided by Athens, impeded plans for the reconquest of Egypt.1 It took five more years for Artaxerxes to resolve the Corinthian War by abandoning friendly overtures to Athens. He reappointed Tiribazos to office, renewing the offer of aid to Sparta in order to compel Athenian submission, a gambit that finally paid off in the King’s Peace of 386.

It is often held that Artaxerxes employed a defensive balancing strategy, strengthening Athens just enough to weaken Sparta and alternating between pro-Spartan and pro-Athenian generals to prevent either side from gaining the upper hand. But he would have benefited more from an
earlier resolution of the Greek conflict, and the belated peace reasserted Persian supremacy not by equalizing Artaxerxes’s opponents but by granting the advantage to the Greek power most willing to support imperial authority.

Timokrates’s Mission to Greece
The crucial precursor to Persia’s involvement in the Corinthian War was the visit of Timokrates of Rhodes to mainland Greece in 396 or early 395. Xenophon suggests that Persian bribes sparked the conflict’s outbreak, and Plutarch reports Agesilaos’s quip that he was driven from Asia by ten thousand archers (not troops, but the royal figures on daric coinage). Modern scholars prefer the Oxyrhynchus historian’s judgment that Greek hatred of Spartan excesses was the true cause. All the same, it is likely that the Persians hoped an embassy would help to push the mainland poleis into conflict. Their preliminary gifts laid a foundation for future patronage of anti-Spartan combatants once the situation in Ionia improved.

Persian officials paid close attention to the prospect of a war in mainland Greece from the beginning of Agesilaos’s campaign, if not before. The initial appointment of Konon encouraged anti-Spartan activity at Athens; numerous volunteers sailed across the Aegean to join his fleet, and a clandestine embassy made its way to the king in 397 (the diplomats’ exact achievement is unclear, and the Spartans caught and killed them on their return journey). The refusal of Athens, Corinth, and Thebes to contribute troops to Agesilaos’s invasion force and the voyage of the Athenian politician Demainetos to join Konon in the winter of 396-95 offered further evidence of Greek hostility to Sparta. Yet enough Athenians feared the Spartans to restrain those who wished for immediate conflict, and the same was true in Thebes and other cities. The war parties did not yet dominate public discourse, and the cities needed evidence that victory was possible before a majority would support a new conflict. Persia could provide that impetus with an offer of funds.

The sources’ disagreements prevent certainty on the timing of Timokrates’s journey. Both suggest that he reached Greece before the outbreak of Spartan-Theban conflict, but Xenophon’s assertion that Tithraustes organized the mission in late summer 395, after his correspondence with Agesilaos, leaves little time for the outbreak of fighting in central Greece. Most scholars prefer the Hellenika Oxyrhynchia’s report that Pharnabazos sponsored the embassy, probably in the context of his interactions with Konon.
Timokrates’s Rhodian origin strengthens the case for Konon’s involvement, and the breakout from Kaunos and capture of Rhodes in early 395 would have paved the way for direct communication with the overseas Greeks. Timokrates’s origin advertised Persia’s growing advantage at sea and the likelihood that the empire would soon be capable of greater involvement on the Greek mainland.

Timokrates’s voyage must have been planned with great care to avoid his interception. He probably sailed from Rhodes through the Cyclades to a landing point on the east coast of Attica, avoiding contact with the Spartan ships on Aigina, or else proceeded up the Euripos for a more direct approach to Thebes. After meetings with Athenian and Boiotian contacts, he continued to Corinth and Argos, allegedly dispensing the gold equivalent of fifty silver talents (about fifteen thousand darics) between the four cities’ leading anti-Spartan orators. Xenophon claims that Athens took none of the money, but the Oxyrhynchus historian and Pausanias both identify Epikrates and Kephalos, Konon’s chief Athenian backers, as recipients. Spread out over so many beneficiaries, the sums would not have stretched far enough for military or naval wages. While Xenophon claims that Persia’s bribes paid for a surge of anti-Spartan rhetoric, the Oxyrhynchus account points out that political factions in each city were already attempting to inflame public sentiment for war. But it concedes that Persian offers gave the Theban plotters confidence to open hostilities by leading them to expect that they would be able to overthrow Sparta’s archē “with ease, assuming that the king would give them money, which the man sent by the Barbarian had promised.”

Timokrates’s funds were down payments on a larger grant of Persian assistance that would follow the outbreak of war. Athens, remembering Alkibiades’s fraudulent offers of royal alliance, had good cause for suspicion of promised Persian aid. But Timokrates could testify to his own polis’s liberation by royal ships, led by an Athenian general, and hand out darics to show that the king’s support was genuine. His mission thus deserves to be recognized as the beginning of Persia’s Corinthian War intervention. Whether or not it hastened the conflict, it committed the empire to further involvement. The anti-Spartan coalition would need Persia’s help, after suffering early battlefield defeats at Nemea and Koroneia in the spring and
summer of 394. Once the Anatolian coastline was secure, Pharnabazos’s fleet followed through on Timokrates’s promise.

Pharnabazos’s Revenge

Pharnabazos’s descent on the Peloponnese may have been sweet vengeance for the ravaging of his satrapy, but this must not obscure the fact that he sailed west with Artaxerxes’s approval. The Persian fleet’s voyage to mainland Greece, the first since Xerxes’s invasion, was a spectacular demonstration of imperial power. It showed that the king was capable of more than defending his own territory and that his ability to punish wrongdoing and reward friends, both in monetary and military terms, extended beyond the sea to the edge of the Achaemenid universe.

One might ask why Artaxerxes did not avoid escalation in Greece and transfer his fleet to the eastern Mediterranean for the coming Egyptian war. But Pharnabazos’s campaign did not have to interfere with preparations against Egypt, and part of the Knidos fleet probably caught the autumn winds back to the Levant in 394, while Konon cruised the Hellespont with only forty triremes, most likely his original Cypriotes. The new fleet of spring 393 contained at least eighty ships, and the evidence suggests that many were new additions, not manned by Phoenician or Cilician crews. Over the winter, Pharnabazos ordered Konon’s squadron to retake more Hellespontine cities “so that he might assemble as large a fleet as possible,” and he came back and “manned many ships” on the Anatolian coast in the spring. There is no evidence that Pharnabazos built new triremes in the interval, and the phrasing suggests the assignment of crews to vessels already in his possession. The best explanation is that most were Ionian triremes constructed on Spartan orders in 395-94 and captured at Knidos, now refitted and filled with rowers and crews from the coastal poleis. Six years later, the Hellespontine and Ionian cities could still put about forty triremes at their satraps’ disposal, and these could have represented the local portion of Pharnabazos’s fleet, later returned to Anatolian ports. In addition to oarsmen, the satrap hired mercenaries for operations on land and brought a sum of money that Xenophon calls “the king’s,” perhaps dispensed by the same treasurer who accompanied the Knidos campaign.

Pharnabazos faced no naval opposition from the Spartans but made no attempt at negotiation, despite the opportunity to intimidate them into peace. In addition to desiring revenge, he also might have believed that extra pressure was needed in light of Sparta’s victories over the Greek coalition in 394, and
he may have wished to follow up on Timokrates’s promise to provide aid to Athens and its friends. The king probably expected that a short naval campaign and moderate gifts to the Greek allies would help to complete the display of power beyond the Aegean.

Pharnabazos and Konon set sail in early spring, put in at Melos, and then swept down on the southern Peloponnese. Bypassing the Lakonian port of Gytheion, they rounded Cape Tainaron to land at Messenian Pherai and raid Sparta’s helot-farmed hinterland, before reembarking to strike at other locations. The countryside offered insufficient supplies and shelter for a lengthy occupation, but the fleet next sailed for Kythera, the island off the southeastern prong of Lakonia. Demaratos had once advised Xerxes to seize it as a threat to Sparta, and Athens did so in the Peloponnesian War, cutting

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*Map 4. The Persian Fleet in the Aegean, 396–93*
the trade route from Egypt to the Peloponnese. Now Pharnabazos saw its capture as a perfect opportunity to increase the pressure on Sparta and prevent any further communications with Egypt. He brought the fleet ashore at the town of Phoinikos, assaulted Kythera’s city walls, and secured a rapid surrender. The Persians expelled the polis’s population, offering safe conduct over to the Lakonian coast, where the refugees would contribute to Spartan demoralization. Pharnabazos appointed Nikophemos, an Athenian associate of Konon, to man the empty city with mercenaries; he may have also left them a few ships for further marauding.²⁶

With Kythera’s garrison securely installed, Pharnabazos sailed to the Isthmus of Corinth and secured a meeting with leaders of the anti-Spartan coalition. Xenophon suggests that he could not resist the opportunity for a good speech: “Encouraging the allies to fight the war enthusiastically and prove themselves trustworthy to the king, he left them money, as much as he had, and departed to sail for home.”²⁷ The phrasing hints that further support would have to be earned by additional deeds, echoing the Achaemenid maxim that the king rewarded his helpers according to the value of their service.²⁸ Diodorus adds that Pharnabazos made an alliance with the Greeks but does not spell out the terms. It may have been an informal agreement tied to the handover of funds rather than a formal treaty like the one concluded between Persia and Sparta in 411. If they prepared a written document, there is no evidence that a final version ever earned ratification, as if there was a ratified agreement, one would expect it to have been referenced in the next year’s peace talks.²⁹ Without a fully developed treaty, there was no guarantee of further subsidies, and it is likely that the Persians expected the Greeks to make the best of royal generosity in the time that remained before Sparta’s submission.

Without specifying how much money Pharnabazos handed over, Xenophon offers some hints as to its uses. The grant came at a moment of crisis for the anti-Spartan alliance, which was faltering, unlike the Achaemenids, who were accumulating naval successes. Since Sparta’s victory at Nemea and Agesilaos’s return, the Greek combatants had been mired in a standoff around the fortifications of Corinth.³⁰ The city faced growing danger after the Spartans sent a small naval squadron to interfere with shipping in the Corinthian Gulf. Pharnabazos’s money allowed Corinth to man a flotilla in response.³¹ Despite a theory that Pharnabazos’s treasure was the metal source for gold coins that Corinth minted later in the century, it is likely that this naval funding was limited in scale and that the amounts expended
were far lower than those in the Peloponnesian War.\textsuperscript{32} Corinth had no more than fifteen triremes, although they sufficed to defeat and kill a Spartan na-
varch before the end of 393.\textsuperscript{33} If Pharnabazos’s donation covered their ex-
penses for a year, this might have amounted to 120 talents at Cyrus’s old
four-obol rate. But he offered no ships to fight alongside them, nor any An-
tolian timber for new fleet construction. The goal was not to resurrect Corinth’s
naval power but to provide enough resources to do further harm to the
Spartans and secure allied gratitude. A possible side effect was the Corin-
thian coup that occurred a few months after Pharnabazos’s visit, in which
emboldened war supporters slaughtered elites suspected of Spartan sympa-
thies.\textsuperscript{34} The ringleaders were allegedly the same men who took Persia’s
money, but Pharnabazos had long since returned to Anatolia, while the fleet
sailed to Konon’s native Athens with aid for Persia’s most prominent Greek
clients.

**Konon and Persian Aid to Athens**

Pharnabazos’s delegation of the Athenian mission to Konon seemed a mas-
terstroke. Xenophon suggests that the satrap was ready to end his campaign
after handing out “all the money he had with him” at the isthmus. Even if
this is an exaggeration, he must have welcomed Konon’s promise to raise
additional funds in the Aegean to pay for further operations.\textsuperscript{35} The fleet had
probably sailed at least seven hundred miles since the cruise began, but it
was still early summer, leaving several months for active campaigning, and
Konon was used to far greater financial constraints.\textsuperscript{36} His extended opera-
tions would keep up the pressure on Sparta, and a hero’s homecoming had
potential to shape a durable friendship between Persia and Athens. The
ships remained the king’s, and Pharnabazos probably expected Konon to
return them to Achaemenid ports once the mission was complete.\textsuperscript{37} But he
had no reason to fear a threat to imperial interests from Konon’s creation of
a dual identity as Persian general and democratic statesman.\textsuperscript{38} It is doubtful
that either man anticipated the looming danger of Sparta’s complaints against
Konon to a new Persian commander with little to gain from Pharnabazos’s
success.

Upon arrival at Athens, Konon set his rowers to work on the city’s forti-
fications. The walls of Piraeus and the Long Walls between the port and the
urban center had been a crucial element in Athens’s defenses throughout
the previous half century, until their demolition by the Spartans at the end
of the Peloponnesian War. Athens began reconstruction when the Corinthian War broke out in 395 but had made little progress due to shortages of funds and labor. With Pharnabazos’s approval, Konon delivered both.

The satrap donated a monetary sum that Cornelius Nepos, possibly relying on Deinon, reports as fifty talents. The grant was enough to pay the wages of specialist masons, stonemasons, and carpenters and may have been used to purchase some of the building materials. Some Athenians and five hundred Thebans took part in the project, but Konon’s eighty triremes contributed the bulk of the manpower, eleven thousand men or more. In less than a year, they erected the majority of the planned circuit, although its completion took until 391.

Pharnabazos may have supported the restoration of Athens’s defenses as a final act of revenge on Sparta. But in more practical terms, the wall circuit enhanced Athenian security in case the front lines at Corinth gave way and also earned the city’s gratitude at limited cost. The satrap’s grant did not extend to new trireme construction or naval wages. Unlike the Corinthians, the Athenians were unable to raise a combat fleet until 391 or 390, when they managed to gather enough money from their own citizens to cover the costs. Konon does seem to have transferred the fleet’s Greek mercenary contingent to the Athenian forces, securing their command for a protégé, the young Iphikrates, and sending them off to man defenses at Corinth and raid Spartan allies in the northern Peloponnese. But neither he nor other Persian agents took further responsibility for their pay, which was probably covered thereafter by internal taxation at Athens.

It is possible that the deal also applied to the isolated mercenary garrison on Kythera, whose continued payment by the Persians posed logistical constraints.

Overall, Pharnabazos could view Konon’s activities at Athens as a valuable continuation of Persia’s Spartan war. It is doubtful that Konon thought his fund-raising missions in the Aegean islands conflicted with Persian interests, even if they bestowed additional benefit on his native city. Collection errands might have been undertaken with small squadrons, as in the Peloponnesian War, rather than the entire fleet, and it is unclear whether they actually brought any islands or cities into a dependent relationship with Athens. If Konon contributed to the reestablishment of Athenian authority in some of the islands, it is possible that he did so through diplomatic contact rather than direct invasion and occupation. None of his operations deserves characterization as anti-Persian.
Konon stayed in Athens for almost a year, erecting a temple in Piraeus to the patron goddess of Knidos, orchestrating diplomatic missions, and charming the Athenian assembly.49 The Athenians showered him with honors, including a heroic statue in the Agora, and also bestowed diplomatic favors on Euagoras of Salamis.50 Some may have preferred to avoid being identified as dependents of the Great King, instead claiming Knidos as a virtual Athenian victory.51 But Konon probably orchestrated some public recognition for the Persian naval commander who had funded Athens’s walls. It may be relevant that an honorary decree for Pharnabazos’s great-grandson in 327/26 refers to the late satrap as one of Athens’s “benefactors,” who had been “helpful to the Demos in the wars.”52

The fleet presumably stayed at Athens through the winter while the rowers worked on the walls. There is no evidence that Konon anticipated a serious quarrel with the Persians about the employment of their ships and manpower. Unfortunately, he would prove unable to persuade a new imperial general of the convergence of Athenian and Persian interests.

Tiribazos’s Folly and the Peace Talks of 392

The peace talks of 392 should have ended the Corinthian War. Despite modern debates over the sequence and details of negotiations, it is clear that Tiribazos and Sparta’s envoys discussed terms almost identical to those ratified five years later. Most modern studies present Artaxerxes as the chief obstacle to peace, attributing his refusal to make an agreement with Sparta alone to a lingering hatred for the Spartans. Yet there are several indications that Athens’s objections were the decisive factor. The king was willing to make peace with Sparta, but not in the face of his clients’ vocal disapproval.

The crucial question is how Persia forfeited Athenian cooperation. It is startling that so soon after Knidos and the rebuilding of the Long Walls, Athens objected not only to Persia’s definition of autonomy for overseas Greeks but probably also to the king’s ownership of the Ionian cities. Given Konon’s role in retaking them for Persia, there was no reason why their status should have been in question. But Tiribazos’s arrest of Konon offers a plausible catalyst for Athens’s shift to defiance. It appears that the karanos acted without royal approval, and Artaxerxes’s disavowal was insufficient to repair the damage.

Tiribazos became the new commander for western Anatolia, based at Sardis, in late 394 or 393.53 His status as Artaxerxes’s court favorite was his chief recommendation for office, although he had fought at Kounaxa and gained administrative experience as a district governor in Armenia. He could
not boast of a military victory comparable to Pharnabazos’s triumph at Knidos and may have resented the Daskyleion satrap’s role in the takeover of the Ionian cities, traditionally the purview of the Sardis satrap or senior western general. Their rivalry offers a possible explanation for Tiribazos’s mistrust of Konon, Pharnabazos’s Athenian deputy, who also provoked suspicion through a surging cult of personality in the Ionian cities, not dissimilar to the hero worship of Lysander a decade before.

A Greek settlement would allow Tiribazos to take credit for Pharnabazos’s success. Xenophon reports Sparta’s initiative in sending an embassy to the new *karanos* in early 392, perhaps in response to the Kythera garrison’s depredations. But it is plausible that the king had ordered Tiribazos to pursue a treaty with Sparta, now that the naval campaign had achieved its purpose. If Artaxerxes demanded that he forge ahead with the war, Tiribazos could have refused to meet Antalkidas, just as Cyrus had rebuffed the Athenian diplomats in 407. It is more likely that he entered talks with royal encouragement but was given some discretion in the details of negotiation.

It is less clear why Pharnabazos was uninvolved. Perhaps Artaxerxes believed that a different commander, lacking personal enmity toward Sparta, would be more effective in compelling its leaders to terms. It is also possible that the king was sufficiently impressed with Pharnabazos’s recent victory to appoint him to a share in the command of the impending invasion of Egypt. Whatever the reason, Pharnabazos’s absence emboldened Tiribazos to ignore the priorities of the overseas allies and to display a favoritism for Sparta that was at odds with royal instructions.

Tiribazos gave initial offense by receiving the Spartan embassy without inviting the allies to participate in peace talks. The Spartans hoped to drive a wedge between their Greek opponents and the Persians, and Tiribazos played into their hands. When the Athenians found out about the negotiations, they sent Konon with a counterembassy to demand a place at the table and convinced their allies to do likewise. Tiribazos then asked all the Greek envoys to support the compromise proposed by the Spartan envoy Antalkidas. Sparta was willing to end hostilities with the king and acknowledge Persian ownership of all Greek cities in Asia but asked that Persia declare autonomy for all of the Aegean islands and the European poleis. By implication, this would mean the loss of imperial support for the Greek allies’ possession of valuable dependencies—Athens’s islands of Skyros, Lemnos, and Imbros, Thebes’s presidency of the Boiotian League, and Argos’s planned political merger with Corinth. The allies protested but Tiribazos
refused to budge. Once the envoys left for home, he arrested Konon as a traitor to royal interests.62

Soon afterward, Tiribazos set out for court, in misguided confidence of winning over the king to his position. It is possible that he reported first by letter and that Artaxerxes then called him home to account for his actions.63 Royal displeasure may have played a part in the illustrious prisoner’s release before his departure, but Konon returned to Cyprus and died of disease a short time later.64 The sources are silent on the fleet, but the Cypriote ships probably followed him home to Euagoras’s Salamis, while the Ionian triremes dispersed to their respective ports.65

A royal balancing policy cannot explain Tiribazos’s decision to turn on the allies and Konon.66 There was no reason for the king to fear that the Greek allies’ control of smaller neighbors outside his empire would threaten his control of the Anatolian coast.67 Athens still lacked a fleet and Corinth was collapsing, while Thebes and Argos had never been significant naval powers. The fragile Greek alliance posed no threat and did not need weakening to prevent it from harming the Persians; rather, it required additional support to maintain the war against Sparta. Yet Xenophon reports that Tiribazos gave secret funds to Antalkidas to help the Spartans man new ships, which not only failed to equalize both sides but assisted Sparta in restoring an imbalance that might end the war.68 Furthermore, a Persian general would normally communicate with the king via the imperial post and so if his actions conformed with royal policy, Tiribazos should have been able to inform Artaxerxes about what he was doing without having to travel to court.

For Tiribazos, the attraction of Sparta’s Greek autonomy plan may have been the prospect of a hastened peace with Persia’s main enemy, as well as an opportunity to score ideological points by posing as protector of weak Greek communities from abuse by stronger neighbors. Perhaps he doubted that the allies could win a rapid victory, given their lack of progress in the fighting around Corinth. At the same time, Tiribazos might have believed that Konon wished to revive Athens’s Aegean power, or he may have simply hoped to embarrass Pharnabazos.69 In any case, he proved unable to persuade the king.

Many scholars have argued that Artaxerxes wasted the chance for a settlement with the Spartans, who were willing to make peace, due to continuing anger over Spartan depredations in Anatolia.70 Others suggest that Artaxerxes persisted in viewing Sparta as a greater threat than Athens or worried that it would resume attacks on Persian Ionia once the Corinthian War ended.71
But these approaches misread the king’s intentions by limiting them to a wish to protect his own territories and ignoring his obligations to the clients he had hitherto supported. Just as the treaty drafts of the Peloponnesian War prohibited a peace without consultation of the allies, Artaxerxes must have expected to participate in the conclusion of hostilities between his Greek friends and enemies. Acceptance of Tiribazos’s terms would have meant renouncing the empire’s allies. There is no reason to believe that Artaxerxes would have rejected peace if not only Sparta but Athens and the other Greeks had agreed to his terms.  

The obvious solution was to insist that the Spartans accept conditions that were not anathema to the other Greek powers. This seems to have been the thrust of the second peace conference, a direct meeting between Greek representatives at Sparta in winter 392-91. In the interval since the Sardis talks, the Spartans had won major victories, breaking through the Corinthian Long Walls and defeating Corinth’s fleet. Yet despite their growing advantage, they now offered concessions. The sources do not specify Persia’s direct involvement in the renewed talks, but it is likely that the king’s refusal to support Tiribazos’s plan compelled them to compromise.  

The peace terms at Sparta, as represented by Athens’s envoy Andokides, preserved Athens’s few island possessions and allowed Thebes to retain most of Boiotia. Andokides’s speech warns of the danger of rejecting the king’s proffered friendship, as Athens had done with disastrous results in the days of Amorges and Darius II. Yet the Athenian assembly failed to agree and voted against the peace, exiling Andokides and Konon’s former ally Epikrates for advocating it. According to a fragment of Philochoros, the motive was anger at the king’s claim to the Asian Greeks, which remained an essential component of the proposed agreement.  

This was a shocking turnabout. There is no indication that the Athenians had protested Persian rights to Ionia at the time of the initial Sardis meeting, and if any were tempted, Konon would have counseled otherwise. The best explanation for Athens’s sudden belligerence is that the assembly was outraged over Tiribazos’s arrest of Konon, which removed the most forceful advocate for cooperation, insulted Athens, and provoked a desire for revenge. In such hostile conditions, Athenian peace supporters were unable to prevent the majority from repudiating Persia’s right to control of Ionia. Konon’s disappearance empowered political rivals, above all Thrasyboulos, who sought a restoration of Athens’s overseas might. The new public mood contributed to the reconstruction of Athens’s fleet with the aid of
internal taxation in 391-90. Athens’s reassertion of protection over its former Ionian adherents was an understandable response to perceived Persian treachery and the fear of how the king might treat them without Konon’s mediating presence.

If Athens had accepted the terms discussed at Sparta, the resulting peace would have looked much like the one concluded a few years later. Instead, the king’s clients now rejected his patronage. Tiribazos’s arrest of Konon sparked the very crisis that it aimed to forestall, not only galvanizing Athenian resentment of Persia but encouraging an eruption of civil conflict in the Ionian cities, similar to that which followed the fall of Lysander’s dekarchies. In Konon’s absence, supporters of Sparta and oligarchy challenged Ionian democracies that had taken hold after Knidos. Inscriptions dated to between 392 and 387 show outbreaks of stasis in Erythrai and Klazomenai, and there were probably others. On Rhodes, a pro-Spartan faction revolted in 391, trying to overthrow the democracy established during Konon’s occupation. Unable to win on their own, the Rhodian rebels dug in and sent to Sparta for aid. Persia no longer had a large fleet in the vicinity that would allow it to intervene, because many of the king’s ships had returned to the eastern Mediterranean for the preparations against Egypt or the new conflict in Cyprus.

Konon’s fate was also a factor in the Cypriote troubles, as Euagoras battled the rulers of Kition, Amathous, and Soloi for regional power. Rather than seeking independence from Persia, the dynast probably hoped to capitalize on his recent naval contributions by winning Artaxerxes’s approval to rule the entire island. Konon’s return of Euagoras’s ships strengthened his forces, but by 391, the king sided with Euagoras’s opponents, declaring him a rebel and planning a crackdown, perhaps due to resentment of Euagoras’s misuse of royal warships for unauthorized conquests. In return, Euagoras called on Athenian assistance. Aristophanes and Nikophemos, former lieutenants of Konon, helped convince the city to send him triremes, in open support of anti-Persian rebellion.

The alienation of Euagoras carried dire implications for Persia’s coming war with Egypt. The invasion led by Pharnabazos, Tithraustes, and Abrokomas, mentioned in Isokrates’s Panegyrikos, probably occurred around this time, and despite Egyptian infighting after the death of Nepherites and Akoris’s succession, the Persians failed in a three-year campaign. The escalating Cypriote war may have reduced the number of available ships and interfered with logistical preparations. Even worse, by 388, both Euagoras and Athens had contracted alliances with the new Egyptian pharaoh.
In summary, Tiribazos’s actions caused a chain reaction that weakened Persian authority across the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. Artaxerxes’s disapproval is clear. The removal of Tiribazos from Sardis looks like a deliberate effort to contain the damage and salvage the empire’s Greek relations.88 Xenophon describes Strouthas, the new general, as an enthusiastic supporter of Athens and its allies, who “remembered what sorts of evils the king’s country had suffered at the hands of Agesilaos.”89 But it is unclear how Strouthas manifested this sympathy, and there is no evidence that he paid further subsidies to Athenian military forces.90 He probably attempted to resume negotiations on more favorable terms and may have encouraged the participants in the Sparta peace talks.91 Yet his arrival did not prevent Athens from rejecting peace, and Sparta made a final effort to exploit the Ionian chaos and retake its overseas possessions.

**Strouthas and the Failure of Outreach to Athens**

Strouthas displayed military and diplomatic talent in the face of the return of the Spartans to Ionia in the spring or summer of 391, checking their offensive and forging stronger ties with many of the Ionian cities.92 But his early victories would not bring decisive results, while the offshore struggles on Rhodes and Cyprus drew in Athenian and Spartan naval forces with a mutual disregard for Persian authority.

The new Spartan invasion force was led by Thibron, receiving a second chance at command. Its eight thousand men were probably mercenaries, since Spartan and allied troops were busy around Corinth and Argos.93 Xenophon claims that Thibron established a base at Ephesos, but Diodorus refers only to nearby fortresses, and Ephesos’s subsequent role in Strouthas’s arbitration decree may indicate that the polis in fact closed its gates.94 Winning over the smaller poleis of Priene, Achilleion, and new Magnesia, the Spartans began raiding up the Maeander valley and targeting the Persian agricultural base.95 But Strouthas had a large army to hand, including five thousand hoplites, some of whom may have come from Miletos and other pro-Persian cities, as well as the traditional light infantry and cavalry.96 Strouthas’s horsemen proved Thibron’s undoing, catching the Spartans unaware at their campsite when some of the soldiers were dispersed in search of plunder. Killing Thibron and many of his troops, they chased the survivors to the shelter of a fort called Knidinion.97 Strouthas’s battle was the most impressive victory by a Persian army over Spartan land forces to date and must have strengthened Ionian perceptions of imperial power.
An undated stele from Miletos illustrates Strouthas’s display of civic authority in the region, recording his arbitration in a dispute between Miletos and its small neighbor Myous over a tract of land in the western Maeander valley.98 Rather than resorting to battle, the poleis submitted their case to a council of dikasts from cities associated with the archaic Ionian League (the legible section names representatives from Chios, Erythrai, Klazomenai, Lebedos, and Ephesos).99 The cities recognized Strouthas’s right, as Ionia’s governor and the king’s representative, to ratify or overturn their verdict. In the end, Myous withdrew its claim before the dikasts could issue a ruling, and after the dikasts informed Strouthas of this, he confirmed Miletos’s possession of the disputed territory.100

Like Pharnabazos’s decision not to impose garrisons in 394, Strouthas’s arbitration advertised the compatibility between Persian rule and traditional Ionian institutions. It is noteworthy that the proceedings included Chios, which Pharnabazos and Konon had liberated but which the Persians had not claimed as a royal possession in the Peloponnesian War and would not in the King’s Peace.101 Its involvement suggested that nonsubject allies and coastal Ionians alike could benefit from a benevolent Persian authority. On the other hand, Strouthas’s victorious army was stationed not far from most of the cities in question, and some may have accepted his judgment out of fear. The perception of a predetermined outcome would explain why Myous withdrew its claim. As Persia’s most important supporter in Ionia during the Spartan war, Miletos was likely to have Strouthas’s sympathy, while former Spartan allies such as Ephesos and Erythrai had reason to demonstrate their return to allegiance by supporting the Milesian claim. What the Persians called cooperation with local justice was likely to appear to Greek detractors as favoritism for the king’s collaborators.

Another inscription, an Athenian assembly decree issued between 391 and 386, suggests that Strouthas’s successes were insufficient to reestablish a full Ionian trust in Persian authority. The polis of Erythrai, despite the lavish honors it had bestowed on Konon and its participation in the Miletos arbitration, called on Athens to refrain “from handing over the Erythraians to the Barbarians.”102 Civil war in Erythrai had resulted in the expulsion of part of the citizen body, and the faction that emerged in control may have found Athenian alliance preferable to cooperation with a Persian general.103

It is possible that Erythrai’s loss of confidence stemmed from Strouthas’s inability to dislodge the remainder of Thibron’s army. In late 391 or early 390, a Spartan force of seven or eight triremes, en route to support the Rhodian
rebels, captured Samos and landed a new general named Diphridas near Ephesos. Rallying Thibron’s survivors, he resumed attacks on Strouthas’s territories and humiliated the Persian commander by kidnapping his daughter and son-in-law as they traveled to Sardis. A Spartan raid on an inland portion of the royal road would have called Strouthas’s defensive abilities into question, and his payment of an enormous ransom financed further predation by Diphridas’s forces.

Meanwhile, the Spartan naval squadron had seized Knidos as a base for contact with Rhodes, and Agesilaos’s half brother Teleutias had reinforced it by the summer of 390. The Persian failure to maintain control of the site of Pharnabazos’s and Konon’s great victory may have stemmed not only from Strouthas’s preoccupation with Diphridas but also the withdrawal of local troops to combat Euagoras’s rebellion. Sometime in the last half decade, Artaxerxes had created a separate Carian satrapy, entrusted to the native dynast Hekatomnos of Mylasa. In early 390, the king ordered Hekatomnos to sail for Cyprus. Although Strouthas goes unmentioned in the sources, he may have supported the mission by putting the Ionian ships that had served in Konon’s fleet at Hekatomnos’s disposal. But the campaign failed to suppress Euagoras, and the Spartans profited in the meantime.

The renewal of shared enmity with Sparta did little to improve Persian-Athenian relations, as the Athenians sent their new triremes to Euagoras’s aid. An initial squadron of ten ships under Nikophemos and Aristophanes may have reached Cyprus before the Spartans captured ten more, led by Philokrates, near Knidos. A short time later, Thrasyboulos sailed with forty triremes to the Bosporus, where he captured Byzantion and replaced its oligarchy with a democracy, reimposed Athens’s old 10 percent toll on inbound Pontic merchantmen, and made an alliance with Chalkedon. Xenophon claims that many cities came over to him because of the king’s and Pharnabazos’s friendly outlook toward Athens. But it is doubtful that even Persian officials who still viewed the Athenians as friendly clients wished to see them resume collections in ports on the Anatolian side of the Bosporus and Propontis.

Thrasyboulos’s next campaign, in early 389, tested how far the Athenians could press their renewed economic claims along the king’s coast. He moved the fleet south, preparing to challenge the Spartans at Rhodes and extorting as much money as possible on the way. A visit to the Mimas peninsula encouraged Erythrai’s anti-Persian stance, and Thrasyboulos restored the archē’s 5 percent harbor tax at the small island of Klazomenai.
The citizens of Klazomenai had moved to an offshore location during the Peloponnesian War, defying Persian orders to return to the mainland, although stasis had led to the establishment of a breakaway coastal community at Chyton by 387. If pressed, the Athenians could argue that Klazomenai’s island site made it independent from royal claims to Asia, and taxation there did not violate the king’s rights, but Persia’s response in the King’s Peace indicates vehement disagreement. No such excuse was possible for the last leg of Thrasyboulos’s voyage, as his fund-raising along the Carian coast provoked the city of Halikarnassos to lodge a complaint of mistreatment at Athens. Finally, he rounded Lycia and put in at Aspendos, the former base of Tissaphernes’s Phoenician fleet, where Athenian financial demands posed a blatant offense to the king. No source mentions direct Persian involvement, but the Aspendians’ reaction, storming the Athenian camp at night and killing Thrasyboulos in his tent, served imperial interests.

Thrasyboulos’s actions probably convinced Artaxerxes that Strouthas’s diplomatic efforts had not restored Athenian respect for Persian authority. The Athenians continued operations on the Anatolian coast after Thrasyboulos’s death, sending Iphikrates with Konon’s mercenary veterans to challenge the Spartan holdouts in Pharnabazos’s Troad. The Persians cannot have been sad to see Iphikrates ambush and massacre Sparta’s Abydos garrison, which had been raiding the surrounding territory. But the presence of an Athenian mercenary force may have reawakened unpleasant memories of the Peloponnesian War. By 388, the king decided that despite Tiribazos’s previous errors of judgment, hostility to Athens and conciliation of Sparta was now the most promising path toward a resolution of the Greek debacle.

The King’s Peace

Artaxerxes reinstated Tiribazos in 388, showing his willingness to reestablish patronage over a humbled Sparta and discarding efforts to win back Athens by friendly means. Athens’s connections with Cyprus and Egypt and Persia’s defeats in both regions strengthened the king’s resolve to end the Greek conflict. These setbacks aside, the Spartan and Corinthian Wars had now dragged on for more than a decade, and their duration challenged Artaxerxes’s claims to authority over Anatolia and influence across the sea. The king’s best chance to bring the Greeks into compliance was a diplomatic offensive, rewarding the willing and threatening the defiant with full-scale attack.
Artaxerxes’s final Greek policy, expressed in an edict that set the conditions for the King’s Peace, was not based on the concept of balance between Greek powers. Its object was to offer the Spartans an overwhelming advantage over their rivals in exchange for their return to obedience. Furthermore, it promised that Persia would react to further opposition with direct, decisive intervention. The peace is often interpreted as Artaxerxes’s plan to secure the permanent possession of the Anatolian frontier. But it was not merely a defensive measure, as the king asserted a decisive claim to influence over the poleis across the sea. He depicted Greek independence as the outcome of his voluntary grant and made his forbearance from further interference dependent on acceptance of his terms.

Tiribazos’s replacement of Strouthas alerted the Spartans that a deal was in the works and prompted them to appoint Antalkidas as navarch. The former ambassador landed at Ephesos and obtained Persian permission to visit Artaxerxes’s court, where he and the king resumed discussion of the peace terms considered in 392. Antalkidas’s journey and the subsequent negotiations lasted the rest of the year and may have resulted in an initial pact between Persia and Sparta, preliminary to the wider Greek peace. Around the same time, Pharnabazos also traveled to court and married Artaxerxes’s daughter Apame—perhaps a reward for Knidos and an indication of continuing favor despite Tiribazos’s ascendancy and the failure in Egypt. Tiribazos and Antalkidas returned to Sardis in early 387, bringing the royal edict for dissemination to the Greeks. Xenophon quotes verbatim:

Artaxerxes the King considers it just for the poleis in Asia to be his, and among the islands, Klazomenai and Cyprus; but for the other Greek poleis, both small and great, to be permitted to be autonomous, except for Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros; these should, as long ago, belong to the Athenians. And whichever one does not accept this peace, I will make war on them alongside those who are willing, both on foot and by sea, with both ships and money.

The opening phrase frames the royal decision in moralizing terms, echoing the boast of Darius I at Naqsh-i Rustam that “what is right, that is my wish.” The following section forbids a repeat of Athens’s recent misdeeds, the financial exactions at Klazomenai and assistance to Euagoras. Scholars have proposed several reasons for the Klazomenai reference, including the likelihood that Artaxerxes wished to establish Persian naval bases in its
vicinity, but the most important point was that an Anatolian coastal polis could not be allowed or encouraged to escape royal authority through relocation.\textsuperscript{129} The king was determined to close any loophole by which the Athenians might continue to make financial claims on any part of his possessions.\textsuperscript{130} On the other hand, perhaps through some lingering influence of Pharnabazos or Strouthas, he softened the blow by offering the island concession that Athens had hoped for in 392.

Artaxerxes sought to end any claims to his coastal poleis by overseas Greek powers and fixed a geographical boundary between royal possessions and autonomous states that would enhance the stability of western Anatolia.\textsuperscript{131} Yet it is unclear why the assent of Argos, Corinth, or Thebes should have been necessary if this was his only concern. The proclamation of autonomy for Greeks beyond Persia’s borders was an expression of universal authority. Its conferral on peoples outside the king’s direct rule amounted to a statement that Greek independence was in Persia’s power to provide and that the king’s provision of justice did not end at the empire’s borders but extended to the peoples whose freedom he claimed to protect.\textsuperscript{132} Finally, the promise of autonomy was tempered by the threat of direct military action if the independent Greeks contravened the king’s solution for their war.\textsuperscript{133}

In short, Artaxerxes employed a political concept amenable to Greek audiences in service of the traditional Achaemenid display of benevolent imperialism, which sought to restore order in place of chaos and protect the weak from the strong.\textsuperscript{134} Sparta, in turn, learned how to live with and profit from the Persian worldview. By acknowledging the error of their challenge to the king’s possession of Anatolia, the Spartans returned from a state of defiance to one of support for royal authority. They benefited pragmatically from Persian support for their strategic objectives, the checking of Athens’s naval revival and the breakup of both the Argive-Corinthian sympolity and the Theban-controlled Boiotian League. Sparta’s cooperation allowed Artaxerxes to display Persian supremacy by forgiving his client’s misdeeds and rewarding its return to obedience.

On returning to Sardis, Tiribazos commenced a series of measures to demonstrate the force behind Artaxerxes’s threats. Antalkidas had left a fleet of twenty-five ships on the Ionian coast, and during his absence, it sailed to Abydos where an Athenian squadron of thirty-two triremes blockaded it from the opposite coast of the Hellespont.\textsuperscript{135} With Tiribazos’s support, Antalkidas hurried to Abydos to take personal command, evaded the enemy, and met a wave of naval reinforcements that guaranteed his control
of the straits. A Syracusan fleet of twenty ships, sent by the pro-Spartan tyrant Dionysios, was first to arrive, but the decisive additions were about forty Persian-owned triremes from the ports of Anatolia. Some may have been the same ships that sailed to Athens with Konon six years before, now in the hands of Tiribazos and the new satrap of Daskyleion, Ariobarzanes. The Persian-Spartan fleet, now more than eighty triremes strong, stopped the merchant traffic from the Black Sea from continuing to Athens, diverting it into friendly ports (where its proceeds may have benefited Persia’s Anatolian officials). Only after establishing this chokehold on Athens’s chief supply line did Tiribazos issue a summons to Athens and the other major combatants, declaring that any who wished to hear the king’s terms must send representatives to Sardis.

The resulting conference allowed Tiribazos to conduct a ritual display of imperial authority, showing the Greek ambassadors the royal seal before reading the king’s document aloud. Hearing Artaxerxes’s words and persuading their constituents to ratify a peace, the Greeks acted out the formula used by Darius I and Xerxes to describe universal obedience to their commands: “What was said to them by me, that they did.” The coordination of satrapal ships with the Spartan fleet and the precedent of Pharnabazos’s 393 campaign probably convinced them to take seriously the threat of Persian action against the noncompliant. At a final conference at Sparta, marked by last-minute haggling on possible exceptions to the autonomy rule, the major combatants agreed to the peace. Despite any lingering resentment at Ionia’s fate, Athens voted for adherence by late 387. By early 386, a combination of Persian and Spartan threats cowed Corinth, Argos, and Thebes into acceptance as well, and Greece returned to a state of general peace, at least for the time being.

The King’s Peace was not a perfect triumph, not only because its delay had worsened the situations in Cyprus and Egypt, but also because it soon gave way to new wars among the trans-Aegean Greeks. Sparta attempted to pursue a renewed hegemony on the Greek mainland, on the pretext of punishing other cities’ alleged violations of the autonomy clause, and with a confidence heightened by Persia’s renewed approval. The Athenians rebuilt a naval league in the Aegean islands, and Thebes finally altered the political balance by crushing the Spartan army at Leuktra in 371, although it lacked the ability to supplant its rivals’ dominance for long. Yet Persia was instrumental in sending diplomats to urge new settlements, and Artaxerxes’s terms provided a script for each successive effort to restore Greek political
harmony. The steady flow of ambassadors between the leading poleis and the Susa court demonstrated the extension of Achaemenid power and justice to a Greek world otherwise prone to chaos. During the intersatrapal conflicts that plunged Anatolia into turmoil in the 360s, Athens and Sparta occasionally interfered with individual Ionian poleis and the satraps with offshore islands. But such incidents were limited in duration and scale, more similar to the occasional clashes during the Peace of Kallias than the conflicts between 412 and 387. Overall, Persia could view Greek states as beneficiaries of imperial order until the coming of Alexander.
Conclusion

This study began by problematizing the narrative of Persian-Greek relations from 450 to 386 and questioning assumptions about Achaemenid defensive strategy. The traditional interpretation states that after initial loss of the Anatolian Greeks to Athens, Persian rulers shied away from direct confrontation out of cautious respect for Athenian (and later Spartan) military power. Instead, they exploited the Peloponnesian War to retake Ionia and balanced Sparta against Athens to secure it, preventing their Greek allies from growing strong enough for renewed encroachment. This book has laid out a more assertive model, rooted in an ideology of Persian world supremacy that advocated not only defense of a coastal frontier but continuous efforts to extend diplomatic influence beyond the Aegean. Ionia's reclamation was less important to the kings than patronizing the greatest overseas poleis—first Athens, then Sparta—and acquiring gratitude, respect, and profit in return.

Despite Persia’s earlier failure to conquer mainland Greece, the kings did not seek out new Greek conflicts in order to avenge old defeats. Artaxerxes I treated peace with Athens as preferable to war; it was both economically lucrative and illustrative of Persia’s ability to bestow world order. Darius II first agreed to friendship with Athens; however, when provoked, he responded not only by seeking to reclaim Ionia but by seizing a moment for intervention in the larger Greek war. He did not embrace this strategy out of a fear that Persia could not defeat Greek states without Greek assistance but because he sought to win the allegiance of Greece’s leaders and earn credit for ending the inter-Greek conflict. Darius did not have to aid Sparta to reclaim Ionia after Athens’s disaster in Sicily, nor did Artaxerxes II have to send a Persian fleet to the Greek mainland to secure the Anatolian coast after the victory of Knidos.

Persian efforts to resolve Greek conflicts were meant to express universal authority. But competing priorities and instincts for financial conservation inclined Persia’s rulers to treat direct military involvement as a last resort
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and tempered their generosity to Greek clients. There is insufficient evidence to prove that the kings attempted to protect their territory by balancing potential Greek challengers. It appears more likely that their limited resources, exacerbated by their satraps’ financial constraints, political rivalries, and diplomatic missteps, often hindered the application of imperial power. The reluctance to meet the expenses necessary to achieve and maintain Persia’s full naval potential was a notable part of the problem.

Persia’s interventions in the Peloponnesian and Corinthian wars and its struggle with Sparta ended in decisive victories, but only after serious errors and extended delays. Many of these setbacks occurred because imperial agents underestimated the Greek poleis’ stubborn reluctance to accept defeat. The decision to ally with Sparta and the satraps’ financial promises in the winter of 413-12 were grounded in flawed expectations of a rapid Athenian surrender. The result was a lack of sufficient Persian ships and troops to force a decision and a reduction of the Peloponnesian allies’ wages that provoked severe mistrust, made worse by Pharnabazos’s continuing efforts to outbid Tissaphernes. In 411, the latter’s misguided retention of Alkibias, in hopes of securing a negotiated solution with Athens, sparked Ionian and Peloponnesian defiance and the chain reaction that forced Darius to cancel Persia’s planned naval campaign, resulting in the Persians missing an ideal chance for victory. Between 399 and 396, Tissaphernes concluded repeated truces with the Spartans, failing to exploit moments of military advantage, in the faulty belief that threats of force could compel a negotiated settlement. In 392, Tiribazos assumed that negotiation with Sparta alone could end the Greek war, leading him to disregard the wishes of Persia’s Greek clients and to fail to take into account the backlash that might follow the arrest of Athens’s pro-Persian hero Konon. Each of these missteps contributed to the perpetuation of conflict, and none can be attributed to deliberate balancing policies. Rather, they arose from Persian misunderstandings of Greek actors’ complex interests.

The kings’ commitment of additional resources and pragmatic adaptation to circumstances helped to bring about eventual success in 404 and 386. Support for allied naval construction and provision of Ionian ships permitted the resurrection of Peloponnesian fleets after the disasters of Kyzikos and Arginousai, and Darius II and Cyrus dispensed funds essential to Sparta’s victory and Athens’s surrender. When the Spartans challenged Persia after Cyrus’s rebellion, Artaxerxes II sought to negotiate but resorted to more vigorous efforts when necessary, moving naval forces around in order
to thwart their partnership with rebel Egypt and exploiting his fleet’s advantage to coerce Sparta’s acceptance of Persian supremacy. After Tiribazos’s blunder delayed success by alienating the allies, the king finally lent direct naval aid to his Spartan opponents to bring Athens back into line. Both states’ resulting acknowledgment of the king’s right to dictate peace and his qualification to set conditions for future relations between Greek poleis outside his direct control marked a watershed moment in Persia’s Aegean diplomacy, the point at which all the Greeks who mattered accepted membership in a universe ruled from Susa.

Persian kings measured their long-distance influence by acquisition of wealth as well as clients’ cooperation with imperial dictates. The imposition of peace on the Greeks had the side effect of increasing taxable maritime trade between Persia’s eastern Mediterranean subjects and Aegean ports, including but not limited to Piraeus. This relationship provided impetus for the first Artaxerxes’s accommodation with Athens, and it was no accident that Darius’s Peloponnesian War intervention followed wartime decreases in Athens’s economic output. The dismantling of Athens’s archē created new economic partners such as Rhodes, and Persia’s naval victory in the Spartan war benefited the king in part by reopening sea-lanes between the Levant, Rhodes, and the recovering Piraeus. Egypt’s loss must have devastated Persia’s Mediterranean revenues, and the chaos on Rhodes and Cyprus after 392 probably interfered with Phoenicia’s Greek trade. But after the King’s Peace and the reconquest of Cyprus that followed, a booming merchant traffic returned, a lasting benefit of the second Artaxerxes’s efforts to stabilize the Aegean.1

All three kings had other pressing priorities, but this should not deny the Greeks an important place among the empire’s subjects and neighbors. Persian interactions with Athens and Sparta bore consequences for all of the empire’s western provinces, especially due to their implications for efforts to secure Egypt. In the middle of the fifth century, Artaxerxes’s victory over an Athenian-Egyptian alliance made it possible to negotiate an honorable peace with Athens. After the Peloponnesian War, Cyrus’s rebellion, which relied so heavily on Greek recruitment, prevented Artaxerxes II from stopping Egypt’s drive toward independence. Yet the king’s belated naval buildup for Egypt’s reconquest created the resources necessary for victory over Sparta, and Sparta’s Egyptian connections prompted Persia’s decisive naval commitment in the Aegean. This in turn delayed Persia’s Egyptian offensive, and the bungled peace efforts of 392 led to wider instability from
the Aegean to Cyprus that postponed it further. But the King’s Peace severed Athens’s alliances with Euagoras and Egypt, and the return of Greek stability facilitated the Persian reconquest of Cyprus and renewed attempts on the Nile Delta. The achievement of uncontested supremacy over the trans-Aegean Greeks became a precondition for the achievement of greater goals on Persia’s Mediterranean frontiers.

The resolution of the Peloponnesian and Corinthian wars, therefore, deserves a place among Persia’s most significant accomplishments in the late fifth and fourth centuries. It provided a formula for the empire’s subsequent Greek relations, as well as moments of Persian-sponsored reconciliation between major poleis, that lasted fifty years beyond the King’s Peace. The lessons of Persia’s Greek interventions only lost their relevance when displays of naval might and subsidies to overseas clients proved inadequate in the face of a new kind of threat from Alexander’s Macedonia. In closing, one may hope that future studies will devote greater space to these interventions as critical moments in the diplomatic history of Persia, Athens, and Sparta and that historians of later states with aspirations to universal dominance may also benefit from attention to Persia’s interactions with clients at the margins of empire.
Chapter 1 · Achaemenid Persia and the Greeks across the Sea

1. XPh §3; cf. DSe §3, DPe §2. For the Persian terminology, see Seager and Tuplin 1980, 146–49; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2001; Kuhrt 2002, 21; Rollinger 2006a and 2006b; Root 2007, 178–79.


4. For the Oxyrhynchus historian, see Bruce 1967; McKechnie and Kern 1988; Occhipinti 2016. For Ephoros and Diodorus on Persia, see Tuplin 2013b. For Plutarch and Persia, see Binder 2008.

5. See Stevenson 1997; Lenfant 2004; Llewellyn-Jones and Robson 2010; Wiesehöfer, Lanfranchi, and Rollinger 2011.

6. Cf. Barjamovic 2012, 44. For suppression of historical detail in Achaemenid royal inscriptions, see Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1999; Briant 2002, 552–53; Stolper 2005, 22; Rollinger 2014. For diplomatic correspondence from the Achaemenids’ predecessors, see, for example, the archives of Sargon II (Parpola 1987; Parpola and Watanabe 1988; Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990; Fuchs and Parpola 2001).


15. Thuc. 8.87–8.


17. Rawlinson 1875, 509; Olmstead 1948, 369.

18. For the first theory, see Dandamaev 1989, 256; Cawkwell 1997a, 119; Briant 2002, 582; Rung 2008, 32. For the second, see Ryder 1965, 29; Hamilton 1979, 247–48; Keen 1995, 6–7; Cawkwell 2005, 166–67; Ruzicka 2012, 63. For the third, see Hamilton 1979, 307–8; Funke 1980, 149–50n60; Cawkwell 1981, 76; Hornblower 1982, 185; DeVoto 1986, 201; Cartledge 1987,
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26. DNa §2a; DSe §3–4.


31. See Haubold 2012, 12–14; Rollinger 2013; Dusinberre 2013, 49–63.


38. In reality, the seas functioned less as closed borders than as highways for communication, trade, and cultural exchange (Whittaker 1994, 99–101; Parker 2006, 89).
40. Hdt. 1.134.2; cf. Tuplin 2011b, 43.
42. For “expansionist” and “postexpansionist” phases in Achaemenid history, see Wiesehöfer 2007, 13–16, 2009, 66. For a shift to defensive behavior on the Aegean frontier in the later reign of Xerxes or Artaxerxes I, see Balcer 1984, 23–25, 30; Lincoln 2007, 13, 94–96; Ruzicka 2012, 34; cf. Haubold 2012, 17–18.
48. Cf. Thuc. 8.87.5; Hell. Oxy. 22.2.
52. HA Hadr. 5.1–4; see Whittaker 1994, 57; Potter 2013, 331.
57. Lewis 1977, 57; Colburn 2013, 46.

Chapter 2 · Artaxerxes I and the Athenian Peace

2. Hdt. 6.98.3.
3. The bibliography for the Athenian archē is enormous; see among others Meiggs 1972; McGregor 1987; Kallet-Marx 1993; Kallet 2013; Picard 2000; Pébarthe 2008; Morris 2009; and the essays in Low 2008 and Ma, Papazarkadas, and Parker 2009. For debate over whether Athens's hegemony should be termed an “empire,” see Pébarthe 2008 and 2011 (in favor) and Morris 2009 (against). I employ the Greek term “archē” to stress the difference in scale and conception between Athens and the Persian empire, although Athens engaged in “imperialist” behavior (maintaining control over distant, sometimes unwilling subjects from which it extracted resources for its own advantage).


6. The peace is attested in several fourth-century Athenian speeches (Isoc. 4.118–20, 7.80, 12.59; Dem. 15.29, 19.273; Lyc. 1.72–73). The most detailed account, Diod. 12.4.4–6, derives from Ephoros; Plut. Cim. 13.4–6 refers to a treaty text included in Krateros’s third-century document collection. For association with the Persepolis Penelope statue, see Hölsher 2011, 45, 49–53, 57–58.


8. See Meister 1982 for complete bibliographic summary of the anti-peace tradition.


14. For the hypothesis that Diodorus’s source Ephoros might have dated the peace to the 460s and that Diodorus moved it later because he misread Ephoros and confused the Cyprus invasion with the Eurymedon campaign, see Meister 1982, 24–31. But Meister’s theory cannot be proven, and Diodorus’s narrative of events on Cyprus (12.3–4) contains enough significant differences from his account of Eurymedon (11.60–62) (for example, the Persian generals he names as present on Cyprus are not the same as the ones he lists as present at Eurymedon, and he also refers to the occurrence of a major siege in the Cyprus campaign) to undermine the argument; see Cawkwell 2005, 282.


16. For the conflicting evidence for limits on Persian military movement toward the Aegean, see Hall 2014, 64. Isoc. 7.80 and 12.59 set them at the Halys River, but others agree on a distance of one day’s ride (Dem. 19.273; Plut. Cim. 13.4) or three days’ march (Diod. 12.4.5) from the sea. These may allude to Sardis (cf. Hdt. 5.54), but overlook Daskyleion, only twenty miles from the coast. Most sources claim a restriction on naval travel past Phaselis or the nearby Chelidones islands; a similar clause may have named the Kyaneiai islands off the Bosporus, although Persia lacked significant naval infrastructure in the Black Sea. For the possible requirement that Ionian city walls be demolished, see Wade-Gery 1958, 219–20; Lewis 1977, 153;

17. Cf. Seager and Tuplin 1980, 143–45, 152–53; Tuplin 2013b, 666. While *autonomia* was less common before the fourth century (Meister 1982, 70), Hdt. 8.140a is an important exception. Cawkwell 2005, 283–84, proposes the restriction of autonomy to Athenian allies rather than all Anatolian Greeks.


20. For war fatigue and acceptance of the impossibility of naval victory, see Grote 1907, 428; Meyer 1901a, 615–16; Stockton 1959, 71; Eddy 1973, 247; Dandamaev 1989, 251; Badian 1993, 32; Cawkwell 2005, 132–35. For Artaxerxes’s balancing policy, see Dandamaev 1989, 256; Cawkwell 1997a, 119; Briant 2002, 582; Wiesehöfer 2006b, 659; Rung 2008, 32.

21. Lewis 1977, 82.

22. Thuc. 1.112.3–4; Diod. 12.3–4; Plut. *Cim.* 18–19. Isoc. 8.86 reports that Athens lost 200 ships in Egypt and 150 more off Cyprus; the second figure might be a mistake (Green 2006, 242) or evidence of a "Pyrrhic" victory (Blackman 1969, 198; Maier 1994, 309).

23. See Busolt 1897, 357; Eddy 1973, 247–48; Dandamaev 1989, 252; for counterargument, see Cawkwell 1997a, 118n8. For Megabyzos, see Ctes. *FGrH* 688 F14 39–42 with Briant 2002, 577–78. Most scholars date his revolt to the early 440s, since Ctesias §39 places it five years after the fall of Prosopitis in 455/54 (cf. Miller 1997, 21), but Kahn 2008, 428–34, redates Prosopitis to 458/57, which would put Megabyzos’s revolt and reconciliation in the late 450s, before the Cyprus campaign. For Egypt, see Thuc. 1.110.2, 112.3; Hdt. 3.15.3.

24. For Athens’s gradual expansion in Ionia, with the Eurymedon campaign (c. 466) as a decisive factor, see Briant 2002, 555–59; Miller 1997, 12–13; Whitby 1998, 219–21.


26. Hdt. 6.42.2; Thuc. 8.5.5; see Murray 1966, 142–46; Lewis 1977, 87; Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 16–17; Briant 2002, 580. For the theory that some Ionian cities paid a double tribute to the king and Athens, see Cook 1961b, 11; Hornblower 1982, 25; Hornblower 2008, 771; for counterargument, see Murray 1966, 142–46; Badian 1993, 53.


29. ML 30 A 6–12.

30. The Tektaş Burnu ship was transporting wine, pine tar, and Ionian fine ware; its amphorae originated in Erythrai, Chios, and Mende (Carlson 2003; Carlson 2013). For shifts from local to broader Aegean trade networks during the Athenian archē, see Lawall 2013, 112–14. Kyzikos may have been involved in the import and distribution of fine Attic vases, which decreased in most parts of Ionia from circa 475 to 450 but continued at Daskyleion and Gordion (DeVries 1997, 449–50; Slawisch 2013, 197–201).

31. Thuc. 3.31.1, 8.24.3–4, 8.28.3. For Chios’s Aegean trade, see Lawall 2013, 109–10.

32. Hdt. 3.90.1–2; Murray 1966, 149.


34. Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1939, 1949, and 1950; for overview and summary, see Meiggs 1972, 234–54, 540–59. For recent discussions of the methodology of restoration and new interpretations of the evidence, see Kallet 2004; Stroud 2006; Paarman 2007; Constantinopoulou 2013.
38. Constantakopoulou 2013, 29, includes one-talent payers in the “small” category.
39. See Keen 1998a, 248–52, and further discussion on page 34.
42. Cf. Dusinberre 2013, 41.
43. Compare Persian nobles’ sensitivity to any decline in their personal estates (cf. TAD A6.10 8–10).
45. For the Demaratis, see Xen. Hell. 3.1.6; An. 7.8.17; Whitby 1998 identifies a poem of Ion of Chios (fr. 27) as an encomium to the family. Thuc. 1.138.5 estimates Magnesia’s contribution to Themistokles’s income at fifty talents. See Nollé and Wenniger 1998–99, 60; Mauermann 2013, 128.
48. Hdt. 3.90.1; for demographic growth in Achaemenid Lydia, see Roosevelt 2009, 110–12, 195–97, 203. Monson 2015, 175–76, notes that Persian tribute rates were lower than those attested for the Hellenistic and Roman periods.
49. Strabo 13.4 (Xanthos of Lydia, FGrH 765 F 12).
50. Cf. Miller 2011, 331–33; Rose 2013a, 72–73; Dusinberre 2013, 89.
53. Lewis 2016, 317–22, connects the Achaemenid Anatolian slave trade with the movement of other goods between Gordion and the Propontis and notes a late sixth-century inscription (SIG³ 4) attesting Kyzikos’s taxation of slave sales; see also Lewis 2011, 109–10; Dusinberre 2013, 41. For the Babylonian and Idumaean evidence, see Stolper 1989; Lemaire 2015, 115.
54. Hdt. 3.95.
55. For Xerxes’s fleet numbers, see Aesch. Pers. 341–343; Hdt. 7.89.1. For the estimate of approximately six hundred triremes, see Meyer 1901a, 376; Hignett 1963, 93, 345–50. Cawkwell 2005, 260–62, reduces the number to three hundred, but this may be too low to account for storm losses and the battles of Artemision, Salamis, and Mykalæ, as well as a squadron that returned to Phoenicia (Hdt. 9.96.1). Wallinga 2005, 32–46, proposes retaining the higher figure but suggests two-thirds were undermanned and used as replacement vessels.
56. Persian numbers for Eurymedon are infamously problematic. Thucydides refers to the 200 Persian ships lost as the entire fleet (1.100.1); Diodorus mentions a fleet of 340 ships being taken but also refers to 100 ships lost near Cyprus, probably confusing this battle with the campaign of 450 (Diod. 11.60.6, 62.1). Plutarch cites two figures, Ephoros’s 350 ships and Phanodemos’s 600, but keeps the Thucydidean statistic of 200 lost and mentions that some escaped; he also reports the capture of 80 additional Persian triremes shortly after the battle (Cim. 12.5, 13.3). Beloch 1916, 161–62, makes these 80 part of the 200 captured and assumes that they made up the entire fleet, stating that there were only 120 at Eurymedon itself, but this accepts the dubious proposition that no Persian ships escaped either defeat, while it is safer to retain the sources’ emphasis on Persian numerical superiority in the overall cam-
paign. For the participation of three hundred Persian ships in the operations around Egypt and Cyprus, see Ctes. FGrH 688 F14 37; Diod. 11.77.1, 12.3.2.

57. Plut. Cim. 12.2 mentions there were 200 Athenian ships at Eurymedon, while Diod. 11.60.6 refers to 250. Thucydides reports that two hundred sailed to Egypt (1.104.2; cf. Diod. 11.74.3), followed by fifty more (1.110.4); Kimon’s Cyprus campaign also employed two hundred (1.112.2; Diod. 12.3.1), sixty of which were dispatched to Egypt but then later rejoined the fleet (1.112.3). See Gabrielsen 1994, 126–27, for later fifth- and fourth-century fleet figures.


59. Wallinga 1987, 74; Cawkwell 1997a, 125.

60. Diod. 11.3.7, 14.39.1–2; cf. Hdt. 5.32, 6.48; see Wallinga 1987, 53–54. Cawkwell 2005, 257, argues that rather than maintaining a large standing fleet, the Persians augmented fleet size for large campaigns by requisitioning clients’ vessels, and it is not impossible that the Phoenicians exerted partial autonomy in fleet construction; cf. Jigoulov 2010, 215n109. The Great King may have accepted shipbuilding in certain regions as an alternative to tribute payment, which would help to explain the lower rate of Phoenicia’s silver tax compared to that of the other coastal districts in Herodotus’s tribute list (3.90–91); Wallinga 1987, 72, makes a similar guess for provision of rowers.

61. Hdt. 7.96.1; Thuc. 1.100.1, 110.4, 116.3, 8.87.1.


64. On triremes, see Morrison, Coates, and Rankov 2000. For Phoenician triremes, see Basch 1969; Casson 1995b, 94–96; Morrison, Coates, and Rankov 2000, 45; Rankov 2013, 79, 97. On the nonuniformity of the Achaemenid trireme fleet and the likelihood of other regional variants, see Bouzid-Adler 2014, 19–20; Bouzid-Adler 2015, 3–10. On the Kition ship sheds, see McKenzie 2013, 354–57.

65. See Theophr. Hist. Plant. 5.7.1; cf. Morrison, Coates, and Rankov 2000, 179–81. Cilician dockyards also used cedar (Strabo 14.5.3). For the speed of Xerxes’s ships, see Aesch. Pers. 342–43; Hdt. 7.96.1, 8.60a.


68. For papyrus’s naval value, see Hermippus F 63.22 K; cf. Gabrielsen 1994, 140. Murray 1985, 144–50, estimates the cost of bronze rams in late fourth-century Athens at sixty and one-quarter drachmai per talent, with rams varying in weight between eight and eighteen talents. For Cyprus’s copper, see Briant 2002, 400; the Persians extracted tin from mines in Drangiana (Strabo 15.2.10), but its appearance in the Egyptian customs document TAD C3.7 (DV1 10), among goods delivered by “Ionian” ships, suggests a closer source in Anatolia.

69. TAD A6.2 8–21; Kuhrt 2007, 727–29. A cubit equaled approximately 50 centimeters or 1 foot 7.6 inches, and one karsh equaled 84 grams or 2.96 ounces (see Kuhrt 2007, 884, for the metric figures). For the reuse of old materials in naval construction, see Rawlings 2010, 268, who references the fleet of third-century Carthage.

70. On trireme age, see Casson 1995b, 90; Morrison, Coates, and Rankov 2000, 199–200; for exceptions to the rule, see Gabrielsen 1994, 255n26. For “new” ships in Athenian records, see Clark 1990, 57–58; Pritchard 2015, 104–5. On numbered trireme classes, with “first” indicating the highest quality, see Gabrielsen 1994, 129–31.

71. For ship sheds, see Blackman and Rankov 2013; these would have existed in any port housing triremes after the early fifth century (Blackman 2013a, 19). Strabo 14.5.7 implies a concentration of Persian ship sheds in Cilicia (Wallinga 1987, 68; Wallinga 1991), although Kition is the only Achaemenid port in which they have been excavated to date; Blackman 2013b, 574, 584, casts doubt on possible identifications at Kyme and Tyre.

73. Thuc. 1.100.1; Diod. 11.60.6–7, 62.1; Plut. Cim. 12.6, 13.3–4; cf. Keen, 1998a, 100. Wallinga 1987, 73, speculates that many were transports rather than combat vessels, a common use for triremes that had been in service for fifteen or more years (Morrison, Coates, and Rankov 2000, 153), but Thucydides does distinguish between transports and warships (1.116.1).

74. Diod. 11.62.2, 71.2, 71.6. Ctes. FGrH 688 F14 36 reports that Achaemenes’s unsuccessful invasion of Egypt, preceding Megabyzos’s reconquest, employed eighty ships, fifty of which were lost; a Samian inscription (ML 34) records the capture of fifteen Phoenician ships.

75. Thuc. 1.110.4; Ctes. FGrH 688 F14 37; Diod. 11.77.1.

76. Diod. 12.3.3. Cawkwell 2005, 134–35, speculates that many of the lost ships were transports, but the need to ferry soldiers to Cyprus did not preclude trireme combat.

77. The Athenians augmented fleet numbers with captured triremes (Gabrielsen 1994, 131), but the Persians lacked this option despite their Egyptian victory; Diod. 11.77.3 claims the Athenians burned their ships before surrender, and Thuc. 1.110.4 reports the destruction rather than capture of an Athenian squadron.


79. Hdt. 7.184.1, 8.17. It is doubtful that triremes often went to sea with severely undermanned crews, contra Wallinga 1982 and Wallinga 1987, 70–71; see Gabrielsen 1994, 108–10; Morrison, Coates, and Rankov 2000, 107–8. But Jordan 2000, 81–84, argues that Herodotus’s 200-man figure should include extra marines and therefore less than 160 rowers. The Kition evidence for triremes that were 20 percent shorter than Athenian models seems conducive to the idea of a smaller number of rowers, perhaps 140 instead of 170.


81. Hdt. 7.97, 8.97.1; Diod. 16.40.6.

82. Hell. Oxy. 22.3; Diod. 14.81.6.

83. See for example PT 25 (Cameron 1948, 125–26), which happens to be contemporary with Xerxes’s invasion of Greece.


85. For early Greek naval wages, see Van Wees 2010, 220–26; Aperghis 2013, 8–9. Pay scales are difficult to establish before the Peloponnesian War; for the plausibility of a three-obol wage in the mid-fifth century, see Meiggs 1972, 427; cf. Pritchett 1974a, 23–24. Figuereira 1998, 181–83, connects midcentury campaigns with the increase in Athenian minting.


87. Cf. Markoe 2000, 98. For compulsory labor as tax in Persian Idumaea, see Lemaire 2015, 116. Punic Carthage preferred to hire mercenary rowers but did draft them in emergencies (Polyb. 1.64.1); see Rawlings 2010, 270–72.

88. For the Babylonian system, see Jursa 2015, 351–53, 381–84; Jursa and Moreno Garcia 2015, 134–36; Jursa and Waarzeggers 2009, 246–53, 255–58. The Ottomans conscripted naval crews through a similar tax, requiring each unit of twenty-three households to provide a rower and cover his wages (Imber 1980, 221, 265–67).


90. Wallinga 1987, 74.
92. Sidon’s groups I–II, contemporary with the later reign of Artaxerxes I, depict a galley with sails partially and then fully furled; group III, issued in the reign of Darius II, shows a warship without its mast under Sidon’s city walls. Elayi and Elayi 2004, 471–93 and 623–27, interpret the images as evidence for a fleet’s continuing presence (cf. Cawkwell 2005, 256), but they cannot speak to its size. Tyre’s coins do not depict ships, but Byblos’ group III, contemporary with Sidon’s, bears a warship with three helmeted marines on deck (Elayi and Elayi 2014, 27–31, 100–101). For galleys on Arwad’s coinage, see Jigoulov 2010, 76.
95. Cf. Andoc. 2.20–21; Diod. 15.3.1; see Meiggs 1972, 267–68; Scheidel 2011, 24–29; Rutishauser 2012, 101.
99. TAD C3.7 DV1 2–3.
103. Cf. Monson 2015, 175–76.
105. Hdt. 3.91.1. For Athens as Phoenician silver source, see Elayi and Elayi 2004, 619–20. Van Alfen 2002, 196–97, argues that reminting did not prompt deliberate import of Athenian owls, although some may have been used for that purpose.
106. For suspicions that Artaxerxes was responsible for the murder, which is attributed to “the King’s son” by the Babylonian text BM 32234, see Wiesehöfer 2007, 5–6; cf. Briant 2002, 566–67. Evidence is lacking for a direct connection between the assassination and Xerxes’ Greek defeats (Briant 2002, 542; Wiesehöfer 2007, 10–12, 16–17), but it is not impossible that they increased the king’s vulnerability within his court and inner family circle.
107. Isoc. 4.117–18; Diod. 12.4.2–4.
108. Grote 1907, 219; Rawlinson 1875, 506; Sykes 1915, 230.

116. Diod. 12.4.5.

117. See Mattern 1999, 172–73, for the Roman view of the reception of foreign embassies as a display of imperial supremacy (i.e., RGDA 31–32).


119. Dem 19.273; see Miller 1997, 190, for the peacocks of Pyrilampes, an Athenian envoy to Persia in the 430s (Plut. Per. 13.10, Plato Charm. 158a), as a royal gift.

120. DB §8, 63; DNB §2c.


123. Hdt. 8.140a.1–2; cf. Harrison 2011a, 68. Although the Athenians rejected the offer, the fact that it was made supports the idea that real negotiations at a later date would have included similar provisions.


126. DSf §9–12.


129. ML 40 (IG i² 10) 27. Meiggs 1972, 112–15, dates the text to the 450s, but see Papazarakadas 2009, 78, for a possible 420s context. For land grants to fugitives without prior cooperation, see Thuc. 5.1; Diod. 13.104.6. An inscription from Teos, threatening punishment against those who conspire with Greeks or Barbarians against the citizens (ML 30 B 23–27), is usually dated to between 470 and 450 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 65–66; Hermann 1981, 3–6; Vouni 2007, 730).


131. Pissouthnês’s father, Hystaspes, was probably a brother of Xerxes (cf. Hdt. 7.65.2: Lewis 1977, 55; Rung 2012, 26) or, alternatively, a brother of Artaxerxes (cf. Diod. 11.69.2: Klinkott 2005, 56).

132. Thuc 1.115.2–4; the typical figure of 15 marines per trireme would give 560 if the fleet left its entire complement behind.

133. Plut. Per. 25.2; the sum is equivalent to thirty-three and one-third talents (cf. Stadter 1989, 245). The way Pissouthnês dealt with the Athenians here might bear comparison with the way Pharnabazos dealt with the Athenians at Chalkedon in 408 (Xen. Hell. 1.3.8).

134. Thuc. 1.115.4–5. Thucydides calls the soldiers mercenaries (epikouroi) but does not specify their origin or whether Pissouthnês paid them (cf. Lewis 1977, 59n65; Hornblower 1991, 190). It is unclear whether they remained at Samos for the siege or returned to Pissouthnês with the prisoners.

135. Thuc. 1.116.1–2, 117.2; IG I' 363; cf. Meiggs 1972, 192; Stadter 1989, 256.

136. Thuc. 1.116.3. Diod. 12.27.4 and Plut. Per. 26.1 claim that they sailed, but they may infer a voyage from Thucydides’s account.

137. Badian 1993, 32.


141. Thuc. 1.113.3; cf. Lendon 2010, 85.
143. Strabo 1.3.1 (Damastes FGrH 5 F 8); cf. Miller 1997, 23–24, 117.
144. Cf. Lewis 1977, 607n70; Badian 1993, 39. For Anaia, see Thuc. 3.19.2, 3.32.2, 4.75.1.

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4. Thuc. 3.34.1–2; cf. Lewis 1977, 61–62; Debold 1999, 119.
8. TL 44 a 44–45; Thuc. 2.69.1–2. The Xanthos stele (TL 44 in Kalinka 1901) celebrates the achievements of the west Lycian ruler Kheriga and his family and allies (for debates over authorship and context, see Childs 1979, 100–102; Keen 1998a, 129–31; Gygax and Tietz 2005, 95–96). For Kheriga’s connection with the Lycian-Athenean battle, won by a certain Trbben-imii, see Keen 1998a, 132–34; Thonemann 2009, 176, 180–81. Lines 36–37 refer to “combined cavalry both Lycian and Median” (“esbedi hemenedi trîmî[m]îldi se medezedi”), but the battle account makes no reference to a Persian presence (cf. Briant 2002, 583).
9. TL 44 a 51–55, c 46–49; Thuc. 3.19.1–2; see Schürr 1998, 152–54; Thonemann 2009, 175–80. Other studies interpret Amorges, named in the accusative, as the direct object of the infinitive “to attack” (“ese . . .  tabãna”) and connect the passage with his defeat at Iasos in 412; see Keen 1998a, 136–37; Cau 1999, 27. But Thonemann reinterprets the syntax to make Amorges the subject of the crucial clause, ordered by the Kaunian governor to attack the enemy. Hystaspes was also the name of Pissouthnes’s father, and Amorges’s “bastard” status (Thuc. 8.5.5) should indicate the existence of a “legitimate” heir familiar to the Greeks; cf. Schürr 1998, 156. Thonemann 2009, 177–79, makes this Hystaspes a karanos in charge of the entire Anatolian seaboard, but translation of “haxlaza” as “satrapal deputy” corresponds better with the term’s other occurrence in the Letoon trilingual (N320). It is unclear why a district governor would have overseen operations near Magnesia, but the Athenians may have threatened Kaunos before sailing north to the mouth of the Maeander, prompting the Persian official in southern Caria to warn his northern counterpart.
12. See ATL 2 A9.98; the Lycians and several Carian locations were assessed in the same year, although payment was not in fact recovered (Keen 1998a, 134). Kaunos appears on a payment list for 421/20 (ATL 2 list 34 II.11), but the amount is not known; its return might have resulted from the Peace of Epilykos.
14. Thuc. 3.31–33.
17. Thuc. 2.67.1.
18. Thuc. 4.75.1–2; contrast Pharnabazos’s harassment of the returning Cyreian mercenaries in 401 (Xen. An. 6.4.24–6.5.32). Just. 16.3.9–12 claims that Lamachos’s expedition was prompted by Herakleia’s friendship for the king and refusal to pay tribute but that Herakleia conciliated the Athenians with supplies for their march.
19. Thuc. 5.1.
20. Thuc. 2.48.1.
21. Thuc. 2.67.4, 2.69.1; the reference to protection of trade with Phaselis and Phoinike may refer to the port of east Lycian Limyra rather than Phoenicia (Dickinson 1979; Hornblower 1991, 355–56; Keen 1993, 152n.6; Keen 1998a, 225–27). Some of the “pirates” may have been Lycian rather than Peloponnesian (Keen 1998a, 127). Figueira 1998, 515, argues that the flow of tetradrachms to Persian territories decreased in proportion to Athens’s rising military costs.
23. Thuc. 4.53.3.
24. Hdt. 7.137.2–3; Thuc. 2.67.1–4, 4.50.2. Also relevant are Ar. Ach. 61–125, in which Athenian envoys recount their journey to the king and produce a fraudulent Persian diplomat who comically rejects Athens’s requests for money, and 646–51, which imagines a royal interrogation of a Spartan ambassador to find out which city was the greatest naval power (cf. Lewis 1977, 64n93; Lewis 1992, 421).
26. Thuc. 4.50.1–2; cf. Lewis 1977, 212.
27. See Cawkwell 2005, 142–43; cf. Meiggs 1972, 329–30. It is unclear whether the king would have been aware of the Athenian tribute claim if no enforcement was attempted; for the 425 reassessment’s limited effectiveness, see Kallet-Marx 1993, 164–70. Against Artaxerxes’s willingness to intervene, see Lewis 1977, 67; Hornblower 1996, 208–9.
28. Cf. Lewis 1977, 2. Maybe Persians knew of Chalkidian resistance to Athens (Thuc. 2.79, 4.7) or hoped to gain cooperation from Perdikkas of Macedonia, but Odrysian Thrace remained Athens’s ally and most north Aegean poleis its subjects before Brasidas’s 424–22 campaign.
29. Thuc. 4.503. For Artaxerxes’s death in November or December 424, see Stolper 1983, 227, 231; Stolper 1985, 117–20. Depuydt 1995, 86–9, 94–95, moves it back to February 424, trying to rescue Thucydides’s suggestion that the Athenian embassy set out soon after Artaphernes’s capture by dismissing Babylonian references to Artaxerxes’s forty-first year as a “chronological fiction,” but Thucydides’s “afterward” (“hysteron”) does not require such a precise time frame and Stolper’s dating remains preferable.
31. Harris 2000 denounces On the Peace as a Hellenistic forgery, but Edwards 1995, 107–8, makes a persuasive case for authenticity; cf. Ueno 2008. Thucydides’s silence undermines Harris’s claim that “Pseudo-Andokides” reworked events from historical texts; it is unclear how Epilykos’s involvement in an otherwise unattested treaty would have occurred to the
forger under such circumstances. For Andokides’s treatment of historical events, see Thomas 1989, 119–23; Missiou 1992, 59.

32. IG I³ 227 (ML 70) with SEG xxxii 10 (Walbank 1983).


34. Cf. Diod. 12.4.5; Thuc. 4.50.2.

35. It is often dated to 424/23, because it correlates with when Eephykos and two Athenians named in the Herakleides decree, Neokleides and Thoukydides (not the historian), held office; see Wade-Gery 1958, 207–11; Andrewes 1961, 3–4; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 202–3; Meiggs 1972, 330; Lewis 1977, 76–77; Lewis 1992, 422n132; Cawkwell 2005, 144; Rhodes 2008, 13; Rung 2008, 35; Munson 2012, 258. But if the decree is connected to a preliminary Persian mission to Athens, the date of the agreement may be moved one or two years later (cf. Thompson 1971, 120–24; Blamire 1975, 24–26; Descat 1991, 35; Miller 1997, 26). Less plausible is Raubitschek 1964, 156–57, putting it as late as 415.


39. Cf. Diod. 12.71.2. For elision between administrators’ rivalries and “rebellion,” see Weiskopf 1989, 18; Briant 2002, 674–75; Rop 2013, 150n38.

40. Pissouthnes’s ambitions are sometimes linked to Darius’s bastardy (cf. Lewis 1977, 78–80; Petif 1981, 11; Lenfant 2004, 272; Waters 2010, 823). But the nothos label affixed to Darius II and Amorges, both sons of lesser wives or concubines, may reflect a Greek concept of illegitimacy foreign to the world of Achaemenid elite polygamy; see Llewellyn-Jones 2012, 341. Brosius 1996, 32–33, retains a distinction between children of legitimate wives and of concubines, but notes the breakdown of this “ideal” in succession disputes; cf. Bigwood 2009, 324n77, 331n116.

41. Cf. Diod. 12.71.2. For elision between administrators’ rivalries and “rebellion,” see Weiskopf 1989, 18; Briant 2002, 674–75; Rop 2013, 150n38.


44. See Andrewes 1961, 4110; Amit 1975, 45; Westlake 1977, 321n8; Cawkwell 2005, 145n6.  
45. Andoc. 3.29; cf. Thuc 8.54.3. It is unclear whether Athens’s friendship with Amorges entailed provision of money, soldiers, or mere verbal assurances of collaboration. Several scholars connect Amorges with an Athenian general’s presence at Ephesos in 414 (ML 77 79); see Wade-Gery 1958, 222–23; Andrewes 1961, 5; Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 236; Lewis 1977, 86n17; Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 17; Andrewes 1992, 465; Hornblower 2008, 769. But Persian contacts were not the only conceivable reason for a visit to Ionia; see Westlake 1977, 322–23; D. Kagan 1987, 30; Thonemann 2009, 187n58. For speculation that Athens was retaliating for an unattested Persian provocation, see Nöldeke 1887, 58; Beloch 1914, 378; Westlake 1977, 328–29; D. Kagan 1987, 31–32; Munn 2000, 128; Rood 1999, 154; Heitsch 2007, 30n28.  
47. For Athens’s support of Amorges as royal motivation, see note 1 above. For Sicily as the primary factor, see Rawlinson 1875, 508; Nöldeke 1887, 59; Grote 1907, 197; Westlake 1977, 328; Petit 1981, 26; D. Kagan 1987, 32; Dandamaev 1989, 260; Keen 1998c, 99; Lazenby 2004, 50, 172–73; Ruzicka 2012, 36.  
49. Thuc. 8.5.5. Westlake 1985b, 45, assumes that Tissaphernes acted on his own, but for the necessity of royal authorization for major satrapal decisions, see Lewis 1977, 58; Waters 2010, 820–24; Cawkwell 2005, 147–49. D. Kagan 1987, 32, suggests that the urgency of the Sicilian news might have heightened the pace of Persian communication.  
50. See Colburn 2013, 46; cf. Lewis 1977, 57. In 396, Tissaphernes allowed three months for receipt of a royal response, but that was because he knew the king was deliberately delaying his reply (Xen. Ages. 1.10).  
51. Thuc. 6.91.7, 7.273–5; cf. Xen. Por. 4.25. Figueira 1998, 228–29, 508, connects the Athenian slaves who fled to Dekeleia with the decline of the Laureion work force; Hornblower 2008, 591–92, remains cautious. Figueira also connects the disappearance of Athenian silver with the rise of pseudo-tetradrachms in Egypt and the Levant (535), but Van Alfen 2011b, 84–85, interprets most imitations as fourth-century issues unrelated to the Dekeleian War.  
52. Thuc. 7.28.4; Kallet 2001, 242151.  
53. Thucydides uses “neōsti” eleven times but only once to describe events several years in the past (6.12.1). At 1.95.1 and 7.33.5, it refers back at most one to two years. Five occurrences refer back months or weeks (1.103.3; 3.30.2; 4.50.3; 4.108.5; 7.1.4). In 1.137.4 and 8.5.5 (Tissaphernes’s and Darius’s tribute order), comparison suggests a very short time frame as well; cf. Hornblower 2008, 771.  
54. Thuc. 8.5.5.  
55. Thuc. 8.6; cf. Lewis 1977, 87.  
56. Darius was entitled to claim all the tribute owed for the ten years since the beginning of his reign (cf. Hdt. 6.59); based on the estimate of between 140 and 168 talents postulated in chapter 2 for Persia’s annual tribute loss, the total now demanded might have come to about fifteen hundred talents. But Murray 1966, 148–49, argues that the king only asked for arrears postdating the satraps’ assumption of office rather than imposing heavy fees on successful subordinates. In this case, Tissaphernes would have been responsible for collecting tribute arrears for between one and eight years, and Pharnabazos would have been responsible for only one year’s amount.  
57. Cf. Westlake 1985b, 45; Briant 2002, 594. For the garrison system, see Tuplin 1987c; Dusinberre 2013, 85–113; Lee 2016b.  
58. For Darius’s frugality, see Thuc. 8.46.2, 8.87.5; cf. Briant 2002, 595–96.  
59. Thuc. 8.5.5, 8.6.
60. Cf. Waters 2014a, 173.
61. Ctes. FGrH 688 F 15 53; Thuc. 8.5.4; cf. Lewis 1977, 87; Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 13–16; Debord 1999, 121–22; Hornblower 2008, 766–68. Tissaphernes’s military title was probably karanos (the equivalent of general); rather than having a fixed territorial command, he would have had powers defined by the king for the duration of the mission (Rung 2015b, 340–44). Parmises is otherwise unknown; for Spithridates, see note 69 below.
62. See Ctes. FGrH 688 F 14 38; Tuplin 2013a, 8–10.
63. The phrase “his son” (“tideimi ehbi,” TL 44 c 16), appears in a fragmentary passage shortly after three references to Tissaphernes (c 11, 14, 15), in a context of reciprocal honors between Persians and Lycian rulers (see pages 59–60).
66. On the other Hydarnids, see Ctes. FGrH 688 F 15 55–56. For skepticism on the identification of Tissaphernes’s family, see Cook 1983, 167; Westlake 1985b, 43n6; Debord 1999, 120n38.
67. Cf. Rung 2012, 27. Tissaphernes’s name was shared by a Persepolis sub-treasurer in 443 (Bowman 1970, nos. 50, 53); it also appears on PFS 36*, a cylinder seal decorated with the image of a four-winged hero wrestling two monstrous bulls and standing on two others, attested on more than two dozen Persepolis Fortification tablets between 504 and 500 (Garrison and Root 2001, 71–72; cf. Jones 1999).
68. Pharnakes’s death occurred between early 414, the date of Aristophanes’s Birds, and the winter of 413-12. Xen. Hell. 4.1.31 makes Pharnabazos older than Agesilaos, who was born around 440; his birth date should not fall much earlier than between 450 and 445, given his command of an Egyptian campaign as late as 373.
69. Spithridates may have been their deputy, given his later service under Pharnabazos (Xen. An. 6.5.7; Hell. 3.4.10; Ages. 3.2–3); cf. Lenfant 2004, 273.
70. Weiskopf 1989, 27, makes Pharnabazos the father of Ariobarzanes, his successor as satrap. If Ariobarzanes was the same man who appears in Xen. Hell. 1.4.7, he was old enough to represent Pharnabazos by 407, but see Debord 1999, 97–103, for alternative identifications.
71. Thuc. 8.58.1.
72. Cf. Lewis 1977, 86; Debord 1999, 122; Cawkwell 2005, 153; Hornblower 2008, 774. Rung 2015b, 345, suggests that Pharnabazos was also a karanos as well as satrap.
74. Belshunu’s appointment took place between 414 and 407; see Stolper 1987 and 1990.
77. Cf. Thuc. 8.9.3.
78. Thuc. 8.45.5.
79. Thuc 8.45.4–5 contrasts the Chians with Persia’s Ionian tributaries; for Chios’s naval contributions to Athens’s Sicilian expedition, see 6.43, 7.20.2, 7.57.4.
80. Cf. Thuc. 8.45.3.
82. Thuc. 8.8.1.
83. Cf. Thuc. 8.45.6.
84. Thuc. 8.3.2, 8.6.4; cf. Hornblower 2008, 798–99. It is unclear whether Tissaphernes agreed to pay the Chian fleet as well; 8.45.4 might imply that he did not.
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2. Olmstead 1948, 358.

3. Thucydides admits to reconstructing Tissaphernes’s thoughts from his actions (8.46.5, 8.56.3); see Kallet 2001, 242–43; Heitsch 2007, 31; Hyland 2007, 8; Munson 2012, 265–66, 270–72. Alkibiades or his close associates are sometimes viewed as Thucydides’s principal sources on Tissaphernes (Brunt 1952; Lateiner 1976, 275), but he separates Alkibiades’s claims to influence from the reality of the satrap’s self-interest (Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 94; Westlake 1985a, 95–99; Gribble 1999, 200–202; Hyland 2007, 8). Westlake 1985b, 51–54, makes Thucydides vacillate on Tissaphernes’s diplomatic ability or incompetence, crediting Peloponnesian informants for his more critical passages.

4. Cf. Thuc. 8.7; for the date, see Busolt 1904, 1422n3.

5. See Lee 2016b, 266; cf. Westlake 1979, 10.

6. Thuc. 8.25.2; cf. Petit 1981, 37–38. For typical satrapal cavalry numbers, see Xen. An. 1.1.4, 1.8.6; Hell. 4.1.17.

7. Cf. Westlake 1979, 35; Debdor 1999, 210; Lee 2016b, 266.


9. Thuc. 18.73.


14. Thuc. 8.18.2.


16. Thuc. 8.18.3.


20. Thuc. 8.20.2.


22. For Ephesos’s revolt by this date, see Lewis 1977, 90n37; Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 43; Hornblower 2008, 805.


27. Thuc. 8.20.2; cf. Westlake 1979, 12.


30. Thuc. 8.19.2; 8.28.5, 32.2.

31. See Rung 2012, 28. Athens employed Arkadian mercenaries in Sicily (Thuc. 7.57.9), and might have transported others to Amorgos.
32. Thuc. 8.28.2.
34. Xen. Hell. 3.4.12.
35. On the Tralles-Idyma road, see Hornblower 1982, 2–4. The route to Mylasa branches off at Stratonikeia; it might have been possible, although more difficult, to move via Labraunda (cf. Hdt. 5.119–20).
36. Thuc. 8.28.1–4. Amorges may have outnumbered the Peloponnesians’ marine contingents, and Tissaphernes brought his army at least as far as Teichioussa, within a day’s march of Iasos. But if Thonemann 2009 is correct to redate the events of TL 44a 51–55 to the 420s, the Xanthos stele’s combat narrative and Kheriga’s aristeia over Arkadian hoplites (TL 44c 29) do not refer to Tissaphernes’s use of Lycian troops at Iasos (contra Meiggs and Lewis 1969, 283; Keen 1998a, 136–37; Debord 1999, 210).
37. Thuc. 8.28.3.
39. ML 79A (241–42, 247); one might also compare slave prices in fifth-century Babylonia (see for example Kuhrt 2007, 762, 846–47).
41. Xen. Hell. 3.4.12; cf. Hell. Oxy. 22.3.
42. Amit 1975, 57–58, suggests that Tissaphernes protected Iasos by paying the Spartans to allow its residents to remain in the city, but given that Thucydides describes them as “andrapiподоби,” or “captives” (8.28), benevolent intent on Tissaphernes’s part does not seem likely; see Gaca 2010 for the inherent violence of an andrapodismos.
43. Thuc. 8.29.1; cf. Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 70.
44. This might provide context for the rise of Hyssaldomos of Mylasa, the father of the future satrap Hekatommos; cf. Debord 1999, 134.
45. Thuc. 8.35.1; cf. Debord 1999, 210. Kyme, Ephesos, Miletos, and Erythrai were already in Persian hands; Teos preferred neutrality but its unwalled state would have impeded its ability to resist paying tribute (cf. Westlake 1979, 12–14; Petit 1981, 51; Debord 1999, 205–6).
46. Thuc. 8.39.3–4, 57.1; TL 44 c 2. The Xanthos dynasts may have ruled Kaunos by 411 (Konuk 2008, 194).
48. Keen 1998a, 137, argues that Tissaphernes struck the coins for Lycian mercenaries, but their issue was more likely the prerogative of the Xanthos dynast (see Alram 2012, 75). Hurter 1979, 100–101, suggests an early fourth-century date based on stylistic comparison with other coins in the same hoard, but gives insufficient evidence to rule out an Ionian War context (cf. Thonemann 2009, 180). The goddess’s image shares a die link with other Lycian issues, but the equestrian motif, unique in Lycian coinage, was popular elsewhere in Persian Anatolia; cf. Sevinç et al. 2001; Ma 2008; Roosevelt 2009, 160–61.
50. For the date, see Busolt 1904, 1436.
51. See Hatzfeld 1951, 225.
52. Thuc. 8.17.2.
53. Thuc. 8.45–46.
55. Thuc. 8.29.1. Lazenby 2004, 255, claims that Tissaphernes “delayed his first pay-out for almost a year,” but it was the Peloponnesians who arrived late, and there is no evidence that the payment at Miletos was tardy.
56. Thuc. 8.29.1; cf. 8.45.2. See Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 97; Cook 1990, 81 (contra Pritchett 1974a, 23–24). Cook 1990, 87, argues that three obols a day was a minimum wage, sufficient to support an individual but not dependents.

57. Thuc. 8.29.2; cf. Xen. Hell. 1.5.4–7; see Busolt 1904, 1436; David 1979–80, 32n6; Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 70–72; Kallet 2001, 254n83; Hornblower 2008, 836–38. Alternative readings by Pernée 1980 and Pearson 1985 are unconvincing. Thuc. 8.45.3 alleges Tissaphernes’s bribery of allied generals to secure complicity, but there is insufficient cause to view the entire additional sum in this light (contra Thompson 1965).

58. Thuc. 8.45.2–3; the passage appears in a “flashback” from early 411 to Alkibiades’s arrival at Tissaphernes’s court. Because the passage does not refer to Hermokrates’s wage compromise, many scholars associate it with a separate reduction of pay that perhaps canceled the original concession (Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 95–97; Andrewes 1992, 469; Rood 1998, 265; Lazenby 2004, 179; Hornblower 2008, 887; Rhodes 2011, 60). Yet Thucydides might have chosen not to repeat the minutiae of changes in the wage reduction plan, which would have distracted his audience from his digression on Alkibiades. It is preferable to take 8.45.2 as an abridged retelling of 8.29.1 (Meyer 1901b, 569; Busolt 1904, 1438n1; Hatzfeld 1951, 226n5; D. Kagan 1987, 73n16; Kallet 2001, 261; Heitsch 2007, 73).

59. Thuc. 8.45.6.


61. Hell. Oxy. 22.3; cf. Westlake 1985b, 48; Lewis 1989, 231–32. Figueira 1998, 516, hypothesizes that Persian officials bought Attic drachmai with gold bullion to facilitate the subsidies. Imitation tetradrachms, sporting the Athenian owl but stamped BAS instead of ATHE, may have been issued on royal authority in this period (Alram 2012, 72), but a fourth-century date is more likely (Figueira 1998, 534; Harrison 2002, 303; Van Alfen 2011b, 74–75). There is no justification for the identification of the unlabeled tiarate head on the obverse as Tissaphernes (contra Robinson 1948); see chapter 3, note 15.

62. Cf. Thuc. 8.2.1–2, 24.5; see D. Kagan 1987, 74.

63. See table 2.2.

64. Thuc. 8.23.1, 33.1, 35.1, 36, 39.1–4.

65. Fifty-five talents (November) plus 78 (December) plus 94 (January–September) equals 979.

66. Cf. Thuc. 8.45.5; Hdt. 3.90.3, 91.3; Wiesehöfer 2006b, 662–63n23.

67. Thuc. 8.44.2: the figure combines the numbers in the text, adding up to 105, minus 6 lost at Triopion (8.35.3) and 3 at Syme (8.42.3). Twelve months times 94 talents equals 1,128 talents.


69. Thuc. 8.36.2.

70. Thuc. 8.37.1; cf. Lévy 1983, 227; Debord 1999, 231n78. See Waters 2016, 95n8, for Assyrian precedents.


74. Lévy 1983, 234.

75. Thuc. 8.37.5. For the spondai as a formal end to Spartan-Persian hostilities dating back to Xerxes’s invasion, see Amit 1974; Lewis 1977, 93; for counterargument see Lévy 1983, 228n71. Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 80, compares the terms of the spondai to the Peace of Nikias (Thuc. 5.18.4), but similar terminology is absent from the Spartan-Athenian alliance of 421 (5.23) and the Spartan-Argive alliance of 418 (5.79).

76. 8.37.5 contains awkward phrasing (“if any of the cities with which the King has made agreements attack the King’s country.”) Several scholars believe it refers to the Ionians, re-
quiring the Spartans to oppose them in the event of revolt (Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 81; Heitsch 2007, 62–63; Hornblower 2008, 856–57), but this might have been put more simply, and it is improbable that Darius made treaties with poleis he claimed to own. The passage more likely refers to Sparta’s allies and Chios, also classified as a royal ally rather than a subject.

81. Thuc. 8.45.4–5.
83. Cf. Heitsch 2007, 60–61. Lewis 1977, 93n51, doubts that the treaty required the Spartans to renounce Milesian donations in light of the call for Ionians to contribute to their own defense (Thuc. 8.45.5), but Tissaphernes probably regarded himself as the recipient of such offerings.
84. Cf. Thuc 8.29.1, 8.45.6; Wiesehöfer 2006b, 662n22.
86. Thuc. 8.46.1.
88. This may be reflected in the addition of trireme iconography to Byblos’s coinage (c. 430–20); cf. Elayi and Elayi 2009, 99–102.
89. Thuc. 8.35.1–2. Knidos’s location is controversial; the most persuasive arguments place it in modern Burgaz and locate Tripion in Tekir, on the western tip of the Carian Chersonese, to which the polis relocated in the later part of the fourth century (Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 1123–25; Hornblower 2008, 849–51).
91. See Hyland, forthcoming.
93. Thuc. 8.50.3; cf. Lee 2016b, 269.
94. Thuc. 8.47.2.
95. Thuc. 8.48.1.
96. Thuc. 8.45.2, 46.5.
98. Thuc. 8.48–49.
99. Thuc. 8.53.1. For the date see Avery 1999, 140–45; Nývlt 2014, 45–46.
100. Thuc. 8.50.1–3; see Westlake 1985b, 50n.31; Falkner 1999, 212–13; Hornblower 2008, 904.
102. For the date, see Avery 1999, 128; Nývlt 2014, 44.
103. Thuc. 8.39–43.
104. Thuc. 8.43.2–4, 44.1–4.
105. Thuc. 8.52.
111. Thuc. 8.54.4. For the date, see Avery 1999, 145; Nývlt 2014, 45–46. For the location as Magnesia, see Busolt 1904, 1471; D. Kagan 1987, 135; Heitsch 2007, 89. Lewis 1977, 103n77, suggests a site in Caria.
112. Thuc. 8.56.4; the clause may allude to Persian naval restraint in the Peace of Kallias. Despite a variation on the possessive pronoun in Thucydides’s manuscript C, it is best to keep the more common reading “heautou,” giving “his” (the king’s) coast, rather than “heautōn,” “their” (the Athenians’) coast; see Lewis 1977, 101n74; Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 134–35; D. Kagan 1987, 137n23; Hornblower 2008, 924; contra Goldstein 1974, 160–62. Meister 1982, 55, notes that “paraplein” means “to sail beyond,” not just “along” the Persian coastline.
114. Nývlt 2014, 55, puts the Knidos meeting in late January and Persian-Athenian talks in early March.
117. Cf. DNB §2g.
122. For the chronology, see Avery 1999, 146; Nývlt 2014, 51.
123. Cf. Lee 2016b, 273n41, on cavalry patrols as displays of imperial power.
124. Cf. Polyaen. 7.16.1; Xen. An. 1.1.3.
125. ADAB C1 (Naveh and Shaked 2012, 175–85).
126. TL 44c 1–4 refers to “Tissaphernes, son of Hydarnes, and the Persian at Kaunos” (“zisaprínajje widrínajje tideimi se parzza xbide”), and the conflict between the Spartans and Athenians (“se sp[art]ali][jahe trbbi atānas zxxāte terñ”), before stating, “I became a maraza for them.” Melchert 1993, 32–34, translates “maraza” as “judge,” producing a claim to have acted as arbiter between the Persians and Spartans; he proposes a connection between the stelai erected at Hytenna and Kaunos (c 5–8) and the 411 negotiations. But Neumann 2007, 195, interprets it as “Befehlshaber;” for other alternatives, see Raimond 2004, 391–93. The dedication of the stelai to the Anatolian deities Maliya and King of Kaunos raises doubts about their recording of a Spartan-Persian agreement; they more likely accompanied a pact between Tissaphernes and the Xanthos rulers.
127. Thuc. 8.44, 57.1; see Meyer 1901b, 571; Busolt 1904, 1450; Lewis 1977, 103; Lazenby 2004, 183.
128. Thucydides describes the negotiations as taking place at Kaunos (8.57.1) but then has both sides conclude a treaty in the Maeander valley (8.58.1); see Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 138–39; Hornblower 2008, 927. Contra Erbse 1988, 60–62, and Debord 1999, 213, the best explanation remains the suggestion that there was an initial negotiation at Kaunos and ratification ceremony near Magnesia (Westlake 1979, 23; Lévy 1983, 225; Cawkwell 2005, 148; Nývlt 2014, 49–53).
130. Thuc. 8.58.1.
Chapter 5  •  The King’s Navy and the Failure of Satrapal Intervention

1. Thuc. 8.59, 78, 87.4.
3. Cf. Lewis 1977, 132n140. For Aspendos’s ties with Cilicia, see Xen. An. 1.2.12. Some scholars link the 411 fleet with shared Melqart imagery on late fifth-century coins of Tyre and Tarsus (Kraay 1962, 13–15; Kraay 1976, 280–81; Debord 1999, 213n.76; Elayi and Elayi 2004, 633; Elayi and Elayi 2009, 341), but Casabonne 1996, 134n98, argues that Phoenician cultural influence is a better explanation. Qedar 2002 interprets a tiarate head coin from Dor as an issue of Tissaphernes for the fleet, but the lack of an inscription makes identification doubtful.
5. Thuc. 8.87.3; cf. Plut. Alc. 25.4, rounding to 150. Isoc. 16.18 gives only ninety; cf. Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 290. Perhaps the orator confused the size of the 411 fleet with the ships that supported Konon around the time of his speech (Hell. Oxy. 12.1–2; Diod. 14.79.5; cf. Stylianou 1998, 131n344).
6. Thuc. 8.87.5; Diod. 13.46.6; cf. Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 291.
9. This assumes a communication speed of 140 miles per day (cf. Colburn 2013) and distances of 830 miles from Babylon to Sidon, 970 from Ecbatana to Sidon, 1030 from Susa to Sidon, and 795 from Sardis to Sidon.
11. Christian 2013, 198; compare the religious aspects of Spartan naval delay in 412 (Thuc. 8.6.5, 9.1–2).
13. Thuc. 8.81.3; 8.87.1; see Lewis 1958, 392; Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 276, 293; D. Kagan 1987, 212.
14. See Casson 1995b, 289n92, citing a reference in Lucian Navig. 7 to a ten-day voyage from Sidon to the Chelidones, eighty miles beyond Aspendos, impeded by a storm. A trireme fleet could sail over 120 miles on a “long day” with favorable weather (Xen. An. 6.4.2; Morrison, Coates, and Rankov 2000, 103).

15. Thuc. 8.78.
17. Thuc. 8.36.1; 8.46.1, 5; cf. Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 104.
18. Thuc. 8.78, 79.6, 80.1, 83.2.
20. Thuc. 8.63, 8.79.1.
22. PT 1, 2.
23. PT 12.
25. Xen. An. 1.2.11–12.
26. Xen. An. 1.2.9, 1.3.21, 1.7.18.
28. Thucydides refers to only one garrison’s establishment, that at Iasos (8.29.1); for Achaemenid garrison practice see Tuplin 1987c; Debord 1999, 38–41; Dusinberre 2013, 85–113. Parke 1930, 47–48, argues that the forts were established after the 411 treaty, assuming that Persian ownership was incompatible with the presence of a Spartan harmost at Miletos (see 8.28.5). But Derkyllidas governed Abydos only after the treaty (Thuc. 8.63.1; Xen. Hell. 3.1.9).
29. Thuc. 8.35.3–4.
30. On garrisons as storage sites, see Tuplin 1987c, 225. See page 26 for the size of Persian trireme crews.
32. Thuc. 8.108.5.
34. For assumptions of anti-Persian sentiment, see Westlake 1979, 37; Gorman 2001, 239.
36. Thuc. 1.115; IG i 13 14 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969, no. 40) 13–14; IG i 13 21 85; see Raaflaub 2009, 103.
38. For the use of price gouging to exploit a fleet’s presence, see Casson 1995a, 268.
39. Thuc. 8.108.5.
40. Thuc. 8.81.3; see Munson 2012, 261.
41. Thuc. 8.82.3.
42. Thuc. 8.83.1; cf. Busolt 1904, 1498; Heitsch 2007, 129. Petit 1981, 60–64, argues that the only conceivable explanation for Tissaphernes’s restraint toward Alkibiades was a “relation amoureuse.”
43. Thuc. 8.84.3–4.
44. Thuc. 8.84.5.
45. Thuc. 8.85.1–2.
47. Thuc. 8.87.1. Unnecessary confusion surrounds Tissaphernes’s invitation to Lichas and Philippos’s later presence at Aspendos with two Peloponnesian triremes (8.87.6). Rather than Philippos replacing Lichas (Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 289, 342; Hornblower 2008, 995, 1005), Lichas could have traveled by land with the satrap and Philippos by sea with the ships. Lichas’s death of illness “at a later date” (8.84.5) need not have occurred in 411.
49. Miletos paid Athens ten talents a year in the 450s and five thereafter, between 8 and 16 percent of the total silver tribute for Ionia-Aeolis (see page 21).
50. Thuc. 8.18.3.
53. Thuc. 8.108.4–5; Diod. 13.42.4. For the likelihood of Peloponnesian involvement, see Westlake 1979, 38 (contra Meiggs 1972, 356; Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 356).
54. Philippos was at Aspendos (Thuc 8.87.6, 99) and Hippokrates at Phaselis (8.99).
55. Cf. Diod. 11.61.4; Xen. An. 1.2.1, 1.9.14, 2.5.13; see Briant 2002, 596, 730; Kosmetatou 1997, 8.
56. For the date, see Busolt 1904, 1513.
57. Thuc. 8.99.
58. Thuc. 8.108.3. The imperial post could have informed Tissaphernes of Mindaros’s departure in two days, while it took the Spartan fleet nine to reach the Hellespont.
59. Thuc. 8.87.5.
60. Diod. 13.46.6.
61. Isoc. 16.18–20; Diod. 13.37.4–5. A proxeny decree of the late fifth century (IG I³ 113) thanking Euagoras of Salamis for some great service and referring to Tissaphernes and the king as allies of Athens may have stemmed from rumors that the dynast colluded in the fleet’s withdrawal; see Costa 1974, 43, 46; Lateiner 1976, 277. Meyer 1901b, 620, argues that Athens sought Euagoras’s support against the king, but the inscription suggests attempted friendship with both. It might refer to Athens’s later approach to Tissaphernes and Cyrus in 407 (see Lewis 1977, 130n133; Debord 1999, 223n178), but it would be surprising if this unsuccessful initiative prompted public thanksgiving.
62. Thuc. 8.87.4.
64. See Grote 1907, 326; Meyer 1901b, 602–3; Busolt 1904, 1514; Beloch 1916, 386–87; Cook 1983, 209; Hornblower 2008, 1004–5; Hawthorn 2014, 216.
66. Cf. Grote 1907, 326: “The historian is doubtless right; but without his assurance, it would have been difficult to believe that the maintenance of a fraudulent pretence, for so inconceivable a time, should have been held as an adequate motive for bringing this large fleet from Phoenicia to Aspendus, and then sending it away unemployed.”
73. Compare the withdrawal of Ottoman galley fleets to Istanbul or the Levant in August and September to avoid damage by autumn storms (Guilmartin 1980, 104–5; Imber 1980, 216; Williams 2014, 226).
Cf. Hdt. 7.187.2; see O’Connor 2013.

Hdt. 3.91.1.


Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1908, 606; Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 343; Westlake 1989b, 47; Hornblower 2008, 1040.

Cf. Hdt. 3.91.1.


Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1908, 606; Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 343; Westlake 1989b, 47; Hornblower 2008, 1040.


Thuc. 8.61–62.

On Zenis and his wife and successor, Mania, see Xen. Hell. 3.1.10–15; cf. Amit 1975, 63; Lewis 1977, 128n123.

Thuc. 8.60, 62.

Thuc. 8.80.3.

Diod. 8.40.6; cf. Thuc. 8.80.3.

Thuc. 8.87.1, 99; Xen. Hell. 1.1.14, 4.1.32; cf. 1.3.17.

Cf. Lewis 1989, 231.

Mindaros engaged with either eighty-six (Thuc. 8.103.1, 104.2) or eighty-eight ships (Diod. 13.39.3) and lost eighteen (Diod. 13.40.5) or twenty-one (Thuc. 8.106.3).

For the dates, see Busolt 1904, 1517, 1522. Diodorus gives Mindaros eighty-four and Dorieus thirteen at Abydos and claims they lost ten (13.45.6–7, 46.4). Xenophon indicates a lower size, more plausible in light of the Kynossema losses; his version reports thirty ships lost at Abydos and sixty remaining, probably including Dorieus’s fourteen, thereby implying a force of seventy-six before the battle (Hell. 1.1.2, 7, 11).

For the lower figure see Xen. Hell. 1.1.7, 16; for the higher, Diod. 13.50.2. It is possible that Mindaros left a few triremes at other locations and that Xenophon’s sixty represents the number actually engaged at Kyzikos.

Thuc. 8.107.1.

Xen. Hell. 1.1.6; cf. 4.1.32.


Brock 2009, 153.

Westlake 1979, 3613, relies on the silence of the sources to make an unjustified argument that there was no Ephesos garrison. The Persian generals that Plut. Lys. 3.2 claims occupied Ephesos before Lysander’s arrival might be connected with the battle of 409 but could also be associated with an earlier occupation. Lee 2016b, 269, suggests that Tissaphernes may have built the walls that are attested in 409 (Hell. Oxy. 1.1).

Thuc. 8.109.

Cf. Xen. An. 5.3.6; DiDonnici 1999.

For Artemis’s Sardis temple and its importance in Lydia, see Gusmani 1964, nos. 1–2, 4–5; Dusinberre 2003, 60–64. For Artemis in Lycia, see, for example, TL 44c 8. It was possible for Persian nobles to worship non-Persian deities without engaging in syncretism; see Tuplin 2004, 169–70. For dedications of Persian glass and horse trappings at the Ephesos temple, see Miller 2013, 29.

Diod. 13.46.6. On Diodorus’s conflation of the satraps in book 13, see Tuplin 2013b, 668.


Xen. Hell. 1.1.9.

Cf. Plut. Alc. 27.5; D. Kagan 1987, 236.

Xen. Hell. 1.1.10; Plut. Alc. 28.1.


Notes to Pages 95–100

104. Diod. 13.49.4.
105. For the spring date, see Busolt 1904, 1527; D. Kagan 1987, 247; Lazenby 2004, 202. Bosworth 1997, 303, puts the campaign in summer.
107. Xen. Hell. 1.1.20–22; Diod. 13.64.2.
110. Xen. Hell. 1.1.23.
112. Mindaros’s sixty or eighty triremes imply the presence of twelve to sixteen thousand men; this estimate assumes the survival of eight to ten thousand men, as much of the fighting occurred on shore and cavalry covered the retreat.
113. Cf. Thuc. 5.1; see Lewis 1977, 128; Debord 1999, 93–95, 219; Andrewes, Dover, and Gomme 1981, 357; Lazenby 2004, 199.
117. Xen. Hell. 1.1.25; cf. David 1979–80, 33. See note 88 for Diodorus’s fleet total; Xenophon’s lower figure comports better with the scale of the reconstituted fleet of seventy ships in 407.
119. See Meiggs 1982, 108; for the Persian bureaucratic requirements; cf. TAD A6.2. Bissa 2009, 108, estimates the weight of a trireme’s hull at twenty-five tonnes and the oars at two or three more, increasing the total by 50 percent for precut wood; including the oars, this amounts to about forty-two tonnes, or fifty U.S. tons of timber per ship.
120. Xen. Hell. 1.2.8, 12; 1.3.17; cf. Bissa 2009, 146.
121. Xen. Hell. 1.4.11.

Chapter 6 • Cyrus the Younger and Spartan Victory

3. The chronology of 410–7 is controversial due to Xenophon’s failure to note one of the transitions between years; this work follows the standard dating of Andrewes and Lewis 1992, 503–5.
4. Xen. Hell. 1.1.26; Diod. 13.64.3 reports the Athenian siege at this point but compresses the chronology. For wall building, compare Pharnabazos’s activities at Kyzikos (Diod. 13.49.4).
5. Diod. 12.82.2.
6. Memnon FGrH 53 F 20; Strabo 12.4.2; see Debord 1999, 91; Guney 2012, 77–81.
7. Cf. Xen. Hell. 3.2.2; Xen. An. 6.5.30.
8. Xen. Hell. 1.3.2–3.
9. FGrH 156 F 79–80; Bosworth 1997, 301-3; Rhodes 2011, 80.
10. Cf. Hdt. 5.26, 6.33. For another Persian historical error in Arrian, see An. 2.1.4, associating the King’s Peace with a Darius rather than Artaxerxes II.
12. Xen. Hell. 1.1.32. Lazenby 2004, 206, puts this event in 411, but the renewed fleet-building effort on Chios better fits a post-Kyzikos context.


15. Thuc. 8.78.


17. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.34, 1.2.1–3, 1.2.7; Diod. 13.64.1. Some scholars favor emendation to one thousand armed rowers (Lazenby 2004, 208); for the higher figure's plausibility, see D. Kagan 1987, 268. Tissaphernes may have failed to aid the Milesians due to their 411 dispute; see Lee 2016b, 271.


22. Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.8. At full strength, the crews of twenty-seven triremes numbered fifty-four hundred, but the battles of 411-10 would have lowered the count (cf. Thuc. 8.106.3; Diod. 13.40.5).


24. Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.7–9; *Hell. Oxy.* 1–3; Diod. 13.64.1.


26. Bleckmann 1998, 162, suggests that the Ephesian Megabyzos was Xenophon’s source for Tissaphernes’s role.

27. Cahn 1985, 592–93, dates them to between circa 400 and 395 because of Tissaphernes’s activities in Aiolis during the Spartan war, but the proximity to Antandros and spread of late-fifth-century bronzes in Rhodes and Ionia support an earlier date; see Bodzek 2012, 110–15.


31. Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.7. Keen 1998c, 102, infers Pharnabazos’s responsibility, but the ships were not engaged in northern waters (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.17).

32. For the Sicilian departure, see Diod. 13.61.1; following Xenophon’s figures, this would have left thirty-eight of the ships built at Antandros to replace the sixty lost at Kyzikos. Kratesippidas’s ships were owned by Spartans but manned by Peloponnesians (Diod. 13.65.3); it is unclear whether they included Pasippidas’s ships or the Antandros triremes.

33. Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.16–17; Diod. 13.64.4; Plut. *Alc.* 29.1–2.

34. Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.5–7. For the date see D. Kagan 1987, 276; Lazenby 2004, 211.


37. Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.10–12.


42. Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.2. Some scholars argue that these were the same Spartans traveling with Pharmanabazos who continued on to court while the others stopped for winter (Beloch 1916, 256–57; Lotze 1964, 9–10; Bommelaer 1981, 63–65; Debord 1999, 222). But the one-embassy theory requires an implausible round-trip journey between Gordium and Susa, more than twenty-six hundred miles, between the start of winter and early spring. Proponents of an earlier chronology defend the separate embassy but propose a departure date in 410, soon after Kyzikos (Robertson 1980, 290–91; Krentz 1989, 125; Podrazik 2015, 83). However, in this scenario, the envoys would have remained at court for roughly a year if Darius’s decision is backdated to 409 and two years on the time frame followed here. It is preferable to place the first embassy’s journey earlier in 408, making its stay in Susa last a few months at most.


44. Cf. Busolt 1904, 1567; Beloch 1914, 416; Dandamaev 1989, 266; Briant 2002, 597, 600; Wiesehöfer 2006b, 664.

45. Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.2.

46. Cf. Andoc. 2.20–21 on the arrival of a Cypriote grain convoy at Athens; see Costa 1974, 46; Lewis 1977, 130n133; Krentz 1989, 179.

47. For economic contacts between the east Greek poleis and Persian subjects, see the late fifth-century proxeny agreement between Rhodian Lindos and Naukratis (*IG* XII, 1 760; Bresson 1980 and 2005).


49. Cf. Thuc. 8.87.5; *Hell. Oxy.* 22.2.


52. Thuc. 8.43.3; cf. Hdt. 9.106; see Meyer 1901b, 628; Tuplin 1987b, 139; Cartledge 1987, 190; Stronk 1990–91, 122.

53. Cf. Thuc. 8.85.2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.2.

54. This could contextualize Sparta’s punishment of Derkyidas, the harmost of Abydos, after Pharmanabazos accused him of “ataxia,” or “leaving his post” (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.9). The satrap may have been angered at the looting of Persian territory (Judeich 1892, 341; Meyer 1902, 45; Krentz 1995, 163) or over a failure of cooperation during the fighting near Abydos.


57. Briant 2002, 600; Keen 1998c, 103; Klinkott 2005, 118. It is doubtful that the future monarch was the same Arsakes as Tissaphernes’s officer at Antandros (contra D. Kagan 1987, 294).


60. Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.1. Lysander’s base facilitated speedy communication with Sardis; see Lotze 1964, 15; Bommelaer 1981, 88; Krentz 1989, 135; Lazenby 2004, 218. His arrival before Cyrus makes it unlikely that the Persians sent funds across the Aegean for his Peloponnnesian ships (contra Robertson 1980, 293).

61. Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.3; *An.* 1.9.7; see Cousin 1905, 15–18; Debord 1999, 122–23; Klinkott 2005, 247.
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64. Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.5–7. The text claims a three-year detention, but this would be excessive for the purpose; if the diplomat Euryptolemos was Alkibiades’s cousin of that name, he was back in Athens for the Plynteria in midsummer (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.19). For emendation to three months, see Krentz 1989, 126, 131; Rhodes 2011, 83. Alternatively, Podrazik 2015, 85–89, proposes that Euryptolemos and Mantitheos left the embassy early, while the other three ambassadors were detained by Pharnabazos. Xenophon says nothing more of the non-Athenian envoys; for another case of diplomatic contact between Cyrus, Darius’s court, and overseas Greeks separate from Athens or Sparta, see Hyland 2015. Keen 1998b, 90, denies that the Gordian encounter proves Pharnabazos was subordinate to Cyrus, but Lysander’s ship building at Antandros in 405 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.10) also suggests Cyrus’s authority over the Daskyleion satrap.
65. Diod. 13.104.6. Tissaphernes may have remained titular satrap of Sardis as Cyrus’s subordinate (Keen 1998b, 89–91; Keen 1998c, 102–3; Rung 2012, 32), received a coastal satrapy encompassing Ionia, Caria, and Lycia (Busolt 1904, 1567; Debord 1999, 123), or served as an advisor in Cyrus’s retinue (Ruzicka 1985, 207). Klinkott 2005, 125, suggests he acted as Cyrus’s subordinate governor in Ionia, but it seems unlikely that he had much more to do with the Peloponnesians. Others have suggested his receipt of a new Carian satrapy (Beloch 1914, 416; Lewis 1977, 119n78; Petit 1981, 87–88; Sekunda 1991, 88), but this development is better associated with Hekatomnos’s appointment in the 390s. “Retirement” to Caria in a non-administrative capacity (Hornblower 1982, 33; Cawkwell 2005, 155) would be difficult to reconcile with his activities in 405.
66. Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.8–9.
69. Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.4–5. The king may have discussed the rate with Boiotios (Lewis 1977, 124; Krentz 1989, 125; Podrazik 2015, 84).
70. Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.6–7. Despite the grant’s royal origins, the passage implies payment in Attic rather than Babylonian talents. Diod. 13.70.3 and Plut. *Lys.* 4.1–4 leave out Cyrus’s initial rejection of the Spartan request to raise the wages, and their report that Cyrus provided ten thousand darics (only thirty-three and one-third talents) has caused confusion. Plut. *Lys.* 4.4 associates the amount with the one-obol raise (cf. David 1979–80, 34), but the numbers do not add up. Busolt 1904, 1573n1, interprets Diodorus’s sum as a badly rounded version of a month’s pay, but this is not close enough to the forty-six talents Cyrus would owe to make the argument plausible (Lewis 1977, 131n138). Several studies conclude that Xenophon exaggerates Cyrus’s contribution (Bommelaer 1981, 86; Krentz 1989, 136; Cawkwell 2005, 170n18), but both Diodorus and Plutarch characterize his gift as generous and probably give a generic, unreliable estimate for a large sum of Persian coin.
73. Lewis 1977, 131n138, estimates ten months at three obols and seven and a half at four obols, based on the later total of ninety triremes; cf. Lewis 1989, 231–32; Krentz 1989, 135–36. It is not clear when the fleet’s size increased, and Cyrus may have made initial calculations based on its original numbers.
74. Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.10.
75. Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.4 reports the intention to encourage desertions but does not say whether the initiative proved successful (for doubts see Krentz 1989, 136); Plut. *Lys.* 4.7 assumes the latter (cf. D. Kagan 1987, 311; Lazenby 2004, 224).
76. Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.10. 1.5.4 reports the intention to encourage desertions but does not say whether the initiative proved successful (for doubts see Krentz 1989, 136); Plut. *Lys.* 5.1–2. See Lotze 1964, 20–22; Bommelaer 1981, 106; D. Kagan 1987, 312.
77. Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.21; cf. Diod. 13.69.4. For the chronology, see Busolt 1904, 1574–75; D. Kagan 1987, 312–13; Krentz 1989, 139; Lazenby 2004, 220; Rhodes 2011, 85.
81. Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.6, 10.
91. Ruzicka 2012, 36–37, suggests that the news helped to destabilize Persian Egypt.
92. Xen. *An.* 1.9.14. Campaigns against recalcitrant Anatolian groups were part of Cyrus’s mission and gave him an opportunity to gain military experience (Lewis 1977, 134; Podrazik 2015, 84–85). But it is unnecessary to view them as his primary purpose (contra...
Keen 1998b, 90; Keen 1998c, 103); see Tuplin 1987b, 141–42. Such activities did not require large forces (cf. Xen. An. 1.2.4) and could have been performed by the satraps (cf. Xen. Hell. 3.1.13).

99. Xen. Hell. 2.1.8–9, 13. The passage may be interpolated, given its oddities in phrasing and spelling and the negative characterization of Cyrus (Lewis 1977, 104n83; Krentz 1989, 109; Giraud 1999, 397; Schmitt 2002, 51–53), but it is worth noting the parallel with Xen. Cyr. 8.3.10.

100. Xen. Hell. 2.1.6–7; cf. Busolt 1904, 161; Lotze 1964, 26.

101. Xen. Hell. 2.1.10.

102. Xen. Hell. 2.1.11–12; compare Xen. An. 1.2.11.

103. Xen. Hell. 2.1.13–14. Diod. 13.104.3–4 only reports one meeting and overlooks Cyrus’s initial complaints.

104. Xen. Hell. 2.1.20; Diod. 13.105.1.


107. Paus. 10.9.9. Since Samos supported Athens, a Samian general in Lysander’s service was presumably Anaian; Erythrai is a plausible restoration for a lacuna preceding the phrase “under Mount Mimas” (see Lewis 1977, 115n50). Westlake 1979, 27, objects that Erythrai would not require such introduction, but perhaps an unattested stasis caused a separatist community to stand in for Erythrai (cf. Thuc. 8.23–24).

108. For Ionia’s limited naval role, see Westlake 1979, 26–27, 33–34; Tuplin 1987b, 137–38. For Cyrus’s triremes in 402-1 see Xen. An. 1.4.2.

109. No source reports the exact size of Lysander’s fleet. Xen. Hell. 2.2.5 gives him 200 ships in the post-battle cruise to Athens, leading many scholars to infer that he had between 180 and 200 at Aigospotamoi (Beloch 1914, 424n1; Hamilton 1979, 39, 45183; Bommelaer 1981, 97177; Krentz 1989, 174; Lazenby 2004, 238). But some might have been captured Athenian triremes manned with prize crews (cf. Busolt 1904, 161n1). The 150 that Lysander used for Athens’s blockade (Xen. Hell. 2.2.9) should be closer to the pre-battle size (D. Kagan 1987, 382). Diod. 13.104.3 states that Lysander brought thirty-five new ships from the Peloponnese to Ephesos, and either ninety or a hundred were available from the Arginousai fleet, if possibly undermanned. Twenty-five more from Ionia would bring the total to between 150 and 160. The fleet would have been larger if ships constructed at Antandros in spring 405 took part; although the Sicilian ships begun at Antandros in 410 were ready for service by late spring 409, it is not likely that construction could have been completed in just a few months.


111. Diod. 13.104.4; Plut. Lys. 9.2. For Lysander’s assignment as Persian administrator, see Judeich 1892, 25; Hamilton 1979, 39; D. Kagan 1987, 381; Keen 1998c, 104; Debord 1999, 43–44, 227. For more limited rights of tribute collection, see Busolt 1904, 161n2. See Tuplin 1987b, 134–35, for redirection of tribute to support the war. Lysander’s collections in Cyrus’s Ionia offer a probable context for the series of silver tridrachms, marked with the abbreviation “SYN-” for “alliance” and sharing Chios’s weight standard, issued by numerous poleis including Ephesos, Knidos, and Rhodes near the end of the fifth century; see Karwiese 1981; Ashton, Kinns, Konuk, and Meadows 2002, 137–39; Meadows 2011, 287–92; Ellis-Evans 2016, 10–11, 14–15.

112. See page 21. Several large and middling payers (Chalkedon, Kyzikos, Lampsacos, Klazomenai, Halikarnassos) remained in Athenian hands before the 405 campaign.


115. Seventeen months times 100 talents (for 150 ships) equals 1,700 talents.

116. Lampsakos was once assessed at a twelve-talent tribute rate, but Iasos had already been sacked and partially depopulated a decade before and, together with Kedreiai, paid only one and a half talents per year. It is doubtful that sales of the Iasian and Kedreian captives (Xen. Hell. 2.1.15, Diod. 13.104.7) and confiscated property from Lampsakos (Diod. 13.104.8) would have yielded a great fortune. The Athenians at Aigospotamoi were suffering from a supply shortage (Diod. 13.105–6).


118. Cf. Plut. Artox. 2.2–3; Lotze 1964, 27n4. The depletion of Cyrus’s idia would make sense of his later complaint about insufficient household resources (Plut. Artox. 4.1). Some studies have associated his subsidies with a group of pseudo-Athenian tetradrachms overstamped with tiny images of crowned heads; they postulate that those marked with bearded heads represent the king and that a beardless variant depicts Cyrus (Weiser 1989, 272–78; Figueira 1998, 533–34; Briant 2002, 616). But such identifications without written legends are dubious and the series more likely dates to the fourth century (Harrison 2002, 303–4; Van Alfen 2011b, 75–76).


120. Diod. 13.104.5.

121. Diod. 13.70.4, 14.10.1; Plut. Lys. 5.3–5, 14.1–2, 19.2–3.


123. Diod. 13.104.6. The manuscript names Pharnabazos, probably a final instance of Diodorus’s confusion of the satraps. Several scholars retain Pharnabazos (Judeich 1892, 32–33n2; Lotze 1964, 28n3; Bommelaer 1981, 98–99n86; D. Kagan 1987, 382n22; Debord 1999, 95n102), but Tissaphernes later reappears as the patron of the anti-Lysandrian faction at Miletos, and the distance from Daskyleion makes him the more plausible actor (Meyer 1901b, 655; Meyer 1909, 113n1; Busolt 1904, 1614n.2; Beloch 1922, 3013; Andrews 1971, 214–15n15; Petit 1981, 86n2; Lewis 1977, 121n92; Tuplin 1987b, 145). The text refers to “Klauda in Lydia,” a plausible mistake for Kalynda, spelled Klaunda in the Athenian tribute lists (Braun 2004, 112n48).

124. Xen. Hell. 2.1.29.

125. Plut. Lys. 18.1; cf. Cousin 1905, 63; Lotze 1964, 57. Badian 2006 associates the gift with Notion, perhaps because it followed Cyrus’s departure, but the prince could have communicated from the road.

126. Xen. Hell. 2.2.1–2, 8–23.

127. For the Babylonian chronological evidence, see Stolper 1994, 238, and 1999, 3–5; the last extant text from the reign of Darius II dates to September 17, 405, and the earliest known reference to Artaxerxes II appears in April 404. Diod. 13.108.1 reports his death after the Athenian surrender, but this may refer to the date at which the news reached mainland Greece; for its possible arrival during the peace negotiations, see Krentz 1982, 36–41; D. Kagan 1987, 409; Bleckmann 1998, 606. Hawthorn 2014, 228, suggests that Darius’s death might have cut short Persian funding of Sparta and saved Athens if not for Aigospotamoi, but the scale of Cyrus’s funds would have given Lysander another campaign season in which to seek a decisive battle.

128. Andoc. 3.29, Isoc. 8.97. For doubts, see Lewis 1977, 131n138; Cartledge 1987, 89; Lewis 1989, 232; Cawkwell 2005, 170n18. David 1979, 40–41, accepts the figure’s plausibility.


130. Pritchard 2015, 99, estimates Athenian costs at six hundred talents a year; these were partially covered by the polis’s financial reserves and trierarchs’ liturgies, as well as extortion from communities in the eastern Aegean war zone.

Chapter 7 • Artaxerxes II and War with Sparta

1. Ctes. FGrH 688 F17 59; Xen. An. 1.1.3; Plut. Artox. 3.3–5. Ruzicka 1985, 208, depicts Cyrus’s return as “flight—engineered by Parysatis”—but bureaucratic oversight of the royal roads should have impeded a fugitive’s escape if the king desired his recapture. On the date, see Olmstead 1948, 373; Andrewes 1971, 215; Bommelaer 1981, 123; Debord 1999, 124.

2. Xen. Hell. 2.3.8; cf. Lotze 1964, 241n3; Pritchett 1974a, 47–48n103; Cartledge 1987, 89; Tuplin 1987b, 145–46; Badian 2006.

3. See Bommelaer 1981, 101; Cartledge 1987, 352; Stronk 1990–91, 124. In defense of Diodorus's one-thousand-talent figure for Sparta’s annual tribute collections (14.10.2), see Parke 1930, 56n35; David 1979–80, 43; Cartledge 1987, 89. For doubts, see Hamilton 1979, 61; Westlake 1986, 409n13; Lewis 1994, 31n30; Green 2010, 279n12; Rutishauser 2012, 143.

4. Plut. Lys. 20.2–4; Nep. Lys. 4.1–3; Polyæn. 7.19.

5. Plut. Lys. 16.1, 20.3, 20.5; cf. Debord 1999, 233n5. Andrewes 1971, 213, 217–18, is unnecessarily skeptical with respect to the quarrel’s historicity. Some scholars prefer a date of 403 (Meyer 1902, 44; Beloch 1922, 16n1; Parke 1930, 52n29; Hamilton 1979, 88–92), but Lysander was occupied with the Athenian civil war for much of the year and not in possession of ships in its aftermath.

6. Parke 1930, 58, assumes that Pharnabazos’s deal with Athens in 408 invalidated his claim to Chalkedon, but it is unclear why this should have applied after Athens’s defeat. Perhaps he tolerated the garrison because of its ties to Spartan-held Byzantion (cf. Lewis 1977, 137; Tuplin 1987b, 145; Keen 1998c, 104). Debord 1999, 229, suggests that the mass castration of Chalkedonian boys alleged by Arrian occurred when the Spartans occupied Chalkedon in 405, but this atrocity may be unhistorical (FGrH 156 F 79–80; see page 100).


9. There is no evidence that he went to court for the succession; cf. Petit 1981, 93n4; Stronk 1990–91, 125.


13. See Meyer 1902, 182; Keen 1998b, 92; Hornblower 2011, 220. Klinkott 2005, 43, proposes that Cyrus kept his office because the charges against him were unproved. Lewis 1977, 120–21, considers Cyrus’s “moving freely in the satrapy” by 401 to be proof of his legitimate officeholding. Another theory proposes that Artaxerxes returned Cyrus’s satrapies but de-
tached Aiolis, Ionia, and Caria to allow Tissaphernes to check his power (Petit 1981, 96–97n2; Ruzicka 1985, 208; Keen 1998b, 92).


19. Abrokomas’s army, stationed between the Euphrates and Phoenicia in summer 401 (Xen. An. 1.4.3, 5), is often connected with the planned Persian response to the Egyptian revolt (Meyer 1902, 181; Beloch 1922, 301n1; Kienitz 1953, 76; Ruzicka 1985, 210; Dandamaev 1989, 273; Briant 2002, 617–20; Ruzicka 2012, 38–39), but Lee 2016a, 113–14, argues that Abrokomas was too far north too late in the season to have undertaken an Egyptian campaign before the Nile flood season and therefore must have been assigned to oppose Cyrus.


23. Xen. An. 1.2.3 lists four thousand men detached from Cyrus’s garrisons for the 401 campaign, plus the troops that had besieged Miletos (cf. 1.1.11) and others left behind in the cities.


25. Polyaen. 7.18.2.

26. Xenophon mentions eleven hundred troops under Pasion of Megara and Sokrates of Achaea and possibly a thousand more under Sophainetos of Stymphalos (An. 1.1.6–7, 11; 1.2.2–3). For Tamos’s ships see An. 1.4.2; Xenophon’s figure is preferable to Diodorus’s later total of fifty (see note 55 below).

27. Xen. An. 1.2.4.


30. Xen. Hell. 3.1.1; Diodorus claims Sparta’s knowing cooperation against Artaxerxes (14.11.2) but also makes Cyrus use a Cilician campaign as pretext (14.19.3–6). See Judeich 1892, 37; Cartledge 1987, 352; Lendon 1989, 305; Lewis 1994, 42; Debord 1999, 235; for doubts, see Cawkwell 2005, 160. Paus. 3.9.1, in the context of Agesilaos’s invasion, makes Lysander point out that Cyrus, not Artaxerxes, supported their fleet in the Peloponnesian War; this may preserve traces of a debate from 402–1 (Hamilton 1979, 106; Stronk 1990–91, 126–27).


32. Grote 1907, 226–27; Rawlinson 1875, 519–21.


34. Diod. 16.44.1–2.


37. Plut. Artax. 22.1 (Deinon FGrH 690 F19).

38. Xen. Hell. 3.1.3; Diod. 14.35.2; cf. Westlake 1981, 261–63; Keen 1998b, 94; Buckler 2003, 36n27. Some scholars maintain that Tissaphernes did not become karanos until 397, when Xen. Hell. 3.2.13 reports his authority over Pharnabazos (Petit 1981, 136–37; Krentz 1995, 170; Debord 1999, 124n80, 242). But if the powers of the office varied according to the mission (Rung 2015b), there is no reason to doubt that Tissaphernes was a karanos before the king gave him explicit authority over his rival.

39. Xen. An. 1.1.7, 1.7.12, 2.5–3.4; Xen. Hell. 3.1.3; Diod. 14.23.6, 26.4–273, 35.2; see Tuplin 2015b, 654. Diod. 14.26.4 reports Tissaphernes’s marriage to one of Artaxerxes’s daughters...
but may be confusing him with Orontes (Xen. An. 2.4.8) or Pharnabazos (Plut. Artox. 273); see Petit 1981, 115–16; Cook 1983, 208.


41. Judeich 1892, 41; Petit 1981, 128n1. Tissaphernes broke off contact with the retreating mercenaries in October (Xen. An. 3.5.1–13; Diod. 14.27.4); for the chronology, see Lee 2007, 284–86.

42. Xen. An. 2.4.9, 2.5.35, 3.3.1–11, 3.4.2–5, 13.

43. Diod 14.35.2–3.

44. Cf. Lee 2016b, 277. For Prokles, see Xen. An. 2.1.3, 2.2.1, 7.8.17. For Ariaios, see Xen. An. 2.4.1, 2.4.9, 2.5.35; Diod. 14.80.8; Polyaen. 7.16.1; Xen. Hell. 4.1.27.

45. Cf. Meyer 1909, 10n1; Beloch 1922, 35–36n2.

46. Polyaen. 2.1.16; Front. Strat. 3.11.2; cf. Lewis 1977, 139n19; Debord 1999, 245.


48. Xen. An. 7.1.2–3; 7.2.4–7, 12–14.

49. Cf. Lewis 1977, 142.

50. Xen. Hell. 3.1.3.


53. Cf. Xen. Hell. 3.4.25.


55. Diod. 14.35.3–4. Diodorus gives Tamos fifty ships (14.19.5), implying a major reinforcement for Egypt’s navy (Lewis 1977, 141n43; Ruzicka 2012, 39), but this total is probably a mistake that results from his combining the claim of twenty-five Spartan ships with the twenty-five that belonged to Cyrus (cf. Xen. An. 1.4.2).


57. Diod. 14.35.7.

58. Contra Buckler 2003, 41; the withdrawal from Kyme contrasts sharply with Cyrus’s winter siege of Miletos (Xen. An. 1.2.1–2).


61. Tissaphernes’s army probably included hoplites, but not as many as the Spartan invasion force (Xen. Hell. 3.2.15; Polyaen. 7.16.1; cf. Diod. 14.99.2); see Anderson 1974, 28.

62. Tissaphernes brought five hundred horsemen from Caria to Kounaxa (Xen. An. 1.2.4), and probably commanded several thousand in the fall of 401 (An. 3.4.2; cf. An. 3.4.13). For sling bullets found in Lydia, inscribed with Tissaphernes’s name in Greek, see Foss 1975, 28–30; Weiss and Draskowski 2010, 125–26.

63. Xen. An. 3.3.6–11, 3.4.24–33, 3.5.2–3.

64. Xen. Hell. 3.1.4–5, 3.2.20; Diod. 14.36.2.

65. For a numismatic allusion to Magnesia’s refoundation, see Konuk 2011, 155–56.


68. For the site, see Saner 2016.

69. Xen. An. 7.8.24; Hell. 3.1.6–7; Diod. 14.37.1, 4.

70. Xen. Hell. 3.1.8–9. Derkylidis’s combat forces declined to seven or eight thousand due to casualties and dispersal in garrisons (Xen. Hell. 3.1.28; Diod. 14.39.5); cf. Judeich 1892, 58n2; Meyer 1909, 35; Krentz 1995, 166.
73. Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.16–28, 3.2.1, 9; Diod. 14.38.3 reports a single truce lasting eight months.
74. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.8–12; Diod. 14.38.6–7.
75. Ctes. FGrH 688 F 30 74; see Lenfant 2004, 286n744. Ctesias claims to have carried a royal response to the Spartans, but the epitome leaves its contents obscure. For the date, see Meyer 1902, 202; Tuplin 1987b, 148 (contra Lewis 1977, 140n40). The ambassadors may be the same ones who met Derkyllidas at Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.8 (Judeich 1892, 49; Hamilton 1979, 116; Lenfant 2004, 286n744; for doubts, see Westlake 1986, 417n34; Krentz 1995, 168). Beloch 1922, 36, suggests that Sparta considered peace, but Westlake 1986, 424n47, disputes its early readiness to end the war.
77. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.13. Some scholars argue that Pharnabazos now received a naval command that was not subject to Tissaphernes’s authority (Barbieri 1955, 84n2; Briant 2002, 636), but the sources suggest that he did not take personal command of a fleet until 394 (see note 179). The journey from Daskyleion to Babylon (1,185 miles), Babylon to Tarsus (630), Tarsus to Salamis and back (260), and Tarsus to Sardis (485), at an average rate of fifteen miles a day and including time spent at Artaxerxes’s and Euagoras’s courts, would have taken a minimum of six months.
78. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.11–12.
79. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.14–15; for the location see 3.2.19. Diod. 14.39.5 claims that Derkyllidas’s forces numbered seven thousand and that the satraps mustered thirty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry; the Persian figures are excessive but some numerical advantage is plausible (cf. Westlake 1986, 421).
80. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.18.
82. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.20.
83. Westlake 1981, 263–64, suggests Tissaphernes sought to avoid battle on financial grounds; Briant 2002, 635, stresses fear for his Carian estates. But such motives do not explain Tissaphernes’s restraint at a moment of significant tactical advantage. The satraps’ potential battlefield superiority undermines arguments that the delay was meant to buy time for a naval buildup (cf. Judeich 1892, 52; Meyer 1902, 196; Beloch 1922, 39; Petit 1981, 139–40; Cartledge 1987, 356; Buckler 2003, 58). Either a victorious battle or a negotiated outcome would have ended the need for a Persian fleet in the Aegean.
85. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.1–2; Ages. 1.6.
86. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2; Ages. 1.8. For the Spartan context, see Hamilton 1979, 129–33; Westlake 1986, 422; Cawkwell 1976a, 66; Cartledge 1987, 192, 356.
87. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5; Ages. 1.10.
88. Diod. 14.79.4; see Meyer 1902, 204; Beloch 1922, 39–40n3; Ruzicka 2012, 49.
89. Cawkwell 2005, 162; Ruzicka 2012, 42–43.
91. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5–6; Ages. 1.10–12. Buckler 2003, 61, notes that the truce wasted half of the supplies Agesilaos brought for the campaign. For Xenophon’s presentation of Tissaphernes’s deception, see Danzig 2007, 43–44.
the Ionian recruits, state he had six thousand Peloponnesian allies and two thousand ex-helot citizens. But Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.4 implies that he was unable to gather the intended complement before setting out, perhaps due to allied refusals (Paus. 3.9.2–4). Integration with Derkyllidas's troops can be assumed, although the sources are not explicit (cf. Hamilton 1979, 133; Cawkwell 2005, 172n31; Ruzicka 2012, 49). Some of Agesilaos's troops might have been needed for garrisons, limiting availability for combat; see Meyer 1909, 35–37; DeVoto 1988, 49; Buckler 2003, 64.

93. Diod. 14.80.1; *Hell. Oxy.* 14.3 gives the cavalry a higher total (“[. . .] kischilious kal[i] my[rious]”); its infantry figure is lost in a lacuna (cf. Dillery 1995, 273n58; Lotz 2016, 142).

94. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.12–13; Diod. 14.79.2 claims Agesilaos had four hundred cavalry.

95. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.11; Ages. 1.13.


97. Lewis 1977, 141; Cawkwell 2005, 162; Ruzicka 2012, 42–43.


99. Diod. 14.39.1–2; Just. 6.1.9. It is unclear whether the Cypriotes were to build all new triremes or refurbish existing ones; Isoc. 9.47 implies that Eaugoras owned some before Artaxerxes expanded the fleet (cf. Barbieri 1955, 88). For the Cypriote context, see Costa 1974, 47–49; Briant 2002, 636.

100. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.1.

101. See Shrimpton 1991, 7; Tuplin 1993, 57; Krentz 1995, 182; Stylianou 1998, 131–32. For a three-hundred-ship fleet in the mid-380s, see Diod. 15.2.1, 3.

102. Diod. 14.39.3–4; Ctes. *FGH* 688 F 30 74. Philochoros *FGH* 328 F 144 dates Konon’s departure from Cyprus to the archonship of Souniades (397/96).


104. Xen. *An.* 1.4.2.

105. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.12, 15; Diod. 14.79.4.

106. Diod. 14.79.4; see Kienitz 1953, 79–80. The date of the convoy’s departure is linked to the problematic chronology of the Kaunos siege and Konon’s capture of Rhodes; see note 113.

107. Diod. 14.79.3; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.13. Agesilaos’s capture of Phokaia (Polyaen. 2.1.16; Front. *Strat.* 3.11.2) probably took place in 396 (cf. Judeich 1892, 58n1; Debord 1999, 245). Buckler 2003, 62–63, separates Agesilaos’s activities in Diodorus and Xenophon into two operations, but it is more likely that each preserves different details of the fall campaign.


110. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.11–12; *Ages.* 1.15–17.


113. Diod. 14.79.4; cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 12.3. The date of the Kaunos siege is controversial. Because Diodorus ascribes the campaign to Pharax, who led the fleet that supported Derkyllidas in spring 397, many scholars place it in late 397 or early 396 (Beloch 1922, 39–40; Beloch 1923, 214–15; Barbieri 1955, 102–9; Hamilton 1979, 187–88; Funke 1980, 55n29; Petit 1981, 141n11; Krentz 1995, 169; Bresson 2010, 441; Ruzicka 2012, 46–47; Asmonti 2015, 132–33). But Pharax was ambassador to Syracuse soon thereafter (Diod. 14.63.4; cf. Hornblower 2011, 223–24), and *Hell. Oxy.* 12.2–3, discussing the Persian reinforcements that Diodorus mentions after the Kaunos siege, also notes the replacement of a Spartan navarch named Archelaidas by another named Pollis. It is preferable to treat Diodorus’s identification of the Spartan commander as an error and place the siege’s conclusion after Agesilaos’s first Anatolian campaign, giving Pharnabazos sufficient time to travel south; see Judeich 1892, 62; Meyer 1909, 57–59, 70–72; Schäme 1915, 79–80; March 1997, 261–64; Buckler 2003, 71n34.
114. Diod. 14.79.5. The context suggests a land-based relief force rather than a separate Persian fleet; see Asmonti 2015, 134n1; contra Schäme 1915, 79–80; Barbieri 1955, 111–12; March 1997, 260; Debord 1999, 244. An active naval command would have required Pharnabazos to travel even farther from his satrapy, to Pamphylia or Cilicia. Diodorus refers to Konon’s ships as “triereis” or “naus” and to the Spartan naval force as the “stolos tôn Peloponnesión” but uses “dunamis” for both Pharnabazos’s force and Agesilaos’s army. The additional triremes in 14.79.6 are better interpreted as an advanced detachment of the fleet led by Baalshillem of Sidon.

115. For the emendation to Tissaphernes, see Krumbholz 1883, 86; Barbieri 1955, 110n1; Asmonti 2015, 133, but see Judeich 1892, 65n1, for a counterargument. Hell. Oxy. 12.3 might be relevant despite lacunae. Shortly after a reference to Pharnabazos and Konon, it mentions “a Persian man named [. . . ]ne[s];” it seems implausible that Tissaphernes would require an introduction.

116. Following the chronology discussed in the text, we can assume that the capture of Rhodes occurred very early in 395, the coup a few months later in late spring or early summer, and Konon’s visit to Tithraustes in late summer.

117. Diod. 14.79.6, 8; Hell. Oxy. 12.2. Most scholars add up the ships to 170 (Barbieri 1955, 120–22; Krentz 1995, 193; Ruzicka 2012, 51). But Diodorus’s capacity for confusion should be taken into account, and it is possible that the extra 40 were part of Baalshillem’s 90, making the total 130 and helping to explain the drop back to 90 for Knidos (Diod. 14.83.4); see Schäme 1915, 80–81 (despite Barbieri 1955, 121n2). Diodorus is confused on the timing of the Phoenicians’ arrival, which he reports after the capture of Rhodes, while Hell. Oxy. 12.2–3 has them joining Konon at Kaunos (cf. March 1997, 261–63; Buckler 2005, 71n35).


120. Diod. 14.79.7 totals the grain at five hundred thousand unspecified units (sitou de myriadas pentēkonta); Justin 6.2.2 refers to six hundred thousand modii, equaling ten thousand Attic medimnoi. One choiinx, 1/48 of a medimnos, was a common daily ration for an ancient soldier (see O’Connor 2013).


122. See Beloch 1922, 46n1; Lewis 1977, 142n47; Westlake 1981, 270–74; Krentz 1995, 192. This rests on the likelihood that Tithraustes, the official entrusted with the mission, left court no later than May to reach Kelainai by midsummer; it was 975 miles from Babylon and farther from Susa, a journey of more than two months at a traveling pace of fifteen miles per day. But it is not impossible that he moved much faster in light of the mission’s nature; one might compare the rapid journey of Alexander the Great’s subordinate Polydamas in his mission to assassinate Parmenion (Curt. 7.2.18).


124. Xen. Hell. 3.4.20–24; Ages. 1.29–32. Paus. 3.9.6 reflects aspects of both traditions. Xenophon leaves Agesilaos’s victory less complete (Dillery 1995, 111–13), but takes a harsher line on Tissaphernes’s negligence (DeVoto 1988, 52).


126. Lotz 2016, 136–44.


129. There is insufficient evidence for the theory of Westlake 1981, 274–75, based on Nep. Con. 2.2 and 3.1, that Tissaphernes was plotting rebellion. The allegation may reflect later justifications of the killing; for court propaganda in Deinon, Nepos’s probable source (5.4), see Stevenson 1987, 29–31; Bassett 1999, 475–76.


131. See Cartledge 1987, 217; DeVoto 1988, 47; Briant 2002, 639–43; Cawkwell 2005, 163, 172n 29. Xen. Ages. 1.34 claims that the one hundred talents later dedicated at Delphi were a tenth of the spoils; cf. Krentz 1995, 203.

132. For the Sardis temple’s landholdings, see Descat 1985; Dusinberre 2003, 123–25; Roosevelt 2009, 112–15.

133. Poly. 7.16.1; Plut. Artax. 23.1; Diod 14.80.6. In support of Parysatis’s involvement, see Beloch 1922, 45–46; Petit 1981, 159–61; Cook 1983, 214; Dandamaev 1989, 289; Hornblower 1994, 57. For doubts, see Westlake 1981, 269–70.

134. Hell. Oxy. 22.3. Con. Nep. 3.2 attests Tithraustes’ position as chiliarch (Old Persian *hazarapatish), a high official with power over access to royal audiences (see McKechnie and Kern 1988, 148). Xen. Hell. 3.4.25 and Ages. 1.35 are laconic by comparison.

135. Poly. 7.16.1; Plut. Artox. 23.1; Diod 14.80.6. In support of Parysatis’s involvement, see Beloch 1922, 45–46; Petit 1981, 159–61; Cook 1983, 214; Dandamaev 1989, 289; Hornblower 1994, 57. For doubts, see Westlake 1981, 269–70.


137. Xen. Hell. 3.4.25–26; Xen. Ages. 4.6; Diod. 14.80.8.


139. Cf. Xen. Hell. 3.2.15, 3.4.12, 3.4.21.


141. Cf. Xen. Hell. 3.4.19; Ages. 1.28.

142. For a feud between Tithraustes and Pharnabazos, see Judeich 1892, 68; Lewis 1977, 142–43n51; Debord 1999, 248n118; Buckler 2003, 68–69. Briant 2002, 639, views Tithraustes’s behavior as a response to complaints from Persians in Lydia, prioritizing Sardis’s short-term security over Daskyleion’s. Others argue that he meant to draw the Spartans away from the Persian fleet (Meyer 1909, 21; Krentz 1995, 192; Buckler 2003, 69–69), but it is unclear how Agesilaos could have threatened its base at Rhodes after the Spartan fleet’s withdrawal.

143. Hell. Oxy. 22.3; Isoc. 4.140.

144. Hell. Oxy. 22.3. Despite Konon’s intention to visit both, it is unclear whether Pharnabazos was present. Konon’s trip from Rhodes may have encouraged the rumor that Tithraustes sent the Rhodian diplomat Timokrates to Greece (see chapter 8).

145. Hell. Oxy. 22.3. Keen 1998b, 94, proposes that they were the satraps of Sardis and Greater Phrygia.

146. Xen. Hell. 4.1.2–15; Ages. 3.3–4; Hell. Oxy. 25.1–4. For the route, see Debord 1999, 248–50.

147. Xen. Hell. 4.1.33.

148. Hell. Oxy. 24.5–6, 25.3; cf. Debord 1999, 250–51, on the severity of the agricultural ravaging. For a connection between Gordion’s defense and arrowheads excavated at its gate complex, see Rose 2013b, 17.

149. Xen. Hell. 4.1.15–16, 33; Hell. Oxy. 25.3. For association of the destruction layer with the campaign of 395-94, see Bakir 2003, 3, 9; Bakir 2007, 170; İren 2010, 252; Abe 2012, 4. But Sarıkaya 2015, 213–14, argues that the burned level could date to any time in the first quarter of the fourth century and that the connection with Agesilaos is unwarranted in the absence of more explicit attestation for the fortress’s capture (cf. Krentz 1995, 205; Briant 2002, 641).
If Sarıkaya is correct, this would require an alternative context in which a great fire at Das-
kyleion could have occurred (perhaps Ariobarzanes’s revolt in the 360s?).

150. For Pharnabazos’s numbers, see Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.17, 24; for Agesilaos’s forces, see Xen.

151. *Hell.* 3.4.10, 4.1.3, 4.1.21; *Hell. Oxy.* 25.2.


156. Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.31–33.


158. Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.41. Xenophon’s more critical portrayal of Agesilaos’s Anatolian cam-
paigns in *Hellenika* contrasts with the encomiastic depiction in *Agesilaos*; see Tuplin 1993, 56–60; Dillery 1995, 114–18.

159. Xen *Hell.* 4.1.41; cf. Isoc. 4.144.

160. Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.3–8; *Ages.* 2.1.


166. Lewis 1977, 141n43.


168. For Phoenicians at Knidos, see Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.11; for the Cypriotes, see Isoc. 9.68.


173. Isoc 4.142 states that Artaxerxes left Konon’s ships unpaid for fifteen months, which
would stretch from their arrival at Kaunos in spring or summer 396 to the meeting with
Tithraustes in fall of 395; cf. March 1997, 265. But the *Panegyrikos* is capable of exaggeration;
the same passage makes Sparta’s blockade of Konon last three years.

174. This estimate combines Justin’s six hundred thousand *modii* or one hundred thou-
sand *medimnoi* with the highest possible fleet size, 170 ships with two-hundred-man crews;
given the fleet’s reduction by the time of Knidos, the grain may have lasted much longer.


177. *Hell. Oxy.* 22.3.


179. Diod. 14.81.6; for Pharnabazos’s superior rank, see Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.11, 4.8.9; cf. Barbieri

180. Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.5.


182. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.28; cf. Diod. 14.79.4. Krentz 1995, 193, implausibly adds 120 new tri-
remes to Pharax’s 120 but suggests that some were transports, rightly noting Spartan diffi-
culty in supporting such a large fleet; cf. Buckler 2003, 43.


185. Diod. 14.83.5. Xen. *Hell*. 4.3.12 asserts Peisandros’s great inferiority in numbers. Beloch 1922, 76n1, argues that Diodorus’s 90 must refer only to the first line, with the second line adding up to 170; cf. Hornblower 1994, 72; Bresson 2010, 442. But Xenophon may have echoed Agesilaos’s propaganda in attempting to blame the defeat on an exaggerated discrepancy between fleet sizes.

186. Diod. 14.83.4–7; cf. Philochoros *FGrH* 328 F 145. For the location of Knidos in modern Burgaz, see chapter 4, note 89. Paus. 6.3.16 places the battle near a “mountain called Dorion,” otherwise unknown. Diodorus’s claim that Peisandros sailed to Physkos, the name of a town well east of Loryma, would seemingly put the Spartans on the wrong side of the Persian fleet, interfering with their subsequent flight to Knidos; cf. Judeich 1892, 74–75n1; Barbieri 1955, 145–47; Fornis 2009, 206; Ruzicka 2012, 56. Meyer 1909, 80, suggests a Spartan effort to attack Kaunos; Buckler 2003, 73, regards the move to Physkos as evidence of Peisandros’s incompetence; Harding 2006, 181–82, suggests Konon intercepted the enemy en route to Physkos. Bresson 2010, 446–50, proposes an ingenious solution: a small island off Triopion (modern Tekir) shared the peninsula’s name of Chersonese, and the strait that separated it from the mainland was homonymous with Physkos, so in this case, the Spartans might have sailed west from Knidos, and then Konon could have caught them along the coast near Triopion.


188. Xen. *Hell*. 4.3.12; Diod. 14.83.7; see Barbieri 1955, 153.

189. Diod. 14.84.3–4. The text reads Teos but refers to islands, and Telos’s location makes it an obvious emendation; see Robert 1934, 43–44. For Samos, see Paus. 6.3.16. For Erythrai’s honors to Konon, see Tod 1948, no. 106; Ma 2006, 126. For his statue at Kaunos, see Marek 2006, 263–64. Cawkwell 1956 and 1963 interprets the alliance (SYN) coinage issued at Knidos and other Aegean sites as evidence for a pro-Persian league set up after Konon’s victory; cf. Debord 1999, 276–77. But hoard evidence now points to an earlier issue in association with Lysander’s Ionian tribute collections; see chapter 6, note 112.


Chapter 8 · Persia, the Corinthian War, and the King’s Peace

1. Persia’s first attempted reconquest of Egypt (Isoc. 4.140) is traditionally dated to between 385 and 383 (Meyer 1902, 311–12; Beloch 1922, 97; Beloch 1923, 228–29; Kienitz 1953, 85n2; Ray 1987, 82; Shrimpton 1991, 10; Hornblower 1994, 80; Lloyd 1994, 347), but a strong case can be made for the late 390s or early 380s, between the end of Pharnabazos’s Aegean cruise and the King’s Peace (see Judeich 1892, 156–57; Ruzicka 1983, 106; Stylianou 1998, 149–50; Cawkwell 2005, 162–63; Ruzicka 2012, 66–67). Xenophon credits Pharnabazos for having secured Athenian sympathy for the Hellespontine cities from around 390 to 388 (*Hell*. 4.8.31, 33; 5.1.28), but what he says is too vague to prove that Pharnabazos was present in Anatolia for the entire period in question. Dem. 20.76, sometimes taken as evidence that the Athenian general Chabrias fought Persians in Egypt after the King’s Peace, does not identify his opponents, who might have belonged to his employer’s Egyptian rivals.


4. Xen. *Hell*. 3.4.4–3.5.5; Paus. 3.9.2–4; *Hell. Oxy*. 9.1–3, 11.1–2. For the date of Demainetos’s voyage, see Meyer 1909, 58; Seager 1967, 95n2; Funke 1980, 66; Strauss 1984, 38; Seager 1994, 98; Asmonti 2015, 134.
5. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25–26, 3.5.1. For the Corinthian War’s outbreak in May or June, see Pascual 2009, 76; although Rung 2004, 418–19, places the Battle of Sardis in early spring and Tissaphernes’s execution in early summer to retain Tithraustes’s involvement alongside Pharnabazos in Timokrates’s mission.


11. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1–2; *Hell.* Oxy. 10.2–3; Paus. 3.9.8.


14. The failure to deliver Persian aid figured among the charges against Alkibiades’s memory at the trial of his son in the mid-390s (Lys. 14.37). His defenders still credited him with diverting the royal fleet of 411 (Isoc. 16.20).

15. Other political factors had greater effects on the Athenian decision (Strauss 1986, 111; Cook 1990, 95–97), but for the importance of financial support, see Kagan 1961, 328–29; Cartledge 1987, 290; Rung 2004, 423.


17. Cf. DB §8 and DNb §2c; see Harrison 2015, 12–20.

18. Cf. Isoc. 9.56, 68; Ruzicka 2012, 60.

19. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.6–7. For the ship total, see Diod. 14.85.2; the figure only appears after Pharnabazos’s departure, but Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.9 implies that he left Konon most of the fleet.


21. Ruzicka 2012, 58; Shannahan 2016, 17. Early fourth-century coinage from Kyzikos bears a tiarate head with the abbreviated name PHARNABA- and the image of a warship’s bow and ram, perhaps depicting a Greek rather than Phoenician-style trireme (Bouzid-Adler 2015, 8–9). Maffre 2004, 20–24, connects it with Pharnabazos’s role in rebuilding the Achaemenid fleet in 398, but this took place in Cyprus (see pages 131, 134); Kyzikos was hostile to him in 396 (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.10), and none of the construction for the new royal navy took place in the Propontic region. Konon’s Hellespontine campaign and manning of new ships in 393 offers a more plausible context; see Bodzek 2000, 275–76; Bodzek 2003, 12–13; Bodzek 2004, 18–19.


24. This may have been urged by an embassy of the Athenian Epikrates to the king (Plut. *Pelop.* 30.12, Athen. 6.251a–b, Plat. *Com.* Fr. 119); for its association with the Knidos campaign, see Bruce 1966, 277; Funke 1980, 106n12; Strauss 1986, 126; Seager 1994, 104; Fornis 2009, 226–27n103; Asmonti 2015, 163.

25. Pascual 2009, 84, dates Pharnabazos’s departure to March or April and the Messenian raids to before the May harvest; for the fleet’s possible activities on Delos, Paros, and Antikythera, see Seager 1967, 102; Hornblower 1994, 74; Pascual 2009, 84; Rutishauser 2012, 146.


28. DNB §2c.

29. Diod. 14.84.5. For a formal treaty, see Busolt 1874, 669–70; Judeich 1892, 81; Strauss 1986, 126. For counterarguments, see Barbieri 1955, 160; Ryder 1965, 29–30; Seager 1967, 103n77; Hamilton 1979, 292n48; Funke 1980, 71n12; Fornis 2009, 211n43.

30. On the traditional chronology (Seager 1994, 106), there were skirmishes but no major actions in this summer, but some scholars move the battle of Corinth’s Long Walls to 393 instead of 392 (Buckler 2003, 109–10n41, 135; Pascual 2009, 86).


33. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.11 does not give a number, but they were later defeated by a Spartan squadron of twelve (cf. 4.8.23); see Buckler 2003, 115n47. Corinth also manned fifteen triremes in 412 (Thuc. 8.3.2); one of its generals operated with five later in the Peloponnesian War (*Hell.* Oxy. 10.4).


36. The estimate assumes that Konon sailed from a Hellespontine port such as Lampsa-kos and took the most direct possible routes to Melos, Pherai, Kythera, and Kenchreiai. For a June date, see Pascual 2009, 84.

37. For arguments that Konon donated the ships to Athens or that Athens kept them after his downfall, see Funke 1980, 134n94; Clark 1990, 58; Hornblower 1994, 76. Shannahan 2016, 12–15, proposes that the Persians made an official gift of the fleet, including those ships taken at Knidos, to Athens, but it is unclear why such a buildup of Athenian naval power would have seemed beneficial to Persia after the destruction of Sparta’s Aegean fleet. Konon was also unlikely to transfer the Cypriote contingent to Athens, as this would have betrayed his patron Euagoras, who needed the triremes for competition with rival Cypriote dynasts (cf. Shrimpton 1991, 4). It is more likely that Konon’s superiors expected the return of a force that amounted to a quarter of Artaxerxes’s projected three-hundred-ship navy and that Athens used internal taxation to fund the construction of a moderate number of triremes by 390; see Maffre 2004, 15; Fornis 2009, 220–21.


40. For use of Deinon, see 5.4. Fornis 2009, 215, suggests that Konon also donated personal funds.

41. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.10; Diod. 14.85.3. See Seager 1967, 103; Funke 1980, 129; Strauss 1986, 127–28; Seager 1994, 104; Conwell 2008, 117; Asmonti 2015, 163. The estimate for Konon’s crews assumes an average of 140 rowers per Phoenician-style trireme, as opposed to the 170 on a full-strength Greek model (see page 26). For continuing work in 392/91, see *IG II²* 1662–64; Munn 1993, 116–17, suggests it was never finished, given Piraeus’s lack of gates in 378 (*Xen. Hell.* 5.4.20, 34), but they may have been removed at a later date (Conwell 2008, 117–18).

43. Xen. *Hell. 4.8.12* does not prove “ongoing Persian subsidy of the Athenian fleet,” contra Ruzicka 2012, 60–62; it asserts Sparta’s wish to stop Tiribazos from supporting Konon’s navy, but these ships probably belonged to the king rather than Athens (see note 37).


45. Harpokration, s.v. *Xenikon en Korinthōi*, states that Konon raised the mercenary unit that Iphikrates and Chabrias later commanded. This is often taken to imply Persian funding of the unit at Corinth (Pritchett 1974b, 119; Strauss 1986, 126; Buckler 2003, 111–12; Fornis 2009, 213; Hornblower 2011, 201; Shannahan 2016, 12), but the passage does not state that they continued to fund the unit after Iphikrates took command. Dem. 4.124 reports that the Athenian polis paid the mercenaries. *Ar. Plut.* 170–74 lists the god Wealth’s benefactions to mankind, which include making the Great King proud and sustaining the mercenaries at Corinth, but it does not connect the two, and it also mentions unrelated benefactions such as filling the assembly’s seats (171). For internal taxation through the wartime *eisphora*, see *Isoc.* 17.41; *Lys.* 28.2–4.

46. Cf. Ruzicka 2012, 64.

47. Xen. *Hell. 4.8.12*. Buckler 2003, 137, is unpersuasive in suggesting that Pharnabazos was using Konon for the time being but considering a transfer of aid to Sparta.

48. Xen. *Hell. 4.8.12* reports Sparta’s accusation that Konon used the king’s ships to take islands for Athens. He probably restored its control of Delos, Skyros, Lemnos, and Imbros; see Judeich 1892, 83; Beloch 1922, 78–79; Hamilton 1979, 244, 290; Funke 1980, 152–33; Tuplin 1993, 79n40; Ryder 1965, 26; Seager 1967, 101, 104; Strauss 1984, 46; Strauss 1986, 129; Fornis 2009, 227; Rutishauser 2012, 147; Ruzicka 2012, 57–58; Asmonti 2015, 164–67. Nep. *Con.* 5.2 accuses him of plotting to recapture Ionia for Athens, but there is no evidence that he collected money for Athens in Anatolia (Ryder 1965, 30; Fornis 2009, 217–19; contra Buckler 2003, 133).


50. *IG II²* 20 (Tod 1948, no. 109) and *SEG* 29.86. For Athens’s praise of Euagoras as a means of denying Persia credit for Knidos, see Lewis and Stroud 1979, 187–93; Hornblower 1994, 75. But Euagoras still remained on friendly terms with the king, and the decree should not be taken as anti-Persian (Costa 1974, 51).

51. Plat. *Menex.* 245e–246a; Deinarchus 1.75; Dem. 20.68–70; see Seager 1967, 100; Funke 1983, 151; Strauss 1986, 126; Tuplin 1993, 78; Hornblower 2011, 231.

52. Tod 1948, no. 199, 24–29; cf. Briant 2002, 645; Kuhrt 2007, 378n6. Lewis and Stroud 1979, 191, deny that Pharnabazos received Athenian honors but mention his dedication of a robe (*xustis*) for a cult statue of Athena, which appears in inventories from the Hekatompedon in 374/73 and 371/70 (*IG II²* 1421 118; *IG II²* 1424a 303–4); the second record’s note on the robe’s poor condition supports the idea that it was dedicated in the 390s. Compare Hdt. 8.120 for symbolic gifts of clothing to Persia’s client poles.


58. Cf. Weiskopf 1989, 29. DeVoto 1986, 194, contends that Tiribazos’s “mission was to curb Pharnabazus and Athens,” but if this was true, his successor would have been unlikely to favor Athens (see Badian 1991, 26n6).
59. See note 1 above. Cawkwell 2005, 162–63, suggests that Pharnabazos left Anatolia in 392; Ruzicka 2012, 66–67, maintains that the Egyptian campaign started two years later.
60. Xen. Hell. 4.8.16.
65. For the assumption that Konon’s fleet demobilized between late 393 and his arrest in 392, see Meyer 1902, 258; Beloch 1922, 84; Shrimpton 1991, 4; Maffre 2004, 15; Fornis 2009, 220–21.
68. Xen. Hell. 4.8.16. The secrecy surrounding the subsidy makes it unlikely that the sum was comparable to the great Peloponnesian War payments, but it may have enough to aid one of the small squadrons deployed in 391-90; see Meyer 1902, 256; Fornis 2009, 213.
73. Although a few scholars propose that the Sparta conference preceded the one at Sardis (Judeich 1925; Wilcken 1941, 4–12; cf. Badian 1991, 33), most others believe that a first meeting took place at Sardis and that a second at Sparta followed several months later (Martin 1944, 17–20; Martin 1949, 135–38; Ryder 1965, 27–33, 168–69; Seager 1967, 105n92; Lewis 1977, 146n68; Hamilton 1979, 256–57; Cawkwell 1981, 70; Funke 1980, 88n56; DeVoto 1986, 196; Strauss 1986, 137, 147n57; Jehne 1991, 265; Urban 1991, 60; Seager 1994, 107–9; Zahrnt 2000, 299–302; Rhodes 2008, 15–16; Wilker 2012, 97). Buckler 2003, 148, argues that the Sparta talks followed immediately after Sardis and that Tiribazos arrested Konon after Athens’s rejection of the second conference’s terms, but it is more plausible that Athenian defiance followed Konon’s removal.
74. Xen. Hell. 4.4.7–13, 4.8.11; cf. Funke 1980, 141; Strauss 1986, 138. If the coup and battle at Corinth are redated to 393 (Pascual 2009, 86–87), they would be relevant to the Sardis conference instead of its sequel.
75. For Tiribazos persuading the Greeks to resume negotiations, see Seager 1967, 105n94; Strauss 1986, 137; Seager 1994, 108; for doubts, see Ryder 1965, 32–33; DeVoto 1986, 197–99; Badian 1991, 28; Jehne 1991, 266–69; Urban 1991, 66–70; Jehne 1994, 34–35; Bruce 2001, 58. It seems more likely that renewed Persian efforts followed Tiribazos’s removal. Cawkwell 1981, 70, interprets Philochoros’s reference to the king sending down a peace in 392-91 as the provision of a “rescript” for the Sparta conference; others suggest the influence of Strouthas’s appointment (Hamilton 1979, 256; Wilker 2012, 103) or Greek efforts to win Persian approval regardless of who was in charge at Sardis (Funke 1980, 141n27).
77. Philochoros FGrH 328 F149a–b; compare Plat. Menex. 245b–c, which conflates the negotiations of 392-91 and 387-86 (Keen 1998d, 376–77). F149a refers to the king sending

78. For the dependence of Persian-Athenian friendship on Konon, see Buckler 2003, 141; Fornis 2009, 229. For Athenian anger at his arrest (cf. Isoc. 4.154), see Strauss 1986, 138; Shannahan 2016, 16.


84. Diod. 14.98.2–4; for the chronology of the Cypriote War’s outbreak, see Tuplin 1983, 178–82. For Euagoras’s reemployment of Konon’s ships, see Shrimpton 1991, 4. Beloch 1922, 89, suggests that Konon’s alleged treason compromised Euagoras in Artaxerxes’s eyes, but this is unconvinving. Costa 1974, 53–56, argues that Artaxerxes turned against Euagoras to prevent him from becoming strong enough to interfere with Persian naval power and the Egyptian war (cf. Hamilton 1979, 294; Briant 2002, 647; Ruzicka 2012, 68), but accepting Euagoras’s supremacy in Cyprus would have been an alternative option for retaining his cooperation.


86. Isoc. 4.140; see Ruzicka 2012, 66–76.

87. Cf. Ar. Plut. 178; see Judeich 1892, 155; Meyer 1902, 259; Beloch 1922, 93; Kienitz 1953, 83; Seager 1967, 114; Lewis 1977, 147; Hamilton 1979, 298; Lloyd 1994, 347; Hornblower 2011, 231; Ruzicka 2012, 74–75, 253n29; Urban 1991, 96, is unconvinving in downplaying the significance of Athenian-Egyptian alliance; the affront to Persia was clear even if a major transfer of aid did not occur.

88. Cf. Strauss 1986, 137; Shannahan 2016, 16. Strouthas may have combined the office of karanos with satrapal authority (cf. Debord 1999, 254; Ruzicka 2012, 64). Keen 1988b, 93, suggests that Strouthas did not need a satrapal post as general, but Tod 1948, no. 113, 41–42, calls him “satrap of Ionia.” According to Theopompos FGrH 115 F 103.4, Autophradates was the Sardis satrap at this time, and so the king may have created a separate Ionian province for Strouthas (Meyer 1902, 251; Hornblower 1982, 37n11; Hornblower 1994, 77–78; Debord 1999, 254–56; Stylianou 1998, 533–34; Ruzicka 2012, 64), but the Theopompos fragment lacks context and may err on administrative terminology (Lewis 1977, 118–19175; Weiskopf 1989, 38–39). The title in the arbitration stele does not rule out Strouthas’s governance of Sardis or prove the existence of an Ionian satrapy; it might refer to a district within his wider jurisdiction, just as the Letoon trilingual (N320) calls Pixodaros satrap of Lycia in the Greek and Lycian versions but names Caria and Lycia in the Aramaic (cf. Klinkott 2005, 120–22).

89. Xen. Hell. 4.8.17.

90. A few scholars propose that Strouthas released Konon (Olmstead 1948, 390; Costa 1974, 52–53n82), but Nep. Con. 5.4 suggests Konon’s departure predated Strouthas’s arrival (Judeich 1892, 86n2; Barbieri 1955, 192). Contra Ruzicka 2012, 67, there was no Athenian fleet on the Ionian coast for Strouthas to subsidize, and there is no evidence that he sent money across the Aegean; the Corinthian fleet, which has been proposed as another recipient of Strouthas’s funding (Ruzicka 2012, 250n5), was inactive by late 392 and ceased to exist with Sparta’s capture of Lechaion in spring 391 (Xen. Hell. 4.4.19). Persia did not fund the Athenian
naval expeditions of 390; see Seager 1967, 111; Strauss 1986, 152, 167n5; Tuplin 1993, 81; Seager 1994, 113.

91. Strouthas may have arrived in early 391, assuming that it took at least six months for Tiribazos to travel to court and for his replacement to travel to Sardis (Meyer 1902, 251; Hamilton 1979, 256; Funke 1980, 94n81; Strauss 1986, 147n61; Fornis 2009, 209n29), but he could have come sooner if he started from a provincial location instead of court.

92. On the date see Tuplin 1983, 184.


95. Xen. Hell. 4.8.17; cf. Isoc. 4.144 (Tuplin 1983, 84; Tuplin 1993, 77).


97. Xen. Hell. 4.8.18–19; Diod. 14.99.3. Some scholars place Knidion near Knidos (Parke 1930, 69; Cook 1961a, 67–68; Debord 1999, 256n169), but this would mean the Spartans would have had to move more than 150 miles away from their original base; it was probably nearer to Ephesos (cf. Judeich 1892, 86n3). Alternatively, Diodorus may have misunderstood his source’s reference to a Spartan voyage to Knidos after having dropped off the new general to oversee Thibron’s survivors (cf. Xen. Hell. 4.8.21–22).


99. Tod 1948, no. 113, 15–31; cf. Kuhr 2007, 380. On the old Ionian League, see Hdt. 1.142–43; the members that do not appear are Priene, Kolophon, Teos, Phokaia, and Samos (but there is space for one more preceding Erythrai).

100. Tod 1948, no. 113, 9–10, 35–44.

101. Diod. 14.84.3; cf. Xen. Hell. 5.1.31.

102. SEG 26.1282, 11–14; see Debord 1999, 262; Sato 2006, 34–37. Brosius 2012, 160–61, reinterprets the key phrase, proposing that the city favored Persia due to Konon’s popularity and asked Athens’s permission to join the king, but this argument overlooks the role of local stasis (ll. 5–10) and the consequences of Konon’s arrest.

103. Alternatively, it is possible that Erythrai revolted against Persia in protest when Konon’s enemy Tiribazos was reappointed to command.


106. Xen. Hell. 4.8.22–23. Contra Cook 1961a, 68, it is doubtful that the Spartans retained Knidos or the ships that escaped there after the battle. For the chronology of 391–89, see Tuplin 1983, 183–84; Seager 1994, 112–16.


108. Diod. 14.98.3–4; Theopompos FGrH 115 F 103.4 specifies that Hekatomnos led the fleet while Autophradates served as general. For the date see Tuplin 1983, 178. Debord 1999, 258, proposes Kaunos as their port.


111. If the Egyptian campaign lasted from 392 to 390 (Cawkwell 2005, 162–63), Pharnabazos could have returned to Daskyleion in time for Thrasyboulos’s campaign; if it ran from 390 to 388 (Ruzicka 2012, 67), he might have left soon after Thrasyboulos’s arrival.
112. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.27, 31. For Persian toleration of Thrasyboulos's voyage, see Strauss 1984, 47; Urban 1991, 87; Tuplin 1993, 81; Asmonti 2015, 175; for counterarguments, see Funke 1980, 154–75; Hornblower 1994, 77. The Persians might have accepted activities at Byzantion that they deemed less appropriate on their own side of the water.

113. For Thrasyboulos’s resurrection of financial methods from the archē, see Cawkwell 1976b, 270. He stopped short, however, of full-fledged reclamation of Anatolian cities (Strauss 1986, 153–54).


115. Thuc. 8.31.2; Tod 1948, no. 114, 8–13.

116. Lys. 28.12, 17; cf. Debord 1999, 261. Hornblower 1982, 85–56, suggests that Hekatomnos of Caria did not obtain Halikarnassos until after the King's Peace, but in light of royal claims to all of the Anatolian poleis, he must have considered it under his jurisdiction.


119. For Thrasyboulos's resurrection of financial methods from the archē, see Cawkwell 1976b, 270. He stopped short, however, of full-fledged reclamation of Anatolian cities (Strauss 1986, 153–54).


124. Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31; cf. Diod. 14.110.2. Hamilton 1979, 313–14, argues that the king did not make peace with the Athenians because he had not been at war with them, but their alliances with Euagoras and Egypt suggest otherwise.

125. DNB §2b (Kuhrt 2007, 504).


127. For Klazomenai's value as a staging area for campaigns against Euagoras, see Ruzicka 1983, 105–8; Ruzicka 2012, 81–82. The Klazomenai decree of 387/86 stipulates that the Athenians plan to collect a tax but will refrain from sending a garrison (Tod 1948, no. 114, 7–8, 23–25). They may have claimed its technical autonomy, justifying extraction of funds while trying to placate the king (cf. Sato 2006, 29–33).


See Badian 1991, 41–42; Buckler 2003, 174. Some scholars have questioned the king's interest in enforcing the Greek peace and suggest that he deputized Sparta to do so instead (Cawkwell 1981, 77–78; Quass 1991, 49; for counterargument, see Lewis 1977, 147n80; Seager 1994, 118). Badian 1991, 37–39, doubts that the king would have sworn an oath alongside Greek participants, but this is implied by Tod 1948, no. 118; see Jehne 1994, 38–39.

Cf. DNa §4; DNB §2a; DSe §4. Hamilton 1979, 316, argues that autonomy “benefited Sparta far more than it did Persia,” but Artaxerxes increased his Greek support by adopting a popular Greek principle (Urban 1991, 108–9). Its application to all Greek poleis outside Asia, regardless of their involvement in the war, speaks to Persia’s universalizing ambitions (cf. Martin 1944, 23–24; Jehne 1994, 42–45).

Xen. Hell. 5.1.7.

Xen. Hell. 5.1.25–28. Urban 1991, 104–6, speculates that Tiribazos and Ariobarzanes acted without the king’s approval in aiding the Spartans, but demotion in 392 should have made Tiribazos more attentive to orders.

Xen. Hell. 5.1.30.

DB §7–8; DNa §3–4; DSe §3; XPh §3.

Cf. Waters 2014a, 188.


Conclusion

1. See Rutishauser, forthcoming.


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